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In this thesis I shall summarize and critically examine the 
central features of the theories of values of four contemporary moral 
philosophers: A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare, and P.H. Nowell - 
Smith. I shall first look back, however, to the theory of moral philo- 
sophy of the most influential 'forefather' of this group, David Hume. 
Hume's theory stands as a challenge to moral philosophers who would 
assume that moral judgments are primarily, in some sense, acts of 
'reason'. Although our four contemporaries follow Hume in this, his 
challenge, in the form I shall indicate shortly, will provide the main 
theme for this thesis. 
There are of course other important philosophers who have set 
forth theories similar to those I have chosen, and the names of Carnap, 
Schlick, Barnes, Findlay, and Urmson immediately come to mind. A larger 
effort than this would be remiss if it did not give them special atten- 
tion. 
The attempt to classify the philosophers in this tradition is 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein's example of the problem of defining the 
word "games", although in the case of our philosophers there is no 
single term which seems appropropriate to separate them from some other 
types of philosophers. Like the activities we call "games" our philo- 
sophers have similarities and dissimilarities, and yet there are enough 
similarities to suggest that they have 'family resemblances'.1 They do 
1wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part I, sec. 67, p. 32e. 
1 
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not suffer from the lack of an appropriate 'family name', so long as one 
keeps in mind their 'family resemblances'. 
To begin with, perhaps the most obvious resemblance is that the 
four contemporaries, following Hume, react against any suggestion that 
ethical statements are essentially or primarily 'cognitive', or acts of 
'reason', or acts of 'the mind'. They would oppose any assumption that 
man has an intellectual 'faculty' or capability that enables him to 'know' 
what is ethically right or wrong, good or bad. This does not of course 
mean that their theories preclude the possibility of a person's making 
moral judgments, but it does mean that any analysis of moral judgments 
will not single out a 'cognitive' factor as central or most important. 
The consequence of this is that many traditional theories of moral 
philosophy must necessarily be rejected. All theories of moral philo- 
sophy that are part of metaphysical theories must of course be 'eliminated'1 
since they would be dependent on an alleged special knowledge of 'reality', 
including 'moral reality'. Thus any theory traditionally classified in 
moral philosophy texts as "objectivist" must be abandoned since our philo- 
sophers would reject any suggestion that 'goodness' or 'rightness' are 
'qualities' or 'predicates' which have a reality independent of their 
being 'cognized' by any person. Among other metaphysical theories those 
labelled as "absolutist" have been especially designated for attack by 
our contemporary analysts in this study, no doubt because of the pre- 
dominance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century of neo- 
Hegelian 'absolutists' like T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, and Bernard 
1A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Ch. I; Cf., Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning; Human Understanding, last para., Sec. XII, Part III, p. 165. 
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Bosanquet. The 'anti- cognitivist' approach would of course reject any 
theory which has been traditionally termed "intuitionist " -- -any theory, 
that is, which postulates that moral judgments are in some way immediate 
intellectual acts or acts of 'intellectual intuition'. This is of course 
a wide category, and would include philosophers as unlike as G.E. Moore 
on the one hand, and Sir David Ross, and H.A. Prichard, on the other. 
These theories -- metaphysical, objectivist, absolutist, and 
intuitionist, however they are termed -- comprise almost all of the main 
classifications of theories in traditional moral philosophy. One main 
exception is that of 'subjectivist' theories. This is not to say that 
some or all of the moral philosophers in this study may simply be termed 
"subjectivist ". Professor Ayer, for example, specifically rejects a 
common type of 'subjectivist' analysis in Language. Truth, and Logic,' 
while postulating what he has termed a 'radical subjectivist' theory. 
In a later paper, however, as I shall indicate, he argues that the 
'subjectivist versus objectivist' antithesis is irrelevant in moral 
philosophy; and he is followed in this view by Nowell -Smith. Nevertheless, 
in a review of Hare's Language of Morals, Professor Braithwaite does not 
hesitate to term this type of approach "subjectivist ";2 and since he 
identifies himself with it he would not regard the word as a derogatory 
label as it appears to be when used by some 'objectivists'. Whatever 
they are appropriately termed, our contemporary moral philosophers are 
concerned to indicate, as we shall see, that their analyses do not warrant 
any suggestion that their theories are erected on 'shifting sands °. 
Their analyses are attempts to understand moral judgments and not to make 
them. 
1Op. cit., pp. 104 -5. 
R.B, Braithwaite, Mind, Vol. LXIII, 1954, P. 250. 
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In their rejection of most traditional theories our five philo- 
sophers might be termed "non- cognitivists ". The main objection to using 
this class -term, however, is that it is too broad. It is possible, that 
is, to think of a °non -cognitivist° analysis of ethical statements which 
would be quite unlike the analysis of any of the philosophers in this 
study. When Professor Macmurray, for example, wrote that "a judgment of 
value can never be intellectual in its origin "1, he was subscribing to 
what could be termed a non-cognitivist theory; but in other respects his 
views are quite unlike those of the philosophers I have chosen to study. 
In their respective analyses of ethical statements, as we shall see, our 
philosophers come close to being satisfactorily termed "emotivists ", and 
indeed, Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson may be so termed. Hare and Nowell - 
Smith, however, explicitly dissociate themselves from 'emotivism' (al- 
though, as I shall indicate, their views are much closer to 'emotivism° 
than they would wish). 
The four contemporaries, having had the advantage of a mass of 
writings in moral philosophy and logic since Hume's day, have more in 
common. In addition to opposing 'intuitionism' and 'absolutism', they 
are also opposed to 'naturalistic' theories, that is, theories which 
purport to translate the relevant ethical terms in ethical judgments 
into non -ethical or 'naturalistic' terms (to say, for example, that the 
word "good" is equivalent in meaning to the word "pleasure ", or to say 
that the 'logical behaviour' of ethical sentences is the same as that of 
'descriptive' or 'theoretical' sentences). There can be no translation, 
they insist, one way or the other: there is no equivalence of meaning 
1John Macmurray, Reason and motion, P. 37. 
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between an ethical term and a non -ethical term, or between an ethical 
statement and a 'descriptive' or 'theoretical' statement. And in saying 
this they are insisting on what has been called in recent times "the 
autonomy of morals ".1 At least in his prescriptions for the analysis of 
morals Hume is in agreement with our contemporaries in this; and perhaps 
the best example of this is the well -known passage in which he admonishes 
moral philosophers who argue from premisses containing the words "is" 
and "is not" to conclusions containing the words "ought" and "ought not ".2 
Of course it should be noted that absolutists and intuitionists, among 
most other contemporary philosophers, agree with Hume's prescription; 
and this agreement is evident in their seeking to avoid what has been 
termed (since G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica) the 'naturalistic fallacy'.3 
But apart from this, and an insistence upon the principles of logic, there 
are few other similarities between our 'emotivist' -like philosophers and 
any group which includes intuitionists and absolutists. 
There is a further, and extremely important 'family resemblance' 
which clearly separates our four contemporaries from traditional moral 
philosophers, including Hume. This feature is their method of doing 
philosophy -- -that is the method of 'logical analysis' imparted to us 
primarily by the work of 'the Vienna Circle', and by Wittgenstein. The 
wedding of this new influence with the tradition of Hume is succinctly 
expressed by Ayer in the following reference to 'the Vienna Circle': 
"So far as their positivism went they were continuing an old 
philosophical tradition - --it is remarkable how many of their 
most radical doctrines are already to be found in Hume. Their 
originality lay in their attempt to make it logically rigorous 
and in their use for the purpose of a developed and sophisticated 
logical technique." 
Nowell- Smith, Ethics, p. 36; also W.H. Walsh, "The Autonomy of 
Ethics" The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 26, 1957, pp. 1 -14. 
3Hume, Treatise, Book III, Part I, Sec. 1. 
3G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 10. 
4 Ayer, "The Vienna Circle ", in The Revolution in Philosophy, p. 73. 
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The manifestation of this new influence is well expressed in Hare's state- 
ment and guiding theme for his work The Language of Morals: "Ethics, as 
I conceive it, is the logical study of the language of morals."1 And 
that is the extent of their claims. Moral philosophy (indeed philosophy 
in general) is not a theory or a code one might expound, it is an activ- 
ity-- -the activity of the logical analysis of language. According to 
them, the philosopher who endeavours to search out and propound the 
'fundamental principle of morality', who seeks to 'know' the 'Good' or 
the 'Right' as if these words referred to characteristics or qualities 
of the world that could be intuitively known, or who sets forth a 'way 
of life', is engaging in the activity of the moralist and not that of 
the moral philosopher. As we shall see later, this new view of the role 
of the moral philosopher is not a creed without foundation, for, it is 
held, there are logical grounds for maintaining that the moral philosopher 
guá moral philosopher cannot be more than a logical analyst of the 
language of morals. This approach is clearly seen in the editorial 
foreword by A.J. Ayer to Nowell -Smith's Ethics: 
"There is a distinction, which is not always sufficiently marked 
between the activity of a moralist, who sets out to elaborate a 
moral code, or to encourage its observance, and that of a moral 
philosopher, whose concern is not primarily to make moral judg- 
ments but to analyse their nature. Mr. Nowell -Smith writes as 
a moral philosopher. He shows how ethical statements are related 
to, and how they differ from, statements of other typ2s, and 
what are the criteria which are appropriate to them." 
This view about the role of the moral philosopher has met and 
probably will continue to meet opposition. One would have thought that 
the fervor of this opposition would have lessened somewhat since the late 
'thirties, following the publication of Language, Truth, and Logis, when 
Hare, The Language of Morals, Preface, p.v. 
Op, cit. (The word "primarily" in this foreword is puzzling). 
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Sir David Ross wrote of Ayer's theory as an "attempt to discredit ethics ",1 
and Martin D'Arcy thanked Ayer "for having shown us how modern philosophers 
can fiddle and play tricks while the world burns. "2 As recently as 1955, 
however, a writer about moral philosophy, John L. Mothershead, Jr., 
quotes with approval C.I. Lewis's statement concerning the 'emotive theory'. 
"This," they would agree, "is one of the strangest aberrations ever to 
visit the mind of man. "3 it me say at once that, while recognizing the 
difficulties in early expressions of the 'emotive theory', my sympathies 
are more with the Ayer's than with the D'Arcy's and the Mothershead's. 
No doubt this kind of moral philosophy, if sound, is destructive of most 
traditional theories of moral philosophy; but if it is unsound it will 
only be revealed by a serious analysis and not by a reliance upon 
persuasion and propaganda. 
In saying that the four contemporary philosophers are philosophical 
or logical analysts and are thus in general agreement about the method 
of doing philosophy, I do not suggest that they are in agreement about 
particular doctrines. In particular, there is the same kind of range in 
theories of 'meaning' between Ayer and Nowell -Smith as may be found in 
the doctrines of Wittgenstein between the Tractatus and the Philosophical 
Investigations. There must necessarily be some differences between 
theories of values written under the assumption that (to state this point 
generally) 'the meaning of a statement is in its verification', and 
those written under the assumption that 'the meaning of a word is in 
its use'. This is not to say that a particular analysis of moral language 
is necessarily implied by a philosopher's epistemology. Professor Ayer, 
for example, has insisted that his "emotive analysis of ethical judgments" 
1W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 3$. 
2D'Arcy, "Philosophy Now ", in Criterion, 1936. 
3J.L. Mothershead, Jr., Ethics, p. 130. 
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can stand apart from his theory of knowledge and is "valid on its own 
account ".1 As I shall indicate, however, the theories of 'meaning' 
held by the philosophers in this study are important and do have an 
influence on their respective analyses. A secondary aim of this thesis 
will thus be to note the differences which appear to result from the 
ways in which the philosophers assume or incorporate in their theories 
different views about 'meaning'. 
Apart from the general similarities between our contemporaries and 
Hume, there is a special link between their theories which is of funda- 
mental importance to this thesis. As I have mentioned, Hume's analysis 
leads to an insistence upon the 'autonomy of morals'; but since value 
judgments are most often made after a consideration of what we generally 
term 'the facts' of a situation, and since when we are asked to explain 
or give 'reasons' for a value judgment we often respond with 'factual' - 
type statements, we must then consider what the relationship must be 
between 'factual reasons' and value judgments. Now each of our contempor- 
ary philosophers will be seen to have somewhat different views about this 
relationship. Ayer will be seen to accept without qualification that 
there is what Nowell -Smith has termed "Hume's gap "2 between factual 
statements and value judgments; and he follows Hume in allowing that the 
relationship is what might be referred to as psychological rather than 
logical. Stevenson, for the most part, accepts the "rough but useful 
rule...that ethical judgments are supported or attacked by reasons related 
to them psychologically, rather than logically ";3 but there are some 
exceptions, he admits, and it will be necessary to consider them. Hare 
and Nowell -Smith, however, would wish to dissociate themselves from the 
'Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, Preface to 2nd. Ed., p. 20. 
Nowell- Smith, Ethics, p. 40. 
'Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 115. 
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'psychological' emphasis of the 'emotivist' theories, and while Hare 
accepts that there is a gap and tries to bridge it by logic, Nowell- 
Smith tries to eliminate the gap altogether. Although the problem of 
'Home's gap' emerges most clearly when we consider the theories of Hare 
and Nowell -Smith, it may be taken as the underlying problem for this 
thesis. Can we assume, that is, that there has been a progression within 
this non -cognitivist tradition which begins by accepting ' Hume's gap' 
and ends by either bridging it or eliminating it; or must we conclude 
that Hume's challenge remains? 
CHAPTER I 
DAVID HUME (1711 -1776) 
Section 1 
Although there has been disagreement about the philosophic merits 
of the writings of David Hume, there can be no disagreement about the 
fact that these writings have had a profound effect on subsequent philo- 
sophers. Any philosopher who would assume that moral argument can proceed 
from factual statements to value judgments cannot ignore the challenge 
posed by Hume. He cannot be ignored especially by one who would study 
the writings of contemporary moral philosophers who believe that their 
proper role is that of being logical or philosophical analysts of the 
language of morals. It is not of course that he could be termed a logical 
or philosophical analyst, for these terms are applicable only to certain 
philosophers of the past several decades; but these philosophers, as we 
have already begun to see, give much credit to Hume for laying the ground- 
work for their development. In an editorial foreward to a recent book on 
Hume, for example, Professor Ayer wrote that "It is astonishing to find 
how much of what is thought to be distinctive in modern analytical 
philosophy was already foreshadowed in Hume's work."' And in the 
Preface to Ethics and Language, Professor Stevenson wrote: "Apart from 
lA.J. Ayer, Editorial Foreword to David Hume, by A.H. Basson. 
Cf., above, Introduction, p. 5. 
10 
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my emphasis on language, my approach is not dissimilar to that of Hume. "1 
These statements are typical of the credit given to Hume by contemporary 
philosophical analysts; and in this chapter my task will be to bring forth 
and examine the elements in his writings which have given rise to such 
credit. 
The reader of Hume's writings is immediately confronted with a 
problem concerning textual interpretation which must be considered before 
trying to assess his philosophy. In the "Advertisement" to his Enquiries 
(An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals), Hume requests that the reader should ignore his 
earlier work, the unsuccessful and at that time much vilified, A Treatise 
of Human Nature. Indeed he asserts with some feeling that he "never 
acknowledged" the Treatise2 (he had it published anonymously). "Hence- 
forth," he wrote, "the Author desires, that the following Pieces (i.e. 
the Enquiries) may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical 
sentiments and principles." Most of his interpreters, however, are agreed 
in ignoring his desire, and with good reason. Despite his success in 
presenting, in the later work, a more easily understood text, his young 
man's work, the Treatise, is generally acknowledged to be one of the 
great works in the history of philosophy. In any event, in what concerns 
us in this present study we need not worry unduly; for as Hume has 
acknowledged in the opening sentence of the same "Advertisement" to the 
Enquiries (surprisingly in view of its context), "Most of the principles, 
and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in 
2C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Preface, p. vii. 
Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I shall for the most part 
adopt the common practice of referring to his A Treatise of Human Nature 
as the Treatise, and I shall refer to the Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals as the Enquiry. When referring to the Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding I shall use the full title. 
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three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature..." Where there are 
significant differences between the two works in his treatment of these 
"principles" I shall try to note them. 
In considering Hume's moral philosophy I shall be mainly concerned 
with his arguments to 'prove' that moral judgments are not based on 
'reason', and his 'emotivist' analysis of ethical terms and statements. 
As I have indicated in my Introduction, it is this aspect of his work 
which most engages contemporary philosophers, even those, perhaps 
especially those, who are not in sympathy with him. Professor C.D. Broad, 
for example, in his chapter dealing with Hume in his Five Types of 
Ethical Theory, writes that "it will be best, in the case of Hume, to 
take first...the question of the meaning and analysis of ethical predicates 
and propositions."1 
Before considering Hume's analysis, however, it is useful to 
consider briefly his aims as a 'moral philosopher', and the methods he 
proposes to use. To avoid possible confusion, we might first consider 
what he means when he speaks of 'moral philosophy'. 
In the Introduction to his Treatise, he uses the phrase "moral 
philosophy" to contrast it with "natural philosophy ", and in this context 
the phrase has a much wider connotation than it generally has today. 
Where "natural philosophy" might be translated as "natural or physical 
science ", Hume translates the phrase "moral philosophy" as "the science 
of human nature ".2 This indeed is the subject of his A Treatise of Human 
Nature, and the full title of this work is worth emphasizing: "A 
AN I TU an ATTEMPT to introduce the e erimental 
Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS." The word "moral" as here used 
is synonymous with one of the uses of the word listed in the Oxford 
2C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. $5. 
Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, p. 5. 
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Dictionary, namely: "Used to designate the kind of probable evidence that 
rests on a knowledge of the general tendencies of human nature, or of the 
character of particular individuals or classes of men." In the Introduction 
to the Treatise Hume summarizes the subject areas which he proposes to ex- 
amine by means of his 'moral philosophy'. There are, he says, four "sciences, 
whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate" than the 
sciences of "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion ". These 
four are "Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics "; and within these sciences 
"is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be 
acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament 
of the human mind. "1 
"The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations 
of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and 
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider 
men as united in society, and dependent on each other. "2 
The science of 'morals' in this group of four 'sciences' indicates 
another, and more restricted use of the word "moral", which comes closer to 
our contemporary uses; but even this use is wider in connotation than it is 
in the phrase "moral philosophy" as used by most contemporary 'moral philo- 
sophers'. Hume's use of the word here would include what we would now des- 
cribe as the 'psychology and sociology of morals' in addition to 'moral 
philosophy' or the 'philosophy of ethics'. 
The word "moral" is used in even another sense by Hume, and this 
sense should be noted since we shall have occasion to refer to it later. In 
one context he contrasts 'moral reasoning' with 'demonstrative reasoning' 
"All reasonings," he writes, "may be divided into two kinds, namely, 
demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral 
reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. "3 As used in this 
ilntroduction to Treatise, p. xix, ff. 2Ibid. 
Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, p.35, Cf., p. 164. 
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context the word is synonymous with another listing in the Oxford Diction- 
ary, namely, "as applied to all evidence which is merely probable and not 
demonstrative." 
To avoid misunderstanding I shall use the phrase "moral philosophy" 
(unless I say otherwise) in one of the main senses in which it is generally 
understood today. Without at this point attempting to engage in an 
analysis of the word "philosophy ", which would of course require a 
prolegomena of great magnitude and difficulty, I assume that my use of 
the phrase will be understood, even if it sometimes provokes disagreement, 
when I say that it will be synonymous with "the philosophical or logical 
analysis of the language of morals ". And when I speak of Hume's 'moral 
philosophy' (unless I say otherwise) I shall be concerned primarily 
with what we would now term his analysis of ethical terms and statements. 
This is not to suggest that his explicit purpose as a moral 
philosopher was with such an analysis. Indeed, his analysis is subordinate 
to what he felt to be the purpose of moral philosophy. Like most philo- 
sophers before the present century, he felt no logical restrictions 
against stating that purpose. 
"The end of all moral speculations," he wrote, "is to teach us 
our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of 
vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and 
engage us to avoid one, and embrace the other. "l 
In entertaining such an aim, even in stating the purpose of moral philo- 
sophy, Hume is entering the realms of what we would now term the 
psychology and sociology of morals - --as well as failing to differentiate, 
as his followers would differentiate today, between the role of the 
moralist and that of the moral philosopher. 
Enquiry, p. 172 
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We have already seen that contemporary philosophers would insist on the 
latter distinction;) but, in addition, many contemporaries, especially 
most philosophical analysts, would oppose his engaging in empirical 
science - --not simply because his science is suspect, but simply because 
it is empirical science. As J.C. Urmson has written, the philosophical 
analyst would maintain that philosophy is not "a science alongside the 
natural sciences ", and "the philosopher does not make empirical state - 
ments."2 He goes on to say that, according to the philosophical analyst, 
"philosophy is...to be identified with analysis. Analysis is the one 
and only legitimate activity of philosophers." 
Far from avoiding empirical statements, or suggesting that philo- 
sophy is not a "science alongside the natural sciences ", Hume proposed 
that his philosophy should be the central science of all sciences. This 
central science was his "science of human nature ", or "the science of 
man ". All the sciences, he said, "even, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, 
and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of 
MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by 
their powers and faculties." In what he goes on to say he sets the 
task for his major philosophic writings: 
"'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we 
might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted 
with the extent and force of human understanding, and 
cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of 
the operations we perform in our reasonings. "3 
And the method Hume prescribes for his philosophy, as for all of science, 
is the empirical method. 
Hume had been greatly impressed by the successes of the empirical 
)Above, Introduction, p. 6. 
2J.0. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p. 116; cf., Nowell -Smith, 
Ethics,3p. 17. 
Treatise, p. xix, 
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method of modern science, as it had been applied by natural philosophers, 
especially Newton. 
"In Newton ", wrote Hume, "this island may boast of having 
produced the greatest and rarest genius that ever rose 
for the ornament and instruction of the species. Cautious 
in admitting no principles but such as were founded on 
experiment; but resolute toIadopt every such principle, 
however new or unusual...." 
But there had been a delay, he felt, in applying the empirical method 
to 'nnoral subjects ". He writes somewhat contemptuously of most of the 
writings of earlier and contemporary philosophers, referring to "the 
weak foundations of those systems, which have obtained the greatest 
credit... "2 
"Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced 
from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence 
in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the 
systems of the most eminent philosopher, and seem to have 
drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself." 
Some recent philosophers (he mentions Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, 
Hutcheson, and Butler) had "begun to put the science of man on a new 
footing ", but Hume obviously felt that this was barely a beginning. 
"In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human 
nature," he wrote, "we in effect propose a compleat system 
of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, 
and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. "4 
He was aware that the hope to apply the empirical method in "moral 
philosophy" (i.e. his "science of human nature ") would not be without 
difficulties; and he specifically mentions the problem that confronts 
all social scientists: that the object of investigation should be 
unaware that it is being investigated. He pointed out that if he were 
to try to investigate himself, in the same manner as he would have 
1Hume, History of England, as quoted by Kemp Smith in his The 
Philosoihy of David Hume , p 52. 
Treatise, p. xvii. 3Loc. cit. 4Ibid., p. xx. 
HUME 17 
investigated natural objects, this "reflection and premeditation would so 
disturb the operation of (his) hatural principles, as must render it 
impossible to form any just conclusion from the phaenomenon. "1 This 
problem no more deterred him, however, than it deters present -day 
psychologists and sociologists; and in the last part of his Introduction 
to the Treatise, he prescribes the method that we might expect him to 
follow: 
"We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science 
from a cautious observation of human life, and take them 
as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's 
behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. 
Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected 
and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, 
which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much 
2 superior in utility to any other of human comprehension. " 
Writing about this passage, Mr. Basson quite rightly points out that the 
word "experiments" is not used by Hume in the same sense in which it is 
generally used today. Of Hume's 'experiment', Basson writes the 
following: 
"(It)is a procedure all his own, and it is invariably introspective 
in character. There are observations of human behaviour, but 
they are not accounts of a particular man's behaviour in 
carefully specified circumstances. They are accounts of general 
features of human behaviour, which are in fact obvious to 
everybody. "3 
If Hume had consistently adhered to the empirical method he 
prescribed for his study of 'moral subjects', his philosophic writings 
would probably be of little more than historical interest to psychologists 
and sociologists, and certainly of lesser interest to philosophers. 
Fortunately for philosophy, however, he did not follow his own empiricist 
prescriptions; and this is perhaps not surprising since the task he set 
for himself- -that of explaining the principles of human nature --is a 
1Treatise, p. xxiii. 2Loc. cit.; cf., Enquiry, p. 174. 
3A.H. Basson, David Hume, pp. 19 -20. 
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logically and scientifically impossible task. Ironically, he clearly 
recognized this; 
"...If this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles 
should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will 
venture to affirm, that 'tis a defect common to it with all 
the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ 
ourselves..." 1 
18 
The effect of this approach was that he believed that man could make no 
claims to perfect knowledge; and in so many ways throughout his writings 
he insisted that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability. "2 In 
saying this Hume makes a break with one of the fundamental hopes of the 
philosophy and science that had preceded him. This was the hope of 
attaining perfection of knowledge, with mathematics as the model for all 
other branches of knowledge. Leibniz perhaps best expressed that hope 
when he suggested that man should aim to "find characters or signs 
appropriate to the expression of all our thoughts as definitely and as 
exactly as numbers are expressed by arithmetic or lines by geometrical 
analysis... "3 If this were possible, he felt, it would be possible to 
resolve differences of opinion by the invitation, "Let us calculate, 
Sir ". But Hume would distrust even the conclusions of mathematics. 
When applying the "certain and infallible" rules of the demonstrative 
sciences, he says, "our fallible and uncertain faculties are apt to de- 
part from them and fall into error. "4 (One must wonder at his use of 
the words "certain" and "infallible" in this context). Hume is explicit 
on this point. 
"There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician," he writes, "so 
expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any 
truth immediately upon discovery ok it, or regard it as 
anything, but a mere probability." 
1Treatise, p. xxii. 2Op. cit., p. 181. 
'Leibniz, On Method, Preface to the General Science, reprinted in 
The Age of Reason, Intro. and Comm. by Stuart Hampshire, p. 147. 
'Treatise,, p. 180. Cf.,Ayer, "Basic Propositions", from 
Philoso3hical Essays, p. 105. 
.Loc. cit., p. 180. 
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One might then have expected that in undertaking an assessment of the 
limits of the human understanding, Hume would have attempted to examine 
empirically all possible claims to knowledge with the limited hope of 
arriving at conclusions he would hold to be no more than probable. 
Nevertheless, in outlining his *mental geography ", delineating "the 
distinct parts and powers of the mind ",1 he asserted several important 
universal categorical propositions which could not be justified on 
empirical grounds - -- including the extremely important prescription 
we have just seen, "all knowledge resolves itself into probability ". 
We have earlier seen another such universal proposition, that "all 
reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reason- 
ing, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that 
concerning matter of fact and existence." Such statements could never 
be made on the basis of the empirical method, and yet, as we shall see, 
they are central to his philosophy, including, especially for us, his 
moral philosophy. 
Hume should have been aware of this difficulty, just as some 
of his present -day followers are aware of it when faced with the charge 
that the verification principle (their criterion for literal meaningful- 
ness of a statement) is not itself verifiable. He had said, after all, 
that "we can give no reason for our most general and most refined prin- 
ciples, beside our experience of their reality.... "2 This is, in effect, 
the same position now taken by some of those who rely on the verification 
principle, although they assert that the principle itself is not an 
empirical statement, and is arrived at on the basis of logical analysis. 
"Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 13. 
Treatise, Introduction, p. xxii. 
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Despite Hume's inconsistency, he had prescribed his criteria for mean- 
ingfulness and had challenged all claims to knowledge that could not 
be 'verified' in terms of his 'principles'. This is the same kind of 
approach adopted today by those who defend the verification principle. 
Professor Ayer has succinctly articulated this 'method of challenge', 
and his words might well refer to Hume's similar method: 
"It (the verification principle) purports to lay down the 
conditions which actually govern our acceptance, or indeed 
our understanding, of common sense and scientific statements 
which we take as describing the world 'in which we live and 
move and have our being'. This leaves it open to the meta - 
physician to reply that there may be other worlds besides 
the world of science and common sense, and that he makes it 
his business to explore them. But then the onus is on him 
to show by what criterion his statements are to be tysted: 
until he does this we do not know how to take them." 
In the same vein, after asserting, in effect, that every 'idea' (including, 
for example, the 'idea of God', whatever one's 'idea of God' is) is 
ultimately able to be traced back to sense experience, Hume had issued 
this challenge: 
"Those who would assert that this position is not universally 
true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy 
method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in 
their opinion, is not derived from this source. "2 
Hume does not, then, (nor can he) establish by empirical means 
his claims for the empirical method as the only legitimate method for 
acquiring 'knowledge'. Nevertheless, from the assumptions of his method 
he rejects all other systems of philosophy which are obviously not 
essentially empirical. 
Although he has said that Book III ( "Of Morals ") of the Treatise 
is "in some measure independent of the other two, and requires not that 
2Ayer, in Revolution in Philosophy, ed. G. Ryle, pp. 75 -6. 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 19. 
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the reader should enter into all the abstract reasonings contain'd in 
them ",1 his epistemological principles in Book I are of relevance to 
his moral philosophy in two ways. First, as we have seen they would 
preclude the possibility of any theory of moral philosophy based on an 
alleged special, metaphysical knowledge -- -any theory, that is, that is 
not essentially empirical. Perhaps the archetype for metaphysical 
theories of this kind, although Hume does not specifically say so, is 
the Platonic theory which sets as an ideal a special and perfect 'knowledge' 
or 'vision' of 'the Good'. The revelation of 'the Good', to be achieved 
by few, if any, 'philosopher- kings', and by no others, is the ultimate 
moment of perfection in knowledge. An important assumption of this 
theory is that with perfect knowledge a person could do no wrong. A 
corollary is that within such a theory it would not be possible to say 
that a person, while knowing what was right, willingly chose to act 
wrongly. If a person acted wrongly, or chose an evil end, it would be 
because he did not have perfect knowledge about the situation, From 
Hume's point of view any such theory is obviously suspect. Thus, in the 
development of his philosophy, at least in the order of its exposition, 
Hume's epistemological prescriptions clear the way for his moral philo- 
sophy by undermining the possibility of theories based on claims to meta- 
physical and religious knowledge. Later, in Books II and III, he 
specifically attacks such theories when he argues that 'reason' has no 
influence on actions and passions; but even before this attack, it must 
be noted, he has already gone a long way toward 'discrediting' most 
traditional theories of moral philosophy. 
His epistemological prescriptions are of relevance in a second 
1From the 'Advertisement' to Book III. 
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and more positive way. Although they lead to scepticism concerning any 
hopes of achieving perfect knowledge, they are a preparation for his 
postulating a theory of what Kemp Smith has termed "natural beliefs ", 
and this theory is compatible with and tends to corroborate his moral 
philosophy. All knowledge, he felt, in being no more than probable, 
is "of the same nature with that evidence, which we employ in common 
life... "1 What, then, was the nature of our 'common' reasoning? Hume's 
approach to this question belongs more appropriately to psychology than 
to philosophy. He generalizes about what in fact we seem to do. Despite 
our being unable to demonstrate, for example, that a 'cause' will be 
followed by an 'effect', our repeated experiences of perceiving a specific 
cause -effect relationship will 'produce' in us a 'belief' that the next 
appearance of the 'cause' will be followed by a specific 'effect'. From 
such observations he makes the following claim: 
"...all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd 
from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an 
act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our 
natures. "2 
And earlier in the Treatise, in a section entitled, "Of the causes of 
belief ", he had written the following: 
"Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sen- 
sation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow 
our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I 
am convinc'd of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes 
more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set 
of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide upon my 
feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects 
have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any 
other principle but custom operating from the imagination, 
that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to 
the existence of another. "3 
Here we see what may appropriately be termed an "emotivist theory of 
1^treatise, p. 181. 2Ibid., p. 183. 31bid., p. 103. 
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knowledge ". As Kemp Smith points out, Hume had reversed the traditional 
role of treason' and 'feeling', and it is this which is "truly distinctive" 
in his philosophy. 
1 
From his epistemological principles, and after 
having postulated his positive theory of knowledge (his 'emotivist' 
theory), his range of possibilities for a compatible theory of moral 
philosophy is of course extremely limited. It can come, then, as no 
surprise to one who follows Hume's exposition to read, subsequently, 
that "morality...is more properly felt than judg'd of... "2 
I have said that this can come as no surprise to the reader who 
follows Hume's exposition. Kemp Smith has effectively argued, however, 
that, influenced by Francis Hutcheson, Hume had been convinced of the 
correctness of his moral philosophy even before he undertook to write 
his epistemology. As Kemp Smith expressed it, "it was through the gate- 
way of morals that Hume entered into his philosophy, and that, as a con- 
sequence of this, Books II and III of the Treatise are in date of first 
composition prior to the working out of the doctrines dealt with in 
Book I. "3 This thesis is supported largely, however, by evidence 
external to the Treatise and the Enquiries, and, while interesting, it 
is of little relevance to this study. What is relevant is that, however 
he had arrived at it, Hume's theory of knowledge precludes the possibility 
of a ' cognitivist' theory of moral philosophy. 
Section 2 
Hume's epistemology, in itself, should have been a sufficient 
basis for his dismissing any 'cognitivist' analysis of ethical state- 
ments since, as we have seen, the acceptance of any claim to knowledge 
1Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, po Bff. 
2Treatise, p. 470 3Kemp Smith, Op. cit., p. vi. 
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is primarily dependent on the "sensitive" rather than on the "cogitative" 
parts of our nature. It should have been possible for him to plunge 
directly into the "positive aspect "1 of his moral philosophy with his 
'emotivist' analysis of ethical statements. However, in the first 
section of Book III ('Of Morals ") of the Treatise, he presses the 'negative 
aspect', a specific attack against theories of moral philosophy which 
assert that "moral distinctions" are "derived from reason ". The title 
of this section is, "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason." 
Now although he has said in the Advertisement to Book III that 
the Book is "in some measure independent of the other two ", it is 
readily apparent that at least Section I is not independent. His argu- 
ments to 'prove' that it is impossible "from reason alone, to distinguish 
between moral good and evil" are considerably dependent on his epistemology. 
Specifically, the reader must accept the very prescriptions with which 
Hume begins the Treatise (and like the prescriptions we have seen earlier,2 
by the way, these ones similarly cannot be derived and supported by the 
empirical method). In Book III he reiterates them. "It has been observed," 
he writes, "that nothing is ever present to the mind but its perceptions," 
and "perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds, viz., impressions 
and ideas. "3 He is in effect stipulating that the word "perceptions" 
is to be used for all possible experience: "all the actions of seeing, 
hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall under this denomina- 
tion". There would perhaps be nothing exceptionable about this were it 
not for another of his stipulations, namely, that if an alleged 'idea' 
is not to be dismissed as meaningless it must be traced back to some 
2Kemp Smith, Op. cit. p. 193. 
3 
Cf., p.19. Treatise, p. 456. 
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antecedent 'impression'. 
Teihen we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical 
term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too 
frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that 
supposed idea derived ? 1 
Hume's account of 'impressions' and 'ideas' is far from satisfactory, 
especially because of the debatable psychological language in which it 
is expressed, but the effect of what he writes is the empiricist's 
claim that all knowledge must be a posteriori, must come in and through 
sense experience; and as I have previously mentioned this would dis- 
credit much of traditional moral philosophy. Any claim to moral knowledge 
based, for example, on alleged 'a priori ideas', or whatever is intended 
by the phrase "pure reason ",2 must be considered meaningless. 
In the following passage, Hume clearly indicates the tradition he 
would oppose: 
"Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity 
to reason that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses 
of things, which are the same to every rational being that 
considers them; that the immutable measures of right and 
wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, 
but also on the Deity himself. All these systems concur 
in the opinion that morality, like truth, is discern'd 
merely by ideas, and by their juxtaposition and comparison."3 
Among such theories would be those which have since been listed in moral 
philosophy texts under the headings, "virtue is knowledge ", "objectivist ", 
"absolutist ", and "intuitionist ". 
Another related aspect of his epistemology which is carried over 
into Books II and III and which leads to the same conclusion as that in 
the preceding paragraph is seen in his use of the words "reason" and 
"reasoning ". In his arguments against cognitivist theories of moral 
philosophy he uses the words to denote the two kinds of reasoning which, 
quiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 22; cf., Treatise, pp.6-7. 
2Enguiry Concerning the Principles of Mal ors, p. 171. 
'Treatise, p. 456. 
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according to him, encompass the activities of 'reason'. (In Book I he 
tended to restrict the use of the word "reason" to only the first of 
these 'functions'). This stipulation of the use of the word "reason" 
as seen in Book II is as follows: 
"The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, 
as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it 
regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those 
relations of objects, of which experience only gives us 
information. "1 
And in Book III of the Treatise the relation of this epistemological 
assumption to his moral philosophy is clearly drawn.: 
"...were virtue discover'd by the understanding; it must 
be an object of one of these operations, nor is there any 
third operation of the understanding, which can discover it. "2 
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It was from this base in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that 
he issued one of his most often quoted challenges: 
"When we run over our libraries, persuaded of these principles, 
what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; 
of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, 
Does it contain any: abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it 
then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry 
and illusion. "3 
As I have mentioned earlier, this, like other prescriptions we have seen, 
cannot be derived from and supported by the empirical method; and yet 
Hume purports to have so derived them. Nevertheless, although his 
language in postulating this prescription tends to be psychological 
(moreso in the Treatise than in the Enquiry, as may be seen from comparing 
the two preceding quotations) there is a logical basis to what he says 
which makes it difficult to say that he is in error. If we analyse 
types of arguments in our language, arguments which we accept as in 
1Treatise, p. 413. 2lbid., p. 463. 
3Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 165. 
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some sense 'logical' and 'meaningful', we readily distinguish two basic 
methods, that is the deductive and inductive methods; and this is to 
arrive at the same conclusion which Hume purported to have arrived at 
through introspective psychology. Now to say that Hume is in error 
would necessitate accepting his challenge and indicating at least one 
other method of argument, or method of supporting propositions we would 
wish to assert. As we shall see shortly, there have been rationalist 
philosophers who would say that Hume's two categories of 'cognition' 
are restrictive and that there are more than two. In fact, all of the 
types of theories mentioned above ('virtue is knowledge', 'objectivist', 
'absolutist', and 'intuitionist') are dependent on claims to 'knowledge' 
or 'reasoning' that go beyond Hume's two categories. 
Among philosophers who have taken up this challenge, there is 
none more notable than Kant (the first important philosopher to appreciate 
Hume's greatness even while disagreeing with him). It was Hume's criti- 
cism of the concept of causality that, according to Kant, aroused him 
from his "dogmatic slumber ";1 and he recognized that Hume's criticism 
had wider implications.2 He accepted that the criticism would rule out 
the possibility of'bnalytic a priori propositions" in the sense in which 
this would have been accepted by the 'dogmatic rationalists'. As Kemp 
Smith puts it: 
"He was, and to the very last remained, in entire agreement 
with Hume's contention that the principle of causality is 
neither self -evident nor capable of logical demonstration, 
and he at once realised that what is true of this principle 
must also hold of all the other principles fundamental to 
science and philosophy. "3 
But Hume went further than Kant was prepared to go. Hume, in limiting 
2Kant, Prolegomena, p. S. 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 55; also Critique of Practical 
Reason, Abbott's transl., Sec. 167ff (pp. 140 -147). 
-Kemp Smith, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. xxvii. 
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'reason' to his two categories, would reject the notion of the 'synthetic 
a priori' altogether; whereas Kant felt that unless one could maintain 
that there is a kind of a priori knowledge, "there can be no moral philo- 
sophy at all. "1 Speaking of Kant's general concern for 'the a priori', 
Kemp Smith writes the following: 
"The fundamental presupposition upon which Kant's argument 
rests --a presupposition never itself investigated but always 
assumed --is that universality and necessity .cannot be reached 
by any process that is empirical in character." 
Thus for Kant the fundamental problem for moral philosophy (as for 
epistemology) as a result of Hume's criticism was the problem of 
establishing the possibility of "synthetic a priori propositions ".3 
Kant would allow that an ethical principle (such as, for example, "one 
ought not to murder "), like the so- called 'principle of causality', is 
neither self -evident nor capable of logical demonstration. In form it 
is like empirical statements, or, as Hume would say, statements about 
"Matters of fact and existence ". Such a statement, for Hume, must 
obviously be considered within the category of reasoning which he has 
called "probable reasoning ". Kant's task, then, was to show that moral 
principles, could in fact be 'universal' and 'necessary', or a priori. 
This, as Kant acknowledged in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 
is an exceedingly difficult task. "Nor have we here asserted the truth 
of this proposition," he writes, "much less pretended to have a proof 
of it in our power. "4 His attempt was, in effect, to assert the possi- 
bility of a type of reason which goes beyond the two categories 
prescribed by Hume. In brief, his arguments are inconclusive. Like 
Hume's they remain no more than persuasive. 
1Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. Paton, p. 58. 
Op. cit., p. xxi, -Kant, Groundwork, pp. 112 -3. 
Ibid, p. 112. 
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Despite Hume, and despite Kant's difficulties with Hume, there 
have been other moral philosophers who have shown little reluctance in 
setting forth theories which have depended on a third category of cog- 
nition. F.H. Bradley, for example, is another notable philosopher who 
would have bridled at the restriction. Outlining his special theory 
he had this to say: 
"That which tells us what in particular is right and wrong 
is not reflection but intuition. We know what is right 
in a particular case by what we may call an immediate 
judgment, or an intuitive subsumption.r1 
Bradley allows that "these phrases are perhaps not very luminous, and 
the matter of the 'intuitive understanding' in general doubtless difficult, 
and the special character of moral judgments not easy to define ". But 
whatever 'intuition' may be for him, it is (as he tells us in a footnote) 
"the opposite of 'reasoning' or 'explicit inferring' "; and although he 
would not object if the reader substitutes the words "perception" or 
"sense ", he insists that these be understood as not to exclude "the 
intellectual, the understanding, and its implicit judgments and infer- 
ences ".2 
In more recent times there have been other similar attempts to 
go beyond Hume's two categories. C.D. Broad, for example, specifically 
takes Hume to task in his Five Types of Ethical Theory. There, in the 
chapter devoted to Hume, Professor Broad postulates a third category 
which he calls "Formation of A Priori Concepts ".3 (By concerning himself 
in this chapter with only the En uir Concernin: the Princiles of Morals, 
1Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 193 -4. 
Note: When speaking of the reasoning that goes on in mathematics, 
Hume uses the phrase "intuitively or demonstratively certain ", but under 
no circumstances could he have accepted Bradley's use of the word 
"intuition" as referring to an "immediate, intellectual judgment" which 
tells us "what in particular is right and wrong ". Cf. Enquiry Concerning 
the Human Understanding, p. 34. 
3Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, pp. 105 -6. 
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he is able to say that Hume ignored the category "involved in what he calls 
'knowledge of the relations of ideas' ". But, as we have seen, and as 
Professor Broad acknowledges, Hume does not ignore this category of 
'cognition' in the Treatise). Professor Broad does not argue for his 
third "function of cognition" as a base for his subsequent criticism of 
Hume. There have been other intuitionist theories which, however 
different in some respects, ultimately postulate that 'rightness' or 
'goodness' are to be ascertained by acts of 'intellectual intuition';1 
but I have seen none that are conclusive, and none more persuasive than 
Hume's prescriptions to exclude them. Later, when considering what the 
contemporary moral philosophers in this study have to say about 'intuition- 
ism' and other cognitivist theories I shall have to treat this question 
further. For the present I wish merely to note what Hume would exclude. 
I may say, however, that in view of the inconclusive nature of Kant's 
attempt to establish 'synthetic a priori propositions', it would appear 
to be more profitable to criticize Hume on other grounds. 
A point to notice here, by the way, is that in the examples I 
have given of cognitivist philosophers who would object to Hume's 
delimiting the categories of 'cognition', the emphasis has been on 
'moral judgments', or the 'cognition' or 'discernment' of ethical 
'characters' or 'qualities', rather than on 'motives' to either actions 
or passions. The further question of whether the act of 'cognizing' 
moral 'rightness' or 'goodness' is in itself a motive to moral action 
is here left in abeyance. The question obviously is of considerable 
importance to some moral philosophers and seems inevitably to lead to 
the concern made manifest in papers written on the theme, "why should I 
1Cf., Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 170, and Carritt, The 
Theory of Morals, p. 123. 
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do my duty ?" One of the merits of Hume's approach is that, as will be 
evident, this awkward question need not be raised. 
Hume's first argument to dismiss cognitivist theories (Book III,I,I) 
may be paraphrased as follows: it is confirmed by common experience that 
men are often governed by their duties, deterred from some actions by the 
opinion of injustice and impelled to others by that of obligation; but, 
as he claims to have proved earlier --Book II, II,III -- reason alone cannot 
motivate or deter moral actions or passions. "Therefore ", he concludes, 
"the rules of morality...are not conclusions of our reason. "1 This 
argument is unsatisfactory, however, as may be seen by a consideration 
of the types of relationships between the terms of, first, the premisses, 
and then of the conclusion. In the premisses, when Hume speaks of our 
being deterred from some actions and impelled to others, and when he says 
that reason cannot motivate or deter moral actions and passions, the 
relationship between the terms is 'causal' or 'psychological'; but the 
relationship between the terms in the conclusion, however, is of a 
different type. Even if his argument were valid (which is questionable 
if stated in syllogistic form) the most Hume would have demonstrated is 
that reason does not motivate or cause the act of drawing or discerning 
'rules of morality' or 'moral distinctions'. The possibility would thus 
remain that reason is able to draw or discern or 'distinguish' the rules 
of morality or moral distinctions. There is some point, then, to the 
criticism of this argument made by D. Daiches Raphael, when he writes 
the following: 
"Even if Hume has proved his premiss, he has proved that reason 
is not the moral faculty only in the sense in which 'moral 
faculty' means the faculty moving us to moral action, not 
1Treatise, p. 457. 
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in the sense in which it means the faculty that discerns 
the morality of actions. Yet the question he is now supposed 
to be settling is whether right and wrong are 'discerned' or 
'distinguished' by reason ".1 
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There is more to Hume's argument, however, than this unsatisfactory 
syllogism. Underlying this and other arguments to dismiss cognitivist 
theories of moral philosophy is the very emotivist assumption he wishes 
later to 'prove', (an evident circularity here), namely, that 'moral 
distinctions' are 'impressions', specifically 'passions'.2 This had 
been made explicit earlier in Book II of the Treatise in the following 
passage: 
"The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanc'd to 
explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the 
origin of moral rights and obligations, is that from a 
primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, 
by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and 
others in like manner excite a pleasure. The uneasiness 
and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, 
but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a 
character is to feel an original deli ht u.on its a.earance. 
To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness. "3 
With this assumption that 'moral distinctions' are 'passions' and the 
premiss that reason has no influence over or does not "excite passions" 
(as "morals" do),4 Hume may have felt that he could conclude that reason 
has no influence over or does not motivate the 'passions' which he has 
designated as "moral distinctions ". Restating the argument in this way, 
a way which does no injustice to Hume, it would be possible to avoid 
Raphael's criticism. In other words, Hume may be interpreted as saying 
that a 'moral distinction' or 'moral judgment' is a passion; a simple, 
original, and complete 'impression' in itself, and whatever 'causes' it . 
to exist, and motivates it or influences it to be what it is, it is not 
2Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 49. 
3 Treatise, p. 470. (My underlining). 0p.cit., p. 296., 
4Treatise, p. 457. 
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'reason' that does so. 
This is not to suggest that the argument is without difficulty. 
Both of its premisses are open to challenge: first, that 'moral dis- 
tinctions' are 'passions' (in Hume's terminology, "impressions" rather 
than "ideas "); and, secondly, that 'reason' has no influence over 
'passions'. Now the first one, as I have suggested, takes us to the 
heart of his emotivist theory of moral philosophy. While his 'emotivist' 
analysis may be treated separately (I shall do so later), it is apparent 
that its strength is threatened (at least as he states it) if he fails 
to support the second premiss that "reason is perfectly inert, and can 
never either prevent or produce any action or affection. "1 This is his 
challenge: 
"As long as it is allow'd that reason has no influence on 
our passions and actions, he writes, "'tis vain to pretend,2 
that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason ". 
In his endeavour to support his premiss Hume uses three main 
arguments. In introducing the first of these he feels that he can 
quickly dismiss the possibility that "abstract or demonstrative" reasoning 
might ever motivate an action. 
"I believe it scarce will be asserted, that the first 
species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action. 
As its proper province is the world of ideas, and as the 
will always places us in that of realities, demonstration 
and volition seem upon that account, to be totally remov'd, 
from each other ".?3 
It should be noted that in this statement and in the argument that follows 
he concerns himself only with the motivation of actions and not of 
passions; later, however, he makes the transition in an argument which 
31b1d. p. 458. 
Treatise, p. 413. 
21bid., p. 457. 
HUME 34 
is acceptable if one accepts his use of the word "reason ". It is in the 
later argument that Hume wrote one of his most often quoted phrases: 
"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them. ,,l 
His meaning in this statement will become clearer as we proceed. 
In his first argument to 'prove' that 'reason' cannot be a 
motive to action, his example for 'demonstrative reasoning' is 'math- 
ematical reasoning'. while acknowledging that "mathematics, indeed, 
are useful in all mechanical operations, and arithmetic in almost every 
art and profession ",2 Hume maintains that such reasoning in itself does 
not cause any action. "Mechanics," on the other hand, is a separate 
activity, "the art of regulating the motions of bodies to some design'd 
end or purpose "; but, whatever else may be the causes or motivations to 
achieve such ends or purposes, it cannot be demonstrative reasoning. 
Hume suggests that if a merchant wishes to know the "sum total of his 
accounts with another person ", it is not "abstract or demonstrative 
reasoning" that motivates him to making the calculations, but rather the 
desire to pay his own debts, or to obtain money for marketing. Obviously, 
as Hume allows, such mathematical reasoning has an indirect influence, 
since the conclusions of one's calculations will have a bearing upon 
what one is then motivated to do. As he says, "abstract or demonstra- 
tive reasoning...never influences any of our actions, but only as it 
directs our judgment concerning causes and effects." Thus he quickly 
leads us away from further consideration of demonstrative reasoning into 
the consideration of "the second operation of the understanding ", that 
is, 'probable reasoning', or reasoning concerning causes and effects. 
llbid., p. 415. 2lbid, p. 413. 
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Can it be true that demonstrative reasoning can never be a motive 
to action? Of course when we ask this question in this way we commit 
ourselves to using Hume's methods of simple psychology (to set up a 
model, that is, of 'demonstrative reasoning' and to observe by simple 
observation whether or not it is a motive to action.) Such a procedure 
is of course a matter for the psychologist rather than the philosopher; 
however, it seems worth considering since it throws further light on an 
aspect of Hume's method. The first thing to be noted is that Hume in 
effect stipulates that the phrase "demonstrative reasoning" is not to be 
used to refer to premisses, conclusions, or 'steps' within mathematical 
or logical arguments. It is to be used only for what he terms "abstract 
relations of our ideas ", the 'transition', as it were, between the 
'steps' of an argument leading to a conclusion. Now if the phrase 
"demonstrative reasoning" is thus restricted in meaning it would be 
difficult to disagree with him. It is difficult to imagine how any 
'abstract relations of our ideas' could ever motivate an action. We 
might well ask, however, if he has not been arbitrary in thus stipulating 
how he wishes us to use the word "reason ". So long as we think only of 
his model of 'mathematical reasoning' it is difficult to avoid his con- 
clusions; but this it seems is partly because the 'objects' of such 
reasoning are highly abstract. It is possible, however, to conceive of 
an example of deductive reasoning in which a conclusion may be drawn 
which could motivate an action. Consider, for example, the following 
anecdote which is often quoted in logic texts as an example of the 
derivation of new information from two premisses: 
"While talking of his early experiences as a priest, an elderly 
abbi responded to the comment that the secrets of the confessional 
must often be of a kind disturbing to a young man, by admitting 
that it had indeed been so in his case, as the first confession 
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he ever heard was a confession of murder. Shortly after his 
departure his visit was mentioned to a later caller, a local 
proprietor and notability, who remarked that the abbe' and he 
were very old acquaintances. 'Indeed,' he added, 'I was the 
abbé's first penitent'. "1 
Now if the person who had been talking to the abbe and to the later caller 
happened to be the kind of person who felt duty -bound to report his con- 
clusion, one may well imagine how a conclusion of an instance of 'demon- 
strative reasoning' could motivate an action. Hume has said, however, 
that the 'objects' of demonstrative reasoning are 'ideas', and to say 
that we appear to react or to be motivated by 'ideas' would contradict 
his thesis, for part of his argument against reason as a motive is that 
we are motivated by 'impressions' and not 'ideas'. It may of course be 
argued that the conclusion in this example is an 'impression', and thus 
his thesis would not be contradicted; but, even so, it would be difficult 
to deny that the conclusion is an integral part of a case of 'demonstrative 
reasoning'. By what right, we may now ask, does Hume insist that the 
word "reason" should be used for only the 'relations' between such a 
conclusion and its preceding premisses? Would it be an unconventional 
stipulation of the use of language to say that the word "reason" may 
also be used to include premisses and conclusions, without which, it may 
be said, the word "relations" in this context would be incomprehensible? 
Obviously, as Mr. Basson points out, Hume's is not a "demonstrative 
proof ",2 but is rather a "persuasive" argument. If we accept the terms 
of his argument it is indeed persuasive, but if we challenge them it is 
less so, and indeed may be said to be unsatisfactory. 
In his next main argument to 'prove' that reason is not a motive 
to action, Hume is concerned with the second of his categories of reason, 
lAngus Sinclair, The Traditional Formal Logic, 5th Ed., p. 45. 
2Basson, David Hume, p. 90. 
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that is 'probable reasoning'. Like so many of his arguments, this one 
also is more appropriately in the realm of psychology. Furthermore, it 
is, again, introspective psychology and as such is liable to be opposed, 
with little hope of resolution, by those who interpret their intro- 
spective experience differently. Hume interprets his introspections 
in the following manner. From our past experience we know what will 
probably cause us pain and pleasure. Then, "when we have the prospect 
of pain or pleasure ", it is "obvious ", he says, that "we feel a con- 
sequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or 
embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction." 
"Tis also obvious," he continues, "that this emotion rests not 
here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends 
whatever objects are connected with its original one by the 
relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place 
to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning 
varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis 
evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, 
but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or 
pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object: and these emotions extend themselves to the causes 
and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by 
reason and experience. It can never in the least concern us 
to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, 
if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the 
objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never 
give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is 
nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its 
means that the objects are able to affect us.n1 
In this argument the word "reason" is again used to denote 
'relations', but whereas in 'demonstrative reasoning' Hume is interested 
in 'relations between ideas', in 'probable reasoning' he is concerned with 
'causal relations' between 'objects' which we term "causes" and "effects ". 
Here, as in the preceding argument, he is not primarily interested 
in the 'objects' in our reasoning, but rather with the 'transition' 
between the 'objects', or, in other words, 'causal relations'. "Reason ", 
'Treatise) p. 414. 
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as he says, (meaning in this case "probable reasoning ") "is nothing but 
the discovery" of the "connexion" between "causes" and "effects ". If 
we appear to be motivated by an argument, Hume would say that we are 
not motivated by the reasoning involved in the argument, but by the 
'objects' with which reasoning deals. If we accept that "reason is 
nothing but the discovery" of these causal relations, as in the argument 
for 'demonstrative reasoning', it is difficult not to agree with Hume 
that such reasoning cannot be said to motivate actions. But if Hume's 
use of the word "reason" in the earlier argument is unduly narrow, it is 
even moreso in this one, since in 'probable reasoning' we are dealing 
directly-with 'matters of fact and existence'; and what I have said 
about the first argument at least equally applies here. Can we not, 
that is, use the word "reason" to include the 'steps', especially the 
'conclusion' derived by our 'probable reasoning'? Like the argument 
about 'demonstrative reasoning', this one similarly is not conclusive. 
But even if one might say that Hume unduly restricted the use of the 
word "reason ", and that in some sense 'reasoning' (not necessarily 
synonymous with the word "reason ") might motivate 'actions', this would 
not necessarily undermine Hume's emotivist moral philosophy. This will 
become apparent as we proceed. The significant question, however we 
may appear to be motivated, is: can we say that our ethical statements 
may be given a cognitivist analysis? Hume, it seemed, was unduly 
frightened by the word "reason ". 
The third argument I wish to consider is the one which Hume 
obviously felt was of greatest importance since he chose to repeat it 
and amplify it in Book III of the Treatise ,l having postulated it first 
1Cf., Enquiry, p. 290. 
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in the section we have been considering in Book II. And it obviously is 
more important than the earlier ones since, as we shall see, it raises 
questions which are still crucial for moral philosophers. It is indeed 
in this argument that Hume poses the challenge which I have taken as 
the underlying problem for this thesis. This argument also is dependent 
on his epistemology, specifically on his assumptions limiting reason to 
'demonstrative reasoning' and 'probable reasoning'. He introduces the 
argument in Book III in the following manner: 
"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or 
falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either 
to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and 
matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible 
of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being 
1 
true or false, and can never be an object of our reason." 
The language in this quotation is perhaps a trifle unfortunate. One 
might speculate, for example, about his use of the word "real ".2 Hume's 
intentions are apparent, however, and if we were to state them in terms 
which would be more acceptable today we might say that "reason is con- 
cerned with validity and invalidity, and probable truth and probable 
falsehood; and any argument that cannot be considered either in terms 
of the principles of logic or axioms of mathematics, or in terms of 
accepted inductive procedures, cannot be said to be a concern of reason." 
Accepting that this is his intention we may continue with the next 
phase of his argument. 
"Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are 
not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and 
implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and 
actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced 
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable 
to reason."3 
1Treatise, p. 458. 
2Cf., Raphael, The Moral Sense, pp. 51 -2. 
"Treatise, p. 458. 
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In this passage, in saying that your passions, volitions, and actions" 
are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves ", Hume uses 
the language of the psychologist; but what he says here may be defended 
in terms of what he has previously said. Our "passions, volitions, and 
actions ", that is, are not susceptible of being tested or assessed by 
either logical norms or inductive procedures for either validity or 
probable truth. Whatever, then, might be our criteria for 'judging' 
them, he argues, we do not find such criteria within 'reason'. 
At this point he reinforces his argument with an analysis which 
should be familiar to all students of moral philosophy. "Actions," he 
writes, "do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor 
their blame from a contrariety to it...." This point is made more 
succinctly in the Enquiry when he writes, "Hence the great difference 
between a mistake of fact and one of right; and hence the reason why 
the one is commonly critical and not the other. "1 In the Treatise he 
goes on to say, "Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot 
be reasonable or unreasonable." (We remember of course that the words 
"reasonable" and "unreasonable" have reference only to 'demonstrative' 
and 'probable' reasoning.) And later in the same section in the Treatise 
he writes the following often- quoted passage: 
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, 
I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some 
time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and 
is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected 
with an ought or ought not. "2 
Mr. Basson says of this argument that it, like the earlier ones, is 
'Enquiry, p. 290. 2Treatise, p. 469. 
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"persuasive" and not "conclusive ",1 and this is so. Hume has not proved, 
that is, that ethical value statements may not be derived from factual 
statements. However, he has clearly set up a formidable challenge to 
those who would disagree with him. Whatever else he says, he clearly 
asserts that ethical value statements should not be considered as if 
they were like factual statements; and there would be few today who 
would disagree. Any philosopher who would maintain that there is a 
logical relationship between factual statements and value judgments must 
seriously consider Hume's challenge. 
Hume was of course aware that in our language we do speak of 
actions as being "reasonable" and "unreasonable "; but this, he felt, is 
no argument for saying that "moral distinctions are derived from reason ". 
"'Tis only in two senses," he writes, "that any affection may 
be called unreasonable. First, when a passion, such as hope 
or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the 
supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not 
exist. Secondly, when in exerting any passion in action, we 
chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive 
ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a 
passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses 
means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither 
justify nor condemn it. "2 
Then he goes on to write a sentence which must remain a scandal to all 
cognitivists: 
"Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the 
whole world to the scratching of my finger." 
If the word "reason" is restricted in its use to the two categories 
of 'cognition' stipulated by Hume, this could hardly be denied. Again, 
as we may see, a third category of cognition would have to be supported 
before one could conclusively say that Hume is misguided. 
'Op. cit., p. 102. 2Treatise, p. 416. 
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He goes on in the same passage to speak of another source of 
possible confusion which might lead some people to say that some of our 
actions and judgments are "determinations of reason ". 
"Reason ", he says, "exerts itself without producing any sen- 
sible emotion; and except in the more sublime disquisitions 
of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtilties of the schools, 
scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness." 
Thus, he says, there is a danger of supposing that some of our "calm" 
and "tranquil" passions are activities of "reason ". Among such "calm 
desires and tendencies ", Hume lists "benevolence and resentment, the 
love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, 
and aversion to evil ". Now Hume's language in this particular argument 
is, again, hopelessly in the realm of psychology, as is much of his 
language concerning 'impressions' and 'ideas'; and unfortunately it 
could lead to a reaction in the same kind of language. In his book on 
Hume, for example, D.G.C. MacNabb expresses some uneasiness over Hume's 
restrictive definition of 'reason', and he lists several categories of 
psychological experience which he would wish to include within his use 
of the word "reason ". 
"Now it seems to me," writes Mr. MacNabb, "that this tendency 
to judge impartially and in accordance with general rules, 
this tendency to avoid contradiction, disagreement and 
confusion, this aversion to the arbitrary, the personal and 
the subjective, is something which it is not improper to 
call 'reason'. "1 
After associating his suggestion with Kant by saying that "it is very 
like what Kant called practical reason, the subordination of our maxims 
to universal laws ", Mr. MacNabb then writes the following passage: 
"If it be once granted that his is a proper use of the 
term 'reason', then there is a form of reasoning with 
MacNabb, David Hume, p. 166. (My underlining.) 
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regard to which Hume's objections to the influence of reason 
on conduct and moral judgment are not intended to apply." 
Before he concludes his argument, Mr. MacNabb does grant that his differ- 
ence with Hume is "terminological" rather than one of "substance and 
fact "; and this is obvious when one considers the words which I have 
underlined in the above quotation. All of the key words may be said 
to be 'attitudinal' or 'emotive' rather than 'cognitive', and Hume 
would have had little difficulty in indicating that this opposition to 
his use of the word "reason" does not amount to a significant objection 
to his anti -cognitivist argument. 
These, then, are Hume's main arguments in the Treatise to prove 
that 'hnoral distinctions are not derived from reason ". As we have seen, 
they depend largely on his unproved epistemological assumptions, 
specifically on those asserting that there are only two categories of 
'cognition', namely 'demonstrative reasoning' and 'probable reasoning'. 
Thus some cognitivists, as we have seen earlier, would charge that Hume 
has bypassed the essential point. They could well agree with Hume, 
that is, in allowing that neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning 
could directly motivate moral judgments; but in insisting that there is 
a third category of 'cognition' they would insist that it is this cate- 
gory which allows us to 'intuit' the 'rightness' or 'goodness' of people 
and actions. But to defend this position, 'intellectual intuitionists' 
and other cognitivists must sooner or later face Kant's problem. They 
must assume, that is, that there are, in some sense, "synthetic a priori 
propositions ". And if Kant's arguments for the "synthetic a priori" 
may be taken as among the most cogent, as I believe they are, it may be 
said that for this position, as for Hume's, the arguments are less than 
conclusive -- -are, in fact, persuasive. Considering the challenges posed 
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by Hume, however, as well as the vagueness and difficulty of cognitivist 
arguments for 'the a priori', I find Hume's position generally more 
persuasive. 
The fact that arguments for a philosophic position are, in the 
end, no more than persuasive cannot be held against that position unless 
one is willing to give up the activity of philosophy. 
1 
To say, that is, 
that arguments for a philosophic position must be wholly conclusive or 
demonstrative would be to hold the assumption to which Leibniz, Spinoza, 
and other rationalists vainly aspired when they hoped to found philosophy 
on the model of mathematics, or the assumption of John Stuart Mill when 
he vainly aspired to establish an inductive logic which would give the 
same degree of 'certainty' as deductive logic. While arguments within 
a philosophic position may well be demonstrably valid (or invalid) the 
arguments in support of that position must ultimately fall short of being 
conclusive. Even if a philosopher says that his only appropriate activity 
is that of conducting a logical analysis of language, he cannot con- 
clusively demonstrate or prove that this is his only appropriate activity 
by means of the activity itself. If we are, then, to engage in the 
activity of philosophy, we must content ourselves with arguments which 
are, finally, no more than persuasive. This of course raises awkward 
questions about criteria for persuasiveness but at this point, fortunately, 
we need say no more than that Hume's challenge to those who would assume 
that there must be 'synthetic a priori propositions' remains an effective 
persuasive weapon against such a position, and thus, indirectly, a 
persuasive support for his more agnostic position. (I shall have to 
1Cf. A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 30, "...much 
philosophizing consists in persuasive work...." 
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return to this point when I consider what Stevenson says about persuasion.) 
Section 3 
Believing that he has effectively dealt with cognitivists, Hume 
now proceeds to the positive aspect of his moral philosophy, that is, 
the postulating of his emotivist theory. Hume had of course outlined 
his emotivist theory throughout his anti -cognitivist arguments, even 
before he directly introduced it in Section II ( "Moral distinctions 
deriv'd from a moral sense ") in Book III, Part I of the Treatise. The 
gist of his introduction of it, in the opening paragraph of Section II, 
is as follows: 
"...since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by 
reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means 
of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we 
are able to mark the difference betwixt them...the 
exclusion of the one is a convincing argument for the 
other. "1 
This argument, depending as it does on his preceding anti -cognitivist 
argument, cannot be said to be conclusive. But, as I have suggested, 
if the anti -cognitivist arguments are not conclusive, they are by no 
means without plausibility; and when they are rephrased in non - 
psychological language they constitute a severe challenge to any would - 
be cognitivist - --as Kant was willing to acknowledge. Restating Hume's 
position in language more appropriate to today, it might be said that he 
has asserted, in effect, that all cognitive statements must be expressed 
in terms either of logical relations or probability. But ethical 
statements cannot be said to fall in either of these categories; thus, 
unless cognitivists can demonstrate some third class of cognitive state- 
ments, ethical statements must be non -cognitive (or, as Hume says in 
1Treatise, p. 470. 
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effect, 'emotive'). With qualifications, as we shall see, contemporary 
'emotivists' use arguments similar to Hume's.1 
In setting forth his theory of moral philosophy Hume professes 
to be an empirical scientist, and thus, as we have so often seen, his 
language is more appropriate to the psychologist and the sociologist of 
morals. He was also, however, very much the moral philosopher, for not 
only does he suggest an analysis of ethical statements, but he also uses 
some of the methods of contemporary moral philosophy. For example, when 
he undertakes to "analyse that complication of mental qualities, which 
form what, in common life, we call Personal Merit ", one of his two main 
methods was what we now would call an analysis of the language of morals 
(the other method being of course his so- called "experimental method "). 
Here is what he says on this point: 
"The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in 
forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue 
possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense, 
and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the 
idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in 
collecting and arranging the estimable qualities of men." 
And a careful consideration of his writings will reveal that, to a 
significant extent, he does in fact rely on analyses of the language of 
morals.3 In what follows I shall be concerned with the main results of 
what I shall call his "analysis ". 
There are some differences of emphasis between what he says in the 
Treatise and what he says in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, but, fundamentally, his theory of moral philosophy is the same 
in each book. In each he lists the same catalogue of the "sources" of 
2cf., Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, p. 54. 
Enquiry, p, 174. 3Cf. , Enquiry, p. 272. 
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our moral "sentiments ", and stripped of its psychological language, what 
this amounts to is a classification of four categories of moral state- 
ments. They are as follows: those concerning that which is (1) useful 
to others, (2) useful to the person himself, (3) agreeable to others, 
and (4) agreeable to the person himself.1 Of greater importance is that, 
according to Hume, every ethical statement, however it is classified 
among these four groups, may be 'explained' in the same way. That is 
to say, he postulates the same, fundamental emotivist analysis for all 
ethical statements. This basic analysis, it is to be emphasized, is the 
same in both the Treatise and the Enquiry; and this is apparent when we 
compare the two following quotations, the first from the Treatise, and 
the second from the Enquiry: 
(1) "...when you pronounce any action or character to be 
vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitu- 
tion of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment 
of blame from the contemplation of it."2 
(2) "The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains 
that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines 
virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives 
to a s.ectator the leasin: sentiment of a..robation 
and vice the contrary." 
First, I should like to consider more fully what Hume means by these 
quotations. Later I shall have to consider qualifications which he 
would make to render his theory less 'subjective'. 
His emotivist theory is perhaps easiest understood if considered 
as analogous to the beliefs that many people would accept in their 
statements about works of art. Hume often uses the analogy with 
aesthetics in explaining his moral philosophy, and his language, even 
when it is not consciously drawing on the analogy, is perhaps best 
Treatise, pp 591; and Enquiry, Chs.,VI-IX, esp. 269n. 
'Treatise, p. 469; Cf., p. 475. 3quir.y, p. 289. 
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understood in such terms. Here, for example, is a phrase taken from a 
passage in the Treatise in which he is discussing 'justice'. 
"The approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not 
deriv'd from reason, or any comparison of ideas; but proceeds 
entirely from moral taste, and from certain sentiments of 
pleasure and disgust, which arise upon the contemplation 
and view of particular qualities or characters. "1 
He consciously draws upon the analogy in other passages, among which is 
the following passage from the Enquiry: 
"This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare 
moral beauty with natural, to which in many particulars it 
bears so near a resemblance....Euclid has fully explained 
all the qualities of the circle; but has not in any proposi- 
tion said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The 
beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any 
part of the line, whose parts are equally distant from a 
common centre. It is only the effect which that figure 
produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure 
renders it susceptible of such sentiments. In vain would 
you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your 
senses or by mathematical reasoning, in all the properties 
of that figure. "2 
And after citing the example of architecture which may appear to a 
spectator to be beautiful, he writes: 
"Till such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure 
of such particular dimensions and proportions: from his 
sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty. "3 
Following this 'analysis' of aesthetic judgments Hume concludes that 
moral judgments may similarly be analysed: 
"...crime or immorality," he writes, "is no particular fact 
or relation, which can be the object of the understanding, 
but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, 
which, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably 
feel on the apprehension of barbarity or treachery. "4 
Now of course many philosophers will not accept this analogy. D. Daiches 
Raphael, for example, has the following to say: 
1Treatise, p. 581. 2Enquir,y,, pp. 291-2. 31bid. 
41bid, p. 293; Cf., Treatise, p. 475. 
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"I must say before I go on that I am assuming, perhaps rashly, 
that Hume's elucidation of aesthetic statements is true, 
though I do not think a similar elucidation of moral state- 
ments is true. "1 
We must, then, consider what is involved in saying, as Hume says, that 
an ethical statement is "in many particulars" similar to aesthetic 
statements. 
Especially from the two quotations I have cited earlier,2 as well 
as from other passages in his writings, we may interpret him as saying 
that in making an ethical statement, such as "X is virtuous ", I signify 
or indicate or evince my feeling of moral approval for X. Later he 
elaborates this point. 
"To have the sense of virtue," he writes, "is nothing but to 
feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation 
of a character. The very feeling, constitutes our praise or 
admiration. "3 
Now, two points are to be noted in what Hume says. First, he cannot be 
interpreted as saying that the statement, "X is virtuous ", is equivalent 
in Oeaning to the statement, "I have a feeling of moral approval for X ". 
To repeat his point, when I make an ethical statement or pronouncement, 
"X is virtuous ", I indicate or signify or evince my feeling of moral 
approval for X, but I am not saying anything about this feeling. If the 
statement, "X is virtuous ",were said to be equivalent in meaning to the 
statement, "I have a feeling of moral approval for X ", this would be to 
say that ethical statements are in effect empirical statements about our 
feeling states, and this could be assessed in terms of the categories 
'probably true' or 'probably false'. As we have seen, however, in 
saying that morality is not a matter of reason, Hume emphatically makes 
the point about moral distinctions (or ethical statements) that it is 
2Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 78. 
3 Above, p.47. Treatise, p. 471 
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"impossible (that)...they can be pronounced either true or false, and be 
either contrary or conformable to reason. "1 The same distinction has 
been clearly made in our own time by Professor Ayer in the following 
passage: 
"The distinction between the expression of feeling and the 
assertion of feeling is complicated by the fact that the 
assertion that one has a feeling often accompanies the 
expression of that feeling, and is then, indeed a factor in 
the expression of that feeling. Thus I may simultaneously 
express boredom and say that I am bored, and in that case 
my utterance of the words, 'I am bored', is one of the 
circumstances which make it true to say that I am expressing 
boredom. But I can express boredom without actually saying 
that I am bored. I can express it by my tone and gestures, 
while making a statement about something wholly unconnected 
with it, or by an ejaculation, or without uttering any words 
at all. So that even if the assertion that one has a certain 
feeling always involves the expression of that feeling, the 
expression of a feeling assuredly does not always involve the 
assertion that one has it." 
The point of this distinction, so far as it concerns his own theory, is 
then made in the following passage: 
"And this is the important point to grasp in considering the 
distinction between our theory and the ordinary subjectivist 
theory. For whereas the subjectivist holds that ethical 
statements actually assert the existence of certain feelings, 
we hold that ethical statements are expressions and excitants 
of feeling which do not necessarily involve any assertions. "2 
Before discussing this first point I should like to mention the 
second which is related. From what Hume says, we would be in error if 
we said that, for him, the term "moral goodness" is equivalent in meaning 
to the term "pleasure ", and "moral badness" to "pain ". In part, the 
same distinction may be made as was noted in the preceding paragraph. 
That is to say, on any occasion when I make a statement in which I 
include an ethical value term, such as "good ", the term may serve only 
as an indication of my feeling of pleasure; but I may have the feeling 
top. Cit., p. 458. 
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of pleasure without using the term "good" at all. In part, also, Hume 
makes a distinction between types of 'pleasures', and on a number of 
occasions when he refers to the 'moral sentiment' he qualifies his 
references with some such phrase as "a particular kind ".1 He also 
mentions that "the good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but 
may still command our esteem and respect. "2 Such a 'feeling' may be 
51 
distinguished in practice, he suggests, from 'non -moral feelings', in 
the same manner as we might distinguish between the aesthetic (pleasant) 
feelings we might have for our enemy's fine voice, and our personal 
(painful) feelings for the enemy himself. For Hume, then, a value term, 
such as "good ", like the value statement of which it is a part, may 
signify or evince a feeling of 'pleasure of a particular kind'; but, to 
repeat, the term "good" is not equivalent in meaning either to the term 
"pleasure" or to the phrase "pleasure of a particular kind ". 
An obvious question arises in any consideration of this theory. 
When one person says of an ethical action or situation or agent, "X is 
right ", and another says, "No, X is wrong ", are they simply evincing or 
indicating their respective and different feelings about X? If what I 
have said so far about Hume's theory is sound this would follow. Does 
not this, then, amount to saying, as one so often says in disagreement 
about works of art, "Everyone to his own taste "? This, also, follows. 
Is there any point then in discussing ethical situations further, after 
different spectators have offered their different statements? To this, 
Hume would reply that there is; and in his reply, first, he would amplify 
the analysis we have been discussing, and, secondly, he would make a 
1Cf., quotation on page 49 above. 
2Treatise, p, 472. 
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sociological amendment to his analysis which, as I have suggested earlier, 
has the effect of making his analysis of ethical statements appear to be 
'subjective' - --and his general theory less consistent. 
Both in the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume allows for speculation 
about ethical situations, but he is of course insistent that when we do 
speculate about such situations we attend to matters of 'fact' and not 
of 'right'.1 He is explicit nonetheless in allowing that such specula- 
tions about matters of 'fact' may and do lead to changes of our ethical 
feelings (hence also our ethical statements about the situation). As 
we have seen earlier, he was prepared to say the following: 
"The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; 
and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and 
beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage ùs 
to avoid the one, and embrace the other.i2 
This would be meaningless, however, unless man is by nature so constituted 
that he will react approvingly or disapprovingly to ethical situations; 
and on this point Hume goes on to make the following sociological pro- 
position. (This, by the way, is not the sociological statement which, 
as I have suggested, would lead to amending his analysis; however, as 
we shall see shortly, it is a step in that direction): 
"The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters 
and actions amiable or odious, praise -worthy or blameable... 
that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes 
virtue our happiness, and vice our misery...depends on some 
internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in 
the whole species. "3 
With this as an underlying assumption Hume may allow for speculation 
about matters of fact and existence which may lead to an altering of 
our moral feelings. Here is what he says: 
"...in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a 
Enquiry, p. 290, Cf. Treatise, pp.3116&45$ 
20p. cit., p. 172 Enquiry, pp. 172-3. 
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proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary we 
find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions 
be made, just conclusions drawn, distinct comparisons formed, 
complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and 
ascertained....In many orders of beauty, particularly those 
of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, 
in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may 
frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There 
are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much 
of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our 
intellectual faculties in order to give it a suitable influence 
on the human mind. "1 
Now if we took Hume no further than this we could allow for 
speculation about moral situations without any necessary agreement; 
but, in the preceding passage I have underlined key words which suggest 
that Hume is assuming that there are criteria, or, to use his own words 
from the same context, "general principles ", which may lead disputants 
to the point at which there may be an agreement in their ethical feelings, 
and, further, that such "general principles" are in some sense "right ", 
"proper ", "correct ", and not "false ". This, ultimately, is indeed the 
conclusion to which Hume is led both in the Treatise and the Enquiry 
(although his treatment varies somewhat in each book). It is unnecessary 
to examine his arguments in detail. It is sufficient to say that, 
especially through an examination of the concept of "justice ", he was 
led to assert that there are occasions when our initial feelings might 
not be beneficial to our society, but that, through "public praise and 
blame...(and) private education and instruction" our "esteem for justice" 
may be increased.2 Ultimately, in both books, it is this 'utilitarian' 
concern which becomes dominant. In the Treatise he undertakes to 
provide what amounts to a psychological and sociological explanation 
for the fact that man does make ethical statements approving what is 
llbid., (my underlining), Cf. Treatise, pp. 500, 577, 581 -555, 61$. 
2Treatise, p. 500. 
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agreeable and of utility value to others, and his explanation, finally, 
is that there is a "principle" of "sympathy" which is "the chief source 
of moral distinctions ".1 But in the Enquiry, as Kemp Smith points out, 
Hume gives up the "psychological- mechanistic explanation" of the "source 
of moral distinctions" and contents himself with saying that we simply 
have to accept that "everything, which contributes to the happiness of 
society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good -will. 
Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of 
morality..." In a revealing footnote Hume writes the following: 
"It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why 
we have humanity or a fellow -feeling with others. It is 
sufficient that this is experienced to be a principle in 
human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of 
causes; and there are, in every science, some general 
principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any prin- 
ciple more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to 
the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural 
tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. It is not 
probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles 
more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been 
made to that purpose ".2 
If Hume had been content simply to say that through an analysis of 
morals it is apparent that most people seem to evaluate utilitarian 
concerns as being more praiseworthy than concerns of self- interest, his 
theory would have subsequently faced less philosophic criticism, although 
it might well have been subject to the criticism of sociologists of 
morals. He appeared to want to say more, however, for not only does he 
suggest that the principle of utility is the chief or most important 
principle of morals, but, also, it is a general or universal principle 
shared by all or most men. One of the most succinct expressions of this 
thesis is apparent in the following passage from the Enquiry: 
1 
20p.cit,, p. 618; Cf., pp 576-7. 
Enquiry, p. 219n. 
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"The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all man- 
kind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, 
and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion 
or decision concerning it. "l 
With such a general principle of "humanity ", Hume could hope that well - 
intentioned men might be able to reach what would be termed an "agree- 
ment in feeling states" about specific moral actions and agents (and 
thus an 'agreement' in the ethical statements which signify such feeling 
states). This point should be remembered, for, as we shall see, it has 
certain similarities with Professor Stevenson's theory. 
The analysis of ethical statements in Hume's amended and less 
subjective theory would have to be different from the analysis suggested 
earlier. When I now make the statement, "X is virtuous ", this would 
signify that I have a feeling of moral approval for X, and all or most 
other people would similarly have feelings of moral approval for X. 
Some commentators2 assume too readily, I believe, that from Hume's 
qualified theory, the ethical statement, "X is virtuous ",could be 
analysed as being equivalent to the empirical statement, "All or most 
men would have feelings of approval for X ". But this certainly does 
not accord with Hume's intentions, since both in the Treatise and the 
Enquiry, as I have indicated earlier,3 the basis of all ethical state- 
ments is an individual "spectator's" feelings of approval or disapproval. 
It is often difficult to interpret Hume, but there can be no doubt about 
this point. Fundamentally, for him, morality is a matter of taste, and 
an individual's only 'guides' are his own feelings. Hume's amendment 
appears to be rather a sociological supplement to his radical subject- 
ivism, a support, as it were, based on the empirical generalization that, 
Enquiry, p. 272. Cf., Treatise, p. 547n. 
2See: D.D. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 76; C.D. Broad, Five 
Types of Ethical Theory, p. 85; A.H. Basson, David Hume, pp. 103 -104. 
3Above, p.47. 
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as he believed, all or most men seem to 'agree' in their ethical behaviour, 
But the amendment simply complicates that analysis, for the amended 
analysis is obviously inconsistent within itself. I simply cannot say, 
that is, that the statement, "X is virtuous ",would signify that I have 
a feeling or moral approval for X, and all or most other people would 
similarly have feelings of approval for X. The difficulty is of course 
that I am aware that my ethical 'feelings' at any moment simply do not 
always accord with what is generally approved. Hume himself points out 
that my current ethical feelings (thus, ethical statements) are subject 
to "correction" (although possibly they are 'right' and the feelings of 
all or most others are in need of 'correction'). In any event, I cannot 
rely upon my feelings to be guides for what is approved by "all or most 
people ", or, to limit it further, for what is generally approved in my 
own 'society'. Hume's proposed amendment cannot then be said to be a 
fair representation of the language of morals. 
As I have said in the preceding paragraph, the analysis most 
often assumed for the amended theory is that the ethical statement, 
"X is virtuous ",is equivalent to the proposition that all or most men 
would have feelings of moral approval for X. This, as I have said, is 
a dubious interpretation of Hume; but even if it were a fair interpreta- 
tion it would not help the theory. The difficulty, at least for Hume's 
theory, is that the statement, "All or most people would have feelings 
of moral approval for X ",is an empirical statement, the kind that would 
be tested, if it could be tested, by a sociologist -cum -psychologist. 
Disputes about ethical situations should then be able to be decided, at 
least in principle, by an empirical investigation, the results of which 
would be asserted in the form of probability statements, or, to use 
Hume's language, in terms of "probable reasoning ". This, however, as 
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we remember, is the second and more important of the uses of the word 
"reason" which Hume was so concerned to reject when he argued that "moral 
distinctions are not derived from reason ". The analysis would be a 
contradiction of the thesis that it is "impossible that moral distinctions 
can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or con- 
formable to reason ". To point out this inconsistency, however, amounts 
to no more than an argumentum ad hominem; but lest it be suggested 
that the amended theory is preferable to the radical subjectivism (which, 
as I maintain, is his fundamental theory) it should be pointed out that 
it does not avoid serious difficulties, even with the dubious analysis 
which is admittedly preferable to the suggested analysis in the preceding 
paragraph. 
Ironically, Professor Ayer indicates the difficulties of Hume's 
amended theory when, in defense of his own "radical subjectivism ",1 
(which is nót dissimilar to Hume's theory before being amended), he 
rejects another and more common form of subjectivism. His point (again 
ironically) is much the same point that was made by Hume in the well- 
known passage in which he rejected ethical theories which begin with 
'is -type' propositions but conclude with 'ought -type' propositions. 
Professor Ayer explains his position as follows: 
"...what we are denying is that the suggested reduction of 
ethical to non -ethical statements is consistent with the 
conventions of our actual language. That is, we reject 
utilitarianism and subjectivism, not as proposals to re- 
place our existing ethical notions by new ones, but as 
analyses of our existing ethical notions. Our contention 
is simply that, in our language, sentences which contain 
normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences 
which express psychological propositions, or indeed empirical 
propositions of any kind.r2 
lAyer, Language, Truth, and Logic, p. 109. 
2lbid., p. 105. 
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Thus, in the paragraph preceding this explanation, Professor Ayer had 
written the following: 
"We reject the subjectivist view that to call an action right, 
or a thing good, is to say that it is generally approved of, 
because it is not self- contradictory to assert that some 
actions which are generally approved of are not right, or 
that some things which are generally approved of are not good. "1 
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Hume, above all, would have to agree with this criticism, since, as I 
have mentioned earlier, he must allow that there will be occasions when 
I say "X is virtuous ", while being aware that X is not generally approved 
of. 
From these considerations it is apparent that the amendments to 
Hume's analysis of ethical statements unnecessarily complicate his 
theory. I would suggest, then, that his strongest position is the 
'radical subjectivist -emotivist' theory which is fundamental to his 
philosophy. From this position, to recapitulate, the ethical statement, 
"X is virtuoust,indicates or signifies or evinces my feeling of moral 
approval for X. The statement, "X is virtuous ",is not equivalent in 
meaning, however, to the empirical statement, "I have a feeling of moral 
approval for X." Nor can it be said of his theory that the relevant 
value word in any ethical statement is equivalent in meaning to the 
word "pleasure ", even though the relevant ethical value word might be 
said to indicate or evince a 'pleasant feeling of a particular kind'. 
Despite the elements of psychology and sociology which persist in his 
theory, Hume at his most consistent cannot be interpreted as saying that 
ethical statements are equivalent to empirical statements, nor that 
ethical value words are equivalent in meaning to words describing feeling 
states. He was quite clear, then, in insisting upon what in our day has 
llbid., p. 104. 
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been termed the "autonomy of morals ". Thus his radical subjectivist 
theory would avoid some obvious objections from those, like Professor 
Ayer, who argue that a lack of autonomy in the language of morals leads 
to contradictions. 
A persistent weakness of Hume's radical subjectivist theory, 
however, is that it is inevitably tied to language which is unnecessarily 
psychological. Even in saying that the statement, "x is virtuous ", 
indicates or signifies a 'feeling' of moral approval, we are in some 
way relating ethical statements, through introspective psychology, to 
our 'feelings'. This inevitably leads to the psychological -sociological 
observation (which Hume foresaw) that feelings are "very variable ", and 
that "we sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons 
remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our 
countrymen, than with foreigners. "1 One might have expected, then, that 
Hume would have said that we might neither approve nor disapprove of 
ethical behaviour which does not directly affect us. Obviously such a 
theory would not accord with the language of morals, and of course Hume 
was far too astute to ignore the point, as the following passage indicates: 
"But notwithstanding the variations of our sympathy, we give 
the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China 
as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend 
2 themselves equally to the esteem of the judicious spectator. " 
How, then, can Hume support his theory? 
He attempts to explain the apparent difficulty by saying that 
through our experience of moral intercourse we begin to realize that it 
would be impossible ever to "converse together on any reasonable terms, 
were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear 
1Treatise, pp. 580-1. 2lbid., p. 581. 
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from his peculiar point of view." But his subsequent explanation is 
unconvincing. His central point is as follows: 
"In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, 
and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on 
some steady and general points of view; and always in our 
thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present 
situation. "1 
The difficulty is that, as a support for his psychological premiss 
relating ethical statements to feelings, Hume is compelled to rely on 
further empirical evidence (the evidence, by the way, appears to be 
somewhat like present -day psychological theories of empathy). Thus he 
subjects his position to further attack from any other psychologist who 
would similarly use empirical data which appears to be different. This 
is apparent, for example, in the following psychological criticism of 
Hume's argument by Dr. Raphael: 
"It is not conceivable how a real sentiment can ever arise 
from a known imaginary sentiment; especially when our real 
sentiment is still kept in view, and is often acknowledged 
to be entirely distinct from the imaginary, and even some- 
times opposite to it. I now feel completely indifferent to 
Verres, and know it. Yet, Hume tells me, when I judge Verres 
to have been a villain, I am so deceived by my imagination 
that I talk as if I felt a strong feeling of anger. "2 
The psychological base to Hume's theory is a fundamental flaw, and there 
is no way of getting around it. While saying this, however, we should 
of course give credit to Hume for so clearly suggesting the point of 
this criticism -- -that is, that ethical statements are different in kind 
from factual statements. This weakness in Hume's theory, along with 
his logical prescriptions to avoid the weakness, are extremely suggestive, 
and there is a lesson here for subsequent philosophers. Nowell -Smith, 
for example, after considering and agreeing with the objection raised 
llbid., p. 581. 2Raphael, The Moral Sense., p. 91. 
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by Raphael, goes on to write the following: 
"...the Moral Sense School were, I think, mistaken in con- 
struing moral approval and disapproval as feelings, since 
this suggests too strongly the analogy with itches, aches, 
and tickles. But they were right to connect moral appraisals 
and verdicts with approval and disapproval. "1 
The point of this suggestion will become clearer in subsequent chapters 
when we consider moral philosophers (including of course Nowell -Smith) who, 
gua moral philosophers, are logical analysts of the language of morals, 
and who strive not to confuse their roles with that of psychologists 
and sociologists. For the present, however, I shall briefly indicate 
the type of analysis to which Hume's arguments point. 
Following Hume's logical prescriptions, and using his radical 
subjectivist analysis minus its psychology, we would have a theory similar 
to current theories postulated by logical analysts. In a revised Humean 
theory, the ethical statement, "X is virtuous ", indicates or signifies my 
moral approval for X. The psychological explanation of such moral approval, 
however, is no business of the philosopher guá philosopher; and of course 
there are many behaviourist psychologists today who say that ga attempt 
at introspective psychology, even by psychologists, is misguided. The 
fact remains that an examination of our language indicates that we do 
morally approve and disapprove of agents and actions. But our language 
also indicates more. Negatively, a logical analysis of language indicates 
that ethical statements, whatever they are, are different from empirical 
statements and principles of logic and mathematics. Furthermore, such an 
analysis does not indicate any other kind of 'cognitive' statements; 
thus, as Hume said, there is no point in assuming that the 'basis' of 
1P.H. Nowell -Smith, Ethics, p. 177. 
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ethical statements is 'pure reason', 'intellectual intuition', or any 
other suggested 'cognitive faculty'. Hume's fundamental challenge to 
the synthetic a priori remains, and until it is overcome there is no point 
assuming more than we have a right to assume. 
There are of course objections to this type of theory; but such 
objections have been considered by present -day followers of Hume, and 
since the revised theory is more appropriate to today, I shall consider 
the objections in subsequent chapters. I shall also consider qualifica- 
tions which would be made by contemporary logical analysts of the language 
of morals. Perhaps even at this point we may begin to see what Professor 
Ayer meant, when he wrote: 
"It is astonishing to find how much of what is thought to be 
distinctive in modern analytical philosophy was already 





Professor Ayer begins the First Edition of Language, Truth, and 
Logic (published in 1936) with the following sentence: 
"The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from 
the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are 
themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley 
and David Hume." 
Although his debt to Hume is, I believe, paramount, the separate but not 
dissimilar influences of the early Wittgenstein and the philosophers of 
'the Vienna Circle' distinguish the writings of Ayer from earlier moral 
philosophers. Ayer himself has written elsewhere1 that in their positiv- 
ism philosophers of 'the Vienna Circle' (and what he says of them in this 
context equally applies to himself) were simply continuing an old philo- 
sophical tradition -- -the tradition established primarily by Hume. But 
their more rigorous application of logical techniques led to what might 
well be said to be a novel conception of the aim of philosophy. This 
conception, in brief, is that philosophy is not a set of doctrines or a 
'way of life', but is an activity -- -the activity of the logical analysis 
of language. In looking at the writings of Ayer, as compared with those 
of Hume, we shall thus see some definite differences as well as some 
similarities. 
Considering differences first, we will remember that, for Hume, 
1See above, p. 5. 
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philosophy should be an empirical science, and his aim, if not always his 
practice, was to "glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
observation of human life...."1 And as we have seen, many of the problems 
which arise in studying his writings have to do with his tendency to 
assume the role of the psychologist and the sociologist. Ayer, on the 
other hand, although most decidedly empirical in temperament and approach, 
is nevertheless careful to try to avoid being an empirical scientist in 
his philosophical activities. This distinction is clearly made by him 
in the opening paragraph of his book The Problem of Knowledge. In the 
section entitled "The method of philosophy" he writes as follows: 
"The proof of a philosophical statement is not, or only very 
seldom, like the proof of a mathematical statement; it does 
not normally consist in formal demonstration. Neither is it 
like the proof of a statement in any of the descriptive 
sciences. Philosophical theories are not tested by observa- 
tion. r2 
In addition to distinguishing between the respective roles of the 
empirical scientist and the philosopher, Ayer is concerned also to dis- 
tinguish between the roles of the moralist and the moral philosopher.3 
To make such a distinction is not of course the prerogative of the philo- 
sophical analyst, since any contemporary philosopher with an analytic 
temperament would probably make the same distinction. G.E. Moore made 
this distinction, for example,` and his intention was to be concerned 
primarily with the meaning of general value words, especially the word 
"good ". Nevertheless, he posed as "the fundamental question of Ethics-- - 
the question: 'What things are goods or ends in themselves ?'.!5 Ayer 
would not ask such a question. The task of the philosopher who designates 
1Treatise, p. xxiii. 2Op. cit., p. 17. 3Above, p. 6. 
oore, Principia Ethica, Ch. I; and Ethics, p. 7. 
5Principia Ethica, p. 181. 
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himself as a "philosophical analyst" is, as Ayer expressed it, to 
"confine himself to works of clarification and analysis.... "1 The 
focus now, rather than including a concern for psychological and 
sociological data, and rather than asking and often begging moralistic 
questions, is confined to the logical analysis of language. Thus we 
have book titles such as Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic, Stevenson's 
Ethics and Language., and Hare's The Language of Morals. This is not to 
say, however, that earlier philosophers were in no way concerned with 
the analysis of language, for, as we have seen,2 Hume often uses methods 
which are similar to those of the contemporary philosophical analyst. 
Ayer, in fact, makes a point of saying that "the majority of those who 
are commonly supposed to have been great philosophers were primarily 
not metaphysicians but analysts ";3 and, referring to Hume, he has this 
to say: 
"It is true that Hume does not, so far as I know, actually 
put forward any view concerning the nature of philosophical 
propositions themselves, but those of his works which are 
commonly accounted philosophical are, apart from certain 
passages which deal with questions of psychology, works of 
analysis."4 
Nevertheless, the explicit and exclusive concern for the analysis of 
language among many contemporary philosophers is a new emphasis in the 
history of philosophy. Thus this difference between Hume and his follow- 
ers is immediately apparent when one undertakes to assess contemporary 
writings. On the other hand, there is a remarkable similarity in the 
empiricist temperament of Hume and his present -day followers. This is 
especially apparent when one reads Language, Truth, and Logic. 
1LTL, p. 51. 2Above, Ch. I, p. 46. 
3LTL, p. 52. 4Ibid.s p. 54. 
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Ayer is most like Hume in his positivistic, anti- metaphysical 
theory of knowledge. This is most succinctly expressed in the second 
and subsequent sentences in the Preface to the First Edition of Language, 
Truth, and Logic: 
"Like Hume, I divide all genuine propositions into two classes: 
those which, in his terminology, concern 'relations of ideas', 
and those which concern 'matters of fact'. The former class 
comprises the a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, 
and these I allow to be necessary and certain only because they 
are analytic. That is, I maintain that the reason why these 
propositions cannot be confuted in experience is that they do 
not make any assertion about the empirical world, but simply 
record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion. 
Propositions concerning empirical matters of fact, on the other 
hand, I hold to be hypotheses, which can be probable but never 
certain." 
From this position Ayer rejects metaphysics, including theories of moral 
philosophy dependent on metaphysics. If a "putative proposition" does 
not satisfy his epistemological criteria, he suggests, "it is metaphysical, 
and...being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally 
senseless." He continues: 
"It will be found that much of what ordinarily passes for 
philosophy is metaphysical according to this criterion, 
and, in particular, that it cannot be significantly 
asserted that there is a non -empirical world of values, 
or that men have immortal souls, or that there is a tran- 
scendent God." 
These passages are highly reminiscent of Hume, and, in a later passage, 
in a context concerned with the rejection of metaphysics, Ayer recalls 
Hume's "commit it then to the flames" passage.1 
"What is this," writes Ayer, "but a rhetorical version of our 
own thesis that a sentence which does not express either a 
formally true proposition or an empirical hypothesis is 
devoid of literal significance ? 2 
After 'rejecting' metaphysics, and after ruling out what might be called 
1 
Above, Ch. I, p. 26. 2LTL, p. 54. 
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the weaker metaphysics of the Kantian support for the possibility of 
'synthetic a priori propositions' (in his chapter on The A Priori "), 
it is not surprising, then, that in his chapter entitled, "Critique of 
Ethics and Theology ", Ayer should not even concern himself with most of 
the traditional metaphysical theories (one significant exception, that 
of some of the theories dependent on claims to what has been termed 
"intellectual intuition ", must be noted for later consideration). 
So far as this thesis is concerned, the most important likeness 
to be noted between Ayer and Hume is Ayer's acceptance of an 'emotive 
theory of values' which is strikingly similar to Hume's. This is not 
to suggest that Ayer might not have been influenced by his contemporaries. 
It would appear indeed that the 'emotive theory of values' was 'in the 
air', so to speak, about that time. In 1923 Ogden and Richards had 
published their book, The Meaning of Meaning, in which they had elabo- 
rated an emotive theory of values similar to Ayer's. Then, in 1934, 
Professor W.H.F. Barnes had published a statement in "Analysis" which 
expressed, in germ, the same kind of emotivist theory which Ayer was 
shortly to expound. In 1935, from a somewhat different approach, 
Professor John Macmurray, in his Reason and Emotion, wrote that "for 
the determination of values we are dependent on our emotions...or those 
of someone else....A judgment of value can never be intellectual in its 
origin."' All of these writings and others, as well as those of C.L. 
Stevenson, who was to publish his first paper on the subject in 1937, 
may be said to be indebted to Hume. 
Although in the Introduction to the Second Edition of Language, 
Truth, and Logic (published in 1947), Ayer is concerned to emphasize 
1John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 36 -7. 
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that what he has termed his "emotive analysis of ethical judgments" will 
stand independently of his positivist epistemology and is "valid on its 
own account ", his acknowledgment of indebtedness to Hume applies as much 
to his emotivist analysis as it does to his epistemology. Obviously his 
theory of values should be logically consistent with his epistemology, 
but Ayer maintains that the emotive theory he postulates "is not the only 
theory that would have satisfied this requirement." Nhile I shall indicate 
shortly that his version of the emotivist theory will point up the limita- 
tions of the 'verificationist' epistemology, what is of relevance at 
present is that among possible theories which he felt might be consistent 
with his epistemology he chose an emotivist analysis; and this analysis 
closely resembles the analysis which I have proposed in the previous 
chapter as being the logical outcome of Hume's prescriptions. Ayer's 
analysis, it must be noted, goes through some modifications in expression 
from its first statement in Language, Truth, and Logic, through the 
Introduction to its Second Edition, and, then, in his paper "On the 
Analysis of Moral Judgements ", published in 1949. In this latter work, 
in fact, he allows that his manner of stating his early analysis is an 
"over -simplification "1. Despite these modifications, however, the 
account has not significantly deviated from its first statement; thus 
I shall look to the early version first, noting later modifications when 
it is relevant to do so. 
The general plan for the remainder of this chapter will be as 
follows: Section 2: further consideration of the relationship between 
Ayer's theory of knowledge and his moral philosophy; Section 3: the 
'negative' phase of his analysis in which he rejects 'naturalistic' 
1Op. cit., in Philosophical Essays, p. 238. 
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and 'intuitionist' theories; Section 4: the introduction to the emotive 
theory in its initial expression (ethical statements are "mere pseudo - 
concepts"), and later modifications; Section 5; the positive statement 
of the emotive theory, and later modifications; and Section 6: a con- 
sideration of criticisms of the theory. 
Section 2 
In the Introduction to the Second Edition of Language, Truth, and 
Logic, Ayer points out that the emotive theory of values which he had 
developed in the first edition "has provoked a fair amount of criticism ". 
But this criticism, he suggests, "has been directed more often against 
the positivistic principles on which the theory has been assumed to 
depend than against the theory itself. "1 It is then that he makes the 
point, noted earlier, that his emotivist theory of values can stand 
independently of his positivist epistemology. 
"Consequently," he writes, "even if it could be shown that 
these other statements were invalid, this would not in itself 
refute the emotive analysis of ethical judgments; and in fact 
I believe this analysis to be valid on its own account. "2 
One might argue that a different theory of knowledge could logically per- 
mit a different analysis of ethical statements, and in that sense the 
epistemology compatible with, although not necessarily entailing, an 
ethical theory is important. For example, if one could effectively 
argue for the possibility of 'synthetic a priori propositions', in a 
general theory of knowledge, one might postulate some kind of 'cognitivist' 
theory of values. Nevertheless, so long as we are prepared to say that 
value statements are used in a different way from analytic and empirical 
statements, (and I am not prepared to suggest any other possibility), we 
1LTL p. 20. In a footnote Ayer cites the criticism by Sir David 
Ross in Foundations of Ethics, pp. 30 -41. 
2Ibid. 
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may say that an attack on an epistemological theory is not necessarily an 
attack on a theory of values which is compatible with the epistemology. And 
while we may grant, as Ayer himself has readily acknowledged, that there are 
problems confronting anyone who would try to uphold the early versions of 
'logical positivism', this does not necessarily entail that there are problems 
for his emotivist analysis of ethical judgments (even if, in fact, there 
are). Nevertheless, as we shall see, the effort to make a sharp distinction 
between his epistemology and moral philosophy is often severely strained. 
This is apparent, for example, in his assumption that analytic and empirical 
statements are, so to speak, first -class citizens of language as compared 
with value judgments or any other sentences which cannot, in principle, 
pass the 'verification' test. And this assumption will be seen to lead 
to more serious difficulties; for if the verification principle is accepted 
as the only test for 'meaningfulness', and if value sentences are thus 
said to be 'meaningless', then one must face the charge that such sentences 
as "Stealing money is right" and "Stealing money is not right" are not 
contradictory. It is nonsensical, that is, to say that 'meaningless' 
sentences are either not contradictory or contradictory. This is a 
charge which later disturbs Ayer, and, as I shall indicate, in his being 
compelled to allow that ethical judgments are in some sense meaningful, 
and that they may be said to be contradictory, he should modify more 
than simply the manner of expressing his emotivist analysis. In modifying 
his analysis, that is, he must at least implicitly acknowledge the 
limitations of the 'verificationist' theory of meaning -- -that is to say, 
it may be logically misleading to assume that the 'verification principle' 
should be able to be used for testing statements other than analytic and 
empirical statements. It may be argued therefore that the relations 
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between his epistemology and moral philosophy are much closer than he 
would wish to admit. Nonetheless, my concern in this work will be 
primarily with his emotive theory of values, and I shall treat it, so 
far as is possible, as if it were independent of his epistemology. 
If Ayer's radical empiricist theory excludes at the outset the 
possibility of saying that value statements are literally significant 
propositions, why, we must ask, does he concern himself with values at 
all? Ayer's concern, as is apparent in the opening paragraph of his 
chapter, "Critique of Ethics and Theology ", is to take account of the 
objection against him that statements of value, while not being empirical 
hypotheses, are nevertheless "genuine synthetic propositions ". Obviously 
some account of them is demanded of the logical analyst of the language 
of morals. If statements of value are held to be "genuine synthetic 
propositions ", he is faced with the implication that "the existence of 
ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative knowledge presents an 
insuperable objection to (his) radical empiricist thesis." He must, 
then, give an "account of 'judgments of value' which is both satisfactory 
in itself and consistent with (his) general empiricist principles. "1 
If statements of value are neither analytic nor empirical 
probability statements, and if, as according to Ayer, they are not 
"genuine synthetic propositions ", what are they? Ayer's answer, at least 
in the first expression of it, is that "they are not in the literal sense 
significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither 
true nor false. "2 (He goes on to say that, although he will speak in 
this context of ethical 'statements', what he has to say about them "will 
be found to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of aesthetic statements 
1LTL., p. 102 2LTL, p. 103 
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also ".) Later he makes an important qualification when he writes that 
not only do ethical ' statements' serve as "expressions ", but they are 
also "excitants" of feeling. "They are calculated also to arouse feeling," 
he says, "and so to stimulate action. "1 This, then, is the basis for his 
emotive theory of values. 
Section 3 
Before elaborating on this theory, Ayer is concerned to get rid 
of the only types of theories of moral philosophy which could possibly be 
considered as worthy to be rivals. To begin with, there are those 
theories which would reduce "the whole sphere of ethical terms to non - 
ethical terms." The question he faces is: can "statements of ethical 
value...be translated into statements of empirical fact "? Among moral 
philosophers who would respond in the affirmative are those, he suggests, 
who have been termed "subjectivists ", and "utilitarians ". 
"For the utilitarian defines the rightness of actions, and the 
goodness of ends, in terms of the pleasure, or happiness, or 
satisfaction, to which they give rise; the subjectivist, in 
terms of the feelings of approval which a certain person, or 
group of people, has towards them. Each of these types of 
definition makes moral judgments into a sub -class of psychological 
or sociological judgments.... "2 
One would suppose that if any theory of this nature could be upheld it 
would be appealing to a radical empiricist, and, indeed, Ayer allows 
that the possibility is "very attractive" to him. The reason is obvious. 
"For, if either (theory) was correct ", he writes, "it would follow 
that ethical assertions were not generically different from the 
factual assertions which are ordinarily contrasted with them; 
and the account which we have already given of empirical hypoth- 
eses would apply to them also. "3 
Any moral philosopher prescribing such a possibility, however, 
would have to face a considerable body of philosophic arguments to the 
1LTL, pp. 10$-110. 2LTL, p. 104. 31bid. 
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contrary. Hume, we remember, was concerned to argue against the logic of 
theories which began in terms of 'is' statements, and, in some manner, 
concluded with 'ought' statements. Defenders of 'the a priori' in any 
form would similarly argue that there can be no translation of ethical 
statements to non -ethical statements, or vice versa. Kant, for example, 
thought it was "a matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a 
pure moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be 
empirical and appropriate to anthropology. "1 And in 1903, G.E. Moore, 
in his F inctpia Ethica, introduced to philosophy the phrase "the 
naturalistic fallacy "2 to apply to theories which, in effect, tried to 
define the word "good" in non- ethical terms. He said, indeed, that 
"good" is indefinable in any terms. 
Ayer, in turn, rejects any attempt to postulate a 'naturalistic' 
theory, and in stating his grounds he relies on an analysis of the con- 
ventions of language. First he considers a form of what he calls the 
"subjectivist view" in which "to call an action right or a thing good, 
is to say that it is generally approved of." Now within the conventions 
of our language we "assert that some actions which are generally approved 
of are not right, or that some things which are generally approved of are 
not good "; and in making such assertions we allow that we are not being 
self -contradictory. Within our conventional usage of language, then, 
we imply that there can be no translation of the terms "right" or "good" 
into the phrase "generally approved of ". The same kind of argument is 
used against what Ayer terms "the alternative subjectivist view that a 
man who asserts that a certain action is right, or that a certain thing 
is good, is saying that he himself approves of it." And his ground for 
2Kant, Groundwork (Paton), p. 57. 
G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 10. 
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rejecting this view is that "a man who confessed that he sometimes approved 
of what was bad or wrong would not be contradicting himself." A similar 
argument, he says, "is fatal to utilitarianism ". That is to say, there 
would be nothing self -contradictory about the assertion that "it is some- 
times wrong to perform the action which would actually or probably cause 
the greatest happiness, or the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, 
or of satisfied over unsatisfied desire ". This kind of argument, as Mary 
Warnock points out, 
1 
is different from G.E. Moore's treatment of 'the 
naturalistic fallacy'. Moore's point, as Mrs. Warnock puts it, is that 
supposing one asserts that the word "good" may be defined in terms of 
something else, say 'pleasure', one can always intelligibly ask, "Is 
pleasure good ?" The implication, as for Ayer's analysis, is that the 
terms are not equivalent. 
In outlining Ayer's rejection of 'naturalistic' theories, I have 
stressed that his argument is dependent upon his interpretation of con- 
ventions of our language. The implication is that if linguistic conven- 
tions were different his argument would be different. Ayer recognizes 
this dependence in the following passage: 
"...we are not, of course, denying that it is possible to invent 
a language in which all ethical symbols are definable in non - 
ethical terms, or even that it is desirable to invent such a 
language and adopt it in place of our own; what we are denying 
is that the suggested reduction of ethical to non -ethical 
statements is consistent with the conventions of our language. 
That is, we reject utilitarianism and subjectivism, not as 
proposals to replace our existing ethical notions by new ones, 
but as analyses of our existing ethical notions. Our contention 
is simply that, in our language, sentences which contain normative 
ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences which express 
psychologirgal propositions, or indeed empirical propositions of 
any kind." 
To argue in this manner, with the emphasis on the conventions of our 
1Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, p. 87. 
2LTL, p. 105. 
AYER 75 
language, rather than usage or purposes, is now generally recognized, 
at least among philosophical analysts, to be a questionable procedure; 
and, as we shall see more clearly later, Ayer would now be among the 
first to admit it. The problem, as he acknowledges later, is that "very 
often...the old, the socially correct, way of speaking is logically 
misleading. "1 It could be argued, for example, that it was probably 
through a reliance on the subject- predicate linguistic conventions of 
our language that 'objectivists' were led to postulate non -natural 
predicates or qualities for people and actions designated as 'good'. 
In view of such a consideration, Ayer now admits that, far from adhering 
to a 'conventional' use of language in the initial expression of his 
theory, he was in effect recommending a new convention -- -that he was, in 
other words, unconventional. While he would thus have to restate his 
theory (in the manner which I shall later indicate), the main point of 
his argument against 'naturalistic' theories need not be lost ---even 
though it is now without support. His point, that is, is that "sentences 
which contain normative ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences 
which express psychological propositions, or indeed empirical proposi- 
tions of any kind." With more emphasis on the 'use' or 'purpose' of 
ethical language, rather than on linguistic conventions, this point may 
be more readily made; although, as will be apparent in this and subsequent 
chapters, not without some difficulty. 
After rejecting 'naturalistic' theories, Ayer must face one other 
traditional type of ethical theory which, if acceptable, would, as he 
says, "undermine the whole of (his)...main argument." He introduces the 
question in the following manner: 
"In admitting that normative ethical concepts are irreducible 
1Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ", in Philosophical 
Essays, p. 232. 
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to empirical concepts, we seem to be leaving the way clear for 
the 'absolutist' view of ethics -- -that is, the view that state- 
ments of value are not controlled by observation, as ordinary 
empirical propositions are, but only by a mysterious 'intellectual 
intuition'.nl 
Since the key phrase here is "intellectual intuition ", and since this 
would include a wider group of theories than does the word "absolutist" 
(which tends to be used to refer primarily to Hegelians and neo- Hegelians 
such as Bradley and Bosanquet) I shall use the word "intuitionist" in 
this context. This has the merit of including G.E. Moore who would seem 
inappropriately classified as an 'absolutist'. The crux of the problem 
for Ayer is that in this main rival theory, ethical 'statements', although 
empirically unverifiable, are nevertheless held to be 'genuine synthetic 
propositions'. If such a theory is acceptable, then his radical empiricist 
theory of knowledge is unacceptable. 
In Language, Truth, and Logic he does not clash 'head -on' with 
intuitionism, but rather fights a 'running battle'. Allowing that an 
acceptance of intuitionism will undermine his radical empiricism, he says 
that he will "meet the difficulty by showing that the correct treatment 
of ethical statements is afforded" by his emotive analysis, "which is 
wholly compatible with (his)...radical empiricism. "2 Before beginning 
to expound his own analysis, however, he pauses briefly to point out a 
feature of intuitionism "which is seldom recognized by its advocates ", 
and this feature is "that it makes statements of value unverifiable". 
It is necessary for Ayer to establish this point, thereby putting 
intuitionism on the same footing with his own theory before he proceeds 
to develop his analysis. He does this in the following manner: 
"...it is notorious that what seems intuitively certain to one 
1LTL, p. 106. 2LTL p. 106. 
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person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So that 
unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one 
may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to 
intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition's validity. 
But in the case of moral judgments, no such criterion can be 
given. Some moralists claim to settle the matter by saying 
that they 'know' that their own moral judgments are correct. 
But such an assertion is of purely psychological interest, and 
has not the slightest tendency to prove the validity of any 
moral judgment. For dissentient moralists may equally well 
'know' that their ethical views are correct. And, as far as 
subjective certainty goes, there will be nothing to choose 
between them. "i- 
Ayer's point can hardly be reasonably denied. 
Intuitionism is a serious contender, nevertheless, as is apparent 
from the fact that in his paper, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ", 
he considers it directly, devoting more space to it than he does in 
Language, Truth, and Logic. Of incidental value in considering his 
later treatment of intuitionism is that by the very contrast one gains 
a clearer conception of Ayer's emotive analysis. Among intuitionists 
possibly the one most deserving of attention is G.L. Moore (it is 
perhaps significant that in the paper I have mentioned, Ayer cites only 
Moore as an example of intuitionist philosophers). There is of course 
a fundamental difference between the theories of Ayer and Moore, for, 
although Moore was an analytic philosopher he was no philosophical 
analyst (at least in the sense in which that term is now most often 
used). I should like, briefly, then to consider Moore's account of 
ethical concepts, in so far as it is relevant to a consideration of 
Ayer's position. 
The fundamental difference between the analyses of the two may be 
pointed up by asking what they proceed to say about ethical terms and 
statements after they have rejected 'naturalistic' theories. In Moore's 
llbid. 
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case, after saying that the word "good" is indefinable, he nevertheless 
uses what appears to be what might be termed "objectivist" language, as 
if there should be an objective property which mysteriously remains hidden 
from us. There are many examples of such language throughout Principia 
Ethica and the following passage is typical: 
"The peculiarity of Ethics is not that it investigates assertions 
about human conduct, but that it investigates assertions about 
that property of things which is denoted by the term 'good', and 
the converse property denoted by the term 'bad'. "1 
Elsewhere he says that it is an "erroneous" doctrine to assume "that 'good' 
must denote some real property of things ";2 but, as I understand him, his 
point is that there are logical difficulties with any theory which, in 
attempting to define 'good', asserts that there is an equivalence between 
the word "good" and any specific hypostatic 'entity' or 'property' 
(metaphysical as well as physical or natural) which might be specifically 
denoted by the use of any specific word. Despite this qualification, 
however, and despite Moore's repeated assertions that the word "good" 
is not definable, the logic of his language, as I have previously suggested, 
is of the kind that assumes that there is some objective 'property of 
things', or an 'ultimate, unanalysable predicate'. Perhaps this kind of 
language is nowhere more evident than in the first of the two guiding 
questions which he regards as fundamental throughout Principia Ethica. 
The question, as expressed in the second paragraph of the Preface, is, 
"what kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes ? "3 And it is 
apparent as he proceeds that this question is not asked simply for the 
sake of clarifying it, for, in the final chapter, appropriately entitled, 
Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 36. 
'The second question, "What kind 
is, for Moore, subordinate to the first; 
entails an answer to the second. 
20p. cit. , p. 140. 
of actions ought we to perform ? ", 
since an answer to the first 
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"The Ideal ", he returns to it. The "main object" of the final chapter, 
he writes, "is to arrive at some positive answer to the fundamental 
question of Ethics - --the question: 'What things are goods or ends in 
themselves ?' "1 And far from being agnostic, he undertakes to indicate 
these "great intrinsic goods ". If one asks the obvious question; "what 
is the nature of the evidence" for his assertions about such 'goods', he 
maintains that "no relevant evidence whatever can be adduced: from no 
other truth, except themselves alone, can it be inferred that they are 
either true or false. "2 Such 'goods', for Moore, are simply recognized 
as being intrinsically good. Although he is agnostic "as to the manner 
or origin of our cognition "3 of these 'goods', he nevertheless uses 
language which implies that ethical statements are genuine synthetic 
propositions. Thus Ayer must reject his theory. 
Ayer's concern, after his rejection of 'naturalistic' theories, 
is vastly different from Moore's. To begin with, as we would expect, he 
would have to say that Moore has not differentiated between the role of 
the moralist and the moral philosopher. Even to entertain the question 
"What things are goods or ends in themselves ? ", as if it could be 
appropriately answered by the moral philosopher gua moral philosopher, 
is to go beyond the role of the logical analyst of the language of morals. 
Ayer of course puts this more strongly. "A strictly philosophical treatise 
on ethics," he writes, "should...make no ethical pronouncements. "4 
A related and more significant difference between the two is that 
Ayer would say that the use of ethical terms as if they referred to any 
objective property is to misunderstand the conventions of our use of 
ethical language. To paraphrase what he says,5 keeping in mind later 
12ELILL., P. 184. 2Op.cit., p. viii. 
3 Principia Ethics, p.x. 4LTL., p. 103. 5LTL., p. 108. 
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modifications, we must not cite as our reason for saying that there is 
no criterion for ethical statements the belief that ethical statements 
have a criterion which is mysteriously independent of sense -experience: 
it is rather that ethical statements are inappropriately used when they 
seem to imply such a criterion. To point up this difference in the use 
of language we might say that, in Moore's use, it would be appropriate 
to say of an ethical statement that it might be considered in terms of 
the categories of truth or falsehood -- -that it is, as I have previously 
said, a synthetic proposition.l One might say that while Moore is not a 
'naturalist' in moral philosophy, he is misled nevertheless in taking as 
a model for all language the 'naturalistic' language which legitimately 
applies to empirical science. Ayer, on the other hand, in speaking of 
his own analysis, says that the use of the categories of truth and false- 
hood, or probable truth and probable falsehood, does not make for clarity. 
It is more appropriate, that is, to say that "moral judgments are emotive 
rather than descriptive, that they are persuasive expressions of attitudes 
and not statements of fact.... "2 (I shall return to this view shortly). 
Thus it is that he would reject not only 'naturalistic' theories, such as 
traditional or orthodox 'subjectivism' and 'utilitarianism', but also any 
theory, such as Moore's, which misunderstands the uses of ethical language. 
In his paper, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ", Ayer restates 
the case against intuitionism (as well as against moral sense theories) 
in a slightly different form.3 I say "restates ", since the argument is 
basically the same in that it charges the intuitionist with failing to 
distinguish between the 'normative' and 'descriptive' uses of language-- - 
which is, in effect, the same distinction we have seen between 'ethical' 
1Cf. Principia Ethica, p. 7. 
2Philosophical Essays, p. 246. 31bid., p. 239f. 
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and 'naturalistic' uses of language. 
One supposes that Ayer must have been challenged to demonstrate 
that the experience which intuitionists claim to have when they make 
ethical 'judgments' is not an 'intellectual intuition' of ethical, non - 
natural properties. If Ayer fails to have the same kind of experience 
which the intuitionist claims to have, the charge is that perhaps this 
is simply a shortcoming. But to argue about one's introspective experiences 
in this way, Ayer maintains, is not relevant to his argument. For all he 
knows, the only difference between his experience and the experience of 
the intuitionist is in their respective manners of describing their 
experiences. The central point is that anyone who claims to 'intuit' or 
'sense' something which he 'describes' or 'denotes' as "goodness" or 
"beauty" or "fittingness" or "worthiness to be approved ", is, in that 
experience, engaged in an experience which is more appropriately termed 
"descriptive" rather than "normative ". "The word 'good', or whatever 
other value term may be used," he says, "simply comes to be descriptive 
of experiences of this type...." In that sense the word "good" is used 
in much the same way as we would use the word "friendly" when we say that 
a Man has a friendly face. But to say that a situation has the property 
which we come to describe as "goodness ", a "property whose presence is 
established by people's having such experiences, does not entail that it 
is preferable to other situations, or that it is anyone's duty to bring 
it into existence." Ayer then proceeds to write the following key passage: 
"To say that such a situation ought to be created, or that it deserves to 
exist, will be to say something different from merely saying that it has 
this property." In the experience of allegedly 'intuiting' the 'property' 
of 'goodness', the intuitionist is, then, using the word "good" to 
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'describe' or 'denote'. If he believes that he is doing something more 
than using the word in a 'descriptive' sense, it is because he tacitly 
understands that the word "good" is also used in a 'normative' sense. As 
Ayer expresses it, "This point is obscured by the use of an ethical term 
to describe the property, just because the ethical term is tacitly under- 
stood to be normative." 
"But if the ethical term is understood to be normative," he 
continues, "then it does not merely describe the alleged 
non -natural property, and if it does merely describe this 
property, then it is not normative and so no longer does 
the work that ethical terms are supposed to do. "l 
This argument, then, like the previous one, rests on the charge 
that the intuitionist is confused in his understanding of the uses of 
language. For all we know, he might indeed be having what he terms 
"intellectual intuitions" of 'properties' of a situation. But in using 
terms such as "goodness" or "beauty" to refer to such alleged 'properties', 
he is using terms which are more appropriately used in normative and not 
descriptive situations. He is in effect trying to set up a convention 
for the use of ethical language which is misleading. Ayer expresses 
this point rather strongly: 
"...it is misleading for him (the intuitionist and moral sense 
theorist) to use a value -term to designate the content of 
such (descriptive) experiences; for in this way he contrives 
to smug le a normative judgment into what purports to be a 
statement of fact. A valuation is not a description of 
something very peculiar; it is not a description at all." 
We shall return to a consequence of this argument later, when it is more 
relevant to discuss what Ayer refers to in this context as "the familiar 
subjective -objective antithesis" in moral philosophy. In postulating 
his own analysis Ayer will be concerned to provide what he regards as a 
llbid., p. 240. 2lbid., p. 242. 
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better understanding of the appropriate uses of, respectively, normative 
and descriptive terms, an analysis which will more accurately accord 
with our usage of language, in addition to being consistent with his 
radical empiricist epistemology. 
Section 4 
The general form of Ayer's argument, like the form of Hume's 
treatment of moral philosophy, has a 'negative' and a 'positive' aspect. 
So far, I have been concerned primarily with the 'negative' aspect, in 
which he aims to dispose of earlier theories which might be considered 
as rivals, before he undertakes to postulate the 'positive' aspect of 
his own theory -- -that is, his own emotivist analysis of ethical state- 
ments. There are, however, two general aspects to the 'positive' part 
of his moral philosophy. First, there is the aspect which suggests that 
the reason why it is logically misleading to suppose that ethical state- 
ments may be used in the same way as 'factual' statements or propositions 
is that they are "mere pseudo -concepts ". The second aspect, which I 
shall consider later, is concerned to show precisely in what way ethical 
'statements' are used, and this leads us to the heart of his 'emotive' 
analysis. 
As we have seen, in postulating his radical empiricist epistemology, 
Ayer ( "like Hume ", he wrote) had accepted that there were two classes of 
genuine propositions, the analytic propositions of logic and mathematics, 
and the empirical propositions which concern matters of fact. This, we 
recall, left no room for so- called ethical propositions among 'genuine 
propositions'. Thus, as he says, his theory of values begins with the 
premiss that "the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch 
as there is no criterion by which we can test the validity of the 
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judgments in which they occur."1 To this point, he says, he is in agree- 
ment with the absolutists (or, as I have termed them, "intuitionists "). 
But whereas the intuitionist is unable to explain why ethical concepts 
are unanalysable, Ayer believes that he has an explanation. The reason, 
he asserts, is that "they are mere pseudo -concepts." "The presence of 
an ethical symbol in a proposition ", he continues, "adds nothing to its 
factual content." (As we shall see, Ayer is later compelled to modify 
his manner of expressing this; however, he does not essentially alter 
the point he is making in this passage.) Here,, again, Ayer is reminiscent 
of Hume, for, as we will recall, Hume made much the same point when he 
said that it is impossible that our moral distinctions "can be pronounced 
either true or false, "2 and, that "immorality is no particular fact which 
can be the object of the understanding. "3 But Ayer takes Hume's point 
further, however, to a conclusion entailed by his manner of stating his 
epistemological premisses, when he says that in ethics or morality there 
can be no propositions (using the word "propositions" in the sense in 
which it means that which asserts something which can be said to be true 
or false). 
Whether ethics can do without propositions was, inevitably, a 
controversial question, and Ayer has had to restate his case to make his 
point clear. He does this, in part, in the Introduction to the Second 
Edition of Language, Truth, and Logic, where, in the section entitled, 
"The Principle of Verification ", he stipulates how he intends to use the 
words "proposition" and "statement ". He recognizes that he will be using 
the familiar word "statement" in a "slightly unfamiliar sense ", and 
thereupon writes the following passage: 
1LTL , p. 107. 2Above, Ch.I, p. 39. 3Above, Ch.I, p. 48. 
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"...I propose that any form of words that is grammatically 
significant shall be held to constitute a sentence, and that 
every indicative sentence, whether it is literally meaningful 
or not, shall be regarded as expressing a statement. Further- 
more, any two sentences which are mutually translatable will 
be said to express the same statement. The word 'proposition', 
on the other hand, will be reserved for what is expressed by 
sentences which are literally meaningful. Thus, the class of 
propositions becomes, in this usage, a sub -class of the class 
of statements, and one way of describing the use of the 
principle of verification would be to say that it provided a 
means of determining when an indicative sentence expressed a 
proposition, or, in other words, of distinguishing statements 
that belonged to the class of propositions from those that 
did not." 
If one then adopts this 'verbal convention', as well as the Humean radical 
empiricism, one must say, as Ayer does in Language, Truth, and Logic, 
that ethical (and metaphysical) 'statements' are not 'propositions' 
since they do not express anything that is 'literally meaningful'; or, 
to put it in another way, and perhaps more provocatively, ethical (and 
metaphysical) statements are literally meaningless. 
He has more to say about this distinction in his paper, "On the 
Analysis of Moral Judgements "; although, in this paper, as I have mentioned, 
he modifies his earlier views about the meaninglessness of ethical sen- 
tences. From the very first paragraph it appears that the doctrines of 
the post -Tractatus Wittgenstein can no longer be ignored. This is not 
to suggest, however, that Ayer endorses them. After suggesting that 
what we might call the positivism of the mid- twenties had perhaps been 
over -stated, Ayer writes as follows: 
"Theological and ethical statements are no longer stigmatized 
as false or meaningless. They are merely said to be different 
from scientific statements. They are differently related to 
their evidence; or rather, a different meaning is attached 
to 'evidence' in their case. 'Every kind of statement', we 
are told, 'has its on kind of logic.'" 
While making some concessions to this new theory he is obviously not 
prepared to go as far as some of its proponents would wish. In the 
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second paragraph, after allowing that "it may very well be true" that 
"ethical statements are sui generis", he says that he still wishes to 
hold his earlier view - -- allowing, however, that it was stated in what 
appeared to be an unconventional form of expression. The question is 
whether he could still postulate his type of eznotivist theory if he 
accepted some of the main doctrines of the later- Wittgenstein. As we 
shall see, Hare and Nowell-Smith, among other philosophical analysts, 
wish to maintain that the word "emotivism" is too restrictive and even 
misleading for the purpose of indicating the uses of ethical sentences. 
In any event, Ayer allows in his paper that obviously he had not followed 
the 'conventions of language' in a manner to avoid misunderstanding, and 
his intention now is to explain his linguistic conventions in a way that 
may be more clearly understood. As he says later, "the only relevant 
consideration is that of clarity." 
In view of this concern for conventions of language, and in view 
of his attention to the way in which he wishes us to understand his uses 
of the words "proposition" and "statement ", there is a curious and 
unexplained shift in his manner of using the word "statement" in his 
paper. While this is not directly relevant to his central thesis, it 
has to be noted if we accept his point, as indeed we must, that clarity 
is a relevant consideration. The different use of the word "statement" 
is apparent the second time it appears in the following passage (from 
the second paragraph of the paper). This passage, as will be apparent, 
also raises another important issue concerning conventions of language: 
"Certainly the view, which I still wish to hold, that what are 
called ethical statements are not really statements at all, that 
they are not descriptive of anything, that they cannot be either 
true or false, is in an obvious sense incorrect. For, as the 
English language is currently used --and what else, it may be 
asked, is here in question ? --it is by no means improper to refer 
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to ethical utterances as statements... "1 
The question, I had thought, was not whether ethical utterances are 
'statements', if by the word "statements" we mean, "every indicative 
sentence, whether it is literally meaningful or not "; but it was whether 
an ethical utterance could be a 'proposition', if by the word "proposi- 
tion" we mean "sentences which are literally meaningful " -- -that is, 
sentences which are able to pass the test of his principle of verification. 
Thus, in the above quotation, instead of using the word "statements" 
which I have underlined, one would have expected him to use the word 
"propositions "; but if we do this, in what way are we to regard the use 
of the word "statements" in the phrase, "it is by no means improper to 
refer to ethical utterances as statements... "? 
As we follow his explanation, we see that, in this context, for 
the sake of clarification of his views, he is using another, more socially 
acceptable convention for the use of the word "statement "; although, as 
he will go on to say, this convention is logically misleading. 
"When (by means of a statement) someone characterizes an action 
by the use of an ethical predicate, it is quite good usage to 
say that he is thereby describing it; when someone wishes to 
assent to an ethical verdict, it is perfectly legitimate for 
him to say that it is true, or that it is a fact, just as, if 
he wished to dissent from it, it would be perfectly legitimate 
for him to say that it was false. We should know what he 
meant and we should not consider that he was using words in 
an unconventional way. What is unconventional, rather, is 
the usage of the philosopher who tells us that ethical state- 
ments are not really statements at all but something else, 
ejaculations perhaps, or commands, and that they cannot be 
either true or false. "2 
Ayer's 'unconventional' quarrel with the 'conventional' usage of the words 
"statement ", "describing ", "true ", "false ", and "fact ", has a purpose. 
When a philosopher defies such conventions, (as Ayer himself had done in 
llbid,, p. 231. (My underlining). 2lbid., p. 232. 
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Language, Truth, and Logic), he does this, as he says, to bring out "certain 
points more clearly ". When one does this, he concedes, "very often what 
he is doing, although he may not know it, is to recommend a new way of 
speaking, not just for amusement, but because he thinks that the old, the 
socially correct, way of speaking, is logically misleading...." The 'old' 
way of speaking, that is, is liable to lead one to suppose that ethical 
statements may be analysed in the same manner as empirical probability 
statements. 
"But ", he continues, "when one considers how these ethical 
statements are actually used, it may be found that they function 
so very differently from other types of statement that it is 
advisable to put them into a separate category altogether; 
either to say that they are not to be counted as statements at 
all, or, if this proves inconvenient, at least to say that they 
do not express propositions, and consequently that there are no 
ethical facts. This does not mean that all ethical statements 
are held to be false. It is merely a matter of laying down a 
usage of the words 'proposition' and 'fact', according to which 
only propositions express facts and ethical statements fall 
outside the class of propositions. "2 
Thus Ayer returns to the view which he "still wishes to hold ", that ethical 
statements, whatever they are, are not like probability statements, or 
analytic propositions; and thus they cannot be 'genuine propositions', in 
the sense in which he stipulates his usage of these words. The main differ- 
ence is that in his later work he clearly acknowledges that he is being 
'unconventional ° in his use of these words, and that he is recommending a 
new convention, one that would not be, as he says, logically misleading. 
This is of course in contrast with his arguments against the 
'naturalistic' theories of subjectivism and utilitarianism in which he 
relied entirely on the 'conventional' usage of language to maintain that 
such theories were self- contradictory.2 In any event, Ayer restates his 
llbid. , p. 232. 2Above, pp. 73-74. 
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case against 'naturalistic' theories in his paper; although, as I shall 
argue, this argument similarly is inadequate. His challenge is that "there 
is nothing that counts as observing the designata of...ethical predicates, 
apart from observing the natural features of the situation." From this he 
argues that there is no factual or scientific dependence between the natural 
features of a situation and the observer's use of ethical statements. He 
proceeds then to argue upon the basis of an hypothetical example of two 
'observers' who study a murder case. 
"Let us assume," he writes, "that two observers agree about all 
the circumstances of the case, including the agent's motives, 
but that they disagree in their evaluation of it.i1 
While he allows that in some way the observers' respective uses of ethical 
statements are dependent on the natural features, he insists that such 
dependence is not scientific. If it were scientific, then we would have 
to say that the designata of the ethical 'predicates' were in some manner 
apart from the situation observed, "something independently verifiable, 
for which the facts adduced as the reasons for the moral judgment were 
evidence." But, in the case of the two observers who disagree only in 
respect of their evaluations, the facts able to be adduced are coincident, 
and "there is no procedure of examining the value of the facts, as 
distinct from the facts themselves." Now this argument is also based on 
Humean empiricism. That is to say, the challenge, to one who would disagree, 
to point to ' designata' for ethical predicates, is strikingly reminiscent 
of the approach we have noted in Hume, especially, for example, in his 
statements suggesting that "beauty is not a quality of the circle ", and, 
by analogy, that "crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation, 
which can be the object of the understanding.... "2 
1Philosophical Essays, p. 236. Above, Ch.I, p. 48. 
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This, however, is an argument which invites an argumentum ad hominem 
challenge since it presupposes a 'meaning in terms only of a referent' 
theory of meaning. The naturalist might well ask, in return, "Show me 
the designata of non -value predicates such as 'active', 'intelligent', 
and, for that matter, 'emotive'." Such predicates are used in a 
'dispositional' sense (accepting Ryle's distinction), and it would be a 
category - mistake to demand that ' designata' should be pointed out, in the 
same sense in which Ayer is demanding ' designata' for ethical predicates. 
These non -value predicates are nevertheless useful and indispensable 
words in our 'descriptive' terminology, and while they are not so easy to 
'learn' as, for example, colour predicates such as "red" and "yellow ", 
we may learn to use them with reference to the 'behaviour' of creatures 
and objects. Similarly, the naturalist might wish to argue that Ayer is 
inviting a category -mistake when he asks that designata be indicated for 
ethical predicates. The naturalist might suggest that words such as "good" 
and "right" are more like dispositional predicates in their 'logical 
behaviour'. He would not of course carry the analogy too far; but, in 
carrying it even this far he would have 
it appears, is unwilling 
principle' should be the 
all sentences and terms; 
countered Ayer's argument. Ayer, 
to give up the assumption that the 'verification 
main criterion 
and, as I have 
for the 'logical behaviour' of 
suggested earlier, he appears 
not to give whole- hearted support to the view that 'every kind of state- 
ment has its own kind of logic'. Stevenson and Hare, on the other hand, 
specifically say that the 'verificationist' view, although useful for 
some purposes, is inappropriately used when applied to value judgments. 
If, then, an argument is to be made against 'naturalism' it would have 
to be made in another way. 
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In any event, despite minor modifications to the way in which he 
expresses his views, Ayer persists in his fundamental point that it is 
logically misleading to suppose that ethical statements may be used in 
the same way as 'factual' statements. To see his point more clearly we 
might consider his example of the murder case in more detail. For one 
who studies the case there will be a mass of information about court 
details ( "where and when and how the killing was effected; the identity 
of the murderer and the victim; the relationship in which they stood to 
one another "); and then there will be questions about motives - -- whether 
it was jealousy, starvation, revenge, etc.; and in seeking information 
about motives the 'observer' will acquire data which will include moral 
judgments made by the murderer. But such data, from the point of view 
of the person who studies the case, is 'factual' information: for 
example, is it or is it not a fact that the murderer believed that he 
had a moral right to kill? But then Ayer asks in what sense the situation 
differs if the person who studies the murder 'applies an ethical predicate 
to it'. 
"Suppose that instead of asking what it was that really happened, 
or what the agent's motives really were, we ask whether he was 
justified in acting as he did. Did he have the right to kill? 
Is it true that he had the right? Is it a fact that he acted 
rightly ? "l 
In the three questions at the end of this quotation Ayer has (obviously 
deliberately) used 'ordinary conventions' of our language which, as he 
has said, could be logically misleading. Such questions might lead us 
to suppose, that is, that ethical statements are in fact used in the 
same way and for the same purpose as 'factual' statements - -- that we 
might be led to speaking in terms of ethical 'properties' and 
1Philosophical Essays, p. 235. 
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'characteristics', and might suppose that there is some 'objective' 
criterion to decide between conflicting statements. But Ayer asks us 
not to be misled. The moral philosopher gua moral philosopher must not 
be concerned with "whether a certain action is right or wrong, but what 
is implied in saying that it is right, or saying that it is wrong." 
"Suppose then ", he continues, "that we say that the man acted 
rightly. The point that I wish to make is that in saying 
this we are not elaborating or modifying our description in 
the way that we should be elaborating it if we gave further 
police -court details, or in the way that we should be modifying 
it if we showed that the agent's motives were different from 
what they had been thought to be. To say that his motives 
were good, or that they were bad, is not to say what they were. 
To say that the man acted rightly, or that he acted wrongly, 
is not to say what he did. And when one has said what he did, 
when one has described the situation in the way that I have 
outlined, then to add that he was justified, or alternatively 
that he was not, is not to say any more about what he did; 
it does not add a further detail to the story. It is for this 
reason that these ethical predicates are not factual; they do 
not desc4be any features of the situation to which they are 
applied." 
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Thus Ayer returns to the same position he had postulated in Language, 
Truth, and Logic, where he said, as we have seen, that "the presence of 
an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. "2 
Section 5 
To this point we have been concerned, first, with Ayer's rejection 
of 'naturalistic' and 'intuitionist' analyses of ethical statements, and, 
secondly, with his case to maintain that whatever ethical statements are, 
it is logically misleading to say that they are used in the same way as 
factual statements or propositions. The next, and perhaps most contro- 
versial question, is to ask precisely in what way ethical statements are 
used. This question takes us to the heart of his 'emotive' analysis. 
In treating this I shall look first at what might be said to be the 
llbid. 2Above, p. 84. 
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'classic' statement of the 'emotive theory of values' ---the theory which 
Ayer expounds in the first edition of Language, Truth,and Logic. Then I 
shall consider modifications which he makes to his statement of the theory 
in his paper, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ". Finally, I shall 
consider some objections which have been made against the theory. 
After saying that "the presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition 
adds nothing to its factual content ", Ayer elaborates on this point in the 
following passage: 
"Thus, if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that 
money', I am not stating anything more than if I had simply 
said, 'You stole that money'. In adding that this action is 
wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am 
simply evincing my moral disarov pp al of it. It is as if I 
had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of 
horror, or written it with the addition of some special 
exclamation marks. The tone or the exclamation marks, adds 
nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. Ib merely 
serves to show that the expression of it is attended by 
certain feelings in the speaker:'1 
Ayer proceeds to sharpen up this point by generalising the statement, 
"You acted wrongly in stealing that money," to the more general statement, 
"Stealing money is wrong." Now if an ethical symbol adds nothing to the 
factual content of a statement, then this latter statement, "Stealing 
money is wrong," has no factual meaning: it "expresses no proposition 
which can be either true or false." It is as if one "had written, 
'Stealing money::: - -- where the shape and thickness of the exclamation 
marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral 
disapproval is being expressed." If, in such a statement, I am not 
asserting a proposition which may be said to be either true or false, 
I cannot, strictly speaking, be contradicted by a person who says, 
"Stealing money is right ". Such a person is merely expressing his on 
1LTL, p. 107. (My underlining). 
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moral sentiments, which do not happen to be the same as my own. Of course 
in view of Ayer's rejection of 'naturalistic' theories he must emphasize 
that in saying, "Stealing money is wrong ", I am not even making a factual 
statement about my own 'state of mind'. As he expresses this, "I am 
merely expressing certain moral sentiments ", or, to put it another way, 
"I should simply be evincing my feelings, which is not the same thing as 
saying that I have them." Thus, in emphasizing the point that ethical 
statements are not like 'factual' statements, he says that "there is 
plainly no sense in asking which of us is right. For," he continues, 
"neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition." Taking his general- 
ization further, Ayer goes on to say that what he has said about the symbol 
"wrong ", "applies to all normative ethical symbols." Such symbols are 
not restricted only to sentences which we would ordinarily term ethical 
statements, for they may also appear in sentences which "record ordinary 
empirical facts besides expressing ethical feeling about those facts." 
But wherever they occur, "in every case in which one would commonly be 
said to be making an ethical judgment, the function of the relevant 
ethical word is purely 'emotive'." 
As I have mentioned earlier,1 the view that ethical sentences 
may not be said to be contradictory is one which has invited much 
criticism. Ayer's argument appears to be based on two main assumptions, 
both of which are able to be challenged. First, underlying the whole 
argument, is the assumption that the 'verificationist' theory of meaning 
is the one -and -only possible theory of meaning. Secondly, he assumes 
that single words and statements may have only one purpose or use at 
one time. With these assumptions one would be compelled to express 
views which seem paradoxical to say the least, He could not say, for 
lAbove, p. 70. 
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example, that a value judgment could be said to 'describe' or 'declare' 
feelings, for (unless one said that it could also serve another purpose) 
he would appear to be led to the suggestion that the sentence "stealing 
is wrong" is equivalent in meaning to the factual sentence "I have 
feelings of disapproval for stealing ". Thus, in trying to avoid the 
'naturalist' he had to offer the unconvincing argument that 'evincing' 
is in no sense a declaration of the fact that one has feelings of 
approval or disapproval. And if one assumes a 'meaning in terms only 
of a referent' theory of meaning, such as is the verificationist theory, 
and if he wished to maintain that ethical sentences may be said to be 
contradictory, then, if he rejects 'naturalism', he is faced with the 
alternative offered by the 'non- naturalist objectivist'. Ayer thus 
had no other outlet but the tough -minded radical subjectivist view that 
ethical sentences cannot be contradictory. 
Since this view is so obviously 'unconventional' one is inevitably 
led to questioning the assumptions. As I shall indicate shortly, Ayer, 
in his later work, does modify his views about the 'evincing' of feelings 
or attitudes, and he will allow that ethical statements may be said to 
be contradictory in that they express contradictory attitudes. He does 
not essentially modify his views, however, about what might be termed, 
with great caution, the 'objective' reference of value judgments: even 
in his modified view, that is, value judgments are not held to 'describe' 
in any way the persons or actions judged. That he had not modified his 
views on this point would seem to be because he was not prepared to 
accept the later -Wittgenstein doctrine that words may have more than one 
use at one and the same time. If he had accepted this doctrine he might 
have been able to suggest, as Stevenson and Hare do, that there is a 
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further sense in which value judgments may be said to be contradictory. 
Another way of escaping his paradox is to consider the possibility that 
there may be more than one theory of meaning - -- specifically the theory 
that the meaning of a word is indicated by its use. While he considers 
this (in acknowledging the dictum that 'every statement has its own 
logic'), he does not completely break away from his assumption that the 
'verificationist' theory is fundamental. (I shall again return to this 
point after we have seen later modifications to his emotivist analysis). 
There is also another aspect of this early expression of his 
theory which has been challenged; and this is the view that the purpose 
served by moral judgments is to evince and evoke feelings. To begin 
with, the word "feeling" too readily lends itself to misunderstanding. 
As Ryle points out in his chapter, "motion ", in The Concept of Mind, 
the word "emotion" (which Ayer uses synonymously with "feeling ",1 and 
sometimes with "attitude ") is an ambiguous word. In one sense -- the 
sense in which Ryle stipulates that the word "feelings" is most 
appropriately used -- it may mean 'occurrences', such as "thrills, 
twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches ", and so on. In another sense, 
however, it may be used to classify the "motives by which people's 
higher -level behaviour is explained "; and in this sense we use words 
such as "vanity, kindliness, avarice, patriotism, and laziness" to 
indicate the way in which a person is disposed to behave. This, 
according to Ryle, is a "dispositional use of motive words ". Now Ayer 
does not make this distinction in his use of the word "feelings ", and 
it is obvious that he uses it in both senses, depending on the context. 
When he says, for example, that ethical terms are calculated to "arouse" 
or "evince" feelings, he is using the word in an 'active' or 'occurrence' 
1LTL, bottom of p. 113. 
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sense; whereas when he speaks about ethical argument designed to get 
another person "to adopt the same moral attitude...as we do "1, he is 
obviously thinking in terms of a 'dispositional' use of "attitude ", which 
is his synonym for "feeling ". For the most part, however, the key word 
in his analysis is used in an 'active' or 'occurrence' sense; and this is 
unfortunate. A major difficulty with this primitive form of the emotivist 
theory is, as we have seen when considering Hume's theory, it cannot 
adequately explain moral judgments about actions which have taken place 
in the past, as well as those which occur at remote distances from us. 
While I would judge that the action of Brutus was as morally wrong as any 
similar action taking place before me now, my 'feelings' (in the 'Occurrence' 
sense) obviously are not the basis for my judgment. A further difficulty 
with such an analysis would be that it could not adequately account for 
the relative stability of moral judgments about certain types of actions 
or situations; and it might seem to suggest that moral argument is a 
willy- nilly, hit -or -miss activity- -- if you happen to hit upon the right 
stimulus you will get the desired response. But of course, whatever moral 
argument is precisely, it is not this kind of activity. The basic 
problem, as Ryle points out, is that introspection is a hazardous under- 
taking at best, and, as he writes, "no one could ever know or even, 
usually reasonably conjecture that the cause of someone else's overt 
action was the occurrence in him of a feeling. "2 An analysis more in 
accord with moral argument would, then, be one expressed primarily in 
behaviouristic terms. Instead of using the misleading word "feelings ", 
especially in an 'occurrence' sense, one might use the word "attitude ", 
1LTL, p. 111. 2The Concept of Hind, p, 90. 
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stipulating that it is used to suggest that moral judgments arise from 
the relatively consistent manner in which a person reacts to certain 
types of situations, and that these judgments are addressed to people who 
tend to react similarly. As I shall indicate, this is the position to 
which Ayer is led when he modifies his analysis. This modification would 
lead to a further problem for him, however, for one must ask what could 
be meant by saying that a moral judgment 'evinces' a 'disposition' or an 
'attitude'. It is difficult to understand, for example, how a disposition 
to be 'honest' could be evinced without overt manifestations of behaviour 
which in some way indicate that a person has a tendency to behave in a 
certain way in certain types of situations. As we shall see, Ayer is led 
also to this point of view. 
As I have mentioned, there is an important addendum to his 'emotivist' 
analysis. But before mentioning it I should like to refer to what I 
think is a minor objection to Ayer's use of the word "stealing" in his 
example to illustrate his theory. "It is worth noticing ", wrote Professor 
A. D. Ritchie, "that the example is not quite fair because an ethical 
judgment is already implied in the word 'stole'. "1 Thus when Ayer removes 
the ethical predication, "is wrong ", from the statement in his example, 
the remaining phrase, "stealing money ", although not a complete statement, 
has, so to speak, ethical overtones; or, if we were to speak in terms of 
the usage of language, the word "stealing ", in addition to having a 
descriptive use, also has an emotive use. But I cannot see that this 
criticism is ultimately fatal to an emotivist although it is undoubtedly 
cogent against Ayer's argument in this passage. An emotivist may accept 
the point of the criticism, however, and simply restate the analysis in 
1 "Errors of Logical Positivism ", in Essays in Philosophy, p. 79. 
Cf., W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, pa 34. 
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terms of it. The difficulty with Ayer's analysis is that, as I have 
indicated, he speaks of a relevant word or term as if it must be used 
either 'descriptively' or 'normatively', and as if it could not be used 
for both purposes at one and the same time. The tendency of moral 
philosophers to use highly abstract words such as "good ", "bad ", "right ", 
and "wrong" would possibly lead one to suppose that ethical terms could 
have only one use. Ayer himself points to a way out of this tendency, 
however, when, in the Introduction to the Second Edition of Language, 
Truth, and Logic, he mentions that "there may be a number of cases in 
which...(an) ethical term is itself to be understood descriptively. "1 
Although he does not say so in this passage, he might also have said 
that there may be a number of cases in which a word which is normally 
used descriptively may also be used normatively. The word "stealing" 
is such a word. As we shall see in the next chapter, C. L. Stevenson 
contributed to the history of the analysis of ethical statements when 
he pointed out that single words may be used for different purposes. 
Nowell -Smith added to this point when he wrote the following passage: 
"The commonest practical words do not have just one use. 
They have many uses and can be used to do more than one 
job on any given occasion.i2 
In this the influence of the teachings of the later Wittgenstein is 
of course apparent. As he was to express it, "the functions of words 
are as diverse as the functions" of any individual tool in a tool -box. 
A hammer, for example, has more uses than the obvious one of hammering 
nails.3 Thus, to return to Ayer's analysis, we might say that in every 
case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgment, 
the purpose for the use of the relevant word when considered in terms of 
3 LTL ' p. 21. 2Nowell- Smith, Ethics, p. 95. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 6e & 12e. 
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its ethical use is purely emotive (while the purpose in its descriptive 
use is purely descriptive). It would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to translate the phrase "stealing money" to a phrase which would not be 
considered as divorced from its ethical use; but this is not essential to 
Ayer's point. All he would have to maintain is that the normative use of 
a term is different from its descriptive or other uses. 
An important addendum to this expression of the 'emotive' theory 
of values is that Ayer says that "ethical terms do not serve only to 
express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling and so to 
stimulate action." Carrying this suggestion somewhat further, Ayer 
proceeds to write the following passage: 
"Indeed some of them are used in such a way as to give sentences 
in which they occur the effect of commands." 
In writing this, Ayer is expressing a theory which Carnap had postulated 
about the use of ethical statements, to the exclusion of other uses. 
Ayer's initial expression of the 'emotive' theory, that is, had asserted 
primarily that in making an ethical statement one is 'expressing' or 
'evincing' feelings or emotions, and then, he added that they may be 
used also as 'excitants' of feeling, calculated, that is, to "arouse 
feeling and stimulate action ". Carnap concentrates on the latter use. 
He writes as follows: 
"But actually a value statement is nothing else than a command 
in a misleading grammatical form. It may have effects upon 
the actions of men, and these effects may either be in accordance 
with our wishes or not; but it is neither true nor false.r1 
It is this kind of analysis of ethical statements which has led some 
writers to classify it, as Stephen Toulmin does, as "The Imperative 
Approach".2 The merit of Ayer's approach over Carnap's is that he sees 
1 
2Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, p. 24. 
Toulmin, Reason in Ethics, Ch. 4. 
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that ethical statements are not all exactly alike, and he suggests that 
there is, as it were, a shift in emphasis in ethical statements, ranging 
through three broad categories of statements, indicated by the respective 
ways in which we use the words, "duty ", "ought", and "good ". 
"Thus the sentence, 'It is your duty to tell the truth' may be 
regarded both as the expression of a certain sort of ethical 
feeling about truthfulness and as the expression of the command 
'Tell the truth'. 
The sentence 'You ought to tell the truth' also involves the 
comnand'Tell the truth', but here the tone of the command is 
less emphatic. 
In the sentence 'It is good to tell the truth° the command 
has become little more than a suggestion." 
"And thus ", he goes on to say, "the 'meaning' of the word 
'good', in its ethical usage, is differentiated from that of 
the word 'duty' or the word 'ought'. In fact we may define 
the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of 
the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, 
and also the different responses which they are calculated 
to provoke.il 
This, then, is a summary statement of the 'emotive theory of values' 
as Ayer first expressed it. In his manner of expressing it, as we have 
seen, it has evoked obvious questions and criticism; and, as I have 
indicated, Ayer himself has seen fit to modify it - --to some extent in 
the Introduction to the Second Edition of Language, Truth,,and Logic, and 
to a greater extent in his paper, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ". 
In his paper he goes so far as to allow the following concession: 
"To say, as I once did, that...moral judgments are merely 
expressive of certain feelings, feelings of approval or dis- 
approval, is an over- simplification.r2 
It seems beside the point, then, to consider further implications of, 
and objections to, the first expression of the theory; thus I shall look 
to the modified expression of the theory before considering possible 
implications and objections. 
1LTL, p. 108. 2: Philosophical Essays, p. 238. 
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If his earlier analysis is an over -simplification, in what way 
(or ways) would he amend it? Ayer introduces us to this later expression 
of his emotivist analysis by considering how moral judgments would be 
used by the two hypothetical observers of the murder case. I shall out- 
line what he has to say before commenting on it. The observers, we recall, 
are in agreement about all circumstances of the case, including the agent's 
motives, but they 'disagree' in their evaluation of it. Ayer allows that 
in some way the ethical evaluations they make are dependent on the 'natural 
features' of the situation; and this, I assume, is based on the empirical 
observation that evaluations change with changes in the data the observers 
acquire about natural features of the situation. But such dependence 
between data about the natural features, and the evaluations is not a 
logical dependence, for "ethical argument is not formal demonstration ". 
Nor is it scientific, as we have seen in his rejection of naturalistic 
theories. Ayer strictly maintains 'Hume's gap'. Nevertheless, the 
observers give 'reasons' for their respective evaluations. What, then, 
are they doing? 
"My own answer to this question," writes Ayer, "is that what 
are accounted reasons for our moral judgments are reasons only 
in the sense that they determine attitudes. One attempts to 
influence another person morally by calling his attention to 
certain natural features of the situation, which are such as 
will be likely to evoke from him the desired response.i1 
This initial statement of a modified version of his theory of course 
applies primarily to the illustration of the two hypothetical observers 
who are trying to persuade each other about the 'rightness' of their 
respective evaluations. Ayer thus goes on to speak of other kinds of 
situations in which we make moral judgments. 
Philosophical Essays, p. 238. 
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"...one may give reasons to oneself as a means of settling an 
attitude, or, more importantly, as a means of coming to some 
practical decision. Of course there are many cases in which 
one applies an ethical term without there being any question 
of one's having to act oneself, or even to persuade others to 
act, in any present situation. Moral judgments passed upon 
behaviour of historical or fictitious characters provide 
obvious examples. "1 
This passage is to be remembered in view of some objections to his earlier 
analysis. Brand Blanshard, for example, considers that the earlier view 
is reduced to absurdity on the point, among others, that it does not 
adequately account for moral judgments about something that happened in 
the past, and some critics have said it does not give an adequate account 
of ethical disagreement. (As I shall later argue, most of Professor 
Blanshard's argument in his paper, "Subjectivism in Ethics ----SA Criticism ",2 
fails in its pfrpose.) At present I simply take note of the criticism. 
Ayer next proceeds to emphasize a point which he had expressed 
without emphasis in Languag , e Truth, and Logic,3 and had seen fit to stress 
in the Introduction to his Second Edition .° 
"But an action or a situation is morally evaluated always as 
an action or a situation of a certain kind. What is approved 
or disapproved is something repeatable. In saying that Brutus 
or Raskolnikov acted rightly, I am giving myself and others 
leave to imitate them should similar circumstances arise. I 
show myself to be favourably disposed in either case towards 
actions of that type. Similarly, in saying that they acted 
wrongly, I express a resolution not to imitate them, and 
endeavour also to discourage them. "5 
Now in trying to discourage others, I give 'reasons' why I think the action 
is wrong; and such argument, according to Ayer, "may take various forms ". 
Assuming, for example, that some 'moral principles' (e.g. "that human 
life is sacred ") have an influence upon those with whom I argue, I might 
try to establish that the principle applies to the situation in question. 
2Ibid. 
Blanshard, "Subjectivism in Ethics -- -A Criticism ", from The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1, 1951. 
L STL, p. 107 (bottom of page). 4LTL, p. 21. 
Philosophical Essays, p. 237. 
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Or, if I assume that the utilitarian considerations will influence others, 
I "may try to establish certain facts, as, for example, that the action in 
question caused, or was such as would be likely to cause, a great deal of 
happiness." Such 'reasons' are given in support of a moral judgment which 
one wishes others to adopt. 
"As for the moral judgment itself," he continues, "it may be 
regarded as expressing the attitude which the reasons given 
for it are calculated to evoke.i1 
It is at this point that Ayer allows that his earlier analysis (that 
"moral judgments are merely expressive of certain feelings...of approval 
or disapproval") is an "over- simplification ". Following this, he proceeds 
to say something further about his use of the word "attitude ", 
"The fact is rather that what may be described as moral attitudes 
consist in certain patterns of behaviour, and that the expression 
of a moral judgment is an element in the pattern. The moral 
judgment expresses the attitude in the sense that it contributes 
to defining it." 
On the question of "why people respond favourably to certain facts and 
unfavourably to others ", Ayer, as a philosopher, has no concern. This, 
he writes, is a question for the sociologist. The philosopher, that is, 
takes up the case at the point of the fact that there is generally (to 
use the language of behaviouristic psychology, which is not out of place 
in this context) a certain type of 'response' to certain types of 'stimuli'. 
His task is "only to analyse the use of ethical terms, not scientifically 
to explain it." 
This, in brief, is the newer version of Ayer's analysis of ethical 
statements. In what sense does it differ from the earlier version? An 
obvious difference between the two versions is that we no longer see 
references to the words "feelings" or "sentiments "; but instead we see 
the words "attitudes ", "disposed ", and "patterns of behaviour ". The word 
1lbid. 
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"feelings ", as I have mentioned, is of course highly ambiguous, as 
professor Ryle so clearly pointed out. (His The Concept of Mind was 
published in the same year -- 1949 -- as Ayer's paper). As I have argued 
earlier, Ayer was not clear in his use of the word "feelings" in the first 
edition of Language, Truth, and Logic, and while he uses the word in 
both senses, it may be said that he gives undue emphasis to the 'active' 
or 'occurrence' sense. He does allow for a dispositional analysis, however, 
and even in the first edition of Language, Truth, and Logic, when he used 
the phrase "a certain type of action "1 as leading to the expression of 
"certain moral sentiments ", he is using what Ryle would term "dispositional" 
rather than "occurrence" language. However, as he allows in the Introduction 
to the Second Edition, he did not clearly bring out this point. He makes 
up for this, however, in the Introduction to the Second Edition, when he 
writes the following passage: 
"...the common objects of moral approval or disapproval are not 
particular actions so much as classes of actions; by which I 
mean that if an action is labelled right or wrong, or good or 
bad, as the case may be, it is because it is thought to be an 
action of a certain type. And this point seems to me important, 
because I think that what seems to be an ethical judgment is 
very often a factual classification of an action as belonging 
to some class of actions by which a certain moral attitude on 
the part of the speaker is habitually aroused.r2 
And in other passages in this short section on "The Emotive Theory of 
Values ", he speaks of people who 'disagree' in their ethical evaluations 
as having different 'attitudes'. Although there would be nothing wrong 
with continuing to use the words "feelings" and "sentiments" in his later 
work, so long as he stipulates that he is using them in a dispositional 
sense, there is a danger of their being considered as occurrence words, 
or, even worse, 'introspective occurrence'words. Ayer when most cautious, 
like Ryle and other philosophical analysts, adopts a 'hands off' attitude 
1LTL, p. 107. 2LTL, p. 21. 
AYER 106 
towards 'introspection'. For him there can be no accusation of perpetrating 
what Ryle has termed "the ghost in the machine myth ".1 It is preferable, 
then, to use words which more clearly are understood as being dispositional 
rather than occurrence words; and Ayer does this in his paper. 
In changing his manner of expressing his 'emotive theory of values', 
however, does Ayer change the theory itself? Acknowledging some conventions 
of language he now gives us a more cautious expression of the theory, allow- 
ing that there is a use of the word "meaningful" which would no longer prompt 
him to say that ethical statements are 'meaningless'; but this appears to 
be a bow to conventions of our language rather than to any theory of 'mean- 
ing' beyond the 'verificationist' theory. In insisting that the purpose of 
value judgments is primarily and only 'emotive' he would still assume that 
such judgments fall short of the ideal achieved, at least in principle, by 
factual judgments. What is of more importance to note, however, is that he 
in no significant way modifies his view that ethical statements are distinctly 
different from factual and scientific statements. Not only are they dis- 
tinctly different, but there is no way in which we can argue logically 
from one type to the other. Although we may argue logically about 'facts' 
which, in turn, may lead to different value judgments from those we had 
expressed earlier, the relation between the factual statements and the 
value judgments is psychological and not logical. He thus accepts in an 
extreme form the distinction referred to by Nowell -Smith as "Hume's gap ". 
Section 6 
Ayer's theory of values, especially the early version, has met 
with unfavourable criticism, as well as with adulation. I have already 
mentioned the charge by Sir David Ross that the theory is an "attempt to 
10u. cit., pp. 15-16. 
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discredit ethics ", and Martin D'Arcy's sarcastic 'gratitude' to Ayer 
"for having shown us how modern philosophers can fiddle and play tricks 
while the world burns. "1 But much of this unfavourable criticism has 
either been based on a misunderstanding of the theory, or from the basis 
of 'objectivist' assumptions which could not withstand the criticism 
which a closer reading of Ayer would provide. Criticisms of the theory 
tend to cover the same main points, and it happens that two of these 
points are treated in Brand Blanshard's paper "Subjectivism in Ethics-- - 
A Criticism ".2 Some criticisms, as Ayer pointed out, have been primarily 
an attack on his positivist epistemology, as if the 'emotive theory of 
values' would fall if the epistemology falls. The attack by Sir David 
Ross was of this nature. Now although Ayer's theory of values is certainly 
influenced by his epistemology, it is not logically entailed by it. It 
is possible, as Ayer says, to conduct an analysis of the usage of ethical 
language independently of a specific theory of knowledge; thus the strongest 
criticisms of his emotive theory should focus on the analysis itself. 
The attack by Blanshard is primarily of this nature and thus is worth 
considering. 
One of the main points of Blanshard's criticism is the question of 
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of feelings in some situations. 
The general theme of his paper is to argue that 'subjectivist' theories 
of moral philosophy are mistaken, and in his first section he treats the 
kind of theory as expressed specifically in Language, Truth, and Logic. 
It is not my intention to defend Ayer's theory, either in the first or 
second expressions of it, and I have already indicated some of its 
weaknesses. My purpose is rather to consider whether or not Blanshard is 
1Above, Introduction, p. 7. 20p. cit. 
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successful in his intentions. After quoting a key passage in the 'emoti- 
vist' ( Blanshard terms it 'positivist') analysis, Blanshard goes on to 
interpret that theory as saying that "when people make...(ethical judg- 
ments) they do not mean to assert anything about the character of an act 
or object." He then writes that he will "try to show that this is what 
they do mean to assert." This, then, is ostensibly the conclusion to 
which he will argue in his first section; and the subject of the appro- 
priateness or inappropriateness of 'feelings' is the first of his argu- 
ments to support his conclusion. 
In opposing Ayer's interpretations of language, Blanshard relies 
on his own interpretations of the language of "the plain man ". 
"...everyone takes it for granted," he writes, "that in moral 
matters feelings are sometimes appropriate and sometimes not; 
but this assumption is senseless if positivism is correct. "] - 
To illustrate his point, he cites the example of a painting which depicts 
the end of a gladiatorial combat in a Roman arena. In the painting, the 
victor, with sword upraised, stands over his prostrate opponent and is 
looking to the spectators for the sign for 'mercy' or 'no mercy'. Among 
the spectators, "a group of elegant ladies, with languid amusement, are 
turning their thumbs down." Blanshard supposes that "everyone finds it 
shocking who considers it at all" (with the exception, we might insert, 
of the Roman ladies in their own time), and he expresses the value judg- 
ment that "languid amusement is hardly the appropriate frame of mind with 
which to greet the blotting out of life in blood and pain." Such "in- 
appropriate feelings ", he suggests, are in fact morally bad or wrong. 
"My first difficulty with positivism," he continues, "is that 
it would reduce all such answers (to questions concerning the 
appropriateness of feelings) to meaninglessness. It holds 
that there is nothing bad in death and pain themselves, and 
nothing wrong in inflicting either on anyone. Nothing 
answering to these value words enters the scene until someone 
assumes an attitude. But if this is true, it follows that no 
lOp. cit., p. 128. 
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such attitude is ever more appropriate or inappropriate than 
any other, since the ground which could make anything appropriate 
has been removed. If an attitude of favouring is to be approp- 
riate, there must be that in the object which makes it so; and 
if, independently of the attitude, the object is wholly valueless, 
there is nothing left which could justify either favour or 
disfavour. "1 
There are several points here which one could challenge. To begin 
with, there is nothing in Ayer's theory, even in the early version, which 
could be construed as supporting or rejecting the use of the value state- 
ment "there is nothing bad in death and pain themselves, and nothing wrong 
in inflicting either on anyone." In his later version, published two 
years prior to the publication of Blanshard's paper, Ayer explicitly 
rejects the interpretation which Blanshard later gives. 
"I am not saying that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong," 
Ayer writes, "or that it does not matter what we do. For... 
such a statement would itself be the expression of a moral 
attitude. s2 
His task as a moral philosopher has nothing to do with whether or not the 
languid amusement of the ladies is appropriate, even though he, like 
Blanshard, (but not as a moral philosopher) may make his own moral judgments 
about the ladies -- -just as the ladies made their own moral judgments in 
languidly turning their thumbs down. Ayer could in fact express ethical 
statements similar to Blanshard's about the situation, and quite probably 
would do so, but whether he does nr not is irrelevant. His task as a 
moral philosopher is to analyse the statements which ladies in such 
situations might make, or, for that matter) the statements of any moralist, 
including those of Blanshard in this context. "To analyse moral judgments," 
writes Ayer, "is not itself to moralize." His "meta- ethical theory," he 
goes on to say, "is neutral as regards all moral principles. "3 
30p. cit., p. 128. 2Philosophical Essays, p. 246. 
Ibid. , p. 24$. 
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A minor point to raise in passing is to ask what Blanshard could 
mean by saying that when people make ethical judgments they do mean to 
assert something about the character of an object (in addition to an 'act'). 
Ayer admittedly invites this kind of language when he allows, in the early 
version of his theory, that the function of the relevant ethical word is 
"to express feelings about certain objects... "1 There may be a convention 
of language that would allow one to use the word "object" in this way, 
but I cannot think of what it could be. Nor, it should be noted, can 
A. C. Ewing, who, in taking a similar approach as Blanshard in his dispute 
with emotivism, explicitly rejected this convention. In writing about 
what could be meant by the "'objectivity' of ethical judgments or of value 
judgments in general," Ewing said that "it obviously does not mean that 
they ascribe value properties to physical objects. These clearly do not 
possess ethical qualities. "2 As I have mentioned, however, this is a minor 
point of disagreement. 
The second main point to challenge in Blanshard's first argument 
is that he argues from the assumptions of an objectivist theory which is 
itself impossible to demonstrate, and which, in any event, as Ayer argues, 
is irrelevant to moral philosophy. In the final paragraph of his section 
dealing with Ayer's theory, Blanshard writes that "in judgments of good 
and bad we do commonly mean to say something about objects, something 
believed to hold apart from the accident of the judgment itself." 
Possibly the objectivist assumptions are nowhere more apparent than they 
are in a phrase from the quotation which introduced his argument. 
"Nothing answering to these value words enters the scene until 
someone assumes an attitude; and any goodness or lqadness that 
supervenes is wholly conferred by this attitude." 
3 
LTL, p. 108. 
Op. cit., p. 128. 
2Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 1. 
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The emotivist would of course want to rephrase such a statement, since it 
is expressed in logically misleading language --language which leads one 
to assume an 'objectivist' theory of values. Ayer might well begin by 
saying that ethical terms are not used until they are used, and that his 
task as a moral philosopher does not begin until they are used. There is 
nothing in his theory, as we have seen, which would prevent him, gua 
moralist, from saying that the type of situation depicted by the painting 
is wrong (or right), always was wrong (or right), and always will be 
wrong (or right). His task as a moral philosopher, however, is to analyse 
such value statements, and not, irrelevantly, to judge either the situation 
or the value statements in terms of his own moral standards. 
Above all, however, Ayer could go on to say that Blanshard's 
argument is pointless in that it depends on arguing for one side of the 
'subjectivist -objectivist antithesis' which is "out of place in moral 
philosophy. "1 A subjectivist arguing for the opposite side would similarly 
be arguing pointlessly so far as moral philosophy is concerned. Ayer of 
course had himself invited the label of "subjectivism" in Language, Truth, 
and Logic, for, while consistently rejecting what he termed "orthodox 
subjectivist theories ", he did allow that his own theory might be termed 
"radically subjectivist ".2 But even in the earlier version, the theory 
does not invite comparison with 'objectivist' theories in the familiar 
'subjectivist -objectivist' controversy. This is clarified in the later 
version. It is pointless, he says, for subjectivists and objectivists 
to argue for their respective positions as if this would have any bearing 
on moral decisions. 
"The problem," he writes, "is not that the subjectivist denies 
that certain wild or domesticated animals, 'objective values', 
exist and the objectivist triumphantly produces them; or that 
1Philosophical Essays, p. 242. 2LTL, p. 109. 
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the objectivist returns like an explorer with tales from the 
kingdom of values and the subjectivist says he is a liar. It 
does not matter what the explorer finds or does not find. For 
talking about values is not a matter of describing what may or 
may not be there. There is no such problem. The moral problem 
is: What am I to do? What attitude am I to take? And moral 
judgments are directives in this sense.n1 
Ayer has more to say about this in his paper, but in view of what we have 
already seen concerning his distinction between the uses of ethical and 
factual statements, I believe the point is clear. It is of interest, 
nevertheless, that in extending his argument against the relevance of an 
insistence on 'objectivism' in moral philosophy, he uses the same argu- 
ment which G.E. Moore had used in his exposition of 'the naturalistic 
fallacy'.2 Let us suppose, suggests Ayer, that the objectivist does have 
the kind of experience he purports to have, of intuiting objective values. 
He, the objectivist, can still raise such questions as the following: 
"Are these values the real ones? Are the objects that I am ex- 
periencing themselves really valuable, and haw can I know they arell "3 
How, asks Ayer, are these questions to be answered? Even if the objecti- 
vist suggests that "the value...may be something that it does not occur 
to us to question," it is not "inconceivable that the value should be 
questioned." Thus, as Ayer writes, "these alleged objective values per- 
form no function." So long as it is conceivable, that is, to ask if the 
objective 'characteristic' is valuable, there can be no resolution, within 
such a theory, of the fundamental moral questions, "What am I to do ? ", and 
(to translate Ayer's question slightly), "What moral judgments am I to 
stand by ?" The conclusion is, therefore, that "the whole dispute about 
the objectivity of values, as it is ordinarily conducted, is pointless 
and idle." 
If the objectivist continues to argue that some such theory as his 
is necessary, since a theory of moral philosophy is needed which would 
Philosophical Essays, p. 242. 
Philosophical Essays, p. 243. 
2Above, p. 74. 
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provide more 'objective certainty' than any subjectivist theories could 
offer, we are reminded that Ayer had clearly established that the alleged 
certainty of the 'intuitionist' and 'moral sense' theorist is neither 
more nor less 'certain' than the claims of the self- avowed subjectivistl; 
but this question, in any event, is no longer relevant. 
Blanshard uses a second main argument in support of his claim that 
the ' positivist' analysis misinterprets the conventions of the ethical 
language of "the plain man", and that when we make ethical statements "we 
do commonly mean to say something about objects, something believed to 
hold apart from the accident of the judgment itself." This argument is 
most pointed when it concerns ethical judgments about something that 
happened in the past. Blanshard introduces his argument in the following 
manner: 
"The positivist view requires us to hold (a) that if our 
statement had not been made, there would have been nothing 
good or bad in the event when it occurred, and (b) that if 
the event had not occurred, all the good or evil that our 
judgment indicates would come into being anyhow, by reason 
of our attitude. Both of these implications conflict 
flagrantly with the intention of such judgment. "2 
Now as I have already indicated there is a sense in which the first 
version of Ayer's theory may be charged with not giving an adequate 
explanation of ethical judgments about actions in the past. That is to 
say, any theory which maintains that the purpose of ethical judgments is 
to express and evoke 'feelings' (with "feelings" used in the 'occurrence' 
sense) cannot adequately account for the fact that we may judge an action 
of the past as being just as wrong as any similar action we may experience 
now, even though we may experience none of the 'feelings' which the 
present action 'stimulates'. This is not the argument pressed by Blanshard, 
lAbove, p. 76. 20p. cit., p. 130. 
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however, as may be seen from the preceding quotation. Such an argument, 
in any event, would not be effective against Ayer's later expression of 
his theory in which he emphasizes 'attitudes' in the 'dispositional' 
sense. Blanshard presses a different argument, however, and if what he 
says is sound it would apply equally against either the early or later 
version of Ayer's theory. Blanshard's argument, that is, is, first, that 
"the plain man" would assume that the action of Brutus, for example, was 
morally wrong (or right) even if no person had been present to judge it; 
and, secondly, that 'goodness' or 'badness' do not "come into being" simply 
when a person 'assumes' or 'has' an 'attitude' of approval or disapproval. 
Blanshard's argument is meaningful, however, only on the assumption that 
there are objective 'characteristics' or 'qualities' which are assumed 
to exist independently of any judgment or judger. Blanshard is not so 
much concerned with purposes for which ethical statements might be used 
as he is concerned with the ethical characteristics which he assumes 
are denoted by ethical predicates.' This is of course an objectivist 
concern, and Blanshard's whole argument presses for an objectivist 
interpretation of the conventions of language. Ayer's arguments to indicate 
that the objectivist-subjectivist antithesis is pointless may again be 
recalled. What is the point of arguing that objective values may or may 
not have existed in the past? If they did exist, which seems impossible 
to demonstrate, are they "the real ones ? ", "are they really valuable ? ", 
and "how can I know they are ?" If we can ask such questions, what 
purpose would these objective values serve in a situation which calls for 
ethical decision? Blanshard uses several other minor arguments against 
Ayer in support of his two main arguments, but, in general, and because 
his arguments are ultimately dependent on his objectivist assumptions, 
his section against Ayer fails in its intention. 
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There is a sense, however, as I have indicated, in which one might 
charge Ayer with not giving an adequate account of the 'descriptive' or 
'factual' meaning of value judgments - -- although to concede this point 
does not require giving in to the objectivist. When Blanshard argues that 
in making value judgments we commonly mean to assert something about the 
action or person judged, he is thinking in terms of some non -natural 
ethical predicate. But if one argued against Ayer that ethical judgments, 
while serving their ethical purposes, and while 'indicating' something 
about the judger's moral code, also assert something of a descriptive 
or factual nature about the person or situation judged, then this could 
hardly be denied. As I have mentioned, the tendency for moral philosophers 
to use highly abstract ethical terms such as "good" and "right's, together 
with Ayer's assumption that words may serve only one purpose at one time, 
would obscure the fact that ethical words may also serve a descriptive 
purpose. In saying that a man is just, for example, the word "just" not 
only serves its ethical purpose (whatever that may precisely be), but it 
also tells us something of a descriptive nature about the man. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, Stevenson takes such an approach without 
either giving up an emotivist analysis or conceding any points to the non - 
naturalist objectivist. Ayer's theory, both in its early and its modified 
forms, too narrowly conceives the purposes which ethical words and state- 
ments may serve, and this is a fundamental weakness of his emotive theory 
of values. 
A further main criticism which I have previously mentioned is the 
charge that if the theory were sound it would be impossible for people 
to contradict one another in questions of value ---a conclusion which is 
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held to be absurd .1 (This question concerning ethical disagreement is 
one we shall have to consider in greater detail in the next chapter). 
Obviously this is a charge which Ayer does not treat lightly, for, as we 
have seen in his example of the two observers of the murder case, he felt 
that his manner of expressing the first version of his theory was an over- 
simplification; and in the Introduction to the Second Edition of Language, 
Truth, and Logic he devoted a considerable portion of his short section 
"The Emotive Theory of Values" to this very question. In view of the 
modifications we have seen in his paper, however, it would be pointless 
to continue to say that his theory could not condone the use of language 
which asserts that people contradict one another in questions of values. 
The fundamental question concerns the use of the word "contradict ". 
Enough has been said, I believe, to indicate how he would use the word. 
To generalize the point, contradictory ethical statements, considered in 
terms of their ethical use, are contradictory in terms of the conflicting 
'attitudes' which agents seek to express and evoke. Considered in terms 
of their use for ethical purposes (and not in terms of other, less rele- 
vant uses) they are not contradictory in the same sense in which factual, 
empirical statements may be said to be contradictory. 
An interesting feature of this criticism of Ayer's theory is that 
those who make it, and those who take it seriously, appear to assume a 
theory of meaning which I have referred to as a 'meaning in terms only of 
a referent' theory. That is to say, they assume that words like "good" 
and "right" nnist have specific, objective 'designata',2 whether these 
1Cf., Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 12. Ewing does not refer 
to Ayer by name, but the theory which he criticizes could be Ayer's. It 
is of interest that in his most recent book, Second Thoughts in Moral 
Philosophy, Ewing modifies his attack on emotivist theories, although he 
remains an objectivist. 
2Cf., above, p. 89. 
AYER 117 
'designata' are considered to be natural or non -natural. Thus when I 
say "X is good" I predicate the appropriate designatum of X, and when 
you say "X is not good" you deny that X has the designatum, that is, you 
contradict me. The corollary is that when the word "good" is said not 
to have any designatum in this objective sense, as would be the case in 
Ayer's theory, we would utter these apparently conflicting statements 
but what we say would not be contradictory in the strict sense since our 
relevant ethical words are designatum -less or 'meaningless'. But if we 
regard ethical sentences as used primarily for some other purpose than 
describing or designating (either natural or non -natural predicates), 
then it seems nonsensical to suggest that they cannot be said to be 
contradictory simply because they do not serve a purpose for which they 
are not used. To persist in saying that they cannot be contradictory is 
not to press a point of logic, but is rather to beg the question for some 
type of 'meaning in terms only of a referent' theory of meaning, whether 
it be a 'verificationist' theory, on the one hand, or some type of 
intuitionist objectivist theory on the other. With the 'verificationist' 
background which coloured especially the early expression of his emotivist 
analysis, Ayer undoubtedly invited this attack. But his very assertion 
of the emotivist theory, as we shall see when considering Stevenson's 
theory of 'emotive meaning', points the way out of any need to be con- 
cerned with the charge - -- although it points also to the limitations of 
the 'verificationist' theory of meaning. 
What, in general, may be said about Ayer's emotive theory of 
values ? --- Although he has modified his manner of expressing his theory, 
he does not essentially alter it. That is to say, he strictly maintains 
the 'autonomy of morals', and he insists that the purpose of moral 
judgments is 'emotive'. In the later version of his theory, as we have 
seen, he writes that moral judgments "may be regarded as expressing the 
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attitude which the reasons given for it are calculated to evoke." There 
is no suggestion that 'reasons' are logically related to 'moral attitudes' 
or to the moral judgments which express such 'attitudes'. For Ayer, the 
relationship is strictly 'psychological' or 'causal'. As I have mentioned 
in the Introduction,., each of the philosophers I have chosen to study will 
have something to say about this relationship. Each of them will also 
have something to say, either implicitly or explicitly, about other 
aspects of the kind of emotive theory postulated by Ayer. Whatever may 
be said in criticism of his theory, however, it would be difficult to 
detract from the importance of his contribution to the history of moral 
philosophy. In the language of the logical analyst Ayer has clearly 
restated Hume's challenge in a manner that should give pause to any 
cognitivist. 
CHAPTER III 
C. L. STEVENSON 
Section 1 
In 1937, one year after the appearance of Ayer's Language, Truth, 
and Logic, C.L. Stevenson published a paper in Mind entitled "The 
Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms ". In the following year he published 
two more papersl which stemmed from the first; and then, in 1945, these 
writings were brought together, with some qualifications, in his Ethics 
and Language. Although there have also been later papers, I shall con- 
sider the book as the primary source for this treatment of Stevenson. 
In his book he briefly mentions several recent and contemporary 
philosophers who have influenced him, and he devotes separate sections 
to Dewey, R.B. Perry, and G.E. Moore. He also considers, in one section, 
the writings of Carnap, Ayer, Russell, Ogden and Richards, and other 
emotivists. While he has some reservations about the early expressions 
of the emotive theory of values, he acknowledges, nevertheless, that his 
work "finds much more to defend in the analyses of Carnap, Ayer, and the 
others, than it finds to attack. "2 His work, while influenced by others, 
especially by Wittgenstein, is thus firmly in the Humean tradition, and 
it is not surprising that in a section devoted to Hume he has this to say: 
1 "Ethical Judgments and Avoidability ", and "Persuasive Definitions", 
both inMind, Vol. XLVII, 1938. 
-Ethics and Language, p. 267. Note: henceforth, when citing 
Ethics and Language in footnotes, I shall use the initials EL. 
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"Of all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked 
the questions that here concern us, and has most nearly 
reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept." 
Stevenson's purpose is not, then, to erect a new theory so much as it is 
to qualify an older one. Indeed, after making the statement about the 
"analyses of Carnap, Ayer, and the others," he says that his work "seeks 
only to qualify their views...and to free them from any seeming cynicism." 
The purpose of this present chapter will be to outline and assess Steven - 
son's qualifications to the emotive theory of values. 
The general plan for this chapter will be as follows: in the 
remainder of this first section I shall consider Stevenson's 'preliminary 
distinctions', especially his distinction between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes', 
and between 'descriptive' and 'evaluative' uses of language. In considering 
these distinctions it will be necessary to consider his 'psychological' 
or 'pragmatic' theory of meaning. In Sections 2 and 2 I shall summarize 
his two 'patterns of analysis' of ethical terms and ethical methodology. 
Section 4 will be the conclusion for the chapter. While this general 
plan will serve to indicate the main topics which I shall discuss, it 
must not be construed as suggesting that there are aspects of Stevenson's 
theory which may be considered in isolation from others. As it happens, 
all of these topics are inextricably related within the exposition of 
Stevenson's theory, and it will be found that in this chapter, as in his 
book, there is a certain amount of over -lapping between any one topic 
and one or more of the others. 
In the very first paragraph of his book Stevenson introduces an 
important qualification. In that paragraph he cites the following two 
objects of his work: 
-EL, p. 273. 
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"Its first object is to clarify the meaning of the ethical terms-- - 
such as 'good', 'right', 'just', 'ought', and so on. Its second 
object is to characterize the general methods by which ethical 
judgments can be proved or supported." 
The innovation (while implicit in the first object, as will be apparent 
later) is of course explicit in the second object, for to assume at the 
outset that "ethical judgments can be proved or supported" is certainly 
to suggest something different from Ayer's early statement that "sentences 
which simply express moral judgments do not say anything. "1 Stevenson 
appears, also, to be saying something different from Hume's statement 
that it is impossible that ethical statements "can be pronounced either 
true or false, and to be either contrary or conformable to reason. "2 It 
is in elaborating and supporting this qualification that Stevenson, if 
successful, would make a distinctive contribution to the history of moral 
philosophy. 
In interpersonal situations a person need be concerned with 
proving or supporting his ethical judgments only when one or more other 
people disagree with him; and Stevenson says that in making his argument 
the question which "will prove to be of central importance ",more 'central', 
that is, than the apparently central and closely related question concern- 
ing the meaning of ethical terms, is the question, "What is the nature of 
ethical agreement and disagreement ? "3 He by no means suggests that agree- 
ment and disagreement between persons constitutes the whole class of 
normative problems. He realizes that as a result of concentrating upon 
agreement and disagreement, there are some normative problems to which 
his approach will not be directly relevant. There are, for example, 
problems which arise in personal deliberation, rather than in interpersonal 
1LTL, p. 10$. Cf., above, Ch. II, pp.104 -6 for Ayer's later version 
which iR similar to Stevenson's. 
'Cf., above, Ch. I, p. 39. 3EL, p. 2. 
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discourse, and which involve not disagreement or agreement but simply 
uncertainty or growing conviction." But, as he expects to show later in 
his book, his approach is indirectly relevant to such normative problems, 
and, meanwhile, "there is a convenience in looking chiefly to the inter- 
personal problems, where the use of terms and methods is most clearly 
evidenced. "1 Ten years later, in a review of Nowell -Smith's Ethics, he 
allows that "it is by no means easy to handle both the personal and the 
interpersonal problems without slighting one at the expense of the other, "2 
and he regrets that his approach in Ethics and Language might have created 
the false impression that he had neglected personal problems altogether. 
In his review, however, he maintains, quite rightly,3 that he had not 
neglected personal problems in his book, that, in fact, he "was at pains 
to show that each party is as frequently intent upon straightening out 
his own attitudes as in convincing someone else...." He begins, then, 
by concentrating on interpersonal problems; and, for the sake of simplicity, 
he decides to focus his attention on 'disagreement', treating 'agreement' 
by implication. 
In elaborating his suggestion that in cases of disagreement 
normative judgments may be 'proved' or 'supported', he next introduces a 
distinction which is fundamental to his whole argument. "...Let us 
begin," he says, "by distinguishing two broad kinds of disagreement." 
These two kinds, he goes on to say, are "disagreement in belief ", and 
"disagreement in attitude. "4 
The notion of "disagreement in belief", he suggests, is familiar 
to us and "will require only brief attention." (This statement, as we 
shall see, would be challenged by some philosophers, since they would 
llbid. 2Mind, vol. LXIV, 1955, P. 409. 
'Cf., EL, pp. 130-134; 147-151; & 238-9. 4EL, pp. 2-3. 
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challenge Stevenson's distinction between beliefs and attitudes.) Such 
disagreements in belief "occur in science, history, biography, and their 
counterparts in everyday life...." Among other examples, he cites the 
following: 
"Questions about the nature of light -transmission, the voyages 
of Leif Ericson, and the date on which Jones was last in to 
tea, are all similar in that they involve an opposition that 
is primarily of beliefs.... In such cases one man believes 
that p is the answer, and another that not -p, or some proposition 
incompatible with p, is the answer; and in the course of dis- 
cussion each tries to give some manner of proof for his view, 
or revise it in the light of further information."1 
For Hume and the early Ayer, Stevenson's disagreement in belief would be 
the full extent of 'meaningful' disagreement. 
But, according to Stevenson, we must not suppose that the word 
"disagreement" has no further use. 
"There are other cases," he writes, "differing sharply from 
these, which may yet be called 'disagreements' with equal 
propriety. They involve an opposition, sometimes tentative 
and gentle, sometimes strong, which is not of beliefs, but 
rather of attitudes -- -that is to say, an opposition of pur- 
poses, aspirations, wants, preferences, desires, and so on." 
Such disagreement he terms "disagreement in attitude." Some writers are 
tempted, he believes, to "overintellectualize" situations in which there 
is disagreement in attitude, to analyse them, that is, in terms of 
'beliefs'.. Thus he gives a number of examples which make clear what he 
intends when he speaks of disagreements in attitude: 
"Mrs. A has social aspirations, and wants to move with the 
elite. Mr. A is easy -going, and loyal to his old friends. 
They accordingly disagree about what gaests they will invite 
to their party. The curator of the museum wants to buy 
pictures by contemporary artists; some of his advisers 
prefer the purchase of old masters. They disagree. John's 
mother is concerned about the dangers of playing football, 
and doesn't want him to play. John, even though he agrees 




In a comparison summarizing the two kinds of disagreement, he writes the 
following passage: 
"The two kinds of disagreement differ mainly in this respect: 
The former is concerned with how matters are truthfully to 
be described and explained; the latter is concerned with how 
they are to be favoured or disfavoured, and hence with how 
they are to be shaped by human efforts." 
In saying that there may be disagreement in attitude he would not 
be saying very much if what he said amounted only to pointing to a 
different convention of the usage of the word "disagreement"; for to say 
that people 'favour' different things is not to say anything that Hume 
and Ayer have not said. The point of difference, however, as we shall 
see, is that Stevenson wishes to maintain that there can be disagree- 
ments in attitude that show themselves in the meanings of words: that 
there is a usage of the word "meaning" which is as appropriate when 
speaking of language which expresses attitudes as it is when speaking of 
language which expresses beliefs. 
There is an obvious possibility of confusion between the notions 
of "disagreement in attitudes" and "disagreement about attitudes "; and 
Stevenson makes a special point of clarifying his usage of these phrases. 
"Suppose Mr. Nearthewind maintains that most voters favor a 
certain bill, and Mr. Closerstill maintains that most of 
them are against it. It is clear that the two men disagree, 
and that their disagreement concerns attitudes - -- namely, the 
attitudes they believe the voters to have. But are Nearthewind 
and Closerstill disagreeing in attitude? Clearly not. So far 
as their above contentions show, they are disagreeing in belief 
about attitudes, and need not be disagreeing in attitude at all. 
Disagreement in belief about attitudes is simply a special sort 
of disagreement in belief, differing from disagreement in belief 
about head colds only with regard to subject matter.rl 
A further preliminary distinction which will be seen to be of great 
importance to his theory is that we must not suppose that "every argument 
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represents one sort of disagreement to the exclusion of the others." 
Within individual arguments, that is, "there is often disagreement of 
both sorts." 
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"Our attitudes, as many have pointed out, often affect our 
beliefs, not only by causing us to indulge in wishful thinking, 
but also by leading us to develop and check such beliefs as 
point out the means of getting what we want. And conversely, 
our beliefs often affect our attitudes; for we may alter our 
form of approval of something when we change our beliefs about 
its nature....Any implication that the alternatives are mutually 
exclusive can only be rejected. The influence goes both ways, 
although at times only one direction of influence may predominate." 
In attempting to ascertain these relationships, he says, we must appreciate 
that the relationship "is always factual, never logical." There are four 
logical possibilities among such factual relationships; namely, (1) 
"disagreement in belief without disagreement in attitude," (2) "disagree- 
ment in attitude without disagreement in belief," (3) "both sorts of 
disagreement occur conjointly," and (4) neither may occur. If we are, 
then, to ascertain which of these possibilities, "in any given case or 
class of cases, is in fact realized," we "must appeal to experience." 
But, he continues, "experience clearly shows...that the cases which involve 
both sorts of disagreement (or agreement) are extremely numerous. "2 
These, then, are the preliminary distinctions with which Stevenson 
begins to undertake his task of answering the question, "What is the 
nature of ethical agreement and disagreement ? ". Before he proceeds, 
however, he pauses to examine a basic assumption which underlies all of 
his preliminary distinctions. "Our distinction between the sorts of 
disagreement," he writes, "has presupposed a more general one -- -that 
between beliefs and attitudes. "3 This is obcriously a distinction of 
crucial importance to his theory, as it is indeed to the emotivism of 
1EL p. 5. 
EL, p. 7. 
2EL, p. 7. 
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Hume and Ayer. If no clear distinction can be made between Stevenson's 
use of the terms "beliefs" and "attitudes ", there can be no clear distinction, 
for him, between what has been termed "descriptive" (or 'theoretical', or 
'fact- stating' or 'scientific') language on the one hand, and "evaluative" 
language on the other. If evaluative language, for the emotivist, is 
related to 'attitudes', then to support an emotive theory of values he 
must be able to say that 'attitudes' are able to be distinguished from 
'beliefs'. This would be of special importance to earlier emotivists who 
appeared to regret that value statements did not behave as 'meaningfully' 
as factual or descriptive statements (beliefs). If no distinction between 
'beliefs' and 'attitudes' is able to be maintained, and if factual state- 
ments (belief statements) are held to be the unquestioned 'good citizens' 
of language, as they were by Ayer (and other logical empiricists), then 
it would seem reasonable for emotivists to become cognitivists. 
The relation between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' on the one hand, 
and descriptive and evaluative language on the other, is of course 
inextricable for Stevenson, since, if he is able to show that a distinction 
between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' can be preserved, he cannot do so with- 
out first undertaking an analysis of our linguistic behaviour. This is 
not to say that the relationship between an 'attitude' and evaluative 
language is necessary and direct, for there are other ways of expressing 
or evincing attitudes, and language may often be a crude 'vehicle' for 
expressing 'attitudes'. As we shall see, in making his distinction he 
relies to some extent also on the observation of our non -linguistic 
behaviour. 
As I have mentioned earlier, his distinction has come under attack 
from other philosophers. Mary Warnock intimates that the distinction is 
a lingering crudity of the emotive theory. At the end of her section 
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devoted to Ayer, and immediately prior to treating Stevenson, she writes 
the following passage: 
"Although, as we shall see in a moment, the first crudity of the 
emotive theory was rubbed off very soon, what was not questioned 
was the distinction between descriptive and evaluative language. 
The belief that somewhere behind all discourse there lay a pure 
array of facts, with pure fact -stating statements belonging to 
it with which evaluative statements could be contrasted --this 
belief seems to have had a far longer life in the field of ethics 
than anywhere else.i1 
It is to Stevenson's credit that, despite hrs. Warn ock's contradic- 
tory suggestion, he did question the basic distinction between 'beliefs' 
and 'attitudes', and thus the distinction between the language which 
expresses 'beliefs' and 'attitudes'. In Ethics and Language, as we 
have already seen, he was clearly aware of the importance of this dis- 
tinction to his theory. He was also aware of possible criticisms.2 
"Like so many psychological distinctions," he writes, (the 
distinction)...is not easily made clear. Would further 
analysis serve to undermine it? Does any sharp separation 
reflect an antiquated school of thought, in which beliefs 
are so many mental photographs, the product of a special 
cognitive faculty, whereas attitudes stand apart as the 
drives or forces of a totally different faculty ? "3 
Accepting, then, that he was clearly aware of the problem, we might ask, 
nevertheless, if he is able to preserve the distinction, 
There are several ways in which the distinction might be criticized, 
and perhaps the most obvious one is mentioned by Stevenson himself when 
he asks if his "sharp separation" of 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' may reflect 
an antiquated compartmental theory of psychology, one in which man is 
viewed as if he were a creature composed of two separate and distinct 
faculties, one of which might be termed a "cognitive faculty" and the 
other an "emotive faculty ". Possibly one of the most explicit expressions 
M ry Warnock, Ethics since 1900, p. 93. 
See also his " Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive ", Philosophical 
Review Vol. 57, 1948. , 
p. 2. 
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of such a view was written, as recently as 1932, when John Muirhead 
referred to it as "the general principle of idealistic Moral Philosophy...." 
"The principle was long ago laid down by Plato," wrote Muirhead, 
"Man is a being of divided nature - --a union of instincts and 
desires having their source in the semi -physical organism we 
call the body and directed to their satisfaction in finite 
temporal things like food and shelter, and an intelligence or 
soul with a nisus to objects which, though not particular 
things at all, are realities which can be appropriated by it.... "1 
Such a theory might also be suggested by specifically religious views which 
differentiate, within man, between the alleged separate entities of soul 
and body. As might be expected of a contemporary empiricist philosopher, 
however, Stevenson will have nothing to do with such psychological 
assumptions, and, among repeated warnings not to hypostatize terms, he 
specifically warns against the temptation to hypostatize the psychological 
terms "belief" and "attitude ".2 It must be apparent, then, that whatever 
must be his approach, his distinction between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' 
does not rest on any hypostatic psychology. 
A second possible criticism of the distinction is that which is 
indicated in Mrs. Warnock's criticism when she says that emotivists tend 
to retain "the belief that somewhere behind all discourse there...(lies) 
a pure array of facts, with pure fact -stating statements belonging to it 
with which evaluative statements could be contrasted...." The suggestion 
is that emotivists hold an outmoded theory of meaning, possibly the 
'psychological atomism' of earlier British empiricists, especially Locke 
and Hume, but more probably the positivist theory which is the modern 
offspring of that earlier view. In retrospect Carnap has summed up the 
modern view in the following words: 
"Positivists...believed that every description of science could 
- Muirhead, Rule and End in Morals, pp. 3 -4 ff. 
2EL, pp. 7, $, 67. 
STEVENSON 128 
be defined by perception terms, and hence, that every sentence 
of the language of science could be translated into a sentence 
about perceptions.nl 
Again despite Mrs. Warnock's suggestion, Stevenson cannot be accused of 
holding either of these views. Of those who held the picture or image 
theory of meaning, as Hume did, Stevenson says that they "have been 
criticised too often to require further attention "2 in his book. Nor 
can he be said to hold the modern logical positivist view. When he 
gives a partial analysis of the word "meaning" (which I shall outline 
shortly), endeavouring to find a generic sense of the word which would 
permit him to say that value statements along with descriptive statements 
are meaningful, he finds that all such 'meaning as referent', and 
'meaning as verification' theories are too restricted for his purposes. 
This point is made in the following passage: 
"There is one sense (among many others) which, though conventional 
enough, will be unsuitable for our purpose. In this sense the 
'meaning' of a sign is that to which people refer when they use 
the sign. (E.G.: 'The meaning of "cake" is edible'; 'The 
meaning of "hardness" is a characteristic of flint.') It will 
be convenient to replace 'meaning', so used, by the term 'referent', 
following Ogden and Richards. The sense cannot be the generic 
one required, for we shall want to say that some words (such as 
'alas') have no referent, but do have a kind of meaning - -- namely 
emotive meaning. "3 
What Urmson has to say about Stevenson's criticism of the verification 
principle is appropriate in this context, not only because it reveals 
that Stevenson has gone beyond positivist theories, but also because it 
will be helpful in understanding Stevenson's approach to meaning. 
"Stevenson invokes a use of language not previously recognized," 
writes Urmson, "a use of indicative sentences to which the simple 
dichotomies, analytic- synthetic, true- false, tautological-self - 
contradictory are not applicable. The recognition of this richer 
variety of the uses of language is one of the marks of the new 
1Carnap, "Testability and Meaning ", from Readings in the Philosophy 
of Science, p. 67. 
2EL, p. 62. 3EL' p, 42. 
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period. The tendency now will be, though not perfectly realized, 
to ask questions like, 'What are people doing when they use 
ethical, scientific, metaphysical language, claim knowledge, or 
express belief, make promises, or express sympathy ?' without 
trying to fit them all into a priori categories." 
As Stevenson himself puts it, "everyday life presents us not with 'a' 
usage of terms, but with many different usages. "2 
This distinction between usages of language is not only central to 
his partial analysis of 'meaning', but also to his assertion that disagree- 
ment in attitude may be said to be 'meaningful'. It will also serve to 
indicate how he distinguishes between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes', as we 
shall see shortly. Considering ways in which we use language, he pointed 
out that we may differentiate between two broad purposes; and these two 
purposes, as we might expect, correspond to the two types of disagreement. 
That is to say, we recognize that one obvious purpose of language is to 
express 'beliefs'; and this usage of language might be termed 11descriptive ". 
(While the term "descriptive" is perhaps unfortunate in that the purpose 
for which it is used is broader than the purpose which is conventionally 
served when we speak of describing something, nevertheless there is no 
harm in using the word for the purpose stipulated.by Stevenson so long 
as we do not confuse this use with other conventions.) In addition to 
using language for 'descriptive' purposes, however, we also use it for 
purposes beyond the 'descriptive'. There is, as he had said in his paper, 
"Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms ", a 'dynamic' use of language, although 
in his book he replaces the word "dynamic" with "emotive ". Perhaps the 
most obvious example of the 'dynamic' or 'emotive' use of language is 
our use of 'imperatives', with which we are not primarily concerned to 
'describe' anything, nor to 'communicate' a 'belief', but are concerned 
lUrmson, Philosophical Analysis, p. 172. 2a, 
p. 34. 
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to motivate the agent to whom we direct such language to act in a desired 
way. Imperatives comprise one species of emotive language, and value 
judgments, including ethical value judgments, comprise another species. 
Stevenson is not concerned to give criteria for differentiating between 
sub -species of value judgments (between, for example, aesthetic and 
ethical value judgments), and seems to assume that these may be differ- 
entiated in their use. Considering emotive language in general, he says 
that its purpose is to "evoke or directly express attitudes "1 (and by 
"attitudes" he means "purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences, desires, 
and so on. ")2 In making this distinction, however, he says, as we have 
seen, that a single term need not serve only one purpose, but may serve 
many different purposes. Thus we must not suppose that any particular 
statement will serve only one purpose. This distinction, as I shall 
indicate later, is possibly Stevenson's most important contribution to 
the history of the emotive theory of values. The early Ayer, like Hume, 
clearly separated ethical language from descriptive language, saying, in 
effect, that language used to 'express' an ethical value judgment serves 
only one purpose, while 'factual' or 'descriptive' language serves another. 
Speaking of ethical terms, for example, Ayer had said that in an ethical 
statement "the function of the relevant ethical word is purely emotive ", 
while speaking of ethical statements he had said that "if a sentence 
makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether 
what it says is true or false. "3 Stevenson, however, allows that, in 
varying reciprocal degrees, both purposes may be served at one and the 
same time in our use of individual terms and individual statements. 
1ELs p. 33. 2Cf., above, p. 122. 3LTL, p. lOS. 
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"For the contexts that are most typical of normative ethics ", he writes, 
"the ethical terms have a function that is both emotive and descriptive. "1 
And, in going beyond the early but not the later writings of Ayer, both 
'functions' may be said to be 'meaningful'. 
In proposing a theory of meaning which would serve to include these 
two main 'functions' of language, Stevenson seeks "a general theory of 
signs ".2 Such a theory, he says, must be of such a nature that will allow 
us to say that the term "meaning" can be "ascribed some conventional use 
that marks off a genus, of which emotive meaning will be a species, and 
descriptive meaning another. "3 As I have mentioned, he has said that 
the 'meaning as referent' theory, although "conventional enough ", will 
not do for his purpose (since if this were the only criterion for meaning- 
fulness he must say, as Ayer did, that emotive words are 'meaningless'). 
There is another conventional use of the word "meaning ", however, which 
is more promising: 
"In this sense," he writes, "the 'meaning' of a sign must be 
defined in terms of the psychological reactions of those who 
use the sign. It may be called 'meaning in the psychological 
sense,' or in Morris' terminology, 'meaning in the pragmatic 
sense. "4 
While this sense is more 'promising', it is not adequate, since the emphasis 
is placed on "the psychological reactions of those who use the sign ", and 
such reactions, he suggests, are too variable. "One of the requirements 
for any definition of 'meaning'," he writes, "so long as that term is to 
remain suitable for talking about language, is that meaning must not vary 
in a bewildering way." He does not suggest that there should be no 
variation, for this would be to suggest a "fictitious entity ". In our 
1EL, p. 84. 
ÉL, pp. 41-42. 
2EL, p. 37. 
L, p. 42. 
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practice of using language, that is, in any sense of the word "meaning ", 
we recognize variations of the usage of terms in different contexts, and 
what might be termed variations in 'knowledge' about that for which terms 
are used. He seeks, then, a theory in which "the meaning of a sign must 
be relatively constant." He points out, by the way, that we must not 
suppose that psychological reactions vary only in emotive situations, for 
they similarly vary in "situations which involve a referent." The re- 
sponses, for example, to a place -name may vary considerably from person 
to person, or even from the same individual at different times. If, 
then, the requisite relative constancy is not to be found in the psy- 
chological reactions of the person who uses the sign, Stevenson suggests 
that it might be found with a change of emphasis, concentrating primarily, 
that is, on the sign, rather than on the user. Through our being 
'elaborately conditioned' to use a sign in specific ways (the learning 
process), the sign comes to serve in a relatively constant manner, 
throughout all of its contexts, as a stimulus to reactions on the part 
of the hearer. 'viJhat Stevenson terms the "dispositional property" of the 
sign remains relatively more constant than the reactions of the hearer. 
As may be expected, he warns against hypostatizing the phrase "dispositional 
property ", and he uses the phrase in the stimulus- response terminology of 
behaviouristic psychology. 'Meaning' is thus related to the disposition 
of a sign to serve as a relatively constant stimulus, and this use of the 
word gives us the required generic sense of the term: 
"A sign's disposition to affect a hearer is to be called a 
'meaning' (for the not unconventional sense in question) 
only if it has been caused by, and would not have been 
developed without, an elaborate process of conditioning 
which has attended the sign's use in communication. "l 
Within this generic sense of the word "meaning" we may now be able to 
-EL, p 57. 
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include as species both emotive meaning and descriptive meaning. 
"Emotive meaning is a meaning in which the response (from the 
hearer's point of view) or the stimulus (from the speaker's 
point of view) is a range of emotions. "1 
(He later suggests that, for convenience, the word "emotion" in this 
'definition' should be replaced by "feeling or attitude "). The 'defini- 
tion' of descriptive meaning is as follows: 
"The 'descriptive meaning' of a sign is its disposition to affect 
cognition, provided that the disposition is caused by an elaborate 
process of conditioning that has attended the sign's use in 
communication, and provided that the disposition is rendered 
fixed, at least to a considerable degree, by linguistic rules. 
(Exception: a term without previous use in communication may 
be assigned a descriptive meaning if linguistic rules relate 
it to words that have had such a use.)r2 
It is this psychological or pragmatic theory of meaning (for both des- 
criptive and emotive meaning) which will be of importance when we con- 
sider his two "patterns of analysis" of ethical language and methodology. 
When discussing these analyses it will be necessary to look more closely 
at this theory of 'meaning', especially to consider in what way the two 
species are related. 
While this summary of Stevenson's partial analysis of 'meaning' 
is all too brief, it may clearly serve, however, to refute any suggestion, 
such as that intimated by Mrs. Warnock, that his theory, like that of 
earlier emotivists, is dependent for its distinction between descriptive 
and evaluative language on any 'meaning as referent', or 'meaning as 
verification' theory of meaning.3 
It is not my intention to quarrel with this approach, nor to 
quarrel with Stevenson's suggestion that there is a convention for the 
word "meaning" which we customarily use when we say that value statements 
1EL, p. 59; cf. also p. 33. 2EL, p. 70. 
EL, p. 111 (where Stevenson specifically refers to the limitations 
of the verification principle). 
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are meaningful. Nor could I quarrel with his ingenious suggestion that 
the emphasis for the consideration of psychological or pragmatic meaning 
should be on the 'dispositional property' of a sign, rather than on the 
dispositional responses of the hearer of the sign. If one is disposed 
to quarrel with him one should be prepared to suggest a 'better' or 'more 
meaningful' analysis of meaning - --a far from easy task, as even the most 
cursory reading of the history of philosophy would indicate. But whether 
or not a disputant who is involved in a disagreement in attitude (however 
'meaningful' his emotive use of language might be said to be) is able to 
'prove' or 'support' his position is another matter. This point must be 
considered when we discuss Stevenson's analyses of ethical language and 
methodology. 
Using this new approach, with the emphasis on the two main purposes 
of language, and also relying in part on his observation of our non- 
linguistic behaviour, he makes his distinction between 'beliefs' and 
'attitudes'. We might now look more closely at the main argument in 
which he makes the distinction; although, it will be noted, the argument 
will amount to no more than a reinforcement of his usage of these words 
throughout the early pages of his book. 
In defense of the distinction, he, in effect, asks what we are 
doing and what behaviour are we denoting when we customarily use the 
words "belief" and "attitude ". While this approach is primarily in 
accord with that of the behaviouristic psychologist, it is not Stevenson's 
intention to discredit it.1 Any follower of Hume would of course have 
been forewarned by the realization that many of Hume's difficulties 
resulted from his reliance on the language of an hypostatic introspective 
1EL, p. 66. 
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psychology.1 Stevenson's behaviouristic terminology is obvious in the 
following passage: 
"It is possible, for instance, to accept the pragmatic contention 
that beliefs and attitudes must both be analysed, partly at 
least, with reference to dispositions to action. Such a view 
in no way suggests that beliefs and attitudes are 'identical', 
so long as it is soberly understood. It shows that they are 
more alike than the older psychologists suspected, but it does 
not make them alike in every respect. The common genus does not 
obliterate all differentiae. "2 
With this approach, his analysis to indicate the distinction is simple 
and challenging. 
"It is difficult to specify just how beliefs and attitudes differ," 
he writes, "it remains the case that for practical purposes we 
do and must make such a distinction every day. A chess player, 
playing with a novice, uses an opening that appears very weak. 
An onlooker wonders, 'Does he make the move because he believes 
that it is a strong one, or because, out of charity to his 
opponent, he doesn't want to make a strong one ?' The distinction 
here between a belief and a want (attitude) is certainly beyond 
any practical objection....In the example of the chess player, 
it may be added, there is no lack of empirical criteria by which 
the onlooker may determine which attitudes and which beliefs 
determine the expert's play. No matter where the onlooker's 
inferences may lead him, he must begin by observing the expert's 
behaviour, and can find there all the evidence that a practical 
decision requires."3 
In a later chapter, "Pragmatic Aspects of Meaning ", he extends his analysis 
of these words somewhat further, although he has to allow that he has not 
surmounted the difficulty of giving the differentiae for his key words. 
Ultimately he does not express the distinction any more clearly than he 
has done with the example of the chess player; and this is significant. 
Without making any claims that his method provides the final word, he is 
confident, nevertheless, that with those means that are currently open 
to philosophers, especially with his theory of meaning, his distinction 
may be maintained. 
1Cf0 Above, Ch. I, pp. 37 & 59. 
3EL, pp. 7 -8. 
2EL, p. 7. 
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"...It will be observed," he writes, "that the key terms that 
are used in the present work --in the analysis both of meaning 
in general and of ethical meanings--have only such clarity as 
is afforded by instances of their usage, together with admon- 
itions not to hypostatize and over -simplify. This is not an 
agreeable admission; but it is difficult to see how, at the 
present stage of linguistic and psychological theory, any more 
persistent quest for a definition would be rewarding."' 
There is, however, a further criticism of Stevenson's distinction 
which should be considered. As we have seen, he asks if "further analysis 
would serve to undermine the distinction "; and this question expresses 
the charge that is made. Referring to critics of Stevenson's distinction, 
Professor L.J. Binkley succinctly sums up the criticism in the following 
passage: 
"Stevenson, it is charged, has failed to realize that agreement 
in belief, or agreement on matters of fact, is quite as dependent 
on agreement in attitude as is agreement in ethics. The attain- 
ment of agreement in belief, presupposes, at least, that the 
disputants agree to accept the principle of logical consistency. 
Now the acceptance of such a principle has been called an 'epistemic 
attitude', and any reasons which may support it are, in Stevenson's 
terms, related to it psychologically rather than logically, just 
as are the supporting reasons of ethical judgments. "2 
It is important to note that this criticism, unlike the earlier criticisms, 
might be made by one who is not so much concerned to attack Stevenson's 
general philosophic method as he is concerned to disagree with his analysis 
of the conventions of language. Just such a criticism was made by Professor 
Findlay in his paper, "The Justification of Attitudes ". In this paper, 
after delivering what must be one of the most savage thrusts ever made 
against Ethics and Language, Professor Findlay undertook to attend to "a 
certain family of attitudes, once highly regarded but now somewhat 
neglected," and which, he felt, were "of very central importance in the 
regulation and direction of human life." In the context of the paper, 
1EL, p. 67. 
L.J. Binkley, Contemporary Ethical Theories, p. 95. 
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the implication is that Stevenson had neglected this "family of attitudes ". 
"These are the attitudes," he writes, "that one might group 
together under such vague titles as 'reasonable', 'dispassionate', 
'impartial', 'disinterested' and the like: they represent, in 
some sense, a determined attempt to steer our attitudinal policies 
away from anything that is merely personal, contingent, arbitrary, 
provisional or ill- considered."1 
Findlay's analysis leads him to make a case for his view that this family 
of attitudes is basic to "reasoned argument "2 (some men have them in good 
measure, for example, Bishop Butler, and thus Findlay terms such attitudes 
"Butlerian "; and some men have them only partially, for example, the Mau 
Mau and Nietzsche). 
Now, as I have indicated, Stevenson is aware that some scientific 
disagreements might not be settled in terms only of 'beliefs'; that, in 
fact, whether some scientific disagreements are resolved will depend on 
the 'attitudes' of the disputants. 
"There are certain evaluative issues," he writes, "that are 
integral to the very process of organizing knowledge. Interests 
in knowledge may be opposed, leading theorists to disagree about 
what is worth, speaking of, or what distinctions are important, 
or what schemes'of classification are suitable. These issues are 
not always factual ones in disguise, concerned with what sort of 
organization will serve a stipulated purpose; for there may be 
disagreement about the purpose to be served. They may be 
genuinely evaluative issues, requiring the use of methods like 
those we have examined in ethics. "3 
It might have been of interest if Stevenson had inquired further into the 
question of the "suitability" of "schemes of classification ", for this 
might have led him to one of Findlay's 'Butlerian' attitudes. He did 
not, however, and thus what he says does not go so far as is demanded by 
those critics who would say that at the basis of agreement in belief 
there are 'epistemic' or 'Butlerian' attitudes -- -not simply 'attitudes' 
which dispose one towards resolving a disagreement in belief for the sake 
J.N. Findlay, op.cit., in Mind, LXIII, 1954, p. 156. 
2Findlay, op.cit., p. 160. 
3EL, p. 286. 
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of an end or purpose desired by the disputant, even if it is merely the 
wish to avoid disagreement, but rather 'attitudes' which may dispose 
him towards being logical, consistent, disinterested, impartial, and 
other such 'Butlerian' attitudes listed by Findlay. 
Findlay goes so far as to suggest that the possession of Butlerian 
attitudes is "the principal difference between man and other creatures"-1 -- 
but we need not follow him so far. We might agree, nevertheless, that his 
analysis indicates that there are other conventions for the use of the 
word "attitude" beyond Stevenson's: that there are what have been termed 
"epistemic" or "cognitive" attitudes disposing ' Butlerian' people to 
adhere to norms of deductive logic, axioms and logical procedures of 
mathematics, and empirically established canons of induction. That is 
to say, then, that there are 'attitudes' basic to what Stevenson has 
termed "beliefs ", and these 'attitudes' would dispose at least some people 
to use what we recognize as sound argument, not only in science and every- 
day life, but also in ethics, aesthetics, religion, and all other spheres 
of man's activity. It is this kind of distinction which is accepted, 
also, by John Kemp in his paper, "Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgments ", 
when he maintains that Stevenson's analysis of the word "attitude" is 
not sufficiently thorough. 
But accepting this, must we then say that his distinction between 
what he has termed "beliefs" and "attitudes" is not acceptable? I think 
not, and I would agree with at least this much of what Kemp goes on to 
say: 
"If it is considered necessary to adhere closely to ordinary 
language, and to retain this wider use of the word 'attitude', 
we could without doing violence to Mr. Stevenson's theory, make 
10p.cit., p. 160 
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the distinction one between cognitive attitudes (i.e. belief, 
disbelief, doubt) and emotive attitudes (i.e. those states 
which in Ethics and Language are simply called 'attitudes'). 
What the theory would then be saying is that moral approval 
and disapproval are essentially emotive, not cognitive, 
attitudes.il 
The third aspect of the general criticism against the fundamental distinc- 
tion between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' would thus not serve to undermine 
the distinction if the effect is simply to show that there is a more 
basic use of the word "attitude ", a use which Stevenson had ignored in 
his analysis. Indeed, this particular criticism is of a nature which 
would probably be appealing to any follower of Hume, for what Findlay 
termed 'Butlerian' attitudes could with equal propriety be termed "Humean ". 
The criticism, if it does anything, would bolster emotivism and would 
appear to be a reinforcement of the Humean dictum that "reason is and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions. "2 I shall continue, then, to 
accept Stevenson's distinction, using, for the sake of simplicity, his 
words "beliefs" and "attitudes ", while allowing that one might also use 
the terms "cognitive. attitude" and "emotive attitude" for the same dis- 
tinction. When considering Mrs. 'Warnock's general criticism against the 
assumption that a distinction might be made between 'descriptive' and 
'evaluative' language, I said that, for Stevenson, the relationship 
between these uses of language and 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' is inextricable. 
I shall thus continue to assume that a distinction may be maintained 
between these uses of language, while allowing for the possibility that, 
since language may have such a variety of uses (as Stevenson so often 
says), it may be possible to suggest other categories of usage, or 
qualifications to the category within which we classify ethical value 
judgments. As we shall see in the next two chapters, other analysts 
1John Kemp, "Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgments ", in Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. I, 1951, p. 339. 
Above, Ch. I, p. 34; also pp. 22 -3. 
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disagree with Stevenson on just this point, although they are in general 
agreement with his distinction between evaluative and descriptive uses 
of language. Similarly, however many similarities there may be between 
language as used to express ethical value judgments and language as used 
to express beliefs, I am unconvinced by the suggestion that it is not 
possible to distinguish between them. 
After concluding that, for practical purposes, we may maintain the 
distinction between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes', Stevenson returns to the 
"central problem ", to ask "how people agree or disagree in cases that 
are typical of normative ethics ". His main concern will be to reinforce 
his preliminary distinction that in any analysis of ethical problems one 
must consider disagreement both in 'beliefs' and 'attitudes'. Thus he 
is critical of past theories which may have emphasized one side of the 
dichotomy to the neglect of the other. 
As it happens, the neglect has tended to be one -sided. Most 
writers, he says, have "tended implicitly to emphasize agreement and 
disagreement in belief, leaving agreement and disagreement in attitude 
unmentioned. "1 Une immediately thinks of the more obvious cognitivist 
moral philosophers who "permit ethics to have nothing to do with atti- 
tudes," who say or assume that ethical statements are synthetic a priori 
propositions which may be judged, like scientific statements, in terms 
of the categories of truth and falsehood, or who say that ethical judg- 
ments are matters of intellectual intuition. But we would be wrong, 
Stevenson points out, if we thought only of such philosophers. Although 
it is not so obvious, some theories which have "given attitudes a pre- 
eminent place ", also stress agreement and disagreement in belief, 
neglecting agreement and disagreement in attitude. Stevenson would have 
1EL, p. S 
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to say that both Hume and Ayer, despite being emotivists, have nevertheless 
emphasized disagreement in belief to the neglect of disagreement in 
attitude. This is apparent in their assumptions about the nature of 
ethical disagreement when one considers what they say about the practice 
of normative ethics. 
Although Stevenson does allow that Hume "perhaps" had "half- 
utilized the conception" of disagreement in attitude,1 he nevertheless 
emphasized disagreement in belief. This emphasis, Stevenson points out, 
is apparent in the following passage from An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals: 
"The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that 
morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be 
m whatever ental action or quality gives to the spectator the 
pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. 
We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, 
what actions have this influence. We consider all the circum- 
stances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavour to 
extract some general observations with regard to these senti- 
ments. If you call this metaphysics, and find anything abstruse 
here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is not 
suited to the moral sciences." 
In this passage, as in passages from the Treatise,, Hume obviously does 
allow for disagreements within ethical situations, but, as I have 
mentioned when discussing his theory,3 he is insistent that when we do 
disagree in this way we are concerned exclusively with matters of 'fact' 
and not 'right'. While Stevenson would agree, as we shall see more 
clearly later, that ethical argument deals with 'facts' or 'beliefs', 
the point he is making here is that Hume is assuming that the definition 
of ethical terms may be left entirely to the social scientist. This is 
to neglect the fact that there is a use, or 'meaning', of ethical terms 
or statements which may be said to be 'extra -scientific' or 'non- 
1EL, pp. 11 & 275. 2Fnauiry, p. 2$9, Cf., EL, p. 273. 
Cf. above, Ch. I, pp. 52-5. 
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naturalistic'. This is not unexpected in Hume, however, for, unlike his 
followers today, he had hoped, as we recall, to make philosophy an 
empirical social science similar in nature to what we now term "sociology" 
and "psychology ". 
Ayer similarly would not evade the charge that in what he says 
about normative ethics, unlike that he has said in his analysis, he has 
emphasized disagreement in belief to the neglect of disagreement in 
attitude. This is most apparent in the following passage: 
"It appears that ethics, as a branch of knowledge, islnothing 
more than a department of psychology and sociology." 
And, as Stevenson has said, for the reasons we have seen, "emphasis on 
agreement and disagreement in belief is characteristic of any theory 
that makes normative ethics a branch of psychology." 
We may accept, then, that most writers, including emotivists, 
have tended to neglect what Stevenson has termed "disagreement in 
attitude" as being of importance in normative ethics. I have stressed 
the phrase, "in normative ethics ", since, as I have suggested, it cannot 
be said that past emotivists (unlike most cognitivists) have neglected 
'disagreement in attitude' in their writings. Disagreement in attitude 
is of course important to Hume and Ayer, but, as analysts, they accept 
it as an ultimate fact, as it were, about which little can be said beyond 
recognizing that we react differently to different situations. Hume 
clearly made this point in the passage to which I have already referred: 
"Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not 
susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and 
implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and 
actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced 
either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable 
to reason.n2 
2LTL, 112; cf., Schlick, Problems of Ethics, p. 28. 
Hume, Treatise, p. 458; cf., above Ch. I, p. 39. 
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Ayer says much the same thing in a passage following one in which he had 
said that there can be no argument over "pure questions of value." 
"Given that a man has certain moral principles," Ayer wrote, 
"we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react 
morally to certain things in a certain way. What we do not 
and cannot argue about is the validity of these moral principles. 
We merely praise or condemn them in the light of our own feelings." 
If Stevenson wishes to modify these views, we should expect, then, as I 
have said earlier, that he will clearly indicate that in normative ethics 
not only must we recognize that there is disagreement in attitude, as 
well as in belief, but also that disputants involved in ethical disagree- 
ment may be said to have 'meaningful' procedures to 'prove' or 'support' 
their ethical value judgments. We must assess whether or not he is 
successful in this when we consider his two patterns of analysis of 
ethical statements. 
Having made his distinction between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes', 
and having pointed out that most writers have tended to neglect disagree- 
ment in attitude, Stevenson offers a synopsis of his preliminary distinctions. 
This synopsis may serve, also, as a 'signpost' to indicate his general 
approach in his analysis of ethical statements. 
"When ethical issues become controversial, they involve disagree- 
ment that is of a dual nature. There is almost inevitably 
disagreement in belief, which requires detailed sensitive 
attention; but there is also disagreement in attitude. An 
analysis which seeks a full picture of ethics, in touch with 
practice, must be careful to recognize both factors, neither 
emphasizing the former to the exclusion of the latter, nor 
the latter to the exclusion of the former. Only by this means 
can it reveal the varied functions of the ethical terms, and 
make clear how the methods of ethics compare with those of 
the natural sciences. Only by this means, indeed, can it 
envisage its proper task; for the central problem of ethical 
analysis- -one might say 'the' problem --is one of showing in 
detail how beliefs and attitudes are related. "2 
2Ayer, LTL, pp. 111-112. 
EL, p. 11. 
STEVENSON 143 
After emphasizing the importance of 'attitudes', however, as well as of 
'beliefs', Stevenson is obviously concerned that he should not be misunder- 
stood. Far from detracting from any concern for 'beliefs', he says that 
"potentially, and belief has a bearing on ethics...." Later, in the same 
context, he adds that "beliefs may be relevant throughout the whole 
structure of ethics, and...any effort to minimize their variety can only 
result in grievous over -simplifications. "1 Then he adds that "beliefs 
are the guides to attitudes," since 'beliefs' are the stimuli to which 
'attitudes' are the responses. But lest it be thought that he is over- 
stressing 'beliefs' he says that "disagreement in attitude is the factor 
which gives...(ethical) argument its fundamental unity and motivation. "2 
"In the first place," he continues, "it determines what beliefs 
will relevantly be discussed or tested; for only those beliefs 
which are likely to have a bearing on either party's attitudes 
will be a propos. Any others, however interesting they may be 
in themselves, will be foreign to the ethical point in question. 
In the second place, it determines when the argument will 
terminate. "3 
In the example cited by Stevenson, when the disputants come to the point 
of agreeing in 'attitude' the ethical issue is brought to an end. Both 
'beliefs' and 'attitudes' are thus important in his theory, and his concern 
will be to study them "in their intimate relationship." 
Stevenson's "patterns of analysis" of ethical language and method- 
ology are dependent on his theory of psychological and pragmatic meaning; 
and, as I have said earlier, to understand his analysis it is necessary 
to understand his views about the relationship of the two species of 
meaning (i.e. emotive and descriptive meaning). Now since he has said 
that a single term may serve both a 'descriptive' and an 'emotive' 
purpose at one and the same time, he thus says that "a sign may have 
1EL, p. 12. 2EL, p. 14. 3EL, p. 14. 
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both kinds of meaning." But we must not assume that these species are 
isolated, for, as he says, "there is a continual interplay "1 between them. 
"It may happen," he continues, "...that a word acquires a laudatory 
emotive meaning partly because it refers, via its descriptive 
meaning, to something which people favour. 'Democracy' has a 
pleasing emotive meaning to most Americans because its referent 
pleases them. But if the two sorts of meaning often grow up 
together, it does not follow that they must always change together. 
Either may come to vary while the other remains roughly constant." 
Gradually, for example, a group of people might "come to disapprove of 
certain aspects of democracy, but continue to approve other aspects." 
Thus, while the descriptive meaning of "democracy" might remain unchanged, 
the emotive meaning will become "less laudatory ". On the other hand, the 
group "might keep the strong laudatory meaning unchanged, and let 'democracy' 
acquire a descriptive sense which made reference only to those aspects of 
democracy (in the older sense) which they favoured." Since this is 
possible, we must not assume that simply because there is a change in 
the descriptive meaning of a sign there will necessarily be a parallel 
change in the emotive meaning. "Through inertia," he writes, the emotive 
meaning "will survive a change in the descriptive meaning on which it 
originally depended." This is easily explained, he suggests, in view of 
the fact that the emotive meaning of a sign, like its descriptive meaning, 
is "developed" through "an elaborate process of conditioning which has 
attended the sign's use in communication; "2 and included in this con- 
ditioning process, he says elsewhere, are "gestures, intonations, and 
emotionally vigorous contexts with which the term has previously been 
associated.... "3 Thus, he continues, "it is easy to see why emotive 
meaning can often survive quite sharp changes in descriptive meaning." 
The 'inertia' of emotive meaning is important to Stevenson's 
-EL, p. 71. 2EL, p. 57. 3EL, p. 72. 
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analysis, thus he introduces the following terminology: 
"To whatever extent emotive meaning is not a function of descrip- 
tive meaning, but either persists without the latter or survives 
changes in it, let us say it is 'independent'. Thus non - 
metaphorical interjections will have a wholly independent emotive 
meaning, but most words, including 'democracy', 'liberty', 
'magnanimity', and so on, will have an emotive meaning which 
is independent only in part. On the other hand, to whatever 
extent emotive meaning is a function of descriptive meaning, 
changing with it after only a brief 'lag', let us say that it 
is 'dependent'.nl 
There is another category of relationships between descriptive meaning 
and emotive meaning which he terms "quasi-dependent". There are occasions, 
for example, when a statement may have a confused descriptive meaning, 
and the emotive meaning may be dependent primarily on the confusion. 
"Once the confusion is dispelled, the emotive meaning greatly decreases. "2 
The problem is that some terms may suggest more than they descriptively 
mean, and as in the case of a confused statement, the emotive meaning is 
a 'function' of the 'suggestiveness' of such terms. As he later expresses 
this, ' hauch of the emotive meaning may...be quasi -dependent, eliciting 
the hearer's favour not by definitely designating qualities that he 
admires, but simply by calling them to mind in a vague way. "3 
Before leaving his introductory explanation of the relationships 
of emotive and descriptive meaning, Stevenson once more warns against 
any temptation to hypostatize terms. 
"Emotive and descriptive meaning, both in their origin and 
practical operation, stand in extremely close relationship. 
They are distinguishable aspects of a total situation, not 
'parts' of it that can be studied in isolation. "4 
Section 2 
In undertaking his analysis of ethical terms and ethical methodology, 
EL, P. 73. 
., p. 76. 
2EL, pp. 78-79. 3EL, p. 87. 
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Stevenson sets forth his two "patterns of analysis." "Two patterns are 
required," he writes, "because the ethical terms, as used in everyday 
life, are vague. "1 It is not simply that they are ambiguous (as the 
word "grip" ambiguously may mean either a "grasp of the hand" or "a small 
suitcase "),2 but that they are also extremely vague (analogous to the 
vagueness of the word "red ", which calls for an arbitrary decision in 
using it when referring to those regions of the spectrum where the colour 
we call "red" shades into other colours). Keeping in mind the relation- 
ships of descriptive and emotive meaning, we may appreciate that the 
word "good" may be given a range of descriptive meanings, and "may be used 
to mean such qualities as reliable, charitable, honest, and so on, and 
may even have such a specific reference as that to going faithfully to 
church on Sundays." There are usages, however, such as in the customary 
analytic example, "X is good ", where the word has no descriptive use 
beyond that of 'referring to the attitudes of the speaker'. "We have 
always the choice," he continues, "of making its descriptive meaning 
rich or poor." And when we recall that there are many ethical terms 
other than the word "good" (and its customary partners, "bad ", "right ", 
and "wrong")--terms such as "charity ", "selfishness ", "hypocrisy ",3 and 
others, which were largely neglected by moral philosophers before 
Stevenson and other philosophical analysts pointed out their importance- - 
we are able more clearly to see the wide and varying ranges of the usage 
of ethical terms. 
Considering the possible extremes of the ranges of both the 
emotive and the descriptive meanings of ethical terms, Stevenson suggests 
two patterns which would span the extremes. The first pattern will be 
1EL, p. 206. --EL, p. 34. 3EL, PP. 212-214, 
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primarily concerned with ethical terms which are extremely vague in their 
descriptive meaning except in so far as they 'express' the attitudes of 
the speaker; whereas the second pattern will be concerned with ethical 
terms which are 'descriptively' rich as compared with first pattern terms. 
In both patterns, it should be noted, the terms are of primary importance 
to moral philosophy because of their emotive meaning. 
For his first pattern of analysis, he proposes an analysis which, 
in the order of exposition of his book, he initially postulated among 
other possible "working models ". But in working out his analysis he had 
to allow that, without fuller understanding of emotive meaning, in its 
relationship to descriptive meaning, the working models are too crude 
for their intended purpose. His discussion of meaning, he felt, would 
help to remedy the deficiencies of the working models as first used, and 
thus help to "secure an analysis that is sensitive to the nuances and 
flexibilities of ordinary discourse. "1 Following his necessary excursion 
into 'meaning' (which I have outlined) he returned, then, to his attempt 
to provide an analysis of ethical terms and ethical methodology -- -thus to 
try to fulfil the two main objects of his work, that is, to "clarify the 
meaning of ethical terms ", and to "characterize the general methods by 
which ethical judgments can be proved or supported." 
The first pattern of analysis as initially proposed, in the chapter 
entitled, "Working Models ", is, then, as follows: 
do so as well 
his leaving this 
'This is wrong' means I disapprove of this; 
'He ought to do this' means I disapprove of 
undone; do so as well. 
'This is good' means I approve of this; do so as well. "2 
The 'pattern' in the analyses of these three models of ethical statements 
1EL, 
2EL, p. 21.. 
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reveals two parts: the first being a 'descriptive' or, as he says, 
"declarative" statement expressing the 'fact' that the speaker has a 
feeling of disapproval or approval. Stevenson says that this first part 
"describes the attitudes of the speaker." The second part, however, is 
not 'descriptive', but is an imperative statement, "do so as well," 
which, he says, "is addressed to changing or intensifying the attitudes 
of the hearer." 
The first part of the 'pattern', the 'descriptive' part, goes 
beyond the analyses of ethical statements proposed by Hume, and by Ayer. 
As I have argued,1 Hume, in his analysis of ethical statements (as 
distinct from his expressions of utilitarianism) may be interpreted as 
Ayer had explicitly wished to be interpreted. Ayer had written, that 
is, that "ethical statements are expressions and excitants of feeling 
which do not necessarily involve any assertions," and "the expression of 
a feeling assuredly does not always involve the assertion that one has 
it." Stevenson's analysis departs from this view. A part of the meaning 
of an ethical statement may be expressed in a descriptive statement which 
expresses the fact that the speaker has a feeling or attitude of approval 
or disapproval. (In this first pattern, we recall, the ethical words, 
"good ", and "ought ", are not descriptively rich, and indeed are vague, 
thus the first pattern concentrates only on the descriptive use of 
ethical terms which 'expresses' the attitude of the speaker). 
Ayer had wanted to make a clear distinction between his theory 
and any 'naturalistic' subjectivist theory which would equate the meaning 
of an ethical statement with a 'naturalistic' statement, such as the 
phrase from Stevenson's analysis, "I disapprove of this." But in doing 
1Above, Ch. I, pp. 49-50; and Ch. II, pp. 106 & 115. 
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this, he need not have rejected the possibility that an ethical statement, 
while evincing feelings, might also be in part descriptive. Probably his 
neglect of this possibility is attributable to the fact that he assumed 
that a term or a statement could serve only one purpose at one time. Thus 
he appears to take an 'either -or' approach in his analysis; that is, an 
ethical statement must be considered either as equivalent to a 'natural- 
istic' statement (for Ayer, at that time, any 'meaningful' statement had 
to be 'naturalistic') or it must be considered as expressing or evincing 
a feeling or emotion. Once it is recognized, however, that a single term 
or statement may have a variety of uses at one and the same time, it then 
becomes possible to postulate the kind of analysis proposed by Stevenson, 
without assuming that the primary purpose of an ethical statement need 
be expressed by a 'naturalistic' or 'descriptive' statement. For Steven- 
son, as must be apparent, while the 'descriptive' part of an ethical 
statement is essential (especially, as we shall see, to his claim that 
ethical statements may be 'proved' or 'supported'), the 'emotive' part 
is primary in the sense that "the resolution of an ethical argument 
requires a resolution of disagreement in attitude. "1 I shall return to 
this first part of the first pattern (with its implied emphasis on the 
analysis of methods and disagreement in belief) after discussing the 
second part (with its emphasis on the analysis of meanings and disagree- 
ment in attitude). My plan will be to follow through each aspect of 
the first pattern to its conclusion, before turning to the second pattern 
of analysis. 
The second part of the first pattern of analysis aims primarily 
at further understanding of disagreement in attitude. Unlike the 
L, p. 139. 
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'descriptive' part, the 'imperative' part is not new to emotivist analyses 
of ethical statements. Nor is it novel to cognitivist theories. As Hare 
expresses it, "the greatest of all rationalists, Kant, referred to moral 
judgments as imperatives. "1 As we have seen, Carnap went so far as to 
universalize the 'imperative' approach when he said that "a value state- 
ment is nothing else than a command in a misleading grammatical form. "2 
Ayer, however, would not have agreed. Recognizing that ethical statements 
are not all alike, Ayer had said that only "some" ethical terms "are used 
in such a way as to give sentences in which they occur the effect of 
commands." Now, while recognizing that "there are many differences, 
unquestionably" between imperatives and ethical statements, Stevenson 
allows that "there are likewise many similarities;" and the imperative 
part of the analysis, by using imperative statements as approximate 
analogues to a part of the overall purpose of ethical statements, aims 
to provide a better understanding of that part of the function of ethical 
statements. 
"Both imperative and ethical statements," he writes, "are used 
more for encouraging, altering, or redirecting people's aims 
and conduct than for simply describing them. Both differ in 
this respect from the sentences of science. And in arguments 
that involve disagreement in attitude, it is obvious that 
imperatives, like ethical judgments, have an important place. 13 
Stevenson points out that "the imperative function (of ethical statements) 
is not confined to the imperative mood "; thus it is possible to express 
that 'function', in his analysis, by means of an indicative mood sentence. 
The phrase, "This is good," for example, might have been analysed as "I 
approve of this and I want you to do so as well "; in which case the 
phrase, "I want you to do so as well" might replace the imperative, "do 
1Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 16. 
2Cf., above, Ch. II, pp. 100. 
3EL, p. 21. 
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so as well." While such an analysis is possible, Stevenson says that it 
is liable to be misleading, primarily because the analysis is expressed 
entirely in 'belief' statements; and thus there is a danger that 'dis- 
agreement in attitude' might be neglected. An imperative statement, on 
the other hand, is not open to this misinterpretation ". Like Hume and 
Ayer, Stevenson is concerned, as we have seen, to maintain the distinction 
between ethical statements and scientific or 'naturalistic' statements, 
and by means of his 'working model' he is able to point up the distinction. 
"Ethical statements," he writes, "have a meaning that is approximately, 
and in part, imperative. "1 
Throughout his analysis Stevenson is careful to point out the 
difficulties of achieving an understanding of ethical language through 
the medium of language which is primarily used for other purposes; thus, 
as we have seen, he refers to his working models as being "crude ", and 
helpful only as "rough approximations ". Considering the first pattern of 
analysis, not only do these remarks apply to the overall pattern, but 
they apply to each part of the pattern considered in terms of the separate 
but not isolated purposes for which they are intended. The imperative 
part, which we are now considering, was seen to be inadequate in at least 
two aspects when Stevenson initially introduced it. 
"The first inadequacy of the models is simply this: The imperative 
component, included to preserve the hortatory aspects of ethical 
judgments, and stressed as useful in indicating agreement or 
disagreement in attitude, is really too blunt an instrument to 
perform its expected task. If a person is explicitly commanded 
to have a certain attitude, he becomes so self -conscious that he 
cannot obey. Command a man's approval and you will elicit only 
superficial symptoms of it. But the judgment, 'This is good,' 
has no trace of this stultifying effect; so the judgment's 
force in encouraging approval has been poorly approximated." 
Ln addition to this deficiency, there is a second one, "somewhat parallel" 
1EL, p. 26. 2EL, pa 320 
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to the first, although "more serious ". 
"Imperatives are often used to exert a unilateral influence. 
When a man gives direct orders, he may not take too kindly 
to a dissenting reply." 
While Stevenson allows that there may be moralists who would want their 
ethical pronouncements to be considered in the same manner, there is no 
doubt that others do not. "There are many men," he writes, "whose 
influence looks beyond their own immediate needs, and takes its welcome 
place in a cooperative moral enterprise." 
He recognizes that because of these inadequacies the working models 
(of the first pattern of analysis) may misrepresent "both the manner in 
which moral influence is exerted and the motives which attend it." He 
suggests, however, that misrepresentation may be avoided through attending 
to his psychological or pragmatic theory of meaning. If we recognize, 
that is, that an ethical term has 'emotive meaning', we are not so liable 
to assume that the imperative sentence in his proposed analysis character- 
izes a usage of ethical statements which is exactly like that of commands, 
He refers to the 'function' of emotive meaning in the following passage: 
"In simple forms it is typical of interjections; in more compli- 
cated forms it is a contributing factor to poetry; and it has 
familiar manifestations in the many terms of ordinary discourse 
that are laudatory or derogatory. In virtue of this kind of 
meaning, ethical judgments alter attitudes, not by an appeal 
to self -conscious efforts (as is the case with imperatives), 
but by the more flexible mechanism of suggestion. Emotive 
terms present the subject of which they are predicated in a 
bright or dim light, so to speak, and thereby lead people, 
rather than command them, to alter their attitudes. And they 
readily permit a mutual influence of this sort, as distinct 
from a unilateral one. "1 
And as I have noted earlier, he does not ignore the fact that accompanying 
the use of a word there may be gestures and intonations which help to 
'produce' and reinforce the emotive meaning. When using the working 
lEL, p. 33. 
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models we must, then, appreciate that, without qualification, they /poorly 
preserve' the "quasi- imperative function" of ethical terms; thus these 
terms "must be explained with careful attention to emotive meaning.... "1 
The discussion of emotive meaning, however, brought to light a 
difficulty confronting anyone who would attempt to 'define' the word 
"good" (or any other ethical term). Such a difficulty is of course not 
unexpected, since, as we have seen, Moore and others have argued that any 
theory presuming to have 'defined' the word "good" would commit the 
'naturalistic fallacy'. But these philosophers, as Stevenson pointed 
out, had all emphasized 'disagreement in belief' (and thus 'descriptive 
meaning') to the neglect of 'disagreement in attitude' (and thus the 
possibility of 'emotive meaning'), All had assumed that if "good" were 
to be defined, it would have to be done in terms of 'belief' (or 'des- 
criptive', or 'factual' statements). Now, if disagreement in attitude 
is not neglected, and if we are to recognize 'emotive meaning', it is 
reasonable to ask if a new approach to the definition of ethical terms 
might be successful. The discussion of emotive meaning, however, presents 
a new difficulty since, as Stevenson says, no definition of an ethical 
term can "preserve its customary emotive meaning." 
"It has no exact emotive equivalent," he writes. "This is a 
simple fact which should occasion neither surprise nor per- 
plexity. The term is indefinable for the same reasons that 
'hurrah' is indefinable. (One need only attempt to inter- 
change 'Hurrah' and 'How exciting:' to see that the terms 
are only roughly synonymous.) Although our language affords 
many terms that have the same descriptive meaning, it is 
more economical with its emotive terms. Each term bears 
the characteristic stamp of its emotional history.r2 
Nevertheless, he continues, "it must not be supposed that the emotive 
meaning of 'good' can receive no further study. One need only 'character- 
EL, p. 36. 2EL, p. $2. 
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ize' its meaning, as distinct from defining it." In explaining his use 
of the word "characterize ", he refers to the word "nigger ", a word most 
often used in a contemptuous manner. A dictionary definition of "nigger" 
could reasonably well provide a descriptive meaning by using the recognized 
word "Negro" as being a 'descriptive' synonym; but in attempting to 
provide an emotive meaning, the definition has to use the word "contemptu- 
ous", a word which does not 'define' the emotive meaning. Thus he suggests 
that the word "contemptuous" might be said to 'characterize' the emotive 
meaning rather than 'define' it. 
"Now 'good' may be treated in a parallel fashion. Its descriptive 
meaning may be defined, though not without the complications of 
ambiguity and vagueness that will later concern us; but its 
emotive meaning cannot accurately be preserved in this way, and 
must be characterized. "1 
Having made this distinction, he undertakes to develop a "characteriza- 
tion of the ethical terms...little by little, with constant references 
to examples...." 
This 'characterization' proceeds not only when Stevenson is 
primarily concerned with 'meaning', but also when he is concerned with 
'method', and this is to be remembered when we later discuss the 'des- 
criptive' part of the first pattern of analysis. ìvithin the limitations 
of this chapter it is needless to follow the details of his 'character- 
ization' of ethical terms; but considering general tendencies in the 
history of moral philosophy, there are several features of his analysis 
of 'meaning' which should be noted. 
We have already seen that while he is concerned to reject 'natural- 
istic' theories of moral philosophy, he is very much concerned to say as 
much as he possibly can about the 'non - naturalistic' or 'extra -scientific' 
1Ibid. 
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function of ethical terms. Unlike most 'non -naturalists', however, he 
refuses to "surround ethical judgments with other - worldly mystery ";1 and 
yet, unlike Ayer, he wishes to try to 'characterize' the non -naturalistic 
'function'. His theory of emotive meaning and his two patterns of 
analysis are of course his means. 
There is another point in his treatment of 'meaning' which should 
be noted in view of the amount of attention it has received in the history 
of moral philosophy. He tosses cold water, so to speak, on all those 
who have engaged in the 'teleology versus deontology' controversy. 
"Certain theorists are accustomed," he writes, "to make a sharp distinc- 
tion between 'good' and 'right', as though the terms involved quite 
disparate problems of analysis. "2 He does not refer to any specific 
philosophers, but, we may recall, there have been, on the one hand, 
teleologists, such as G.E. Moore, who held that "good" is the fundamental 
ethical concept, and who defined "right" in terms of 'causes' leading to 
"a good result. "3 On the other hand there have been deontologists, such 
as E.F. Carritt, who wrote that "The Summum Bonum has...been the ignis 
fatuus of moral philosophy ",4 and who, in stressing self- evident 'duties', 
held that the terms "right" and "wrong" were fundamental. Stevenson 
evinces little feeling for the energies expended in this controversy. 
He can find "little ground ", he says, "either in common usage or else- 
where" for the distinctions made by these writers. "There are slight 
emotive differences," he allows, "and different ranges of ambiguity for 
the more specific senses; but that is true of any pair of ethical terms." 
"Only one point of difference is conspicuous, and that is not 
at all profound. Note that it is quite idiomatic to say, 'He 
is a good man,' or 'That is a good book,' but not at all 
L, p. 108. 2EL, p. 97. 
Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 147. 
4Carritt, Theory of Morals, p. 74. 
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idiomatic to say, 'He is a right man,' or 'That is a right 
book.' Thus 'right' is much less suited than 'good' for 
judging persons or things; and a moment's consideration will 
show that it is usually reserved for judging people's actions. 
It is quite idiomatic to say, 'His philanthropic action was 
morally right.' Now it is difficult to believe that this is 
anything more than a linguistic nicety, together with a means 
of giving the adjective 'right', by a limitation of the sub- 
stantives it can modify, an emotive meaning that makes it 
influence actions more specifically and directly. In other 
respects 'right' acts like 'good' (for the first pattern of 
analysis) in indicating the speaker's favourable attitude, and 
influencing that of the hearer.rl 
In the second pattern, as I have indicated, the ethical terms will be 
'descriptively richer', referring beyond the attitudes of the speaker; 
but this qualification does not affect Stevenson's point. 
Any emotivist theory such as Stevenson's mist bypass the 'teleology 
versus deontology' controversy. According to his theory, we begin our 
analysis on the basis of the fact that we sometimes 'react' or 'respond' 
primarily to a person or people and that we have adopted the convention 
of using the word "good" in such situations. On the other hand, we 
sometimes 'respond' primarily to the action of a person, and we have 
adopted the convention of using the word "right" in referring to actions. 
It would appear, however, that traditional deontological and teleological 
theories have been based on question- begging metaphysical, and natural- 
istic assumptions, and the claim to either 'rights' or 'goods' as funda- 
mental will ultimately depend on 'intellectual intuitions', or 'natural- 
istic' claims. This is not to suggest that there is a. parallel between 
deontological and teleological theories, on the one hand, and meta- 
physical and naturalistic assumptions on the other, for of course the 
teleological theory I have given as an example (that is, the theory of 
G.E. Moore), in its reliance on intellectual intuition, may be termed a 
1EL, p. 97. 
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metaphysical theory. The philosophical analyst will of course wish to 
avoid postulating either a metaphysical theory or a naturalistic theory. 
He will not try to plead for one particular definition of a word as 
being prior or fundamental to others, but will seek to observe and clarify 
the word in all of its variety of uses. Without saying more than this it 
is apparent that Stevenson must regard the 'teleology versus deontology' 
controversy as a ^iweedledum- Tweedledee affair. 
Apart from expressing agnosticism about metaphysical claims, and 
apart from questioning naturalism on logical grounds, Stevenson has a 
further specific argument against any theory which would single out the 
use of any ethical term as if it were the 'true', 'essential' moral use. 
As we shall see shortly, all such theories, including teleological and 
deontological theories, would be guilty of the question- begging procedure 
of embodying 'persuasive definitions' in their analyses. In short, he 
points out that there is no way by means of logic alone to select and 
give priority to one use among the variety of possible uses of an ethical 
word. Any such selection will involve the making of a value judgment by 
the writer. 
We may now turn to the first, or 'descriptive' part of the first 
pattern of analysis. In the working models, we recall, this part con- 
cerned simply the expression of approval or disapproval of the speaker. 
The primary concern here is with methodology, and in his treatment of it 
Stevenson should indicate in what way ethical statements may be 'proved' 
or 'supported'. The question which Stevenson puts to himself is this: 
"When people argue about evaluative matters, by what sort of reasoning 
can they hope to reach agreement ? "1 
-EI,, p. 26. 
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In treating the 'descriptive' part of the first pattern we are to 
remember that it, like the 'imperative' part, has inadequacies which are 
especially obvious when we consider the pattern at the "working models" 
stage. The first and most serious inadequacy is of course that the first 
pattern is primarily concerned with extremely vague ethical terms, such 
as "good ", "ought ", and "wrong ", which are 'descriptively poor' as com- 
pared with terms such as "charity ", "hypocrisy ", and "selfishness ". Thus 
the descriptive part of the first pattern emphasizes the 'descriptive' or 
'declarative' statement which expresses the fact that the speaker has 
attitudes of approval or disapproval. This would appear to be a serious 
deficiency since it would limit discussion of the 'beliefs' which may 
alter 'attitudes'. In his treatment of the working models, however, 
Stevenson writes in general terms of the method of 'supporting' or 
'proving' ethical judgments; and, since the first pattern is, as he says, 
"simply an extension of the working models, "1 it is useful to follow him 
in the earlier chapter. Although we are promised that this deficiency 
of emphasis will be made good by the second pattern of analysis, the 
fundamental points made concerning the proving or 'supporting' of ethical 
judgments will remain essentially unchanged.2 
A second deficiency of the descriptive part of the first pattern 
is that descriptive statements, "if taken alone,...hint too much at a 
bare description of attitudes (and)...do not evidence the contagion of 
warmly expressed approval.... "3 But this inadequacy, like that of the 
imperative part of the first pattern, is to be made good by Stevenson's 
treatment of emotive meaning; and the summary statement we have seen 
earlier indicates in what way emotive meaning may serve as a corrective. 
3EL , p. 89. 
EL, p. 22. 
2Cf., EL, p. 134 ff. 
4Cf., above, p. 152. 
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With these qualifications in mind, we may turn to his attempts to fulfil 
the second 'object' of his book, that is, "to characterize the general 
methods by which ethical judgments can be proved or supported." 
If we use the word "proof" in any conventional sense, we must 
immediately acknowledge that an ethical statement cannot be 'proved' or 
'verified'. The working models, while suggesting an analysis different 
from any previous analyses, are of no help. If we take as an example 
the model for the statement "This is good" we may see the problem. While 
the 'descriptive' part, "I approve of this ", may be confirmed or refuted 
(by either introspective or behaviouristic means), there is difficulty 
with the 'imperative' part, "do so as well ". As Stevenson says, the very 
request for a 'proof' of an imperative is nonsensical. But the problem 
occurs, he suggests, "only because we have tacitly assumed that a proof 
in ethics must be exactly like a proof in science." 
"The possibility that ethical judgments may have a different 
sort of proof has not been considered. Or rather, since 'proof' 
may be a misleading term, let us put it this way: It has yet 
to be considered whether there is some 'substitute for a proof' 
in ethics, some support or reasoned argument which, although 
different from a proof in science, will be equally serviceable 
in removing the hesitations that usually prompt people to ask 
for a proof. i1 
Stevenson searches, then, for an "analogue to proof", and in so doing he 
asks if there is any sense in which it may be said that imperatives may 
be 'supported'; and he readily concludes that there is. Although it 
would be nonsensical to respond to an imperative with the retort, "Prove 
it ", it would not be nonsensical to ask "Why ? ", and the question, "why ? ", 
he says, asks for a "reason ". 
"For instance: If told to close the door, one may ask 'Why ?' 
and receive some such reason as 'It is too drafty,' or 'The 
noise is distracting. "' 
1EL, p. 27. 
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The 'reasons', we note, are expressed in 'descriptive' or 'belief' state- 
ments. He then goes on to indicate his convention for using the word 
"reason ". 
"These reasons cannot be called 'proofs' in any but a dangerously 
extended sense, nor are they demonstratively or inductively 
related to an imperative; but they manifestly do support an 
imperative. They 'back it up', or 'establish it', or 'base it 
on concrete references to fact'. And they are analogous to 
proofs in that they may remove the doubts or hesitations that 
prevent the imperative from being accepted." 
His next passage is of fundamental importance for an understanding of his 
analysis of methodology. 
"The way in which the reasons support the imperative is simply 
this: The imperative is used to alter the hearer's attitudes 
or actions. In asking 'Why ?' the hearer indicates his hesitancy 
to comply. He will not do it 'just because he is told to'. The 
supporting reason then describes the situation which the impera- 
tive seeks to alter, or the new situation which the imperative 
seeks to bring about; and if these facts disclose that the new 
situation will satisfy a preponderance of the hearer's desires, 
he will hesitate to obey no longer. More generally, reasons 
support imperatives by altering such beliefs as may in turn 
alter an unwillingness to obey." 
In saying this he is returning to one of his preliminary distinctions; 
that is, that "our beliefs often affect our attitudes; for we may alter 
our form of approval of something when we change our beliefs about its 
nature.... "1 
"The 'substitute proofs' or 'supporting reasons' that we have 
been seeking can thus be recognized as familiar acquaintances 
under a new name: they are the expressions of belief that so 
often play an important, if indirect, role in situations that 
involve disagreement in attitude.i2 
Since there is no 'logical' or 'necessary' relationship between 
'beliefs' and 'attitudes', there can ultimately, be no 'logical' or 
'necessary' relationship between 'supporting reasons' and the ethical 
judgments they 'support'. Speaking of such 'supporting reasons' during 
1Cf., above, p. 124. 2EL, p. 28. 
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his treatment of the first pattern of analysis, Stevenson elaborates on 
this point. 
"Subject to some exceptions that will be noted as we proceed, 
they (that is, the supporting reasons) are related to the 
judgment psychologically rather than logically. They do not 
strictly imply the judgment in the way that axioms imply 
theorems; nor are they related to the judgment inductively, 
as statements describing observations are related to scientific 
laws. Rather, they support the judgment in the way that reasons 
support imperatives. They serve to intensify and render more 
permanent the influence upon attitudes which emotive meaning 
can often do no more than begin. This is possible whenever 
attitudes are functions of beliefs. "1 
In view of the lack of any necessary relationship between 'beliefs' and 
'attitudes', Stevenson is aware of the possibility that his theory, like 
other emotivist theories, might be accused of "building morality on 
shifting sands." In view of what he has said, however, about the "inertia" 
of emotive meaning, and the "dependent" and "quasi- dependent" relation- 
ships between emotive meaning and descriptive meaning, it can hardly be 
said that his analysis indicates that ethical 'attitudes' are any less 
(or more) 'stable' than practices in normative ethics. He readily 
acknowledges that his account of methodology "will fail to content the 
great number of theorists who are embarked on 'the quest for certainty'." 
His analysis does not allow for any guarantee that ethical disagreement 
might be resolved. In writing the following passage Stevenson is ex- 
pressing a view which is typical of the views of Hume and Ayer. 
"Persons who make opposed ethical judgements may (so far as 
theoretical possibility is concerned) continue to do so in 
the face of all manner of reasons that their argument includes, 
even though neither makes any logical or empirical error."2 
Of course, one might add, there is no guarantee in the practice of normative 
ethics, that any disagreement might be resolved; and the demand for an 
analysis in moral philosophy that would suggest that there must be a 
1111 p. 113. 2Eh, pp. 30-31. 
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definite method for resolving ethical disagreements is possibly a case 
of wishful thinking. Stevenson is unwilling to accept the dictum, 
"Natters of taste are not to be disputed," since he believes it is too 
limited in the practice of normative ethics, although it may be of use 
in questions of the palate.1 Nevertheless, he would have to allow that, 
ultimately, after considerable argument, there may be a point at which 
it may be said, if not "everyone to his own taste ", at least "everyone 
to his own attitude." 
This, in brief, is what Stevenson has to say about methodology 
when discussing it at the "working models" stage of the first pattern 
of analysis. After considering what further qualifications he makes 
concerning methodology in the remainder of his treatment of the first 
pattern of analysis, I shall compare this approach with that of Hume and 
Ayer. Apart from differences in linguistic conventions, the theories 
seem very similar. In the Treatise, for example, Hume had said that 
"reasoning takes place to discover this relation (that is, between 'objects' 
which 'cause' pleasure and pain); and according as our reasoning varies, 
our actions receive a subsequent variation ";2 and, in the Enquiry, he 
said that "much reasoning" is necessary "to pave the way" for a moral 
'sentiment'.3 In what sense, then, does Stevenson's first pattern of 
analysis differ? We must return to this point after considering the main 
details of his treatment of methodology. 
In his examination of "rational methods" used in ethical arguments, 
Stevenson classifies four main groups. In view of the distinctions which 
he has made at the 'working models' stage, and in view of what he has 
said about 'meaning', he gives a "general outline of first -pattern 
1EL, p. 111. 
3Enquiry, p. 173. 
2Treatise, p. 41+. 
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methodology" which will be assumed throughout his treatment. 
"Any statement about any matter of fact which any speaker con- 
siders likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason 
for or against an ethical judgment. Whether this reason will 
in fact support or oppose the judgment will depend on whether 
the hearer believes it, and upon whether, if he does, it will 
actually make a difference to his attitudes; but it may con- 
veniently be called a reason (though not necessarily a 'valid' 
one) regardless of whether it is accepted or not, "l 
In Group I he cites examples to "illustrate some of the ways in which 
ethical methods resemble factual ones." 
"They present exceptions to the rough but useful rule mentioned 
previously - --the rule that ethical judgments are supported or 
attacked by reasons related to them psychologically, rather 
than logically." 
These exceptions are of course important to note since they would call 
for a modification of earlier views about 'flume's gap' between factual 
statements and value judgments. As we have seen, Ayer had followed 
Hume in insisting that there could be no 'logical bridge' whatever 
between factual statements and value judgments. Stevenson, then, would 
qualify this view. In recognizing that words and statements may have 
both 'descriptive meaning' and 'emotive meaning' at one and the same 
time, he is able to establish a 'logical bridge' between the 'descriptive 
meaning' of a factual statement and the 'descriptive meaning' of a value 
judgment. "In general ", he writes, "ethical statements, like all others 
that have at least some descriptive meaning, are amenable to the usual 
applications of formal logic. "2 In three of the four examples in Group I 
Stevenson cites cases in which a speaker is shown to be advocating views 
which are formally inconsistent with other statements he has made or 
might make. The first of his examples clearly establishes his point: 
"A: It would be a good thing to have a dole for the unemployed. 
1EL, pp. 114-115. 2EL, p. 116. 
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B: But you have just said that a dole would weaken people's 
sense of independence, and you have admitted that nothing 
which has that consequence is good," 
In this instance, as in the second example, B's reply is "an empirical 
assertion ", but in indicating that A has made a statement which is for- 
mally inconsistent with a previous statement, B's statement thus contra- 
dicts A's judgment. What Stevenson says about the second example may 
equally apply to the first. "A must, in the interest of consistency," 
he writes, "either reject B's assertion, or give up his ethical judgment ". 
In the fourth example of this group speaker B challenges A for 
making an ethical judgment which is a generalization from 'some' to 
'all' of a particular group. In defence of his generalization, A indicates 
that he knows "a great number" of the group in question, and he thus 
tries to support his initial judgment. In this example Stevenson points 
out "how closely an ethical argument can approximate to ordinary induction." 
The essential difference, however, is that each particular ethical judg- 
ment, "unlike observation -sentences in science ", is open to disagreement 
in attitude. Thus, as Stevenson argues, "there is no use of induction in 
ethics that can secure agreement in attitude in the same direct way that 
it can secure agreement in belief. "1 
In these examples of Group I there is an obvious logical relation- 
ship between the statements of speakers A and B, and thus the examples 
do represent exceptions to the "rough but useful rule...that ethical 
judgments are supported or attacked by reasons related to them psycho- 
logically rather than logically." It should be noted, however, that a 
statement which points out a formal contradiction in a person's ethical 
judgments is not to be taken as a 'reason' for one or the other of the 
1EL, p. 11$. 
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judgments. Although it is a 'reason' for making the judgments consistent, 
"the speaker need give up only one of the judgments, formal logic being 
unable to determine which. "1 The statement which serves to reveal a 
formal contradiction is not, then, a 'proof' of any particular value 
judgment, but it is rather "an indefinite disproof ".2 By itself it 
cannot 'prove' or 'support' a particular value judgment. Although, for 
the sake of logical consistency, ethical judgments which we make should 
not be contradictory, "judgments which are consistent may nonetheless 
be rejected." Ultimately, then, (as he indicates in a footnote to page 
134) we are directed back to the generalization he had made earlier, that 
"supporting reasons...have no sort of logical compulsion. "3 And in the 
later passage we have been considering he writes the following: 
"In short, formal logic can provide necessary conditions to the 
rational acceptance of normatively interesting ethical judgments, 
but not sufficient ones, "4 
Despite his establishing a partial 'logical bridge' (over 'Hume's gap') 
between factual statements and value judgments, there is, then, a further 
'gap' which remains to be bridged. Keeping in mind the qualifications 
he has made he may, then, be interpreted as saying that, finally and 
fundamentally, supporting reasons are related to particular value judg- 
ments psychologically and not logically. 
In the remaining three groups in his chapter "First Pattern: 
Method ", the "rough but useful" rule is applied without qualification. 
Unlike some of the examples in Group I, the examples of the remaining 
groups do not illustrate challenges to a speaker's 'description' of his 
'attitudes'. In these examples, that is, the assumption is that he is 
correctly 'describing' his 'attitude', and the emphasis is on the 
;L, p. 134. 
EL, p. 30. 
2lbid. 
L, p. 135. 
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endeavour to alter or strengthen the attitude by means of altering his 
beliefs. In Group II, for example, the emphasis is on altering attitudes 
by means of altering beliefs about the "nature ", or "consequences" of 
that which is to be judged. Stevenson gives the following example of 
an argument concerned with the "nature" of that which is judged: 
"A: The proposed tax bill is on the whole very bad. 
B: I know little about it, but have been inclined to 
favour it on the ground that higher taxes are 
preferable to further borrowing. 
A: It provides for a sales -tax on a number of necessities, 
and reduces income -tax exemption to an incredibly low 
figure. 
B: I had not realized that. I must study the bill, and 
perhaps I shall agree with you in opposing it." 
In Group III the examples concern "motives" of actions, and the "origin" 
of attitudes; and in one of the examples a speaker tries to alter the 
'attitude' of another by pointing up motives which apparently underlay 
the action under judgment. And in Group IV the method of argument is 
"less concerned with resolving disagreement in attitude than with 
temporarily evading the force of a disconcerting influence, or altering 
the means by which it is exerted. "1 The following example will illus- 
trate Stevenson's point: 
"A: You are much too hard on your employees. 
B: But you, certainly, are not the one to say so. Your own 
factory would bear investigation far less easily than mine." 
In these three groups, as I have mentioned, there is no logical relation 
whatever between the factual statements which challenge the value state- 
ments. 
In the introductory paragraph of his next chapter, "Persuasion ", 
Stevenson summarizes the conclusions he has arrived at in his analysis 
of the four types of "rational methods" we have been considering. 
1 L, p. 127. 
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"We have seen that the rational methods used in normative ethics 
may lack finality, even in theory. That they are not final in 
practice, amid the complexities of applying them, is evident 
on every hand. "1 
This statement is of course a clear indication of the suggestion that 
despite his allowing that there may be a logical relation between factual 
statements and value judgment, finally and fundamentally, there is a 
'gap' between factual statements and particular value judgments which 
cannot be bridged by logic. 
"What recourse is there, then," he continues, "for one who 
despairs of a reasoned solution? Must he be content with 
a continued disagreement, or may he support his ethical 
position in some other way ?" 
In his analysis of "rational methods" to resolve ethical disagreement he 
was concerned, as we have seen, with arguments which seek to change or 
redirect attitudes by changing beliefs: 
"But," he writes, "there are other ways of altering a man's 
attitudes -- -ways that are not mediated by reasons which 
change beliefs. Like all psychological phenomena, attitudes 
are the outcome of many determining factors, and beliefs 
figure as but one set of factors among others. To the extent 
that the other factors are subject to control in the course 
of an argument, and so may contribute to changes in a man's 
attitudes, they both can be and are used as a means of securing 
ethical agreement. Such procedures constitute the 'nonrational 
methods' of ethics.... "2 
"The most important of the nonrational methods," he continues, "will be 
called 'persuasive', in a somewhat broadened sense." (This phrase, "in 
a somewhat broadened sense ", is to be noted, since when Hare and Nowell - 
Smith criticize the 'persuasive theory' they will be seen to use the 
word " persuasivd'in a narrow sense). Stevenson describes the 'persuasive 
method' of ethical argument in the following passage: 
"It depends on the sheer, direct emotional impact of words-- - 
on emotive meaning, rhetorical cadence, apt metaphor, stentor- 
ian, stimulating, or pleading tones of voice, dramatic gest- 
ures, care in establishing rapport with the hearer or audience, 
1 L, p. 139. 2EL, p. 139. 
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and so on. Any ethical judgment, of course, is itself a per- 
suasive instrument; but in the use of persuasive 'methods' the 
effects of an initial judgment are intensified by further 
persuasion. A redirection of the hearer's attitudes is sought 
not by the mediating step of altering his beliefs, but by 
exhortation, whether obvious or subtle, crude or refined." 
As Stevenson says, "a study of persuasive methods is...largely a study 
of the emotive use of words, and hence subject to implicit treatment 
throughout the whole" of his work. Qe example of a persuasive argument 
will be sufficient to illustrate what he means. 
"A: It is morally wrong for you to disobey him. 
B: That is precisely what I have been denying. 
A: But it is your simple duty to obey. You ought to 
obey him in the sheer interest of moral obligation." 2 
In any such argument the statements will have of course descriptive 
meaning as well as emotive meaning. Stevenson points out, in fact, that 
"purely persuasive methods are seldom found...for there are very few 
words which have an emotive meaning only. "3 Nevertheless, if a method 
of argument is used which relies on means "that go beyond the mediation 
of articulate beliefs ",4 it is to that extent "persuasive". 
In his analysis of the four "rational methods" and the main "non - 
rational method" of ethical argument, Stevenson says nothing that would 
significantly alter what he had said at the 'working models' stage. And 
as he allows when he introduces his second pattern of analysis, he has 
nothing to add which will alter what he has said earlier about "the 
possibility or impossibility of reaching ethical agreement. "5 Thus, 
as he had said earlier, "unless some further method can be found, a 
reasoned argument in ethics is theoretically possible only to the extent 
that agreement in belief will cause people to agree in attitude. "6 
L, pp. 139-140. 
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While he suggests, then, that his analysis does not indicate that 
there is at present a definitive method for resolving disagreements in 
normative ethics, he makes no claims that his indefinitive analysis is 
definitive. In the quotation concluding the preceding paragraph we may 
note that he qualifies his claims with the phrase "unless some further 
method can be found." The statement is even further qualified, however, 
in the use of the phrase "only to the extent that ". If we could remove 
this latter qualification, and could say that there is always a definite 
relationship between disagreement in attitudes and some beliefs, then we 
could say that a reasoned agreement in ethics is theoretically possible. 
Stevenson considers this possibility. "...Granted an assumption," 
he writes "one may hope that ethicalagreement can be obtained. "1 The 
assumption in question is: "All disagreement in attitude is rooted in 
disagreement in belief." This assumption, he acknowledges, is in turn 
based on the assumption that "rational methods...are sufficient to bring 
about agreement in belief." In view of the amount of attention given in 
writings in the philosophy of science to problems concerning 'meaning', 
'verification', and 'testability', we may wonder why Stevenson would have 
given his psychological assumption any further consideration. But, at 
this point, he becomes something of a moralist despite himself. After 
acknowledging that his psychological assumption rests on the scientific 
assumption, he proceeds to write the following statement: "but even so 
one may hope, granted the assumption, that the growth of empirical know- 
ledge will slowly lead to a world of enlightened moral accord." He thus 
urges the assumption as a 'working hypothesis' which may serve as a basis 
towards the fulfillment of his moralistic hope for a better world. 
la, p. 136 
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Typical of his usual careful temperament, he warns us, however, that the 
assumption "must be used with caution." Referring to the similar socio- 
logical or psychological generalization which Hume used in support of his 
utilitarianism, he grants that any such assumption is "problematical... 
even when it is less sweeping than this one must inevitably be." There 
are obvious cases for which the assumption does hold, he writes, but 
"other cases may be of a different sort." 
"Some ethical disagreements seem rooted, rather in the scarcity 
of what people want. Several nations may urge that their 
crowded and suffering populations give them the right to take 
a disputed territory. Others seem rooted in temperamental 
differences, as when an oversexed, emotionally independent 
adolescent argues with an undersexed, emotionally dependent 
one about the desirability of free love. In these cases the 
growth of science may, for all that we can know, leave ethical 
disagreement permanently unresolved. "1 
While such disagreements may seem not to be rooted in belief, there is the 
possibility, he suggests, that they are. He allows that there is no 
present possibility of testing the assumption, thus "any assurance that 
may attend the assumption must be tempered by a scientific caution ". And 
he again resorts to persuasive, moralistic tactics to urge that the 
assumption not be rejected out of hand. 
"There can be no assurance that it will not hold in any given 
case, and its adoption may be beneficial in prolonging the 
enlightenment of discussion. One may even cling to it in 
desperation, as the only hope of settling issues that may 
otherwise lead to serious discord. "2 
Lest it be thought that the assumption is "fantasticff in implying that 
"all individual differences in temperament are a product of ignorance, 
and that the growth of science would make man behave with monotonous 
similarity," Stevenson points out that ethical agreement is in fact 
possible between people of different temperaments whó lead different 
-EL, pp. 136-7. 
2EL, 
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kinds of lives. In concluding his statement about the assumption he 
writes the following passage: 
"Yet an assumption that is not fantastic may nevertheless be 
false, nor have we any trustworthy assurance that it is true. 
Our conclusions about the finality of rational methods in 
ethics must accordingly be hypothetical: 
If any ethical dispute is rooted in disagreement in belief, 
it may be settled by reasoning and inquiry to whatever extent 
the beliefs may be settled. But if any ethical dispute is not 
rooted in disagreement 
1 
in belief, then no reasoned solution of 
any sort is possible. " 
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This, then, is Stevenson's general conclusion to the question posed 
by the second main object of his book: "to characterize the general 
methods by which ethical judgments can be proved or supported." Before 
discussing it I should like to point out that Stevenson's treatment of 
it is inconsistent with the role of the philosophical analyst - --a role 
which he purports to follow. While he tells us elsewhere in the book 
that his work "does not confine one, after clarity is obtained, to a 
passive or cynical neutrality, "2 he also maintains in the same context 
that analysis 'must retain that difficult detachment which studies ethical 
judgments without making them." In another context, while admitting that 
analysis "cannot pretend to sever its studies from all evaluation what- 
soever", the evaluations which he is prepared to allow are those which 
are concerned with "marking off...(a) field of study ", and are not 
"peculiarly 'moral' ones ", as the ones here in question are. As I have 
suggested, in his urging that the assumption be taken for granted by 
disputants in normative ethics, he is going beyond the role of the analyst, 
and, in fact, is something of a moralist. His task as an analyst, as he 
says, "is concerned with observing and clarifying, as distinct from 
judging, and if in normative ethics all people do in fact act as if 
3EL, p. 138. -EL, p. 110. 
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they held the assumption that "all disagreement in attitude is rooted in 
disagreement in belief" (an impossible 'fact' to ascertain at least at 
present, as Stevenson admits), then, as an analyst, he should simply 
acknowledge this. But as an analyst his role is not to suggest that the 
"adoption" of the assumption "may be beneficial in prolonging the en- 
lightenment of discussion," or that "one may cling to it in desperation, 
as the only hope of settling issues that may otherwise lead to serious 
discord." Further evidence that he is in this instance moralising is 
that, in advocating the adoption of the assumption, for the reasons he 
has given, he could only be addressing his recommendation to disputants 
involved in an ethical or evaluative dispute. It would be pointless to 
make such a recommendation to other philosophical analysts gua philo- 
sophical analysts - -- although it seems pointless, als4 to recommend the 
results of the analysis of normative ethics to disputants who provide the 
data to analyse. Stevenson suggested that, if his analysis is accurate, 
the methods used in some (perhaps most) ethical disagreements may, in 
fact, be based on the assumption that "disagreement in attitude is rooted 
in disagreement in belief," while, on the other hand, in some cases of 
ethical disagreement, the disagreements in attitude seem fundamental 
(such as in the examples of want based on scarcity, or in the tempera- 
mental differences of the adolescents). This, I believe, is as far as 
his analysis could justifiably take him.1 
Considering the first pattern of analysis, what may be said in 
general of Stevenson's aim "to characterize the general methods by which 
ethical judgments can be proved or supported "? In what sense is his 
theory, to this point, different from the emotivist theories of Hume 
1There are other 'persuasive' lapses which I shall mention later. 
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and Ayer ? - -- First, like the earlier emotivists, he agrees that value 
judgments cannot be 'proved' or 'supported' in the same way in which 
'descriptive' or 'scientific' statements may be proved or supported. 
Often, however, and here Stevenson suggests an innovation to the emotivist 
theory, ethical judgments may be given "substitute proofs" or "supporting 
reasons ". But, with one type of exception, this particular qualification 
does not go beyond earlier theories. Although the earlier emotivists 
(considering Ayer's early version of his theory) would not have said 
that value judgments could be given "reasons" or "substitute proofs ", 
we may recall that Hume had allowed that "much reasoning" is necessary 
to "pave the way" for a desired "sentiment ", and Ayer had allowed for 
arguments about the "facts" of the case, about "motives ", "consequences ", 
and other circumstances. Recognizing a different linguistic convention 
(as Ayer does later) we could quite well refer to the 'factual state- 
ments' in such reasoning as "reasons ". While Stevenson's analysis of 
methods of argument goes into considerably more detail than the earlier 
theories, it relies, with the one exception, on the same general rule 
which Hume and Ayer had assumed. That is, as Stevenson had expressed 
it, "ethical judgments are supported or attacked by reasons related to 
them psychologically, rather than logically." There is, however, the 
one exception; and this exception is based on a further qualification 
which Stevenson makes to the emotive theory. 
The qualification is the later -Wittgenstein doctrine that individual 
terms and statements may serve different purposes at one and the same 
time. As Stevenson had expressed this, a term may be considered as 
serving both a 'descriptive' use and an 'emotive' or 'dynamic' use, or, 
in other words, may have a 'descriptive meaning' and an 'emotive meaning'. 
Thus it is possible to establish a 'logical link' between the descriptive 
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meaning of a factual statement and the descriptive meaning of a value 
judgment; and thus, as we have seen, Stevenson argues that there may be 
exceptions to his "rough but useful" rule. A factual statement may there- 
fore be logically related to an ethical judgment in that it indicates a 
formal contradiction between that judgment and another judgment which 
the speaker may have made or, in some circumstances, would make. As we 
have seen, however, Stevenson ultimately allows that there is no "suffi- 
cient" relation of logical entailment between a factual statement and a 
particular value judgment. "Supporting reasons," as he has said, "have 
no sort of logical compulsion." As he has also said, the resolution of 
an ethical argument requires a resolution of disagreement in attitude ", 
and the first pattern, as he readily allows, has not indicated any 
definite or certain way in which this may be accomplished. We must now 
ask whether or not the "second pattern of analysis" will provide any more 
satisfactory solution. 
Section 3 
The second pattern of analysis, as Stevenson has indicated, is 
concerned with ethical terms which are 'descriptively richer' than the 
relatively more vague terms treated by the first pattern. While the 
first pattern considered the 'descriptive meaning' of ethical terms with 
reference only to 'expressing' or 'declaring' the speaker's attitudes, 
the second pattern "will illustrate many other possibilities, allowing 
the descriptive references of the ethical terms to become as complicated 
as any occasion or context may require. "1 This is not to suggest that 
the second pattern will be concerned primarily with descriptive meaning, 
however, for, as Stevenson says, "in both patterns there is an emphasis 
1EL, p. 89. 
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on disagreement in attitude." The main difference lies "solely in the 
added descriptive meaning" that the second pattern provides, "and the 
complications of methodology that arise as a consequence. "1 The general 
form of the second pattern is as follows: 
"'This is good' has the meaning of 'This has qualities or 
relations X,Y,Z...,' except that 'good' has as well a 
laudatory emotive meaning which permits it to express the 
speaker's approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the 
hearer. "2 
We have seen that even the first pattern analysis, simply in recog- 
nizing a limited 'descriptive meaning' of ethical terms, has gone beyond 
the early postulation by Ayer that in an ethical statement "the function 
of the relevant ethical word is purely 'emotive'." The second pattern 
extends the degree of that difference. But if one had hoped that the 
second pattern might have led to any essential modification of the results 
derived by the first pattern analysis, --if one had hoped, for example, 
for a more adequate definition of ethical terms or a more adequate method 
of 'proving' or 'supporting' ethical judgments -- Stevenson quickly dampens 
any such hopes. 
"The great variety of meanings which the second pattern recognizes, 
as compared with the first, and the greater 'content' which it 
seems to provide, end by making no essential difference to the 
nature of normative ethics. Ethics becomes neither richer nor 
poorer by the second pattern, and neither more nor less /objec- 
tive'. All the considerations of the first pattern reappear, and 
the task of analysis is simply to discern them in their new 
linguistic guise. Perhaps this will not be initially obvious. 
With increased descriptive meaning, ethical judgments are open 
to a more direct case of empirical and logical methods, and thus 
seemingly more amenable to the ordinary considerations of proof 
and validity. We shall see, however, that this is a wholly 
unimportant matter, without any results upon the3possibility 
or impossibility of reaching ethical agreement." 
This is not to say, however, that Stevenson's second pattern of analysis 
is unimportant, for, on the contrary, what he has written on the subject 
-EL, p. 206. "EL, p. 207. 3EL, p. 209. 
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of "persuasive definitions" must obviously be of considerable importance 
in the history of moral philosophy. 
This subject is introduced in his chapter concerning the meanings 
or definitions of ethical words (the chapter is appropriately entitled, 
"The Second Pattern of Analysis: Persuasive Definitions "). As in the 
first pattern, his treatment of methodology follows his treatment of 
meanings. In considering the second pattern we may grant at the outset 
that, as the first pattern analysis clearly indicated, ethical words are 
indefinable. Even if it were possible to arrive at acceptable definitions 
of ethical terms as considered (by logical abstraction) solely in terms 
of their 'descriptive' usage, it is not possible to 'define' them in 
terms of their 'extra- scientific' usage - --or, as Stevenson would say, in 
terms of their emotive meaning. The problem of definition is complicated, 
however, in view of the fact that ethical words are often extremely vague 
in their descriptive meaning. A difficulty in trying to define vague 
words is of course that they may be used in different ways by different 
people. Stevenson expresses this point more emphatically. "...One of 
the chief functions of vague words," he writes, "is that they can be 
adapted to this or that specific purpose, as occasion requires. "1 If 
a word is vague, however, and is in fact used in different ways, it is 
hardly the analyst's prerogative to opt for one particular usage, or 
'definition'. 
"It is more important," writes Stevenson, "to understand the 
flexibilities of common words, and the varieties of meaning 
they may 'naturally' be assigned, than to insist on some one 
meaning that they should be given. "2 
This, then, is the task which Stevenson undertakes by means of his second 
pattern of analysis. Assuming that the ethical term "good" (or any other 
lEL, p. 20$. 2EL, p. 206. 
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ethical word) may have a variety of descriptive meanings, depending on 
the variety of contexts in which it is conventionally used, Stevenson 
regards his second pattern of analysis as a "formal schema" which may 
serve as an analytic tool to study the word in any of its uses. 
Despite the fact that, as we now know, an ethical word, such as 
"good ", is vague in its descriptive meaning, and may be used in a variety 
of ways, and despite the fact that its 'extra- scientific' use defies 
definition, many traditional moral philosophers have undertaken to dis- 
cover the definition of the word of their choice, as if it had a single, 
'true', 'essential' meaning. Quoting I.A. Richards with approval, 
Stevenson has this to say of such an approach: "The 'One -And- Only -One- 
True -Meaning superstition'...can have serious consequences in any field 
of enquiry, and in ethics it is fatal to all further advance. "1 None- 
theless, the history of moral philosophy offers many examples of philo- 
sophers who have used this approach. Considering their theories in terms 
of the second pattern, it might be said that such philosophers have argued 
that the variables (X,Y,Z...) should have a restricted descriptive meaning, 
and that all other possible variables (or uses) should be rejected. In 
so doing each philosopher has made a value judgment, thereby begging the 
question for one among other possible uses of the ethical word in question. 
Plato is a noteworthy example. Stevenson points out that through the 
analyses of various uses of the word "justice" in the Republic, Plato 
rejects all with the exception of one: "Justice of the state consists 
of each of the three classes doing the work of its own class. "2 Kant 
does the same kind of thing when he prescribes the categorical use of 
the word "good" in his statement that "it is impossible to conceive any- 
1EL, p. 85. 2EL, p. 225. 
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thing at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good 
without qualification, except a good will. "1 And Hume, in proposing his 
utilitarian theory, would have restricted the moral use of the word "good" 
to that which may be said to be 'useful' and 'agreeable' to others and to 
oneself.2 Nor has this tendency been confined to moral philosophers of 
earlier centuries. Bradley, Dewey, Moore, Ross, Paton, Ewing, and many 
others, have all, in their respective ways, assumed that there was a 
'One- And -Only -One- True -Meaning' of what they respectively took to be the 
fundamental ethical term. As Stevenson would express it, all have em- 
bodied "persuasive definitions" in their analyses of ethical words. 
The basic error made by all of these moral philosophers is that 
they have assumed that, by means solely of a logical or philosophical 
analysis, they could select and give priority to one among many possible 
uses of a particular ethical word. Stevenson's point might be made in 
the following way. If a person stipulated that when he used the word 
"good" in a moral context he intended that it should be regarded as being 
related, for example, to his own 'pleasure', there would be no logical 
way to show him that he must not use the word in this way. It might be 
possible to point out that "pleasure" is an extremely vague and ambiguous 
word, and that it might therefore be difficult for him always to use the 
word "good" as he stipulated; but simply because of its vagueness and 
ambiguity it is just as possible that he could use it consistently. If 
I wished, then, to get him to accept another possibility (for example, 
the utilitarian definition that "good" is equivalent to "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number "), there would be no logically necessary 
1Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, (paton tr.), p. 61. 
2Cf., Above, Ch. I, p.47. 
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relation between my arguments and his acceptance or lack of acceptance of 
the new definition. If he were ultimately to accept the utilitarian 
definition it would have been as a result of my redirecting his attitudes 
through persuading him to accept an altered descriptive meaning of the 
word "good ". An important part of the technique in presenting this 
'persuasive definition' is that I rely on the 'inertia' of the emotive 
meaning of "good ". Thus I seek to transfer or redirect my protagonistAs 
'pro -attitudes' to "good" from his descriptive meaning to mine; and in so 
doing I rely on the fact that, at the outset, he will have pro -attitudes 
to my use of the word even while not accepting my descriptive meaning or 
definition. In presenting the utilitarian 'persuasive definition' of 
"good ", as opposed to the egoistic hedonist theory (or any other theory), 
I would have had to rely primarily on psychological or persuasive tech- 
niques. And so it is with any theory which purports to demonstrate that 
there is one specific definition of a moral word (whether it be "good ", 
or "right ", or any other) which may be considered to be fundamental to 
all other uses. As Stevenson says, "to choose a definition is to plead 
a cause, so long as the word defined is strongly emotive. "1 
"...when a specially defined sense is singled out and recommended 
for exclusive use," he writes, "the matter becomes an evaluative 
one. The definition is persuasive. Those who select a sense as 
the 'true' sense may exert a deep and important influence as 
2 moralists, but they have ceased at that point to be analysts. " 
The value of the second pattern of analysis is not only, then, that it 
reveals the range and complexities of ethical language, but, above all, 
that it clearly reveals that any prescription of a specific sense of the 
word "good" (or any other ethical word) is dependent on a "persuasive 
definition." Thus, as Stevenson says, and as our brief examples have 
1 L, p. 210. 2EL, p. 222. 
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indicated, it is "often useful as a tool for clarifying and criticising 
the several trends of ethical theory. "1 
Stevenson's treatment of methodology by means of his second pattern 
does not add significantly to what he has said earlier, except that 
'supporting reasons' are considered not only as being used to alter 
attitudes, as they were in the first pattern, but also to support 'per- 
suasive definitions'. But, as he allows, his "previous conclusions, as 
developed for the first pattern, can be extended to the second without 
essential change. "2 
There is one aspect of his general treatment of methodology, 
however, which should be noted. As Stevenson acknowledges, "any ethical 
judgment, of course, is itself a persuasive instrument, "3 and since 
'propaganda' relies on persuasive methods, some critics have put "two 
and two together...without making four." Moved by the word "propaganda ", 
which is most often used derogatively, the critics, he suggests, "become 
frightened of all emotive words whatever," and regard all persuasion as 
"bad and shameful, regardless of its motivation and aim." But, in the 
practice of normative ethics, he points out, "we never have occasion to 
decide whether to reject all persuasion, or accept it all....Persuasion 
is sometimes good and sometimes bad, depending upon the circumstances. "4 
The question of deciding between cases of persuasion is, then, a value 
judgment itself, and it is not for the analyst moralistically to pre- 
scribe criteria for sorting out 'good' from 'bad' persuasion, any more 
than it is his role to prescribe any other value principles. As an 
analyst he may try to say something about the methods of those whom we 
conventionally term "moralists" as distinguished from those whom we 
33-EL, p. 253. 
3EZ, 
pp. 139-140. 
2EL, p. 227. 
'IL, p. 163. 
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conventionally term "propagandists "; and, in fact, Stevenson makes such 
an attempt.1 He has to allow, however, that his definitions for "moral- 
ist" and "propagandist" will "perhaps...prove to be persuasive; "2 and 
indeed they are. The very attempt to define them presupposes value 
judgments distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' persuasion. In the 
next two chapters we shall consider the possibility that qualifications 
to this kind of analysis of moral judgments might enable one to make 
the distinction between the 'moralist' and the 'propagandist' which some 
critics, including Hare and Nowell -Smith, find desirable. But even if 
it were not possible to make the distinction there can be no doubt that 
Stevenson's reply to critics is difficult to discount. 
"Persuasion," he writes, "is unquestionably a tool of the 'pro- 
pagandist' and soap -box orator; but it is also a tool of every 
altruistic reformer that the world has ever known. We must not 
banish all doctors to rid the world of quacks. "3 
Section !t 
Concluding the section in which he briefly outlines "the main 
points of difference" between his "emotive" theory and the kind of theory 
which had been presented by Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic, Stevenson 
cautions his reader that "the difference must not cause us to overlook 
the similarities. "4 In sketching these similarities I shall extend the 
point of comparison back to Hume. 
The most obvious similarity is that Stevenson, like Hume and Ayer, 
has presented an emotivist analysis of ethical terms. Thus, like them, 
he would reject most of the traditional theories of moral philosophers. 
An important factor in their rejection of these theories is of course 
their common empirical temperament. From this they would agree that all 
1Cf. Ch. XI, "Moralists and Propagandists ". 
2 
. L, p. 243. 3EL, p. 164. 'EL, p. 268. 
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metaphysical, objectivist, absolutist, intuitionist, and all such theories, 
are based on assumptions which cannot be supported. But beyond this 
methodological rejection of cognitivist theories, Stevenson would point 
out that all have made the error of neglecting attitudes; and, in saying 
this, he would suggest that, to some extent even Hume and Ayer are guilty 
of this failing. All three are in agreement, however, that in some sense, 
the distinctive 'feature' or 'characteristic' or 'use' of ethical state- 
ments may appropriately be termed "emotive ". Among the several differ- 
ences within their expressions of the 'emotive' theory, however, is a 
shift in emphasis in the way they regard the word "emotive ". For Hume, 
and perhaps even more for Ayer, the word was less to be valued than the 
word "cognitive ". The word "emotive ", Stevenson writes, is sometimes 
used "in an extremely rough way, until it labels a wastebasket for the 
many aspects of linguistic usage that are detrimental or irrelevant to 
the purposes of science. "1 Stevenson is emphatic that it is in no sense 
a second -class term, and he "hopes to make clear that 'emotive' need not 
itself have a derogatory emotive meaning. "2 His psychological or prag- 
matic theory of meaning, within which emotive meaning and descriptive 
meaning are the two co- ordinate species, is one of his principle means 
to support that hope. 
Another similarity, closely related to the preceding one, is that, 
at least in their analyses of ethical statements, all three emotivists 
have clearly distinguished between the uses of factual, and value state- 
ments. The contemporary emotivists have made the distinction primarily 
in terms of the uses of language, while Hume's approach was partly analytic 
and partly that of introspective psychology. The main consequence of 
-EL, p. 76. 2g1, p. 267. 
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such an approach would be the rejection of all 'naturalistic' or 'scienti- 
fic' theories of moral philosophy, although Hume had inconsistently 
aspired to making philosophy a science. With the benefit of the ground- 
breaking role performed by Hume, and a gradual improvement of analytic 
techniques, culminating with Moore's exposition of the 'naturalistic 
fallacy', Ayer and Stevenson have been able to improve upon the reasons 
for rejecting 'naturalism'. While emotivist Ayer differed from cog - 
nitivist Moore (and of course all other cognitivists), there were still 
some traces of 'cognitivism' in his early theory. This is perhaps suggested 
in his statement that non -factual, or non -scientific, or non -cognitive 
statements are 'meaningless'; but it is probably more evident in his 
saying that normative ethics is a branch of psychology.1 As Stevenson 
indicated, there is a danger of inconsistency within an anti -naturalistic 
theory which postulates that normative ethics may be turned over to the 
social scientist; and there is clearly an inadequacy within a theory which 
purports to uphold the autonomy of ethics (as Moore's theory does) and 
yet does not provide the analytic means to distinguish between value 
statements and scientific statements.2 Neither Hume nor Ayer can be 
accused of this, even though, as Stevenson suggests, both may be accused 
to some extent of emphasizing 'beliefs' to the neglect of 'attitudes'. 
Stevenson's rejection of 'naturalism', from the basis of the main 
distinctions of the emotive theory, is more satisfactory than earlier 
anti -naturalist theories. Stevenson, in effect, displaces 'naturalism' 
by means of his analysis. Recognizing more clearly than most earlier 
moral philosophers that language may have a variety of uses, and that 
words and statements may have a 'meaningful' use in expressing, evoking, 
lAbove, p. 141. 2Cf., EL, p. 109. 
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and altering attitudes, he maintains that any analysis of ethical language 
and methodology which neglects attitudes is incomplete. Since any natural- 
istic theory is expressed in terms only of 'beliefs', it may therefore be 
dismissed. But, further, if we were to analyse any naturalistic theory 
by means of Stevenson's second pattern of analysis, we would clearly see 
that the writer of that theory has made an evaluative decision in selecting 
one particular descriptive meaning of the ethical word in question from 
among a variety of other possible uses of the word. Thus the naturalist 
would be guilty of embodying a "persuasive definition" in his analysis. 
In concluding a brief section on G.E. Moore (in which Stevenson recognizes 
the influence of Moore upon emotivists), he writes the following passage: 
"Whereas Moore would point to a 'naturalistic fallacy', the 
present writer, throughout the many senses which the second 
pattern recognizes, would point to a persuasive definition." 
The theory of 'persuasive definitions', obviously an important 
innovation in the history of philosophy, has of course a much wider range 
than simply the analysis and rejection of naturalistic theories. Like 
the 'naturalistic fallacy', which has been extended beyond the treatment 
of naturalistic theories, the theory of 'persuasive definitions' has 
the consequence of rejecting any theory which purports to give a specific 
'One- And -Only -One -True' definition of any ethical word. But, going 
beyond the 'naturalistic fallacy', Stevenson's theory has something to 
say about the 'indefinable', although 'characterizable' function of 
ethical words. Stevenson is critical of metaphysical non - naturalists, 
like Moore, who say so little that is meaningful about the function of 
ethical judgments in "influencing, guiding, and remolding attitudes." 
"To surround ethical judgments with otherworldly mystery may 
1EL, p. 273. 
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serve to intensify their influence, whether in one direction 
or another; but to explain it is quite another matter." 
"Unless the 'nonnatural' quality can be defended on more positive 
grounds, it must be taken as 
1 
an invisible shadow cast by con- 
fusion and emotive meaning. " 
The emotivist theories of Hume and Ayer do have something to say about 
ethical education, and Stevenson supplements what they have said by means 
of his theory of 'emotive meaning' and, especially, 'persuasive defini- 
tions'. 
Like Dyer, Stevenson carefully distinguishes between the roles 
of the moralist and the analyst, and, in his philosophic writings, he 
explicitly chooses to be an analyst. "Analysis," he writes, "is a narrow, 
specialized undertaking, requiring only close distinctions, careful 
attention to logic, and a sensitivity to the ways of language. "2 Such 
an activity debars evaluation, at least in principle, and, for the most 
part, Stevenson is so careful in following this role, that the lapse I 
have indicated earlier3 is all the more startling. There are at least 
two other similar lapses, however, and they may be noted. A background 
consideration is that he points out that analysis "cannot pretend to 
sever its studies from all evaluation whatsoever," for, as he indicates, 
it "must introduce certain evaluations (though they will not be peculiarly 
moral ones) in the course of marking off its field of study. "4 In his 
being 'motivated' to his particular inquiry, and in any implicit or 
explicit defense of his work, the analyst (especially if he is an 
emotivist) must be considered to have made evaluations. 
"No inquiry," he continues, "...can divorce itself from the 
evaluative considerations that directly concern and guide 
the process of inquiry itself; nor is ethical analysis an 
exception to this general principle." 
3 L, pp. 108-9. 
Above, p. 171. 
2 p. 222. 
EL, p. 160. 
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While this conclusion could probably be made as a result of an analysis 
of the analytic method, Stevenson permits himself an evaluation which, of 
course, does not follow logically from these considerations. After say- 
ing that a writer may 'wish to combine' the functions of the analyst and 
the moralist, and after pointing out the difficulties and unfortunate 
consequences of such practices in the history of philosophy, there can 
be no doubt that he would not wish to combine the practices in his work. 
Nonetheless, he makes the following value judgment: 
"Ultimately, analysis and evaluation must be brought together; 
for the former is of use only in so far as it gives discipline 
to the latter. But they must not be forced together prematurely. 
They must carefully be distinguished before they can profitably 
be combined. "l 
And in concluding a section in which he presents a most eloquent defence 
(partly analytic and partly 'persuasive') of his theory as contrasted 
with metaphysical and naturalistic theories, he offers the following 
primarily "persuasive" argument for the importance of his kind of 
analysis. He also reveals his own altruistic, utilitarian attitudes. 
"The present analysis can afford no assurance that dictators 
and self -seeking politicians, whose skill in exhortation is so 
manifest, 'inevitably must' fail, if left unopposed, in re- 
shaping moral codes to serve their narrow interests. Nor can 
analysis in itself be expected to oppose these men; for it 
must retain that difficult detachment which studies ethical 
judgments without making them. But this much must be said: 
Those who cherish altruism, and look forward to a time when a 
stable society will be governed by farsighted men, will serve 
these ideals poorly by turning from present troubles to fancied 
realms. For these ideals, like all other attitudes, are not 
imposed upon human nature by esoteric forces; they are a part 
of human nature itself. If they are to become a more integral 
part of it, they must be fought for. They must be fought for 
with the words 'right' and 'wrong', else these attitude -molding 
weapons will be left to the use of opponents. And they must be 
supported with clear- minded reasons, else hypostatic obscurantism 
will bring contempt to the cause it is intended to plead. The 
present task, with its humble task of clarification, cannot 
L, pp. 222 -223 (my underlining). 
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directly participate in this undertaking; but it certainly does 
not confine one, after clarity is obtained, to a passive or 
cynical neutrality.tu 
He need not perhaps have gone so far to 'persuade' some critics that this 
kind of theory does not discredit ethics. 
Probably the most important point of difference between Stevenson's 
theory and earlier emotivist theories is the recognition (probably as 
the result of the influence of the post -Tractatus Wittgenstein) that a 
single word may be used for more than one purpose at one and the same time. 
Stevenson generalized these purposes, as we have seen, thus to maintain 
that any ethical word may be analysed in terms of both its 'emotive 
meaning' and its 'descriptive meaning'. From this distinction Stevenson 
has elaborated his two patterns of analysis, and has indicated in what 
manner the meaning of ethical terms may be 'characterized' and in what 
manner ethical judgments may be given 'substitute proofs' or 'supporting 
reasons'. From this distinction, also, he developed his important theory 
of 'persuasive definitions'. Thus it may be said that any significant 
innovation Stevenson has made to the emotive theory of values is 
dependent on this distinction. 
The recognition that a single word may be used for more than one 
purpose at one and the same time is not only important in the considera- 
tion of Stevenson's theory, but it is important within the tradition of 
moral philosophy I have chosen to examine. Although Hare and Nowell - 
Smith do not entirely agree with Stevenson's use of the distinction, they 
both step off from that point. When discussing these theories in the 
next two chapters we must ask, then, if Stevenson's analysis of the use 
of ethical language has been sufficiently 'persuasive'. 
lEL, p. 110. 
CHAPTER IV 
R. M. HARE 
Section 1 
If attention from one's peers is any indication of the importance 
of a man's work, Hare is undoubtedly an important moral philosopher., 
His book The Language of Morals1 was published only ten years ago (in 
1952) and few other moral philosophy texts published in the last several 
decades have received as much attention in the English- speaking world. 
In her book Ethics Since 1900 Mary Warnock places Hare (along 
with Urmson and Nowell -Smith) in a chapter which she entitles "After 
the Emotivists", and this is a useful classification. While Hare wishes 
to dissociate himself from the emotivists, his analysis of evaluative 
language has enough in common with the theories we have been considering 
to warrant including him in this thesis. 
The plan for this chapter will be as follows: in the present 
section I shall consider Hare's Chapter 1, "Prescriptive Language "; 
Sections 2, 2,, and 4. will treat, respectively, Chapter 2, "Imperatives 
and Logic "; Chapter 3, "Inference "; and Chapter 4, "Decisions of 
Principle ". Section 5 will be a summary and assessment of Part II, 
"GOOD "; and Section 6 will be a summary and assessment of Part III, 
1The similarity of the title of this thesis to Hare's title will 
of course have been noted. - -- (Henceforth I shall use the initials LM 
to refer to The Language of Morals). 
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"OUGHT ". The chapter will end with a brief summary of the conclusions 
of my analysis of Hare's thesis. 
Since this assessment of Hare's thesis will follow the general 
plan of his book I shall outline his exposition of that plan. In the 
first section of Part I of the book he postulates what he takes to be 
the primary purpose of the use of the language of morals, and then he 
presents the plan for his argument. "The language of morals," he writes, 
"is one sort of prescriptive language." The two main species of 'pre- 
scriptive language' are 'imperatives' and 'value judgments'. 'Impera- 
tives' are sub -divided into 'singular imperatives' and 'universal 
imperatives' or 'principles'; while value -judgments are sub -divided 
into 'non -moral' and 'moral'. This is similar to Stevenson's classifica- 
tion, except that where Stevenson's genus is 'emotive language', Hare 
says that the genus is 'prescriptive language';1 and within the species 
of 'imperatives' he obviously intends to provide a more detailed analysis. 
Another important difference, which will be more apparent later, is that 
Stevenson had emphasized that "there are many differences unquestionably" 
between value judgments and imperatives. Mrs. Warnock quite rightly 
points out that Hare seems "to take it for granted that the merest begin- 
ner in the consideration of language can tell at a glance whether a word 
is prescriptive or not ";2 and, as we shall see, a criticism made against 
his classification is that there may be types of sentences outside his 
genus of prescriptive language which may, also, be said to be action - 
guiding. Furthermore, despite his wish not to reduce moral language to 
imperatives, he does not precisely indicate in what way imperative 
1Cf., W.H. Walsh, Reason and Experience, p. 50, for a similar 
division of °judgments' into the two classes, 'prescriptive' and 'fact- 
ual', with logic included within 'prescriptive' judgments. 
20p. cit., p. 129. 
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prescriptive language may be distinguished from evaluative prescriptive 
language. Indeed, near the end of the book he concludes that "to say 
that moral judgments guide actions, and to say that they entail impera- 
tives, comes to much the same thing. "1 There is, then, some vagueness 
about this classification, which Hare admittedly describes as a "rough" 
classification. 
Using his classification of prescriptive language, he intends 
first to compare the 'logical behaviour' of prescriptive language with 
other sorts of language. Then, within prescriptive language, he intends 
to proceed "from the simple to the more complex ", beginning "with the 
simplest form of prescriptive language, the ordinary imperative sentence." 
"The logical behaviour of this type of sentence," he writes, 
"is of great interest to the student of moral language because, 
in spite of its comparative simplicity, it raises in an easily 
discernible form many of the problems which beset ethical 
theory. Therefore, although it is no part of my purpose to 
'reduce' moral language to imperatives, the study of impera- 
tives is by far the best introduction to the study of ethics...." 
After a study of singular imperatives he will proceed to "universal 
imperatives or principles." 
"The discussion of these, and of how we come to adopt or reject 
them, will give me an opportunity of describing the processes 
of teaching and learning, and the logic of the language we use 
for these purposes. Since one of the most important uses of 
moral language is in moral teaching the relevance of the dis- 
cussion to ethics will be obvious. "ii 
Next, in Part II of the book, he undertakes to discuss "a kind of pre- 
scriptive language which is more nearly related to the language of 
morals than is the simple imperative "; that is to say, "the language 
of non -moral value judgments." He believes that many of the troublesome 
features of moral language are apparent in non -moral value judgments, 
3a p. 172. 2LM, p. 2; cf. Pp. 175-9, and 1$0. 
Ibid. 
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and that a "proper understanding of them does much to elucidate the 
problems of ethics itself." As we shall see, Hare will argue that since 
both non -moral and moral value judgments are used for the same purpose 
(that of commending) their 'logical behaviour' is the same.1 In this 
phase of his argument he discusses the word "good ", first in its non - 
moral uses, and then in its moral uses. This plan is carried over into 
Part III, where the words "ought" and "right" are similarly treated. 
Finally, by means of an "analytical model ", he undertakes to show the 
logical relations of the two species of prescriptive language, by re- 
lating the logic of non -moral and moral value judgments to the logic 
of imperatives. 
My treatment of Hare will be somewhat more extensive than the 
treatment of others in this thesis, not because I consider him more 
important than the others, but because I find most of his main arguments 
unconvincing. In view of the generally favourable reception he has 
received from critics, even though they may oppose some of his arguments, 
it seems necessary for me to go into details to justify my generally 
unfavourable approach. The main significance of his work, so far as 
this thesis is concerned, will be seen in the difficulties which emerge 
in his efforts to establish a 'logical bridge' across 'Hume's gap °, and 
to dissociate himself from 'emotivism'. 
I shall treat Part I, "The Imperative Mood ", in considerably more 
detail than Parts II and III, since in Part I Hare introduces what he 
considers to be important aspects of his analysis of prescriptive language. 
The parallels he draws between theories of the analysis of imperatives 
and of the analysis of value judgments will be seen to be very close. 
1 
IS7, p. 140. 
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Towards the end of Part II, for example, in which he has been concerned 
primarily with the 'logical behaviour' of value words, he says that "the 
whole of Chapter 4 ( "Decisions of Principle ", the final chapter of Part 
I) might have been couched, not in terms of universal imperative principles, 
but of value -judgments. "1 Furthermore, he invites close attention to 
Part I when he says that "neglect of the principles enunciated in the 
first part of this book is the source of the most insidious confusions 
in ethics. "2 
His first main task is to consider the simplest form of prescrip- 
tive language, the imperative sentence, and to ask in what way it differs 
from sentences which express 'statements'. He recognizes that sentences 
in both the imperative mood and the indicative mood are "a mixed bunch ", 
and that to classify them all under individual terms "may lead to serious 
error ". Nevertheless, he says, "in a work of this character it is 
necessary to be bold ", and thus he offers the following generalizations: 
"I shall therefore follow the grammarians and use the single term 
'command' to cover all these sorts of thing that sentences in the 
imperative mood express, and within the class of commands make 
only some very broad distinctions....For the same reason I shall 
use the word 'statement' to cover whatever is expressed by 
typical indicative sentences, if there be such. "3 
It seems apparent that his intention in using the word "statement" is to 
relate it only to what may less misleadingly be termed "descriptive or 
declarative indicatives "; thus, to avoid confusion, I shall henceforth 
use the phrase "descriptive indicatives" when it seems appropriate to do 
so. Even with this qualification, however, Hare's following the gram- 
marians may be a logically misleading way of making the distinction 
between 'commands' and 'statements'. The major difficulty (one which 
11E, p. 136. 
2 
LM, p. 2. 3124, pe 4. 
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will be more evident later) is that Hare de- emphasizes the use or purpose 
which a word or sentence may serve. Since individual words and sentences 
may have more than one use, as Stevenson so clearly pointed out, and as 
Hare himself allows, 
1 
it is possible that indicative mood sentences may 
have both a 'descriptive' and an 'evaluative' meaning. (I shall not 
speak of the possible purposes of 'imperatives' lest I be guilty of 
pre -judging one of Hare's arguments, which I shall consider later). Con- 
sidering a sentence such as "It is the major's order that you report 
immediately," for example, it may be seen that an indicative mood sen- 
tence may also, in some sense, be said to be 'action- guiding'.2 It would 
seem preferable therefore to have classified 'commands' and 'statements' 
in terms primarily of use or purpose, rather than in terms of what may 
be a misleading grammatical distinction. His purpose, in any event, is 
to indicate the difference between 'statements' and 'commands'. If the 
'logical behaviour' of 'commands' is in some way to be a parallel to the 
'logical behaviour' of ethical judgments, it is of some importance for 
him to show that this distinction may be made; otherwise he may ultimately 
have to face the possibility of warding off charges of 'naturalism'. But 
the task, he admits, is not easy. "It is difficult to deny," he writes, 
"that there is a difference between 'statements' and 'commands'; but it 
is far harder to say just what the difference is." If the distinction 
is to be made, he asserts, it will be made by asking how we use 'commands' 
and 'statements'. Then, in a passage which emphasizes the grammatical 
distinction, he writes the following sentence: 
"An indicative sentence is used for telling someone that some- 
thing is the case; an imperative is not - --it is used for telling 
someone to make something the case. "3 
211I' pp. 46 
& 79. 
Cf. IM, p. 163; and above, Ch. III, p.150 for Stevenson's view. 
3 
, 
LM, p. 5. 
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Since there have been theories of ethics which have tried to 
reduce value sentences to factual sentences, Hare considers two analogous 
theories which would reduce imperatives to 'descriptive indicatives.' 
The first of these is analogous to the theory which would assert that 
"A is right" means "I approve of A ". In the same manner, one might say 
"Shut the door" means "I want you to shut the door." Although there is 
no harm in using this kind of language colloquially, he suggests, it may 
be philosophically misleading. Unfortunately, he does not allow the best 
advocacy for this naturalistic -type reduction of imperatives. The first 
part of his argument depends on the suggestion that if the reduction 
were correct there would be no logical contradiction between my saying 
"Shut the door" and your saying "Do not shut the door" (to the same 
person); and this, Hare suggests, would be an absurd conclusion. That 
is to say, if the reductionist theory is correct, the sentence "Shut the 
door" would be said to mean "I want you to shut the door ", and the sentence 
"Do not shut the door" would be said to mean "I do not want you to shut 
the door "; and, in a case of disagreement in 'wants', there is no logical 
contradiction. This argument appears to be akin to Ayer's initial doc- 
trine that there is no contradiction between ethical sentences which 
'evince' and 'evoke' different or conflicting 'feelings'. But, in 
Ayer's case, the force of this paradoxical view depended on his maintain- 
ing that ethical judgments are 'meaningless'; and this view, in turn, 
rests on the assumption of a 'meaning in terms only of a referent' 
theory of meaning. Once it is allowed that this kind of theory of 
meaning is limited in its application and is inapplicable as a criterion 
for the 'meaningfulness' of ethical terms and sentences, then it becomes 
nonsensical to suggest that two sentences may not be said to be contra- 
dictory simply because they do not serve a purpose which is not, in any 
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event, the main purpose for which they were used. Now Hare, unlike Ayer, 
would acknowledge the limitations of the verificationist theory of meaning; 
thus it is difficult to understand how he could have said that in a dis- 
agreement of 'wants' there can be no contradiction. This is especially 
perplexing since the basis of his argument is that there is a logical 
contradiction between the initial imperatives "Shut the door" and "Do 
not shut the door ". His argument, that is, is that the reductionist 
analysis of imperatives to descriptive indicatives expressing wants is 
inadequate in that it fails to retain the possible contradictory nature 
of imperatives. He cites a possible criticism for this part of his 
argument, but it could be put more strongly. I fail to see why the word 
"not" does not serve the same logical purpose in the two sets of sentences, 
and I fail to see why the imperatives in this case may be considered 
contradictory while the 'descriptive indicatives' may not. If it may be 
said, as Hare suggests, that 'descriptive indicatives' express only "a 
disagreement of wishes" and not contradiction, then, by the same token, 
it may be argued that the imperatives express only "a disagreement of 
commands" and not contradiction. It is of interest that, in a review 
of Everett Hall's What Is Value ?, Hare is critical of Hall's thesis that 
the word "not" and "all the common logical connectives have a different 
behaviour in imperatives from that which they have in indicatives."1 
There is another aspect of his argument, however, for, possibly 
allowing for the kind of disagreement I have expressed, he writes the 
following passage: 
"But there remains the difficulty that the sentence 'Shut the 
door' seems to be about shutting the door, and not about the 
speaker's frame of mind, just as instructions for cooking 
1Mind, Vol.LXIII, 1954, p. 263 & 265 ff. 
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omelets ('Take four eggs, &c.') are instructions about eggs, 
not introspective analyses of the psyche of Mrs. Beeton." 
But this part of the argument is also inadequate. Hare, especially, 
should have allowed a stronger argument for the 'naturalist' -type re- 
duction. When he later analyses the imperative 'Shut the door', he 
allows that there is more involved than simply the descriptive element 
referring to "your shutting the door in the immediate future." Such an 
analysis in itself, he allows, "does not tell us what the speaker is 
saying about it. "1 Something must be added, he says, "to nod assent" 
to the descriptive element, and, it may be said, this 'nodding of assent' 
is, in some sense, an indication of "the speaker's frame of mind." On 
the other hand, the 'descriptive indicative', "I want you to shut the 
door," is not only "about the speaker's frame of mind ", but it is also 
about the shutting of the door in the immediate future. While I grant 
Hare's right to object that this is a misuse of his conception of the 
'nodding of assent' element in his analysis, I would emphasize that my 
concern in mentioning it is simply to indicate that he recognizes that 
there is more to the analysis of indicatives and imperatives than he has 
allowed in the theory he rejects. He clouds the issue when he adds the 
sentence about the "introspective analyses of the psyche of Mrs. Beeton." 
A supporter of the 'reductionist' view might well be a behaviourist, 
saying no more, and perhaps less, about the speaker's 'frame of mind' 
than Hare does with his analyses to indicate the 'nodding of assent'.2 
If a distinction is to be made between 'commands' and 'statements', and 
if the parallel distinction between value judgments and factual or 
naturalistic statements is in some sense dependent on the argument's 
11M, p. 17. 2Cf. above, Ch. II, p. 96. 
HARE 197 
being valid at this primitive level, then it has to be said that Hare 
does not provide an adequate foundation with this particular argument. 
Since he has more to say later about the logical behaviour of 'commands' 
and 'statements', however, especially about his proposed analysis to 
indicate differences in the 'noddings of assent' between imperatives 
and 'descriptive indicatives', I shall leave this difficulty in abeyance. 
The second 'reductionist' argument is less troublesome. This 
theory, he says, may be summarized "by the statement that 'Shut the door' 
means the same as 'Either you are going to shut the door, or X will 
happen', where X is understood to be something bad for the person addressed." 
And a similar theory, he adds, would be that the imperative sentence could 
be 'reduced' to "If you do not shut the door, X will happen." This kind 
of theory, he says, is "parallel to ethical theories of the sort which 
equate 'A is right' with 'A is conducive to Y' where Y is something 
regarded by the generality as good, for example pleasure or the avoidance 
of pain." Although there is a formal parallel between these theories 
it should be noted that the 'imperative' theory does not seem to promise 
a 'pleasant' consequence if the command is obeyed, but only a 'painful' 
consequence if it is not obeyed; while the ethical theory is both 
positive and negative. But this does not seem to affect Hare's point. 
There is, he allows, an apparent plausibility to the 'imperative' theory 
when considered for situations where the consequences of not obeying a 
command are clearly understood. Dr. H.G. Bohnert, who postulated the 
theory in question, provides an example quoted by Hare, where "Run ", 
said in a burning house, is somewhat similar in intention to "Either 
you run or you burn." 
"But," Hare writes, "in cases where the end aimed at is not so 
easily recognized (the imperative being only to a small degree, 
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or not at all, 'hypothetical') the hearer may be quite at a 
loss to understand, on this analysis, what he is to supply 
after the word 'or'. It is very difficult to see how a 
sentence like 'Please tell your father that I called' would 
be analysed in Bohnert's theory." 
And if Bohnert were to argue that a general evaluative consequence is 
implied- -that, for example, if you do not obey the command, something 
bad will happen --then ultimately, as Hare says, the evaluative word 
'bad' must be analysed. 
"And similarly," he writes, "teleological theories of ethics 
which interpret 'right' as 'conducive to Z', where 'Z' is a 
value -word such as 'satisfaction' or 'happiness', only store 
up for themselves the difficulty of analysing such words. "1 
While Hare is concerned to argue that imperatives cannot be 're- 
duced' to 'descriptive indicatives', he is also concerned that imperatives 
should not be regarded as having "some logically inferior status to that 
of indicatives." Thus, like Stevenson, he points out that the 'verifica- 
tionist' theory of meaning, "which is in many ways a very fruitful one 
in its proper sphere, "2 is misapplied if it is taken as a test for the 
'meaningfulness' of iperatives and value judgments. If one assumes 
that some sense of the verification principle is the only criterion for 
'meaningfulness', then one might be inclined to want to 'reduce' impera- 
tives to 'descriptive indicatives', in the manner we have seen, or else 
to disparage all sentences, especially imperatives and value judgments 
(which, it should be noted, would include some indicatives), which do 
not pass the verification test. While Ayer could not be said to have 
asserted that value judgments are useless, there can be no doubt that 
he regarded them as having a logically inferior status to factual state- 




have seen, and would no longer say that value judgments are 'meaningless'). 
A possible consequence of regarding imperatives as logically 
inferior to "proper indicatives" is that, as Hare says, one might be 
inclined to say that imperatives "do not say anything, they only express 
wishes." Such a theory is suggested if we were to consider the part of 
Ayer's analysis which says that ethical sentences 'express' or 'evince' 
approval, ignoring the part which has to do with the arousing or evoking 
of feelings on the part of the hearer. Such a theory, Hare says, although 
acceptable colloquially, is logically misleading. His argument in support 
of his claim, however, is incomplete. He is especially concerned with 
the possibility that 'the expressing of wishes' may be construed as if 
it implied a "welling up inside us (of) a kind of longing, to which, 
when the pressure gets too great for us to bear, we give vent by saying 
an imperative sentence." Such an interpretation, he adds, would not be 
plausible in an analysis of the kind of 'command' we might give, for 
example, to a joiner when we issue a 'work order'. Nor would it be 
plausible as an analysis of a non -moral value judgment made, say, by a 
Minister of Local Government "who expresses approval of my town plan by 
getting his underlings to write to me saying 'The Minister approves of 
your plan' or 'The Minister thinks your plan is the best one'.... "1 
The difficulty with this argument is that Hare sets up as his 
opponent possibly the weakest kind of 'wish' or 'approval' theory. That 
is to say, he concentrates his attack on an 'introspective' type of 
theory, not entirely unlike the one indicated by his earlier example 
referring to the introspective analyses of Mrs. Beeton's psyche. The 
theories are not of course exactly alike since the theory illustrated 
1 
LNI, p. 10. 
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by the lVîrs. Beeton example was a 'naturalistic' theory, whereas the one 
we are now discussing is a non -naturalistic emotivist theory of a primi- 
tive nature. An advocate for such an emotivist theory, however, need 
not express his theory in introspective terminology, and, as I have 
suggested earlier, might be able to use Hare's 'pattern of analysis' 
(to borrow Stevenson's phrase) in support of his theory. Since the 
argument dealing with the first 'reductionist' theory was seen to be 
inadequate, this present argument is inadequate for the same reason. 
While Hare does not specifically say that Stevenson had assumed 
that only "proper indicatives" or 'descriptive indicatives' are above 
suspicion, he nevertheless briefly considers whether an analysis of 
imperatives might be constructed analogously to Stevenson's theory; and 
he includes this discussion within the same group as the theory I have 
just considered, which, Hare maintained, viewed what we might term 
'improper' indicatives and non -indicatives suspiciously. Later in the 
book1 he will try to indicate in what way his analysis of morals differs 
from Stevenson's; but, at this point, he asserts without discussion that 
"there could be no analogue, in the case of singular imperatives of the 
'attitude' variety of the approval theory of value- judgments...." (A 
footnote to this statement says, "See, for example, C.L. Stevenson, 
Ethics and La guage /.2 Once more I find myself in disagreement with 
Hare; and in view of Hare's concern in this and other instances to dis- 
sociate himself from Stevenson, it seems worth considering what this 
'analogue' might be. 
Although Stevenson had referred often to 'dispositions', as well 
as 'attitudes', he seldom used the king of language in which there is 
LM, p. 70. 2LM, p. 11. 
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reference to such terms as "general, or universal policies ", or "principles ". 
Of situations in which one has to make choices, Stevenson tends to write 
primarily in terms of specific responses to specific stimuli, although it 
must be pointed out, he would not have said that such responses in the 
vast majority of cases, if not all, are in any sense arbitrary. Choices 
are guided, so to speak, by relatively constant emotive meanings appro- 
priate to the circumstances in question. 
1 
Speaking of choices and prin- 
ciples, he says that "the issue arises out of...specific decisions, and 
although broad principles may help its solution, the principles may be 
more difficult to establish than a judgment about a special case. "2 This 
is obviously what Hare has in mind when he suggests that if there could 
be an analogue to Stevenson's theory it would have to be in terms of 
"singular imperatives ". Hare dismisses this possibility in half a sentence 
(saying in the other half that "it is possible to construct such a theory 
about universal imperative sentences "; and, as we have seen in his rough 
classification, he regards "universal imperatives" as synonymous with 
"principles "). I think he might have considered the possibility more 
thoroughly, as I shall later indicate. 
Although Stevenson had given an important place to imperatives in 
his analysis of ethical judgments, especially in his first pattern of 
analysis, he did not analyse them as Hare plans to do. Stevenson seems 
to have assumed that we have an adequate understanding of the use of 
imperatives; and, apart from stressing that there are unquestionably 
dissimilarities as well as similarities between value judgments and 
imperatives, he does not provide us with an imperative analogue to his 
theory of ethics - -- which, in any event, Hare says is impossible. Let 
1Cf.EL, p. 305, for analysis of 'choice'. 2LL, p. 165. 
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us consider, however, how Stevenson might have treated the examples of 
two conflicting singular imperatives, "Shut the door" and "Do not shut 
the door." Since Stevenson described "disagreement in attitude" as "an 
opposition of purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences, desires, and so 
on, "1 it seems clear that he could have included Hare's singular impera- 
tives among 'disagreements in attitude'. Of course he would not have 
provided an analysis of either of these imperatives in the same terms he 
uses in the working models for his first pattern, for there he was con- 
cerned with ethical, not imperative, words, and his concern was to 
characterize 'approval' and 'disapproval' which seem appropriate to value 
statements and not to 'commands'. It is possible, however, to suggest 
that the imperative sentence "Shut the door ", and other singular impera- 
tives, might be said to mean "I want this done; do so." It should be 
emphasized at this point that I am considering an analogue only to the 
first pattern, and that with the supplement of the second pattern there 
would be a richer descriptive meaning referring tc, among other things, 
'the shutting of the door by the hearer in the immediate future'. Thy 
concern is not to provide a complete analysis of singular imperatives, 
but merely to indicate that Hare was too peremptory when he said there 
could be no 'imperative' analogue to Stevenson's analysis of morals. 
Now in the analogue I have suggested, the phrase "I want this done" is 
analogous to the descriptive part of Stevenson's first pattern of analysis, 
and may be said to 'express' or 'describe' the speaker's attitude; while 
the phrase "do so" is a simple imperative addressed to guiding or changing 
the hearer's attitudes or actions. When the hearer's attitudes have been 
sufficiently altered by 'supporting reasons', the desired response will 
1EL, p. 3. 
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probably follow. Stevenson provides the basis for this possible analysis 
of imperatives in the following passage, in which he refers to the use 
of the imperative part of the first pattern: 
"The way in which reasons support the imperative is simply this: 
The imperative is used to alter the hearer's attitudes or 
actions. In asking 'Why ?' the hearer indicates his hesitancy 
to comply. He will not do it 'just because he is told to.' 
The supporting reason then describes the situation which the 
imperative seeks to alter, or the new situation which the 
imperative seeks to bring about; and if these facts disclose 
that the new situation will satisfy a preponderance of the 
hearer's desires, he will hesitate to obey no longer. More 
generally, reasons support imperatives by such beliefs as may 
in turn alter an unwillingness to obey." 
I do not suggest that this proposed analysis of singular imperatives is 
expressed as Stevenson would express it if he were concerned; nor is it 
my present concern to argue for such an analysis. ray purpose, as I have 
said, is simply to point out that Hare has neglected the possibility of 
such an analysis. It is his thesis that an understanding of the 'logical 
behaviour' of imperative sentences is important for the understanding of 
the 'logical behaviour' of ethical judgments, and he has therefore sum- 
marized and has indicated difficulties in actual and possible theories 
of the analysis of imperatives as a prelude to discussing parallel 
theories of the analysis of ethical judgments. If the 'logical behaviour' 
of the imperative analogues is in any sense taken as providing weak or 
strong foundations for the analyses of ethical judgments, Hare should 
not then overlook a possible analysis of imperatives which may support 
(or weaken) its parallel theory in the analysis of the language of morals. 
He especially should not overlook the possibility of this type of emoti- 
vist analysis of imperatives, in view of his concern to dissociate him- 
self from emotivism. 
PP. 27-H 
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As I have indicated, he does allow that it is possible to construct 
an 'approval' theory about "universal imperative sentences ". The sentence 
"Never hit a man when he is down" is cited as an example of a universal 
imperative. In his 'rough classification' of prescriptive language he 
has indicated that "universal imperatives" may also be termed "principles" 
(the terms are not synonymous, for the word "principle" is more general 
and will include value principles as well; and, furthermore, he later 
allows that imperative mood sentences must be "enriched" to express the 
'universality' of moral principles).1 Now in the very first sentence of 
his book, and in the remainder of the first paragraph, he clearly indi- 
cates that much of his attention will be given to what he terms "prin- 
ciples". A portion of that opening paragraph is as follows: 
"If we were to ask of a person 'What are his moral principles ?' 
the way in which we would be most sure of a true answer would 
be by studying what he did. He might, it is true, profess in 
his conversation all sorts of principles, which in his actions 
he completely disregarded; but it would be when, knowing all 
the relevant facts of a situation, he was faced with choices or 
decisions between alternative courses of action, between alter- 
native answers to the question 'What shall I do ?', that he would 
reveal in what principle of conduct he really believed. The 
reasons why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral 
principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide 
conduct. The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive 
language." 
In view of the concern for 'principles' expressed in this passage (to 
which I shall again return) it would seem obvious that of all of the 
'imperative' analogues we have seen to this point, the 'approval' theory 
of 'universal imperative sentences' would be most compatible. Such a 
theory would be similar to Stevenson's, but whereas Stevenson had said 
that "principles may be more difficult to establish than a judgment 
about a special case," Hare obviously feels that principles may be 
1Cf., his final chapter, esp. p. 1$7. I shall discuss this later. 
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established, even if only provisionally. He balks, however, at the words 
"approval" and "attitude ", and any similar words suggestive of an emoti- 
vist theory. The brunt of his complaint is expressed as follows: 
"Sentences containing the word 'approve' are so difficult of 
analysis that it seems perverse to use this notion to explain 
the meaning of mural judgments which we learn to make years 
before we learn the word 'approve'; and similarly, it would 
be perverse to explain the meaning of the imperative mood in 
terms of wishing or any other feeling or attitude; for we 
learn how to respond to and use commands long before we learn 
the comparatively complex notions of 'wish', 'desire', 
'aversion', &c. "1 
An advocate for a Stevenson type of theory, however, could easily neutral- 
ize this argument. As we have seen, Hare does not provide an adequate 
analysis of the word "prescriptive ",2 (he admits indeed that "the terms 
'value - words' and 'evaluative' are exceedingly hard to define ");3 and 
if in the above quotation the word "approve" in all of its appearances 
were replaced with the phrase "prescribe or commend" the argument could 
be turned against Hare. As for the last clause in the quotation, it 
could be said that the infant, for example, learns how to respond to and 
use 'expressions' which indicate wishes, desires, and aversions, long 
before he can utter a meaningful word, including the word "command "; or, 
without begging questions for any emotivist position we might simply re- 
state the clause in precisely the same way except for the addition of 
the word "command ". The clause would now read; "for we learn how to 
respond and use commands long before we learn the comparatively complex 
notions of 'wish', 'desire', 'aversion', 'command', &c. "--- Later, when 
considering what he has to say about "decisions of principle ", it will 
be necessary to consider whether he is further guilty of question - 
begging tactics against the Stevenson type of emotivist theory. 
1LNI, p. 12. 2Above, p. 189. 3LM, p. 80. 
HARE 206 
Hare continues his opposition to an important aspect of emotivist 
theories in the concluding sub -section of his first chapter. He attaches 
some importance to this argument, and, especially since it is question- 
able, I shall treat it in some detail. His purpose is to reject the 
thesis that it is a 'function' of moral judgments and imperatives "to 
affect causally the behaviour or emotions of the hearer. "1 In pressing 
his argument he of course opposes a thesis, which is implicit in Hume's 
theory, explicit in Dyer's, and clearly elaborated by Stevenson, that 
moral judgments are included among 'persuasive instruments'. This 
suggestion, Hare asserts, "led to a difficulty in distinguishing their 
function from that of propaganda." Stevenson, we recall, had allowed 
that no logical distinction could be drawn between 'persuasion' as 
used by the 'moralist', and 'persuasion' as used by the 'propagandist'; 
the definitions of the words "moralist" and "propagandist" are made in 
terms of value judgments concerning 'good' and 'bad' persuasion; and 
thus the definitions of these terms are themselves 'persuasive'. Hare 
opposes this view. 
"Since I am going to draw attention to some similarities between 
commands and moral judgments," he writes, "and to classify them 
both as prescriptives, I require most emphatically to dissociate 
myself from the confusion of either of these things with propa- 
ganda.'t2 
The central difficulty with the 'persuasion' theory, he believes, is that 
it confuses "the processes of telling someone to do something, and getting 
him to do it." The 'processes', he maintains, are "quite distinct, 
logically, from each other." 
In the main part of his argument he seeks to 'elucidate' his 
point by first considering what he believes is a 'parallel' distinction 
11E, p. 12. 
2LM, p 14. 
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in the case of 'descriptive indicative' statements. 
"To tell someone that something is the case," he maintains, "is 
logically distinct from getting (or trying to get) him to believe 
it. Having told someone that something is the case we may, if he 
is not disposed to believe what we say, start on a quite different 
process of trying to get him to believe it (trying to persuade or 
convince him that what we said is true). No one, in seeking to 
explain the function of indicative sentences, would say that they 
were attempts to persuade someone that something is the case." 
He then draws his 'parallel' with the following passage: 
"And there is no more reason for saying that commands are attempts 
to persuade or get someone to do something; here, too, we first 
tell someone what he is to do, and then, if he is not disposed 
to do what we say, we may startlon the wholly different process 
of trying to get him to do it." 
Thus, to illustrate his point, he says that a work- order, "'supply and 
fit to door mortise dead latch and plastic knob furniture' is not intended 
to galvanize joiners into activity; for such a purpose other means are 
employed." 
It is in this argument that we have the first clear indication of 
the logically misleading nature of relating 'descriptive indicative' 
sentences to 'statements', and of 'imperatives' to 'commands'. As I 
have suggested earlier, this may lead to the tendency to de- emphasize 
the concern for possible uses of sentences. The fundamental inadequacy 
of this argument, as Professor R.B. Braithwaite pointed out in a review 
of the book,2 is that Hare is preoccupied "with sentences taken in 
isolation from the contexts in which they are used.... "3 Braithwaite 
extends this criticism wider than we need consider for the present. 
Referring to this particular argument, however, and specifically to the 
second part of the 'parallel' (concerning 'commands'), he expresses the 
belief that Hare "has been led into error by thinking too much of the 
=M2, 
pp. 13 & 14. 
R.B. Braithwaite, Mind, 1954, pp. 249-262. 31bid, p. 252. 
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sentence spoken when a command is uttered and too little of the circum- 
stances which make the hearer of the sentence regard it as a command." 
The error in Hare's argument is an instance of what Professor Macmurray 
had seen as a problem for the techniques of philosophical analysis. In 
an article, "The Analysis of Language ", published in 1951, Professor 
Macmurray makes this point in the following manner: 
"In a proper empirical sense, language is only language in uses 
If we are to consider it for itself, as an object of analysis, 
and yet retain an empirical standpoint, we must consider it in 
relation to its use. This means we must treat it not as a bare 
fact but as an artefact....it shares with all artefacts an 
essential relativity to human purposes. No artefact can be 
defined without reference to the purpose it is designed to 
serve.... "1 
Professor Macmurray goes on to point out that it is misleading to speak 
of the function of language, since "function" is a "biological metaphor 
which carries no implication of conscious purpose...." Hare constantly 
uses the word (and not in inverted commas), and while one 
cannot definitely maintain that he has been logically misled by the word, 
it does appear that he regards 'commands' (in the argument we are dis- 
cussing) as being divorced from the contexts in which they are used, 
and devoid of any suggestion of purpose. So long as purpose and context 
(including the speaker or writer, and hearer or reader) are kept in 
mind, it is difficult to understand how one can maintain that a 'command' 
serves only to tell a person to do something, and that the act of telling 
does not, in any sense, serve as a 'persuasive' or motivating or causal 
instrument used for the purpose of getting, him to do it. As Professor 
Braithwaite says, "Surely telling a person to do something is one way 
of trying to get him to do it: if the telling alone does not succeed, 
1John Macmurray, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
p. 320. 
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other ways will have to be tried - -- rational ways like convincing him by 
giving him reasons, irrational ways like 'persuading' him with a thumb - 
screw."1 
In attempting to draw the distinction between 'telling' and 
'persuading', Hare had hoped to counter what he terms "the so- called 
'imperative theory' of moral judgments." Such a theory, in suggesting 
that moral judgments are 'persuasive instruments', stimulated a reaction 
in which he, to some extent, participates. He suggests, for example, 
that the 'persuasion' theory invites the "natural reaction ", indicated 
by such expressions as "He's trying to get at me; I must be on my guard; 
I mustn't let him bias my decision unfairly; I must be careful to make 
up my own mind in the matter and remain a free responsible agent." Now 
all of these examples are of a kind which might have been used in a 
'persuasive definition' of "propagandist ". That Hare is guilty of taking 
a 'persuasive' approach to 'persuasion' in selecting these examples be- 
comes most apparent when he immediately writes the following value judg- 
ment: "Such a reaction to moral judgments should not be encouraged by 
philosophers." The analyst, I should have thought, goes where his 
analysis leads him, regardless of whether his conclusions are judged 
'good' or 'bad' by others. Hare is further guilty of using a 'persuasive 
definition' for his point of view that telling is not persuading, when 
he goes on to say, "On the other hand, these are not natural reactions 
either to someone's telling us that something is the case, or his telling 
us to do something." 
The conclusion to which Hare is led, or to which he would lead 
the reader, is made clear in the final paragraph of the chapter. The 
10p.cit., p. 251. 
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The 'imperative' theory, he believes, is "based on a misconception of 
the function, not only of moral judgments, but also of the commands to 
which they were being assimilated;" and thus the theory "seemed to 
impugn the rationality of moral discourse." 
"But if we realize that commands," he continues, "however much 
they may differ from statements, are like them in this, that 
they consist in telling someone something, not in seeking to 
influence him, it does no harm to draw attention to the simi- 
larities between commands and moral judgments. For, as I shall 
show, commands, because they, like statements, are essentially 
intended for answering questions asked by rational agents, are 
governed by logical rules just as statements are. And this 
means that moral judgments may also be governed. We remember 
that the greatest of all rationalists, Kant, referred to moral 
judgments as imperatives.r1 
Hare's purpose in this first chapter seems primarily to have been 
a negative one; that is to say, while endeavouring to support his thesis 
that it is helpful to study the 'logical behaviour' of imperatives before 
undertaking an analysis of the 'logical behaviour' of value judgments, 
he sought to indicate that some possible and actual theories of the 
analysis of imperatives were logically misleading. It is apparent, I 
believe, that he has not succeeded. To begin with, we have not seen a 
convincing argument to indicate that there is a difference between 
'commands' and 'statements'; and thus there is no adequate basis for 
saying that a 'naturalistic' analysis of 'imperatives' is not possible. 
This is not of course to assume, by a rough analogy, that a naturalistic 
analysis of ethical judgments is possible. It might well be that this 
is an indication only of a significant difference between 'commands' and 
value judgments; although Hare's thesis that the 'logical behaviour' of 
'commands' and value judgments is the same will be seen to be an obstacle 
to this suggestion. A second specific task in this chapter was to 
11A, pp. 15-16. 
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indicate that theories which assume that the 'logical behaviour' of 
imperatives is inferior to the 'logical behaviour' of 'descriptive indica- 
tives', are logically misleading. In this task, also, his arguments were 
inadequate. In his concern to dissociate himself from emotivism he tended 
to concentrate on crude, introspective analyses of imperatives, thus 
neglecting possible analyses which could be expressed in behaviouristic 
terminology. He dismissed altogether the possibility of an emotivist 
analysis of singular imperatives somewhat analogous to Stevenson's 
analysis of value judgments. And in trying to dissociate himself from a 
possible emotivist analysis of universal imperatives, he failed to provide 
a convincing argument for the distinction between 'telling' and 'per- 
suading'. At this point one can make no conclusions about the possible 
affects of these inadequacies on the subsequent argument. One may say, 
however, that, from this study of imperative analogues, there is no 
evidence to suggest that his 'prescriptionist' analysis of value judg- 
ments will necessarily have any advantage over an emotivist theory like, 
or similar to, Stevenson's theory. 
Section 2 
In the opening section of the second chapter, "Imperatives and 
Logic ", Hare declares his intentions of providing an analysis of 'impera- 
tives' and 'descriptive indicatives', in order to "characterize clearly" 
the difference between them. The purpose, we remember, is to indicate 
that 'commands', like 'statements', are governed by logical rules, and 
that "this means that moral judgments may also be so governed." His 
argument in this chapter is of considerable importance to his analysis, 
thus I shall summarize it before assessing it. 
As examples of the two types of sentences he takes the sentences 
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"You are going to shut the door" and "Shut the door ". These sentences, 
he says "are both about the same thing, namely your shutting the door in 
the immediate future," even though, in their use, they "convey" different 
things about the shutting of the door. In concentrating first on what 
the sentences are 'about', he "recasts" them "more clearly ", he says, "by 
writing in both cases an identical phrase for referring to this thing 
that they are both about ". The suggested recast is: "Your shutting the 
door in the immediate future." But this phrase, in itself, does not tell 
us what each sentence "conveys ". Something else must be added to complete 
the analysis. Thus he suggests that we might write the two sentences in 
the following manner (with the first example indicating the imperative): 
"Your shutting the door in the immediate future, please." 
"Your shutting the door in the immediate future, yes." 
In referring to the first part, which is common to each of these sentences, 
he adopts the term "phrastic ", "derived from a Greek word meaning 'to 
point out or indicate'." For the second part of the sentences, which is 
different in each case, he adopts the term "neustic ", from a word meaning 
"to nod assent ". If a difference is to be indicated between statements 
and commands, it will have to be done, he says, by means of the 'neustic'. 
This is not to say that there is nothing in common between 'neustics' of 
statements and commands, however, for, he maintains, they share the 
"common notion of, so to speak, 'nodding' a sentence." This is "some- 
thing that is done by anyone who uses a sentence in earnest, and does 
not merely mention it or quote it in inverted commas; something essential 
to saying (and meaning) anything ". For this common 'function' of the 
'neustics', Hare uses the word "affirm ". A further distinction is 
necessary, then, if we are to differentiate between commands and state- 
ments. The problem, he indicates, is that so far we have been thinking 
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primarily of the speaker, to the neglect of the hearer. "Closely allied 
to...an affirmation sign would be a sign for agreement for use by a 
hearer." And it is here, he says, that we find "a clue to the essential 
difference between statements and commands...." 
"...it lies in what is involved in assenting to them," he con- 
tinues, "and what is involved in assenting to them.is...closely 
1 
allied to what is involved in affirming them in the first place." 
It is possibly because of this assertion of the 'close alliance' between 
'affirming' and 'assenting' that Hare seems to believe that the single 
word "neustic" may perform the purpose, as Braithwaite puts it, of 
"indicating everything else in the situation which is relevant to its 
being the making of a statement or the giving of a command. "2 In any 
event, by means of the introduction of the factor of 'assent' into the 
' neustic', Hare endeavours to introduce a logical distinction into his 
analysis. This is apparent in the following argument: 
"If we assent to a statement we are said to be sincere in our 
assent if and only if we believe that it is true (believe what 
the speaker has said). If, on the other hand, we assent to a 
second -person command addressed to ourselves, we are said to be 
sincere in our assent if and only if we do or resolve to do what 
the speaker has told us to do. "3 
Thus he introduces the logical distinction I have mentioned. This dis- 
tinction will be of further importance when we consider its 'parallel' 
in the logical behaviour of moral judgments. 
"It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a 
second -person command addressed to ourselves, and at the same 
time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it, 
and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so. 
Similarly, it is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely 
assent to a statement, and at the same time not believe it." 
From this analysis Hare gives the following 'provisional characterization' 
of the difference between, respectively, 'statements' and 'commands': 
1121, p. 19.. 20p. cit. , p. 253. 3LM, 
pp. 19-20. 
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"...whereas sincerely assenting to the former involves believin 
something, sincerely assenting to the latter involves on the 
appropriate occasion, and if it is within our power), doing 
something." 
After having 'provisionally' indicated the difference between 
'commands' and 'statements', Hare now turns to the factors they have in 
common. Considering the 'phrastics' only, he says that since the 'impera- 
tives', like the 'descriptive indicatives', refer "to actual or possible 
states of affairs ", they, like the 'indicatives', may suffer from what 
he terms the "malady " of being subject to the verification principle. 
In saying this Hare makes much the same distinction as Stevenson in his 
analysis of the 'descriptive' part of moral judgments. Of more importance 
for Hare's argument, however, is that since imperatives, like 'descriptive 
indicatives', share the common factor of having "logical connectives" 
within their ' phrastics', they both share the 'malady' of being able to 
be said to be self- contradictory. As we have seen earlier, Hare maintains 
that the "conjunction" of the two commands "Shut the door" and "Do not 
shut the door" is self -contradictory. Now since a 'command' may contra- 
dict another 'command', he continues, it must, like a 'statement', "ob- 
serve certain logical rules." And such rules ''are the rules for the use 
of all the expressions contained in it," In the use of "the so- called 
logical words" (of which "all" is an example) the logical rules "are 
what give the expressions all the meaning they have," That is to say, 
"to know the meaning of the word 'all' is to know that one cannot without 
self -contradiction say certain things, for example, 'All men are mortal 
and Socrates is a man but Socrates is not mortal'." To find out if a 
person understands the meaning of "all ", Hare maintains, the "only" way 
one could do it "would be by finding out what simpler sentences that 
person thought were entailed by sentences containing the word 'all'." 
He grants that "entailed" is a strong word, but he stipulates that he 
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will use it in the sense that "a sentence P entails a sentence Q if and 
only if the fact that a person assents to P but dissents from Q is a 
sufficient criterion for saying that he has misunderstood one or other 
of the sentences." Now since "the word 'all' and other logical words 
are used in commands, as in statements ", he continues, it "follows that 
there must also be entailment between commands." (The emotivist might 
well add that the same holds for the expression of attitudes).1 He gives 
the following example of inferences "from universal imperative sentences, 
together with indicative minor premisses, to singular imperative con- 
clusions": 
"Take all the boxes to the station. 
This is one of the boxes. 
.. Take this box to the station. "2 
But since this inference has two premisses in different moods, he suggests 
that it is necessary to have a logical rule to indicate the mood of the 
conclusion. This problem becomes pressing since he regards entailment 
relations in the inference as existing only between the 'phrastics' of 
the two premisses. How are we to know, he asks, that we cannot add the 
'neustics' in a different way? He thus stipulates two rules "that seem 
to govern this matter ", although we need consider only the second. 
"(2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set 
of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative. "3 
This rule, he says, "is of the most profound importance for ethics", and 
he gives examples "of some famous arguments in ethics that seem to have 
been unwittingly or wittingly founded upon it." Among those mentioned 
as having been 'unwittingly" founded upon it are "Hume's celebrated 
observation on the impossibility of deducing an 'ought' -proposition from 
1Cf., above, 13,195 where Hare would not grant this privilege to a 
type of enotivist theory. 3 
j, P. 27. LM, p. 28. 
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a series of 'is'- propositions "; and Moore's illustration of the 'natural- 
istic fallacy'. 
In assessing this chapter I shall indicate, first, that the pro- 
visional distinction between statements and commands is not even pro- 
visionally adequate; and, secondly, that even if the 'neustic- phrastic' 
analysis of imperatives and 'descriptive indicatives' (or 'commands' and 
'statements') were adequate, it would not fulfil the purpose for which 
Hare intends it. 
The crux of the 'provisional characterization' of the difference 
between statements and commands is in his assertion that "whereas 
sincerely assenting to the former involves believing something, sincerely 
assenting to the latter involves...doing something." Now, as Professor 
Braithwaite points out, Hare "never seriously considers the function of 
descriptive language," and the possibility is suggested that 'statements' 
may have "as their function (or as an important part of their function) 
that of guiding conduct. "1 It would appear that in his views concerning 
'beliefs' or 'statements', Hare is less of a behaviourist than he is in 
his general approach to the analysis of 'imperatives' and 'value judg- 
ments'. As we have seen, he adopts an approach compatible with behaviour- 
ism in the very first sentence of his book, when he writes, "If we were 
to ask of a person 'What are his moral principles ?' the way in which we 
would be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he did." 
And Braithwaite suggests that the behaviourist might well have recommended 
the same approach for the question "What are his beliefs ? ". This kind of 
approach, we recall, was in fact proposed by Stevenson when, assuming 
his 'pragmatic theory of meaning', he said that 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' 
10p.cit., p. 261. 
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must both be analysed primarily by reference to dispositions to action.1 
If Hare had taken the same behaviouristic approach in the determination 
of meanings of 'statements', as he does in determining the meanings of 
'commands' and 'moral principles', it would have been difficult for him 
to say that there is a clear distinction between 'statements' and 
'commands' -- -that, in fact, as Braithwaite suggests, a 'function' of 
'statements' may be that of guiding conduct. If the distinction between 
'statements' and 'commands' is to be made it would appear that it would 
have to be made in another way. 
The second basic difficulty with the chapter, as I have indicated, 
is that even if the 'phrastic- neustic' analysis of imperatives and 'des - 
scriptive indicatives' were adequate, it is doubtful that it would fulfil 
the purpose for which it is used. That is to say, the analysis, in 
association with the practical syllogism, would undermine the rule to 
which he rightly attaches so much importance, that "no imperative con- 
clusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not con- 
tain at least one imperative." If his analysis is held to provide a fair 
'characterization' of the 'logical behaviour' of imperatives, then it is 
debatable whether a valid imperative conclusion can be drawn at all. 
This point may be made through further consideration of his example of 
deductive 'imperative' inference before it is analysed into phrastics 
and neustics (that is, "Take all the boxes to the station ", etc.). Now 
if we either leave the inference in this form, or recast it into a tra- 
ditional Aristotelian syllogism (for example, "All of the boxes are boxes 
which are to be taken to the station ", etc.), then there could be no 
disagreement that the conclusion may be validly drawn. It is perhaps 
1Above, Ch. III, p. 135. 
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of some significance that Hare did not recast the argument into the 
'phrastic -neustic' form when he illustrated his rule for 'imperative' 
inference. But let us now consider it as it might be 'recast' in the 
'phrastic -neustic' form, remembering meanwhile that Hare will later make 
the point that all genuine moral reasoning is either implicitly or ex- 
plicitly based on the Aristotelian practical syllogism:1 
Your taking all the boxes to the station, please. 
This is one of the boxes, yes. 
;.Your taking this box to the station, please. 
Now considering that we are concerned here with mediate, deductive infer- 
ence, by what logical rule of inference may we argue from the imperative 
'neustic' in the major premiss to the imperative 'neustic' in the con- 
clusion? If Hare had made a provision for immediate inference in genuine 
moral reasoning there would possibly be not so much of a problem for 
logic, although it would lead to serious difficulties for moral philo- 
sophy in having to neglect the factual minor premiss. As Everett Hall 
pointed out when referring to an earlier article in which Hare first 
proposed this kind of analysis, "the addition of a dictor (neustic) to 
any given descriptor (phrastic) is obviously an extra -logical matter. "2 
While Hare's special rule for imperative inference might well apply to 
the inference as considered before 'recasting', or as recast in the tra- 
ditional Aristotelian form (it might be added, for example, as a supple- 
ment to the traditional rules for the syllogism), it does not appear to 
be applicable when recast in the 'phrastic -neustic' form and used in 
conjunction with the Aristotelian practical syllogism. Now if the rule 
is considered to be of "profound importance for ethics ", as Hare has 
claimed it to be, then it is apparent that in some way the analysis must 
1Cf. IM, Ch. 3, esp. pp. 39, 43; and p. 56. 
2 
E.W. Hall, What is Value ?, pp. 111 -2n. 
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be inadequate; and thus cannot adequately fulfil his purpose of 'charac- 
terizing' the 'logical behaviour' of imperatives. If the logical rule is 
to be upheld, the remedy, it would appear, would be to return to an 
Aristotelian approach; that is, to retain the value words within the 
three terms of the premisses and to assume that the value purposes or 
'functions' of the words may be carried, so to speak, in any inference 
in which they appear. This is what Hare, in fact, seems to assume.1 
The analysis begins to be helpful if it is considered simply as a schema, 
akin to Stevenson's 'patterns of analysis', to help one understand differ- 
ences and similarities between types of sentences; but, considered also 
as a 'device' to understand the 'logical behaviour' of such sentences in 
deductive inference, it is inadequate. 
In his review of The Language of Morals, Professor Braithwaite, 
while in agreement with Hare's basic non -cognitivist approach, has been 
more directly critical, than I have been, of Hare's 'phrastic- neustic' 
analysis; and that is why I have just said that the analysis "begins to 
be helpful ". 
"Why Mr. Hare's venture is such a bold one," he writes, "is that 
to devise a notation capable, in itself, of indicating all the 
elements that are involved in a communication- situation is, I 
suspect, quite impossible. It would require factors which go 
to make up the complete 'meaning' of2the original utterance in 
the context in which it is used...." 
He is especially critical of Hare's "limiting himself to the two neustics 
es and please ", for this, he believes, does not "do justice to the 
varieties of intention that are present in the various statement, command, 
and moral judgment situations." Here, again, Braithwaite suggests that 
Hare has been preoccupied "with sentences taken in isolation from the 
contexts in which they are used ", and thus, in this instance, has neglected 
1Cf., LM, p. 26, Note 1. 20p.cit., p. 253. 
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possible varieties of intention. Disarmingly acknowledging that he will 
emulate Hare's boldness, however, and that he will imitate his notational 
technique (that is, to use 'phrastics' and 'neustics'), he proposes that 
an analysis of statements, commands, and moral judgments will require a 
total of nine 'neustics' (three for each type of sentence), rather than 
simply two. 
We need not at present consider Braithwaite's analysis in detail, 
since, even if it did more adequately 'characterize' the variety of 
intentions in our use of language (as I believe it does), it nevertheless 
would not. fulfil Hare's intention, since, as I have argued, the 'neustics' 
would be extra- logical. This is not to suggest that Braithwaite is 
concerned to provide an analysis that could satisfy Hare's purpose, for, 
in fact, he argues to a conclusion that would include the main conclusion 
indicated by my criticism to this point. That is to say, his more general 
conclusion is that Hare has not adequately demonstrated his "principal 
thesis...that of the resemblance between commands and moral judgments and 
the lack of resemblance of each of these and non -moral statements of 
fact. "1 One of my main conclusions so far has been that Hare has not 
clearly distinguished between 'commands' and 'statements'; and since 
he has made much of a 'parallel' between the 'logical behaviour' of 
'commands' and moral judgments, I have been compelled to say that, to 
this point, one of the lines of the parallel has not been clearly drawn. 
In what follows I shall be mindful of the other aspects of Braithwaite's 
criticism; that is, that Hare has not adequately distinguished between 
moral judgments and 'commands', and between moral judgments and 'non - 
moral statements of fact' or 'descriptive indicatives'. 
1lbid., p. 252. 
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Section 3 
Although the 'phrastic- neustic' analysis of sentences would under- 
mine the rule "that an imperative cannot appear in the conclusion of a 
valid inference, unless there is at least one imperative in the premisses," 
the rule is obviously stronger than the analysis; and, as Hare says in 
his chapter entitled "Inference ", it "may be confirmed by an appeal to 
general logical considerations. " The rule turns out in fact to be a 
special application of a general principle of deductive inference, implicit 
in the distinctions of Aristotle, and firmly embodied in the philosophic 
writings of Hume and philosophers subsequent to Hume who were aware of 
his challenge. The more general principle is expressed as follows: 
"For it is now generally regarded as true by definition, that 
(to speak roughly at first) nothing can appear in the conclusion 
of a valid inference which is not, from their very meaning 
implicit in the conjunction of the premisses. "1 
Hare gives credit to Wittgenstein and others for this modification of 
Aristotelian logic, for in their work they have shown "to a great extent" 
the impossibility of the kind of approach assumed by Descartes "that we 
can arrive at scientific conclusions about matters of empirical fact, 
like the circulation of the blood, by deductive reasoning from self - 
evident first principles." But, as I have suggested, the reputation of 
Hume as a philosopher is based largely on the use of this general prin- 
ciple. As we have seen, Hare does say that Hume had implicitly used the 
principle in his challenge to those who argue from 'is'- premisses to 
'ought' -conclusions. But this, like Hare's principle for imperative 
inference, is merely a special application of the principle and does 
not indicate the radical nature of Hume's work. As Kant saw,2 Hume had 
1 2Cf. above, Ch. I LM, p. 32. > , p. 27. 
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challenged the very possibility of the Cartesian type of rationalism-- - 
the type of theory which Kant came to refer to as "dogmatic "; and Hare's 
argument is not essentially different from Hume's. The main difference 
is that, whereas Hume and other philosophers had implicitly relied on 
the principle, Hare explicitly wields it against theories which have 
violated it. In his manner of using it, however, he makes one qualifica- 
tion to which he attaches some importance. In saying that in his first 
expression of it he was 'speaking roughly', his point was that it was 
not sufficiently general to cover such an example as 'x=2' entails 
'x2=411. It is not natural, he suggests, to say that the 'squared' 
symbol is implicit in the equation 'x=2'. Thus he qualifies the principle 
to say that "there must be nothing said in the conclusion which is not 
implicitly or explicitly in the premisses, except what can be added solely 
on the strength of definitions of terms." 
With an understanding of this principle of inference, he suggests, 
one may appreciate that "a Cartesian procedure, either in science or 
morals, is doomed from the start." He indicates more precisely what he 
means by "Cartesian" in the following passage: 
"Many of the ethical theories which have been proposed in the 
past may without injustice be called 'Cartesian' in character; 
that is to say, they try to deduce particular duties from some 
self- evident first principle. "1 
In his arguments against these 'Cartesian' theories his emphasis will be 
seen to shift somewhat more to a concern for the language of values 
rather than simply the language of imperatives. Before considering 
these arguments we should note that his special definition of 'Cartesian' 
theories does not encompass all cognitivist non -naturalist moral philo- 
sophers. That is to say, he defines a 'Cartesian' as a philosopher who 
1 
LM, p. 39. 
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says, first, that there are self -evident first principles, and, secondly, 
that particular duties may be deduced from these first principles. Later 
he will say that only "a few great writers, such as Aristotle, Hume, and 
Kant "1 will avoid the net he sets for both naturalists and 'Cartesians'; 
and they escape, he says, only "if studied in the right way ". It should 
be emphasized, however, that it is easy to find examples of cognitivists 
who are not 'Cartesians' as he has defined them: it seems in fact more 
difficult to find examples among the outstanding twentieth century cog - 
nitivists who would fit his definition. It is indeed ironic that Hare, 
a non- cognitivist, with his emphasis on the use of the deductive method 
of moral reasoning, comes closer than most twentieth century philosophers, 
with the possible exception of Toulmin, to the "Cartesianism" he rejects. 
The main difference is in the manner of deriving the most general princi- 
ples. Some of the nonCartesian cognitivists, furthermore, are much less 
concerned with principles than they are with particular actions. Among 
them, for example, are deontologists such as Prichard and Carritt. 
Likening moral rules to the rules for sailing a ship Carritt had said 
that "their function is that of ballast rather than compass." 
"If the difficulty of acting rightly comes from the difficulty 
of knowing what we now ought to do," he continues, "whether 
that difficulty depend upon a real complexity of the situation 
or upon our own bias in the way of desire or prejudice, then 
we shall question any constraining rule and must, as a last 
resort, fix our attention upon the particular instance, in 
which, as is admitted, the validity of rules first and most 
clearly appears.n2 
There are also teleologists, of whom Moore is perhaps the best example. 
While Moore was concerned with the 'self -evidence' of 'ends', he 
agrees with the deontologists in saying that ethical conclusions are 
1 
21.6 P. 45. 
Carritt, The Theory of Morals, p. 115; cf., Prichard, "Does Moral 
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ? ", in Moral Obligation, p. 9. 
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not deduced from general principles. He related particular acts to his 
general principles in 'causal', not deductive terms. Considering the 
question "What ought we to do ?" he wrote as follows: 
"...the question what things are related as causes to that which 
is good in itself...can only be answered by an entirely new 
method - --the method of empirical investigation ....Every 
judgment in practical Ethics may be reduced to the form: 
This is a cause of that good thing. "1 
Perhaps the most obvious omission from Hare's classification of cogniti- 
vists is Kant and his present -day followers, such as H.J. Paton and W.H. 
Walsh. This of course may be a deliberate omission in view of the 
similarities between Hare's theory and Kant's, as we shall see. Perhaps 
the most distinctive feature of Kantianism is its rejection of Cartesian 
'dogmatic' rationalism, as well as Humean empiricism. While Kant ulti- 
mately appears to rely on an intuitive direct insight2 for the recogni- 
tion of his formulations of the categorical imperative, he does not 
suggest that particular duties may be deduced from the fundamental prin- 
ciples. In asking whether the maxim or minor principle of one's proposed 
or desired action could be a universal law, the procedure, whatever it 
is, is not syllogistic.3 Kant's practical syllogism seems to have been 
an analytic tool rather than something which one always explicitly or 
implicitly uses in moral reasoning. It is possible, however, that Hare's 
special arguments against 'self- evidence', which form part of his anti - 
'Cartesian' arguments, may also apply to these non -'Cartesian' cogniti- 
vists. 
I shall first consider, then, the arguments against the 'Cartesians'. 
If such theories assume that particular duties, such as, for example, not 
2Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 146. 
3Cf., Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp. 244 -5. 
Cf., Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 122. 
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to utter a falsehood on a particular occasion, may be said to 'follow 
from' or be 'enjoined' by general principles, then, as Hare argues, the 
principles of these theories "must contain implicitly or explicitly an 
imperative" to the effect that falsehoods are "not to be said in circum, 
stances like those in which I now am." Furthermore, he continues, "they 
must contain other imperatives such as will regulate my conduct in all 
manner of circumstances, both foreseen and unforeseen." (iWe need not 
at this point question Hare's use of the word "imperative ", rather than 
"duty" or "obligation ", or, more generally, "value word ". That is to 
say, if the conclusion is, for example, "My uttering a falsehood now is 
wrong" or "I ought not to utter a falsehood now ", it may be suggested 
that the use of the word "imperative" to refer to the conclusion, or the 
relevant value word within it, is logically misleading. Such a considera- 
tion does not affect Hare's criticism of what he terms 'Cartesian' theories, 
however, and whether we speak of 'imperatives', or 'duties', or 'values', 
his arguments may still apply). Now if a moral system does have a set 
of principles which could be said to 'enjoin' particular duties, then, as 
he argues, "it is obvious that such a set of principles could not possibly 
be self -evident." 
He uses several arguments to establish this point, and the first 
one is strikingly similar to Stevenson's suggestion that "principles may 
be more difficult to establish than a judgment about a special case. "1 
This is ironic, since it is this consideration which seems to have led 
to Stevenson's emphasis on what Hare would term "singular" value judg- 
ments rather than "universal value judgments" or "principles ", and, as 
I shall argue later, this statement may be turned against Hare. His 
1Cf. above, p. 201. 
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argument begins with the following passage: 
"It is not easier, but more difficult, to assent to a very general 
command like 'Never say what is false' than it is to assent to a 
particular command 'Do not say this particular thing which is 
false', just as it is more difficult and dangerous to adopt the 
hypothesis that all mules are barren than to acknowledge the 
undoubted fact that this mule which has just died has had no 
progeny. "1 
It might perhaps appear to be question -begging against the 'Cartesian' 
type of theory for him to use as an example the universal principle 
'Never say what is false', since one can think of exceptions that might 
be made in terms of more 'abstract', or perhaps more 'valued' principles. 
A 'Cartesian' might prefer, for example, a more abstract principle such 
as "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." But this would 
no more evade Hare's argument than would the less abstract principle. We 
are often uncertain about particular decisions, he could maintain, and, 
to paraphrase him, if we could not decide what to do in particular circum- 
stances, how could we possibly decide in advance for innumerable circum- 
stances whose details were t tally unknown to us? 
He makes the same point in another way by reference to the logical 
principle that "if one proposition entails another, then the negation of 
the second entails the negation of the first." This may be made more 
strongly, he suggests, by being less emphatic in one's statements about 
the propositions. That is to say, "to be in doubt" about assenting to 
the entailed proposition (without going so far as to deny it), is "to be 
in doubt about assenting to the first ". If one is in doubt then, about 
a particular value judgment he is considering (assuming that there is no 
doubt about the factual circumstances), then he must also be in doubt 
about the general principle which is assumed to 'entail' the particular 
1LB7, p. 40. 
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judgment. Thus it follows "that no general principle can be self -evident 
which is to be of assistance in deciding particular questions about which 
we are in doubt. "1 
In these arguments Hare has used the term "self- evident" without 
questioning it. He now considers three possible arguments which might 
be used against him to insist that fundamental principles of ethics are 
self -evident. These are the arguments I have mentioned which, if con- 
vincing, might also apply to the non -naturalist cognitivists who are not 
'Cartesians' in Hare's use of the term. "First," he writes, "it might be 
said that a principle of conduct was impossible to reject if it were self - 
contradictor to reject it." In rejecting this view Hare uses the kind 
of approach that would be expected also of Ayer and Stevenson; and this 
approach owes much to Hume, and something also to Locke.2 hat is, Hare 
employs the distinction (first clearly elaborated, although with differ- 
ences, by Kant) of classifying 'sentences' as either 'analytic' or 
'synthetic'. While these terms have been much debated,3 one may dis- 
tinguish between them, as Hare does in the following passage: 
"The term 'analytic'...may be defined with sufficient precision 
as follows: A sentence is analytic if, and only if, either 
(1) the fact that a person dissents from it is a sufficient 
criterion for saying that he has misunderstood the speaker's 
meaning or (2) it is entailed by some sentence which is 
analytic in sense (1). A sentence which is not analytic 
or self -contradictory is called synthetic." 
To illustrate Hare's point, 'analytic' sentences, which cannot be denied 
without self -contradiction, would include: "7 plus 5 equals 12," or 
"Either A is true or is not true "; whereas 'synthetic' sentences, which 
may be understood and dissented from without logical contradiction, would 
include, for example, "Hume was a philosopher ", and, the synthetic value 
1LM, p. 41. 
3Cf. Ayer, LTL, p. 16. 
2Cf. Ayer, LTL, p. 72. 
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statement, "Hume is the greatest of modern philosophers ". Now, as Hare 
points out, if a principle is 'analytic', "it cannot have any content; 
it cannot tell me to do one thing rather than another." And as soon as 
a principle is given 'content', then, as Hume has given us good reasons 
for maintaining, it would no longer be a matter of logical or mathemati- 
can reasoning, and thus no longer could we consider it as if rejecting 
it involved self -contradiction. 
Hare cites two other possible variations of the view that ethical 
principles are in some sense self -evident. The first of these suggests 
that "a principle of conduct might be impossible to reject, in the sense 
that its rejection was a psychological impossibility." The following 
excerpt from his argument should be sufficient to make his point: 
"But what is or is not a psychological impossibility is a con- 
tingent matter; it may be a psychological impossibility for 
me to reject a principle which the more hardened or sophisti- 
cated have no difficulty in discarding. We could never have 
any justification for asserting that no one could ever reject 
a principle, unless that principle were analytic, "1 
And if it is said to be analytic, then his first argument will apply. 
The final possibility of the 'self -evidence' view is one which, 
as Hare indicates, "rests upon the introduction of a value word." 
"It might be suggested that, though a principle was both logically 
and psychologically possible to reject, it might be not rational 
to reject it (it might be impossible for a rational person to 
reject it). Sometimes instead of 'rational' we have other ex- 
pressions, such as 'a morally developed or morally educated 
person' or 'a competent and impartial judge'. These are all 
value- expressions.i2 
This kind of argument was used by Kant, in support of his 'categorical 
imperative'.3 Kant allows that it would be logically and psychologically 
possible for a potentially talented person "to give himself up to pleasure" 
rather than to bother about developing his talents. But, he maintains, 
1LM, p. 42. 
3Kant, Groundwork, p. 90. 
2LM, p. 42. 
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a man who would 'universalize' the maxim of such a way of life --thus 
seeing the consequences of living a life, "like the South Sea Islanders... 
(devoted) solely to idleness, indulgence, procreation, and, in a word, 
enjoyment " --could not possibly, "as a rational being ", will that this 
should become a universal law or principle. - -- Another example from tradi- 
tional moral philosophy is John Stuart Mill's moralistic advocacy of his 
form of utilitarianism. It is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than 
a fool satisfied ", he had written, and his defence of this value judgment 
rests largely on the following passage: 
"From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there 
can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having 
of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most 
grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and 
consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by know- 
ledge of both, or, if they differ that of the majority among 
them, must be admitted as final. "1 
The problem, of course, as Hare points out, is "what would be the criterion 
for deciding" whether a person is 'rational' or 'a competent judge'? And, 
as he argues, there is no way out of this problem that could not be said 
to be either question -begging or of no consequence to ethics. 
In these arguments he has thus used the general principle of 
deductive inference to indicate the inadequacies of any cognitivist type 
of "moral system which claims to be based on principles which are self- 
evident ",2 and from which particular duties are said to be able to be 
'deduced'. The implications of his arguments, as I have suggested, may 
also be applied to cognitivist theories which claim simply that their 
first principles are self -evident. In summing up his arguments to this 
point he claims also to have given "reasons for holding that no moral 
system whose principles were regarded as purely factual could fulfil its 
1 ll, "Utilitarianism", pp. 9-10 (Everyman's) 2M, 
44. 
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function of regulating our conduct." While he may indeed have given such 
reasons, his specific arguments against naturalistic theories have not 
been convincing. It should be noted, in any event, that in his treatment 
of naturalistic theories he did not directly treat naturalistic theories 
of ethics (as he has done in the case of 'Cartesian' theories), but 
rather their possible 'parallels' or 'analogues' in theories of impera- 
tives. This suggested the possibility that in their 'logical behaviour' 
commands may be more like statements, and less like moral judgments, than 
Hare supposes. It is of some interest, also, that in his treatment of 
'Cartesian' theories he did not rely on his 'phrastic -neustic' analysis, 
but relied instead on the general principle of inference to which he 
felt that his analysis of imperatives had led. With that general principle, 
however, rather than the unconvincing 'phrastic -neustic' analysis, he 
could argue, as he wishes to do, that neither imperatives nor moral judg- 
ments can be entailed by factual premisses. And if it is the 'function' 
of "general moral principles" to "regulate our conduct ",1 and if the 
"end- product" of a moral argument is "an imperative of the form 'Do 
so- and- so' ",2 then he could argue that neither naturalistic nor 'Cartesian' 
theories of ethics could be adequate. 
Hare thus comes to the same conclusions as Ayer and Stevenson 
about much of traditional moral philosophy. And if it is the conclusion 
to which one is logically led, he admits that "it is not surprising that 
the first effect of modern logical researches was to make some philo- 
sophers despair of morals as a rational activity." One type of reaction 
to this 'despair', he suggests, was that some philosophers proposed that 
"although, in the strict sense of the word...moral judgments and impera- 
tives cannot be entailed by factual premisses, yet there is some looser 
1 




relation than entailment which holds between them." He quotes S.E. 
Toulmin as an example: 
231 
"Suppose that we put forward an ethical argument," writes Toulmin, 
"consisting partly of logical (demonstrative) inferences, partly 
of scientific (inductive) inferences, and partly of that form of 
inference peculiar to ethical arguments, by which we pass from 
factual reasons to an ethical1conclusion -- -what we might naturally 
call 'evaluative' inference." 
Such a proposal is of course startling in view of all the arguments against 
this kind of 'inference' --- arguments which would be agreed upon by non - 
naturalists ranging from intuitionists to emotivists. It is also of more 
than usual interest coming, as it does, from a philosophical analyst who 
had studied under Wittgenstein. Thus Hare cannot ignore Toulmin's kind 
of argument (he proposes, however, not to treat Toulmin's theory specifi- 
cally, but rather to discuss in a general way the type of theory of which 
it is one of the philosophically better examples). As Hare points out, 
it is the concern of those who postulate this kind of theory "to save 
ethics" from the kind of attacks made by early 'verificationists',2and 
they do this, he says, "by showing that moral judgments are, after all, 
good empirical propositions, only their method of verification is differ- 
ent from, and somewhat looser than, that of ordinary fact- stating sen- 
tences." While Toulmin disagrees with any suggestion that "many so- 
called 'ethical' statements are just disguised statements of fact ",3 I 
believe that Hare's generalization is a fair one in view, especially, of 
the kind of analogy Toulmin draws between argument in science and in 
ethics,4 and of the manner in which he relates ethical judgments to 
specific 'accepted social practices'.5 The procedure by which Toulmin 
proposes that we may argue from factual reasons to an ethical conclusion 
2Toulm;n, The Place of Reason in Ethics, p. 3$. 
LM, pp. 46 á 54. 1bid., p. 145. 
4Ibid., p. 129. 'Ibid., p. 146. 
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(which is treated in more specific detail in Hare's review of The Place 
of Reason in Ethics' is, first, to establish by means of an analysis of 
ethical language the 'function of ethics'. This 'function', Toulmin 
concludes, is "to correlate our feelings and behaviour in such a way as 
to make the fulfillment of everyone's aims and desires as far as possible 
compatible. "). This general 'function' now is seen to underly the 
establishing, in any community, of criteria which may serve as special 
'principles of inference' for ethical argument. Thus, assuming these 
special 'rules of inference', we may argue from factual premisses to an 
evaluative conclusion. 
One of Hare's main arguments against this type of theory is 
succinctly expressed in the following passage: 
"If we ask 'What are these special rules of inference ?' it is 
clear that they are nothing but the old rules of conduct in a 
new guise." 
As he argues in his review (in which he does not 'beg the question' for 
'imperatives' and 'principles' as he does in the arguments in his book), 
the acceptance of a special 'rule of inference' is "a moral judgment in 
its own right ". The manner in which Toulmin claims to be able to argue 
from factual reasons to an ethical conclusion has been accomplished, as 
Hare maintains, "only by smuggling in the essential moral premiss dis- 
guised as a rule of inference." As Stevenson might suggest, this kind 
of theory is guilty of using 'persuasive definitions' - -- which, in Toulmin's 
case, seem to favour a type of utilitarianism, if we may take his 'func- 
tion' of ethics as a fundamental principle of ethics. 
Another of Hare's arguments against this type of theory provides 
a useful commentary on his theory concerning the use of ethical principles. 
1The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1, 1951, pp. 372 -5. 
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He is especially critical of the suggestion that the main difference 
between the 'special rules of inference' and the ordinary rules of logic 
is that "these rules of inference are looser than the rules of logic. "1 
The difficulty with such a theory is that in using 'special rules of 
inference', which incorporate value principles, we may draw conclusions 
which we may or may not accept, without any suggestion that we may be 
guilty of self -contradiction. Thus the 'special rule' would have to be 
said to be valid only 'in general'. He thus asks what could be meant by 
saying that a rule is 'in general' valid, but not always or universally 
valid. There are two ways, he suggests, in which one might regard a 
"rule or principle" as being "incompletely rigorous ". 
"The first way is when the rule lays down that a certain kind of 
action is in certain circumstances to be done, but it is under- 
stood that it is sufficient if it is done in the great majority 
of instances; exceptions are allowed if they are not too numerous 
in proportion to the total number of cases.i2 
He gives as an example "the principle that undergraduates must not take 
a week off work during term." Such a principle, as he allows, is 'loose', 
but since even the exemplary student would be checked if he violated the 
rule too often, Hare says that "the exceptions to it are limited solely 
in number, and not otherwise determined." 
The second way of regarding principles as loose is "very different ". 
In this category one finds principles such as "Never say what is false ", 
which, we grant, may be broken in exceptional cases (such as, for example, 
in "the winning of wars, or the preservation of innocent people from 
homicidal maniacs"). 
"Here the exceptions are not limited by a numerical restriction, 
but by the peculiarities of particular classes of instance. We 
do not say 'Speak the truth in general, but it doesn't matter if 
l, p 50. 2lbid. 
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you say what is false once in a way'; we say rather 'Speak the 
truth in general, but there are certain classes of cases in 
which this principle does not hold; for example, you may say 
what is false in order to save life, and there are other ex- 
ceptions which you must learn to recognize'. "1 
In the first class of instances, the exceptions, according to Hare, are 
all of a kind. The rule remains precisely the same, and the undergraduate 
in the example asks himself, "Have I been breaking this principle much 
lately ?" In the second class, however, the exceptions to the rule are 
"decisions of principle" made in terms of other principles. The first 
principle does not therefore remain the same but is modified. That is 
to say, the rule could now become, "Never say what is false, except in 
war -time to deceive the enemy." In this sense, then, Hare maintains, our 
principles of conduct, as indeed most principles of skill also, are not 
loose at all." 
"Thus ", he writes, "far from principles like 'Never say what is 
false' being in some way by nature irredeemably loose, it is 
part of our moral development to turn them from provisional 
principles into precise principles with their exceptions 
definitely laid down; this process is, of course, never 
completed, but it is always going on in any individual life - 
time. If we accept and continue to accept such a principle 
we cannot, as in the case of the rule about taking time off 
work, break it and leave the principle intact; we have to 
decide whether to observe the principle and refuse to modify 
it, or to break it and modify it by admitting a class of 
exceptions; whereas if the principle were really by nature 
loose, we could break it without modifying it at all.r2 
In concluding his chapter on "Inference" Hare offers one final 
argument against the Toulmin type of theory, and this argument serves 
as a prelude to his important fourth chapter, "Decisions of Principle ". 
"The gravest error...of the type of theory which I am criti- 
cizing," he writes, "is that it leaves out of our reasoning 
about conduct a factor which is of the very essence of morals. 
This factor is decision. "3 




That is to say, a theory which treats 'principles of conduct' as 'logical 
rules' or 'special rules of inference', cannot presume to allow that 
conclusions of ethical arguments are conduct -regulating (Toulmin had 
said that the 'function' of ethical judgments "is to alter one's feelings 
and behaviour ").1 All that one can claim to do by means of such a pro- 
cedure is to come to a logical conclusion. Inferring may allow one 
simply to say that "if he tells a falsehood he will be breaking ...(a) 
principle, whereas if he tells the truth he will be observing it." But 
the word "inference" is "seriously misleading ", Hare argues, if it is 
used, as it is in this type of theory, to include 'decisions' to act or 
not to act upon a particular conclusion. This additional activity, he 
says, "is not inference at all, but something quite different, namely, 
deciding whether to alter the principle or not." Hare thus maintains 
that "what we have to investigate is, not some looseness in entailment, 
but the way in which we form and modify our principles, and the relation 
between this process and the particular decisions we make in the course 
of it. "2 Part of this argument, it is apparent, rests on the distinction 
he had wished to make earlier between telling a person something and 
getting him to do it; and an advocate for Toulmin might well argue that 
a conclusion to the effect that, for example, "If I tell a lie I will be 
breaking a 'principle l", may be seen to be action -guiding. 'Decisions', 
that is, might be 'stimulated' by such conclusions. Discussion of this 
point, however, is related to another part of Hare's argument, for the 
argument rests on the hypothesis that 'decision' is "a factor which is 
of the very essence in morals ", and is an integral part of "our reasoning 
about conduct ". For this part of his argument we must consider what he 
10p.cit,, p. 130. 2LM, Po 55. 
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says in his next chapter. 
Section 4 
In the final chapter of Part I, "Decisions of Principle ", Hare is 
ostensibly concerned with 'universal imperatives' or 'principles', but, 
as we have seen, he has suggested that the whole of this chapter may be 
couched in terms of value judgments. In his elaboration of the chapter, 
as Braithwaite expresses it, Hare "modulates" into a consideration of 
value judgments. Bearing this in mind I shall not be too concerned to 
keep 'universal imperative principles' and value judgments in separate 
compartments. 
Hare's approach in his chapter "Decisions of Principle" may perhaps 
more readily be understood by contrast with the general approach taken 
by Stevenson. In at least one important respect, Stevenson is more agnos- 
tic in his predominantly behaviouristic views about man. Man, for him, 
seems closer to the 'man as a black -box' analogy once suggested to me by 
a behaviourist psychologist. Jtevenson seems less willing than Hare, 
that is, to say anything suggestive of activities inside the 'black- 
box'.1 Thus while he does have something to say about decisions, he 
tends to look upon decision - making primarily in terms of specific responses 
to stimuli. He does not of course regard such responses as being either 
arbitrary, or like reflex actions, for he has said a great deal about 
the stability or 'inertia' of attitudes. His analysis of decision - 
making, however, could be generalized as follows: if I wish another 
person to make a desired decision (that is, to react or respond in a 
desired way), I provide appropriate 'supporting reasons' (or stimuli) 
1Cf. Stevenson, EL, p. 50. For Ayer's similar views see above, 
Ch. II, p. 102. 
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with the hope ultimately of evoking or 'stimulating' the desired response. 
He does not concern himself with the possibility that there might be 
logical relations between 'principles of conduct' and specific decisions 
or value judgments, for, as he has said, principles are more difficult to 
establish than particular value judgments; and, furthermore, he follows 
the "rough but useful rule" that "ethical judgments are supported or 
attacked by reasons related to them psychologically rather than logically. "1 
He thus appears to go further than even Ryle in trying to avoid the "Ghost 
in the Machine" myth. Ryle will allow, that is, that in the 'exercises 
of the disposition of knowing how to do something', we observe, as he 
says, "rules or canons or the applications of criteria. "2 This, as we 
shall see, is approximately the same approach taken by Hare. He believes 
that more can be said about decision -making than Stevenson has said; and 
furthermore, as I have indicated, he is most unwilling to accept the 
emotivist doctrine that moral judgments serve as 'persuasive instruments' 
in the guiding of decisions of actions. I shall argue, however, that in 
this chapter, as in earlier chapters, he does not make a convincing case 
that his analysis is to be preferred over Stevenson's. 
In summarizing and assessing this chapter I shall keep in mind 
three main questions: first, what precisely does Hare mean by the word 
"decision "; and does his account satisfactorily preserve the distinction 
he would make between his theory and the so- called 'persuasion' theories 
of Stevenson and Ayer ?; secondly, what precisely is meant by the phrase 
"principle of conduct ", and is Hare's use of it free from difficulty ?; 
and, thirdly, is the attempt to indicate that there is a 'correspondence' 
between moral reasoning and the Aristotelian practical syllogism a 
1Above Ch. III, p. 163. 
2Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 46. 
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faithful analysis of moral reasoning? As we shall see, the second and 
third questions overlap. 
The chapter opens with the statement that two factors "may be 
involved in the making of any decision to do something." 
"Of these," he writes, "the first may at any rate theoretically 
be absent, the second is always present to some degree. They 
correspond to the major and minor premisses of the Aristotelian 
practical syllogism. The major premiss is a principle of con- 
duct; the minor premiss is a statement, more or less full, of 
what we should in fact be doing if we decide one or other of 
the alternatives open to us." 
This passage, it may be noted, is reminiscent of an aspect of Kant's 
proposed analysis of practical reason; although, as I have suggested 
earlier, it is doubtful if Kant intended his practical syllogism to be 
more than an analytic aid to understand 'practical reason'. In any event, 
the similarity is apparent by a comparison of the preceding passage with 
the following passage by Kant. 
"...the division of the analytic of pure practical reason must 
resemble that of a syllogism, namely proceeding from the 
universal in the major premiss (the moral principle), through 
a minor premiss containing a subsumption of possible actions 
(as good or evil) under the former, to the conclusion, namely, 
the subjective determination of the will.... "1 
There are other similarities, as we shall see. 
Consideration of the two factors which may be involved in decision - 
making will provide the general plan for Hare's chapter. He will argue, 
again like Kant,2 that neither 'principles, nor the factual data of the 
'minor premiss' (that is, the data which provide information about the 
effects or possible effects of a decision), may be neglected in any 
theory purporting to give an adequate account of decision -making. In 
presenting his case, as the reference to the 'corresponding' practical 
2Critique of Practical Reason, (tr. Abbott), p. l84. 
Cf. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p. 76. 
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syllogism suggests, he is concerned also to say that there is a logical 
procedure, even if it is often implicit, either in the making of a 
specific decision or in trying to justify it. 
Hare begins his exposition of 'decisions of principle' by first 
considering the minor premiss. "We plainly cannot decide what to do," 
he says, "unless we know at least something about what we should be 
doing if we do this or that." In illustrating this point he indicates 
that a person confronted with a problem which demands a decision between 
possible alternative actions must consider all relevant data, primarily 
the possible effects of each of his alternatives. He then goes on to 
say that "it is the effects which determine what I should be doing; it 
is between the two sets of effects that I am deciding." This passage 
would of course be seized upon by an advocate for the emotivist point 
of view that 'reasons' for moral judgments are related to the judgments 
psychologically rather than logically. In saying that the effects "de- 
termine" what I should be doing, Hare is using language suggestive of a 
kind of doctrine he wishes so much to avoid. Undoubtedly he wishes to 
suggest something different when he goes on to say that "it is between 
the two sets of effects that I am deciding." But if this is his intention 
we should expect that he will provide an analysis explicitly revealing a 
difference between 'deciding' and 'being determined'; otherwise there is 
the possibility that the emotivist might wish to say that Hare is being 
logically misled in his attempts to avoid emotivism and to postulate a 
form of conativism. This is not to suggest that Hare is necessarily pre- 
supposing any hypostatic departmental psychology in which a 'faculty of 
will' is operative in decision - making; but it may raise the question 
whether the terminology of decision -making may be philosophically mis- 
leading if expressed in language which suggests that 'decisions' are not 
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'caused'. I shall return to this question later. 
Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson had emphasized that the data upon which 
we make value judgments are of a factual nature. Hare, similarly, empha- 
sizes that the data for the minor premiss of his practical syllogism 
must be factual - --or at least as factual as we can make it. In qualifying 
his stipulation he points to the distinction that single words may have 
a variety of uses. It would be "well -nigh impossible ", he admits, to 
exclude all words which may have an evaluative meaning "in view of the 
way in which evaluative meaning pervades our language...." Later he will 
say that "almost every word in our language is capable of being used on 
occasion as a value - word. "1 The criterion for deciding whether the minor 
premiss can admit a given word, he says, is that "there are definite 
tests (not themselves involving evaluation) for ascertaining its truth 
or falsity. "2 
He now considers the relation between this premiss and the major 
premiss, and this leads him into a discussion of the content of the major 
premiss, that is, 'principles'. Since I shall maintain that several of 
his main theses are inadequate I shall summarize his argument in some 
detail lest I be accused of misinterpreting his position. To bring out 
the logical possibilities of the reasons for having principles, he begins 
by offering the hypothetical and "artificial" example of a man with "a 
peculiar kind of clairvoyance such that he can know everything about the 
effects of all the alternative actions open to him" but who so far has 
neither formed nor has been taught any "principles of conduct ". If we 
ask of this man, after he had made a particular decision, why it was 
that he should have chosen one set of effects rather than another, Hare 
1LM, p. 79. 2LM, P. 58. 
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suggests that he might answer in two possible ways: first, he might say, 
"I can't give any reasons; I just felt like deciding that way; another 
time, faced with the same choice, I might decide differently." On the 
other hand, he might say, "It was this and this that made me decide; I 
was deliberately avoiding such and such effects, and seeking such and 
such." While Hare allows that the first decision might "in a certain 
sense" be called "arbitrary ", even though the man had "some reason for 
his choice, namely that he felt that way "; the second decision could 
not in any sense be 'arbitrary'. Such a decision is not arbitrary since 
the man "has started to form principles for himself; for to choose 
effects because they are such and such is to begin to act on a principle 
that such and such effects are to be chosen." 
We see in this example," he continues, "that in order to act on 
principle it is not necessary in some sense to have a principle 
already, before you act; it may be that the decision to act in 
a certain way, because of something about the effects of acting 
in that way, is to subscribe to a principle of action - -- though 
it is not necessarily to adopt it in any permanent sense."1 
He gives two further reasons for having principles. The next one is that 
since, unlike the clairvoyant, our knowledge of the future is "fragmentary 
and only probable ", we must make our decisions upon "principles of pre- 
diction which we are taught, or form for ourselves." These principles 
of prediction, like the principles of the clairvoyant's decision, are 
also "principles of action ", for "to predict is to act in a certain way." 
The third reason why we have principles, he continues, is that "most 
kinds of teaching are impossible" without principles, "for what is taught 
is in most cases a principle." 
"In particular," he says, "when we learn to do something, what we 
learn is always a principle. Even to learn to be taught a fact 
(like the names of the five rivers of the Punjab) is to learn 
1 
1110 P. 59. 
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how to answer a question....By this I do not of course mean, 
that to learn to do anything is to learn to recite by rote 
some universal imperative sentence. This would involve us 
in a vicious regress; for learning to recite is a kind of 
learning, and must have its principles; but in that case we 
should have to learn to recite the principles of reciting. 
The point is rather this, that to learn to do anything is 
never to learn to do an individual act; it is always to learn 
to do acts of a certain kind in a certain kind of situation; 
and this is to learn a principle. "l 
The importance of having "principles of action ", he continues, is that 
when confronted with a type of problem, in a recognizable type of situation, 
we are able "to single out quickly the relevant aspects of a situation, 
including the (possible) effects of the various possible actions, and 
so choose quickly, and in many cases habitually." Thus, he suggests, 
"when the performance of the lesser duties has become a matter of habit, 
we have time to think about the greater." (I would raise a minor point 
of disagreement here about Hare's way of expressing this, for it seems 
doubtful that many of our decisions resulting from practices which have 
become habitual are therefore of 'lesser' value --which seems to be what 
Hare means- -than decisions for which we have little past experience to 
guide us. It would be preferable to speak of 'more easily learned' duties, 
on the one hand, as compared with 'more complex' or 'more difficult' 
duties). 
There is, he says "a limit in practice to the amount that can be 
taught to someone by someone else." A driving instructor, for example, 
"cannot do more than begin to teach his pupil the art of driving, because 
the conditions to be met with in driving are so various." There comes a 
point, then, when the learner must begin to teach himself; and he does 
this by making decisions. Thus Hare reinforces the point we have already 
seen, that "the principles that are taught us initially are of a pro- 
LM, p. 60. 
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visional kind...." 
"Our training, after the initial stages, consists in taking these 
principles, and making them less provisional; we do this by 
using them continually in our own decisions, and sometimes making 
exceptions to them; some of the exceptions are made because our 
instructor points out to us that certain cases are instances of 
classes of exceptions to the principle; and some of the exceptions 
we decide on for ourselves." 
When we modify a principle, he writes, "we adopt whichever form of the 
principle leads to the effects which we choose to pursue. "1 
Throughout this chapter Hare presupposes a distinction between 
what Kyle had termed "knowing how" and "knowing that ".2 This distinction 
is most apparent in the following passage: 
"It is hardly necessary to point out ", Hare writes, "that principles 
of driving, like other principles, are normally not inculcated by 
their verbal repetition, but by example, demonstration, and 
other practical means. We learn to drive, not by precept, but 
by being shown how to do particular bits of driving; the pre- 
cepts are usually only explanatory or mnemonic of what we are 
being shown. "3 
This emphasis on learning principles by learning how to perform types of 
actions might seem to suggest that to refer to what we learn as "principles" 
is stretching a use of language; but Hare insists not. Drivers and 
trappers, he suggests, often know what to do in certain situations "with- 
out being able to say how...though if a skill is to be taught, it is 
easier if we can say how. "4 To reinforce his point that principles are 
involved in such non -verbalized situations, he says that "all decisions 
except those, if any, that are completely arbitrary are to some extent 
decisions of principle ". When confronted, he says, with what appears to 
be a new situation (for example, when a child leaps in front of my car 
I do not put out my hand to signal my intention to stop as I had been 
taught to do) I make an exception which modifies the principle. There- 
3 
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after, Hare suggests, "I accept the former principle with this exception, 
that in cases of emergency it is better to steer than to signal." On 
the spur of the moment, he suggests, I would have "made a decision of 
principle." To understand what happens in cases like this," he continues, 
"is to understand a great deal about the making of value -judgments." 
He does not wish to maintain that 'principles of driving' (that 
is, 'principles of skill') are precisely the same in nature as 'principles 
of conduct'. One general difference, although it is not absolute, is 
that in activities like driving we are generally able to establish the 
ends to be achieved in advance. Thus the principles of good driving may 
be considered as "hypothetical imperatives ". With ethical principles, 
however, we often have to begin by teaching at first "simple rules of 
thumb, and the learner only gradually comes to see what the ends are, 
at which the instruction is aimed. "1 A more fundamental difference, how- 
ever, is, that principles of conduct are "in Aristotle's term 'archi- 
tectonic' of" principles of skill, for, he continues, "the ends of good 
driving (safety, the avoidance of inconvenience to others, the preserva- 
tion of property, and so on) are justified ultimately, if justification 
is sought, by appeal to moral considerations." 
After suggesting that his account is sufficiently general to cover 
all of the different ways of "learning a skill or any other body of 
principles, or of justifying a particular decision made in the practice 
of it ", he turns directly to the question of justification of actions. 
He contrasts the approach of philosophers who tend to stress 'effects', 
with those who stress 'principles'. The error of both extremes, he 
maintains, is not in what they say, but rather that they postulate that 
1LM, p. 66. 
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their respective theories provide the true account of the justification 
of actions, 
"The truth is that," he continues, "if asked to justify any 
decision, we have to bring in both effects --to give content to 
the decision- -and principles, and the effects in general of 
observing those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied 
our inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a decision would 
consist of a complete account of its effects, together with a 
complete account of the principles which it observed, and the 
effects of observing those principles -- -for, of course, it is 
the effects (what obeying them in fact consists in) which give 
content to the principles too. Thus, if pressed to justify a 
decision completely, we have to give a complete specification 
of the way of life of which it is a part. This complete speci- 
fication it is impossible in practice to give; the nearest 
attempts are those given by the great religions, especially 
those which can point to historical persons who carried out 
the way of life in practice. Suppose, however, that we can 
give it. If the inquirer still goes on asking 'But why should 
I live like that ?' then there is no further answer to give him, 
because we have already, ex hypothesi, said everything that 
could be included in this further answer. We can only ask him 
to make up his own mind which way he ought to live; for in the 
end everything rests upon such a decision of principle; He has 
to decide whether to accept that way of life or not; if he 
accepts it, we can proceed justify the decisions that 
are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him 
accept some other, and try to live by it. "l 
Thus, like Ayer and Stevenson, he allows for the possibility that moral 
arguments may ultimately 'break down'. He rejects the notion, however, 
that any decision which has been given such 'justification', even if it 
does fail to 'satisfy our inquirer', is in any sense arbitrary. "Far 
from being arbitrary," he writes, "such a decision would be the most 
well -founded of decisions, because it would be based upon a consideration 
of everything upon which it could possibly be founded. "2 
He now directly relates what he has been saying to the analysis 
of 'value judgments'. In speaking of decisions of principle, he points 
out, one inevitably begins to use value -language. "Thus we decide that 
1 
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the principle should.be modified, or that it is better to steer than to 
signal." Thus, he says, "to make a value judgment is to make a decision 
of principle." Then he writes the following passage: 
"To ask whether I ought to do A in these circumstances is (to 
borrow Kantian language with a small though important modifica- 
tion) to ask whether or not I will that doing A in such circum- 
stances should become a universal law. "1 
I suppose he is thinking primarily of the argument in which he said that 
each decision of principle is part of a never - ending process to make 
principles more precise, or less provisional. This, along with his argu- 
ment suggesting that in 'justifying' decisions (including value judg- 
ments) one must consider the perpetual interplay of principles and effects, 
would indicate in what sense one would will that the principle of his 
action should become a universal law. He does not at this point indicate 
what he means by the "important modification" to Kant's doctrine, but 
possibly he is referring to a point he makes in the final chapter of the 
book when he says that "proper universal sentences cannot be framed in 
the imperative mood. "2 Since he will press his point that moral princi- 
ples must be considered as "universal ", he proposes an "analytic model" 
to "enrich the imperative mood ". While this point must be left until we 
consider what Hare means by a "universal principle ", one must wonder how 
it will be possible to suggest that moral principles may be both universal 
and modifiable at one and the same time. In a later passage,3 although 
not without qualms, Hare assumes for the sake of his argument that there 
can be no synthetic a priori truth -- -that is, that there can be no 'cate- 
gorical imperative' of the nature sought by Kant. 
After this reference, Hare writes the following passage in which 
1 
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he suggests in what way his theory will differ from Stevenson's. 
"It may seem a far cry from Kant to Professor Stevenson; but the 
same question could be put in other words by asking 'What attitude 
shall I adopt and recommend towards doing A in such circumstances ?'; 
for 'attitude', if it means anything, means a principle of action. 
Unfortunately, Stevenson, like Kant, devotes very little space to 
the examination of this first -person question; had he paid due 
attention to it, and avoided the dangers of the word 'persuasive', 
he might have reached a position not unlike that of Kant.n1 
The main difference between Stevenson and Kant, he goes on to suggest, is 
that Kant had pointed out that "we have to make our own decisions of 
principle. Other people cannot make them for us unless we have first 
decided to take their advice or obey their orders." This is to suggest, 
I assume, that Stevenson's emphasis on the disagreement of attitudes of 
two or more people has led to the neglect of what is involved when an 
individual is confronted with a moral problem which he must decide for 
himself without the direct influence of specific judgments by another 
person. Hare suggests that the moral agent is rather like the scientist. 
The scientist's confidence "in other people's observations ", he writes, 
"is ultimately based, among other things, on his own observations and 
his own judgments about what is reliable. He has in the end to rely on 
himself." 
"The case of the moral agent is not dissimilar," Hare continues. 
"When in our early days we are given our elementary moral in- 
struction, there are some things we are told, and some things 
that we do. If, when we did as we were told, the total effects 
of our so doing, when they happened, were always such as we would 
not have chosen, had we known, then we should seek better advice, 
or, if prevented from so doing, either work out our own salvation 
or become moral defectives." 
He concludes the chapter with, first, an excursion into the sociology 
of morals, discussing the way in which the morality of a society may 
change; and, secondly, with the question, "How shall I bring up my 
1124, p. 70. 
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children ?" The merit of this question, as he maintains, is that "it is 
here...that the most characteristic uses of moral words are to be found."1 
I shall not discuss this conclusion except to note that he allows that 
"the only instrument which the parent possesses is moral education - --the 
teaching of principles by example and precept, backed up by chastisement 
and other more up -to -date psychological methods." 
In assessing this chapter, as I have indicated earlier, I should 
like to consider three main questions. The first one is, what precisely 
does Hare mean by the word "decision "? I shall take up this question at 
the point we have just seen, where Hare is concerned to dissociate him- 
self from Stevenson's emotivism, while associating himself, to some extent, 
with Kant's conativism (at least this seems to be his intention). Un- 
fortunately Hare does not say precisely what a 'decision of principle' 
is. To say that it is used for 'commending' or for 'guiding actions'. is 
to say nothing that Stevenson could not have said. Hare's approach is 
rather to say what a 'decision' is not, but, even so, he is not precise 
about what he is rejecting. He appears to rely primarily on the reader's 
drawing his own conclusion from the special argument he had presented 
earlier to the effect that "the processes of telling someone to do some- 
thing, and getting him to do it, are quite distinct." That is, when 
considering imperative analogues to ethical theories, he had maintained 
that "the function of a command is (not) to affect the hearer causally, 
or get him to do something." Similarly, we are to assume that the 
'function' of a moral judgment, which is a decision of principle, is not 
to affect the hearer causally; and since, if I am a hearer, and if I 
make a.decision of principle to act on the basis of a moral judgment told 
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to me, then my decision has not been causally affected. Now whatever 
precisely he means by this, it is apparent, as I have suggested, that his 
case rests primarily on the argument to distinguish between 'telling' and 
'persuading'. But, as we have seen, that argument is by no means con- 
vincing. Unfortunately, also, as I have pointed out, his linking of the 
words "persuasion" and "propaganda" is dependent on his persuasively 
defining "persuasion" with terms normally used to apply to propaganda 
and not to other possible types of persuasion. Taking his arguments, 
then, at face -value, I believe it may be said that he has given no con- 
vincing arguments to indicate why we should use the word "decision" as 
he intends it to be used (whatever precisely that intention is), rather 
than as Stevenson would use it. Speaking of 'choice', which is equivalent 
to Hare's use of the word "decision ", Stevenson has this to say: 
"...it is difficult to see how a choice can be considered anything 
an attitude actually at work-- -i.e., an attitude con- 
sidered in its specific bearing upon a given action. It seems 
to be more than this, it may be urged, only because the term 
hints at some unique faculty of volition, hypostatically conceived. "1 
Hare of course had attached some importance, also, to the suggestion 
that Stevenson, in emphasizing disagreement between two or more persons, 
had thus neglected the consideration of what is involved when an individual 
must ultimately 'work out his on salvation' and must 'rely on himself'. 
But, as we have seen,2 Stevenson is by no means unmindful of this problem. 
Where Hare speaks of the consideration of possible alternative sets of 
effects, Stevenson speaks of a "conflict of attitudes" within the person 
considering possible courses of action. The considerations for resolving 
the 'conflict', in order to make a decision, are much the same as for 
resolving "disagreement in attitude ". "In personal decisions," he wrote, 
2EL, p. 305; Cf., above, p. 201. 
Above, Ch. III, p. 121. 
HARE 250 
"we again find reasons which are psychologically related to the judgment 
in which they eventuate." And the data upon which such decisions are 
made are, like the data of Hare's minor premiss, "all of them concerned 
with matters of fact. "1 Without some further analysis of the word "de- 
cision" by Hare, an analysis which would say precisely what he means in 
suggesting that Stevenson's analysis is inadequate, and without a con- 
vincing argument to indicate that 'telling' is not 'persuading', it is 
difficult to assess the merits of his case. 
What more could he possibly intend in using the word "decision" 
as if it implied a significant difference from Stevenson's use? The 
use of the word "causally" in his statement that a 'command (and thus a 
decision)2 is not "causally affected ", appears to be the most significant 
clue to his intention. In his Index, under "Imperative Sentences ", he 
includes the phrase "function of, not causal ", thus it is apparent that 
he attaches some importance to this distinction. It is apparent, then, 
that he is suggesting that a decision is, in some significant sense, 
uncaused; whereas the emotivist must presuppose that a decision which is 
held to be a response to a stimulus or to stimuli is not, in the same 
significant sense, uncaused. If this is his intention, it would appear 
that he is assuming that his theory is on the side of the angels; whereas 
the emotivist must be considered to support a deterministic theory, and 
thus have to face the old charge that moral judgments and actions are of 
no consequence for ethics if they are said to be 'caused' or 'determined'. 
Unfortunately, Hare provides no guidance for his intentions, for, in the 
Preface he mentions that, "in particular, the problem known as 'The Free- 
dom of the Will', which has a place in most introductions to ethics, is 
IEL, 
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not mentioned... ", and his reason for not mentioning it is not that he 
considers the problem unimportant but that it has to do rather with 
"problems of the language of the psychology of morals, than of the 
language of morals itself." If he is presupposing the controversy, how- 
ever, and doing so in a manner to reject Stevenson's theory, then what 
he seems to suggest should be weighed against what Stevenson has written. 
This controversy, according to Stevenson, "presents no permanent diffi- 
culty to ethics, being largely a product of confusions." He has a con- 
siderable amount to say about this problem in his chapter "Avoidability; 
Indeterminism ", but, for our purposes, we need consider only two of his 
arguments. 
"References to indeterminism," he writes, "will not help to defend 
the 'impossibility' of an enlightened ethics, but will simply 
put one difficulty in the place of another. If a man's choice 
were indetermined, it would be theoretically unpredictable. The 
man himself could not have foreseen his choice, nor could he have 
taken any steps to prevent it. It have sprung 
personality, but from nothing at all. He would still be a 'vic- 
tim', not of determining circumstances,lbut of chance. What room 
is there here for an ethical judgment ?" 
While Stevenson's second argument may seem to presuppose his view of 
ethical judgments as 'persuasive instruments', it applies nevertheless 
to any view such as Hare's which maintains that ethical judgments are in 
some sense action -guiding. 
"The main confusion of the view, however, lies not in its failure 
to avoid a difficulty, but in its creation of an artificial one. 
There is no:.reason whatever to suppose that a reflective person, 
believing that a man's action sprang from a determined choice, 
will on that account suspend judgment of the action. Between 
judging such an action and judging the rain for falling there 
is this difference: a judgment of the rain will make no differ- 
ence to it, whereas a judgment of human action, provided only 
that the action is avoidable, may serve to make such actions 
more frequent, or less frequent, in the future. For the latter 
case the judgment will itself be a new determining factor - --one 
1EL, p. 313. For similar argument see Hume, Treatise, II, III, 
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that is added to the old determining factors of a man's choice, 
and which may serve as a means of controlling or guiding him. 
It would be curious if a 'reflective' person, on coming to 
believe that choice is subject to causes, should immediately 
lose interest in having his judgments number among them. "l 
(By "avoidable ", Stevenson means an action that "would not have happened 
if a choice that was not made had been made. ")2 We may see from these 
arguments, then, that Stevenson would remain undisturbed by any suggestion 
that his theory, which allows that ethical judgments are 'persuasive', is 
therefore a deterministic theory. It is of interest that G.E. Moore has 
lent support to Stevenson's view when in his Ethics he argues that "it is 
extremely doubtful whether Free Will is at all inconsistent with the 
principle that everything is caused. "3 
The second main question proposed as a guide for assessing Hare's 
chapter, "Decisions of Principle ", was, what precisely does he mean by 
"principle of conduct "? This question, as I have said, overlaps with the 
third: Is the attempt to indicate that there is a 'correspondence' between 
moral reasoning and the Aristotelian practical syllogism a faithful analy- 
sis of moral reasoning? Here again we may take Hare's dissociation from 
Stevenson's theory as a stepping -off point. Hare had said that "'attitude', 
if it means anything, means a principle of action ". Now as I have sug- 
gested earlier, Stevenson's general approach is closer to the 'man as 
black -box' analogy. Hare obviously believes more can be said, and he 
wants to extend his analysis of moral argument and decision-making further 
than Stevenson had done. Whereas Stevenson had spoken of 'attitudes' as 
dispositions to respond in certain ways in certain types of situations, 
and whereas he had said that 'general principles' were more difficult to 
establish than particular judgments, Hare suggests that this is only a 
2EL, p. 298-9. 30p.cit., p. 130. 
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partial answer - --and, unfortunately, an answer impaired by Stevenson's 
not avoiding "the dangers of the word 'persuasion'." Nevertheless, much 
of what Hare had said about 'principles' could be taken into Stevenson's 
theory, with simply an exchange of the word "principles" for the word 
"attitudes ". That is to say Stevenson could, for example, agree that the 
best way to be certain about a person's 'principles' or 'attitudes' would 
be by studying what he did; the statement "Never say what is false" 
could be acceptable as an expression of a 'principle' or 'attitude'; when 
we choose to act in a certain way we could be said to be acting in terms 
of a 'principle' or 'attitude'; 'attitudes' or 'principles' are pro- 
visional and subject to alteration; they are not of a factual nature; 
and they are not self -evident. In many respects, then, Stevenson could 
accept the use of the word "principle" as Hare uses it, and could analyse 
it in his 'dispositional' terminology. Thus, where Hare uses the phrase 
"principles of conduct" we could, for the most part, use the words "atti- 
tudes", "policies ", and "practices ", without doing any injustice to his 
intentions. Where, then is the difference? 
The main difference is in the use Hare would make of 'principles 
of conduct'. Throughout his argument there have been two main hypotheses. 
The first is that the function of "general moral principles" is to regu- 
late our conduct, and the second one is that the main particular 'instru- 
ment' for regulating moral conduct is "an imperative of the form 'Do so- 
and-so'." Now, he argues, if this imperative is the "end- product" of 
"a piece of genuinely evaluative moral reasoning...it follows that its 
principles must be of such a kind that we can deduce such particular 
imperatives from them in conjunction with factual minor premisses. "1 
1I=M, p. 39. 
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He does not examine until later the assumption that "value judgments, if 
they are action- guiding, must be held to entail imperatives";1 but this 
need not concern us at present since his special problem in the later 
context concerns primarily the conclusion of the practical syllogism. 
Our present problem is rather with the nature of a principle of conduct 
as the major premiss of the practical syllogism. It should be noted of 
course that if the assumption that a principle of conduct may serve as a 
major premiss is found to be in any sense inadequate, then by virtue of 
the general principle of inference which is so important to Hare's argu- 
ment, there will be a consequent weakness in the conclusion. 
Now even if all genuine moral reasoning were said to correspond to 
reasoning within the practical syllogism, we may nevertheless question 
Hare's proposed use of a principle of conduct as a major premiss for 
moral reasoning. There is a confusion in his use of the word "principle ", 
and in what follows I shall distinguish between a principle as taught or 
as told to anyone (for this use, the word "precept" seems less misleading), 
and, on the other hand, a principle of conduct as proposed or as adopted 
or acted upon or in use. For this sense the word "maxims" may also be 
used. My argument will be an argumentum ad hominem and I shall use ter- 
minology as Hare would, except for the qualification concerning 'precepts' 
and 'principles of conduct' or 'maxims'. 
One of the main difficulties with Hare's argument is that he places 
undue emphasis on one 'principle' in any particular situation, to the 
neglect of other possible 'principles' which may more appropriately apply 
to the situation. While I may have been taught by my elders or pre- 
ceptors the precept "Never say what is false ", and while, through their 
1111 
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teaching and example I may have 'decided' to accept this as a principle 
of conductj(for example, in a situation in which my family is in danger). 
This, Hare would allow. But in such a situation the action I would choose 
to take is not so much a question of modifying the precept and the prin- 
ciple of conduct, expressed as "Never say what is false ", so much as it 
is to act in terms of the end to save my family. In so doing I have to 
make a statement -- -which happens to be a lie. If this action is said to 
be a decision of principle, then the principle would be "To save my family 
in situations like this, I should say such -and -such, which is false. "1 
This is to assume Hare's point that when I make a particular value judg- 
ment I adopt at the same time a principle of conduct. In retrospect, I 
may then realize that the precept and the principle of conduct, expressed 
as "Never say what is false ", is limited and must be modified. But let 
us suppose that I have now accepted that the precept and the principle 
of conduct should be modified, and let us suppose, again, that my family 
is in danger and that a lie would probably save them. Any analysis of 
this situation would indicate, I believe, that I would be even less con- 
cerned with the modified precept and the principle of conduct about lying 
( "Never say what is false except to save my family in this type of situa- 
tion") as a major premiss for my moral reasoning. The principle of conduct 
for the situation before me, which, after analysis, I have verbalized and 
may now regard also as a precept ( "To save my family in situations like 
this I should make statements even if they are false ") is again the 
principle upon which I would act, or is rather the decision of principle 
for the value judgment which I would make. I would thus neglect the 
modified principle of conduct and precept concerning lying ( "Never say 
1For a similar argument see E.M. Adams, "Mr. Hare on the role of 
principles in deciding ", Mind, LXV, 1956, pp. 78-80. 
HARE 256 
what is false except when - -- etc.,) just as I would have neglected the 
primitive, unmodified principle of conduct and precept ("Never say what 
is false "). Indeed, as I have just intimated, I could neglect the modi- 
fied principle and its precept more readily since I would no longer be 
so much concerned to justify telling a lie in such a situation. 
It would seem trivial, then, to say that the implicit or explicit 
major premiss of a piece of moral reasoning should be of such a nature 
that a particular value judgment should be able to be deduced from it, 
since, in any new situation demanding a value judgment I must, at the 
same time, adopt a new general principle of conduct under which the value 
judgment is said to be subsumed. But how 'general' is this principle? 
In my decision to lie Ito save my family now', the general principle of 
conduct could be no more general than, if as general as, the expression 
"To save my family in situations like this I should say such -and -such, 
which is false." (For the sake of this argumentum ad hominem I shall not 
suggest the phrase "in situations exactly like this". This would be a 
debatable procedure and my point may be made without entering that debate). 
The general principle is not, it should be emphasized, either "I ought 
never to say what is false except in situations like this" or, the more 
general principle, 'Fall people ought never to say what is false except 
in situations like this ". My general principle could be no more general 
than this, since, as Hare has allowed, in agreement with Stevenson, "it 
is not easier, but more difficult, to assent to a very general command... 
than it is to assent to a particular command.... "1 Furthermore, by no 
logical means would it be justifiable to say that from the principle of 
a action in a particular situation, I may therefore conclude that all 
1LM, p. 40; Cf., above p. 225. 
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people ought to act that way in the same kind of situation. In arguing 
from one to all I would of course be violating a principle of inference, 
which Hare especially could not condone. If I were to say that the 
principle of conduct of my particular value judgment should be applicable 
for all people in the same type of situation I would appear to be intro- 
ducing a value judgment into my argument. 
Now if the general principle of conduct under which a particular 
value judgment may be subsumed must be as limited in its generalization 
as I have indicated, in what sense may it be said to be provisional or 
modifiable? That is to say, in the hypothetical example I have given, I 
have argued that the general principle must be no more general than "To 
save my family in situations like this I should say such -and -such, which 
is false." There are no logical grounds for making it more general. Now 
in any particular situation in which I must seriously consider the possi- 
bility of acting in such a way that my family would be endangered (such 
situations must have occurred, for example, in Nazi Germany) a new value 
judgment, and thus a new principle of conduct, is required, since the 
situation is not like the earlier situation. This new principle is not 
the old principle modified, but is a new principle which 'generalizes', 
so to speak, the maxim of the action I would choose to follow. To use 
(or misuse) Hare's words, "it is the effects which determine what I should 
be doing...." I need not, then, modify the earlier principle of action 
and its corresponding precept ( "To save my family in situation like this- - 
that is, the earlier situation --I should say such -and -such, which is 
false "), since if a situation like that earlier one again occurred I 
would use precisely that same principle, and may indeed teach it as a 
precept to my children when they are mature enough not to be too confused 
by it. 
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In one sense, then, of the word "principle ", that is the sense in 
which I am said to make a decision of principle when I make a value judg- 
ment, the use of the principle as a major premiss is trivial. My particu- 
lar value judgment, that is, is 'generalized' or 'universalized' to refer 
to my acting in that way in all situations like the particular situation 
in which I have made the judgment. In this use of the word the principle 
is not modifiable since it would not make sense to suggest that it should 
be different. And if challenged to justify my particular value judgment 
it would be of little value to appeal to the principle of my action as 
a major premiss for a moral argument, since the principle is simply a 
generalized statement of what I have done (and this point may be extended 
to actions I have proposed to do). 
A rigid moralist may of course ask, "But why did you lie ?" But 
this would be to introduce a question referring to a special aspect of 
my action to save my family. My reply would probably be, "To save my 
family ", implying that I regard it as justifiable to make a statement 
which happens to be a lie in a situation like that. And this is to lead, 
in retrospect, to the question of the modification of principles of 
conduct and their corresponding precepts, and the recognition of the pro- 
visional nature of the precepts we have been taught (not principles of 
conduct as we act upon them, for, as I have argued, principles of conduct 
in this sense cannot be said to be provisional when we act upon them. 
They are what they are. If I later regard them as wrong this is because 
the moral situation -- including myself within it --is a new situation 
demanding a different value judgment and a different principle of conduct). 
If we say, then, that a principle is provisional or modifiable we must be 
using the word to refer either to the precepts which we have been taught, 
which may be too general to be applicable to all of the various situations 
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known to the instructor or preceptor, or to principles of conduct as 
verbalized in retrospect. If, as a child, I act on the precept "Never 
say what is false ", I have adopted it as a principle of conduct, and for 
the situation in which I use it that principle is not modifiable. When 
a situation may ultimately occur in which a lie seems necessary to achieve 
an end which I would choose, I may bypass or disregard the precept and 
its corresponding principle of conduct, and my value judgment is in terns 
of a new principle of conduct, for which, in retrospect, I may frame a 
new precept. 
Hare obscures this distinction when he says that "we learn to 
drive, not by precept, but by being shown how to do particular bits of 
driving ",l and when, although saying that there is a difference between 
principles of skill and principles of moral conduct, he nevertheless 
regards them as being more akin than they in fact are. After saying that 
we learn to drive "not by precept ", he goes on to say that "precepts are 
usually only explanatory or mnemonic of what we are being shown." my 
suggestion is that the phrase "Never say what is false ", as Hare uses 
it in his paradigm for a principle of conduct, is more appropriately 
termed a "precept" in this sense. No doubt, to a considerable extent, 
we do teach our children the principle of conduct that truth is to be 
preferred to falsehood by the examples we set for them; but in guiding 
them or correcting them we must resort primarily to precepts, with other 
psychological devices including the examples we set, to guide them to 
accept the precepts as principles of conduct. Thus the phrase "Never 
say what is false ", in our use of it to teach our children, is a precept 
which we as preceptors regard as provisional or modifiable. But a 
lIT, p. 63. 
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principle of conduct as a generalized statement of a particular value 
judgment which we may make either as a child or adult is not modifiable-- - 
that is, if we accept the implications of Hare's argument. To repeat my 
point, from his stipulations we must say that any judgment we may make 
later to suggest that we were wrong in using a particular principle of 
conduct must be a new value judgment, with a new general principle of 
conduct, 'determined by a new set of effects'. There is point, then, 
to the suggestion that particular value judgments may be easier to make 
than "very general principles ", and possibly Stevenson, as well as various 
intuitionists, had good reason not to concern themselves with 'universal 
principles' as Hare has done. 
We have seen that the principle of conduct of any particular value 
judgment if used as the major premiss of any argument must be considered 
as trivial if intended to justify the judgment. What, then, may be said 
of the use of a 'precept' as a major premiss for such an argument? If 
the 'precept' precisely verbalizes the principles of conduct of a par- 
ticular value judgment, then it, like the principle, must be trivial. 
If it is to be used, then, in any but a trivial sense, it must be more 
general than the principle of conduct. But this would lead to even 
greater difficulties. An extreme example which makes this point would 
be to suggest that the precept "Never say what is false" should be used 
as the major premiss for a practical syllogism, the minor premiss of 
which would include the factual data that a lie would probably save my 
family. If it is objected that this particular example begs the question 
in appealing to the wrong general principle, then my point, far from being 
weakened, is in fact reinforced. This point is succinctly expressed by 
the intuitionist E.F. Carritt, using an argument that could be readily 
taken over by an emotivist. In opposing the kind of syllogistic procedure 
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which Hare would revive, he wrote that "a rule can only be general, but 
an act must be particular, so it will always be necessary to satisfy 
ourselves that an act comes under the rule, and for this no rule can 
be given. "1 Extending Carritt's point somewhat further, there is no 
rule to 'guide our choice' in any particular situation --which may be 
exceedingly complex- -of one or several precepts,; or principles of con- 
duct from among the many we have been 'told', and have adopted, in our 
normal experience. After making a decision about the problem before us, 
that is to decide about the 'facts' of the situation, we would have to 
make a decision in accepting a principle, from the principles we have 
learned, for use as the major premiss of our practical syllogism. But, 
as Hare has allowed, if we are in doubt about what to do in a particular 
situation, we will be in doubt about a general principle (or major pre- 
miss) which may be applicable in that situation. There is a further 
problem. If a particular decision is the end result of a syllogistic 
procedure, then the choice of the principle to serve as a major premiss 
must itself follow from such a procedure, and so on ad infinitum.2 It 
appears, then, that we are led either to this absurd conclusion, or to 
the conclusion that the syllogistic procedure (as Hare prescribed it) is 
trivial. 
If my arguments have been more persuasive than Hare's it would 
appear that he cannot use his 'principle of conduct' as a major premiss 
for a practical syllogism in any but a trivial sense. If this is so, 
then the third question proposed (Is the attempt to indicate that there 
is a correspondence between moral reasoning and the Aristotelian practical 
1Carritt, Theory of Morals, p. 114. 
2Cf., E.M. Adams, op.cit., p. 7$. 
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syllogism a faithful analysis of moral reasoning ?) has then been answered 
to a considerable extent. The further question, whether an imperative 
may be entailed by the practical syllogism, may be left in abeyance, 
however, until we consider his later argument. Considering what Hare 
has said about 'principles of conduct', however, we may say that in view 
of the apparent difficulties in his argument it would seem preferable, at 
least for the present, to adopt Stevenson's more agnostic approach, and 
to use the word "principles" in the sense in which, as I have suggested, 
it might be interchanged with "attitudes ". And since I have argued earlier 
that Hare has not convincingly established that there is a use of the word 
"decision" which is to be preferred over Stevenson's use of the word 
"choice ", it may be said, in general, that in the chapter "Decisions of 
Principle ", as in earlier chapters, Hare has not made a convincing case 
that his analysis is to be preferred over Stevenson's. 
What may be said, in summary, of Part I of Hare's book? It was in 
this part, we recall, that he was to have presented the groundwork for 
Parts II and III (in which he would deal specifically with the language 
of morals). "Neglect of the principles enunciated in the first part of 
this book," he had said, "is the source of many of the most insidious 
confusions in ethics." He has said in the Preface that his exposition 
in this book was reduced to about half its original length, and thus he 
has excluded the "qualifications, answers to minor objections, and other 
defences with which the security - minded philosopher is apt to hedge 
himself round." Possibly this is a compression which has led to what 
have appeared as confusions and vagueness, although, it might also be 
said, this may have helped to expose basic weaknesses. In any event, if 
I have interpreted him correctly, his attempt to lay a groundwork has been 
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a failure. - - -We have just seen the inadequacies of his most important 
chapter, "Decisions of Principle ". A summary of the three earlier chapters 
reveals, with two exceptions, the same negative result: 
Chapter 1: "Prescriptive Language ": His 'rough' classification 
of prescriptive language was too loose, and he failed to make an adequate 
distinction between statements and commands. His attempt to set forth 
imperative analogues or parallels for theories of moral philosophy was 
both inadequate and incomplete. Thus his arguments against 'naturalism' 
and 'emotivism' were inadequate. In particular, he ignored the possibility 
of an analogue for Stevenson's emotivist theory; and, further, his attempt 
to dissociate himself from emotivism by distinguishing 'telling' and 
'persuading' was unconvincing. 
Chapter 2: "Imperatives and Logic ": A further attempt to dis- 
tinguish between statements and commands had to be regarded as a failure. 
Secondly his 'phrastic -neustic' analysis was not only incomplete, but 
would fail if it were considered as a device to indicate that the 'logical 
behaviour' of imperatives and value judgments may be considered as cor- 
responding to syllogistic reasoning. 
Chapter 3: "Inference ": His special rule of 'imperative' infer- 
ence, which is essentially an Aristotelian rule, may be used independently 
of the 'phrastic- neustic' analysis. He uses the rule with effect against 
a limited type of 'Cartesian' theories which assert self -evident princi- 
ples from which, they say, particular duties may be deduced. While his 
arguments would leave untouched the most important twentieth century 
intuitionists who would deny that particular duties may be deduced from 
general principles, his arguments may be extended to counter any argu- 
ments for the 'self-evidence' of either principles or particular duties. 
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Such arguments would not demonstrate that intuitive 'self -evidence' is 
impossible, however, and a further 'persuasive' challenge, to demand 
proof for the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, would be 
necessary. These arguments, however, are extensions from Hare's, and 
if his arguments in Part I are considered not only as prolegomena but 
as analogues for the analysis of the language of morals, then his failure 
to deal with these important philosophers is a deficiency. He does deal 
effectively against the Toulmin -type of theory which suggests that one 
may argue from a factual basis to an ethical conclusion by means of 
'special rules of inference', and this is a positive contribution. 
Section 5 
The arguments in Part II and in the first chapter of Part III, 
however, are not entirely dependent on the way in which he has expressed 
his arguments in Part I. Oddly enough, he acknowledges this in the Pre- 
face when he says that in Part II he has not "taken for granted the argu- 
ment in Part I." If the reader wishes, he suggests, he may consider 
Part II first. He does not of course suggest that Part I is simply an 
exercise without relevance to his thesis, for, in the final paragraph of 
the book, he indicates how he has worked toward a point at which we 
should "see clearly, how the discussion of the logic of value -words in 
Parts II and III...is connected with the discussion of the imperative 
mood in Part I." Occasionally, as we shall see, he establishes links 
between his arguments in Parts II and III, with those in Part I; and, as 
we shall also see, criticism of the arguments in Part I may often apply 
to his later arguments. Since there is somewhat less reason for des- 
tructive criticism of Part II and the first chapter of Part III, my 
approach may be more general than it has been so far. This is not to 
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suggest that there are no problems, however, and, although I may pass 
over some minor points, I hope to consider in adequate detail what I take 
to be his main arguments. 
Hare believes that it is important to consider the 'logical behaviour' 
of the word "good" separately from that of other words such as "right ", 
"ought ", and "duty ",1 and his general title for Part II is "Good ", whereas 
the title for Part III is "Ought ". Beginning his analysis of value words 
related to "good ", using "good" as typical of all such words, he considers 
'naturalistic' attempts to define value words. In his 'parallel' analysis 
of 'naturalistic' attempts to define imperatives, we recall, his argu- 
ments were not convincing and this was primarily because of his inadequate 
distinction between 'statements' and 'commands'. His argument against 
'naturalistic theories of value', however, fares somewhat better and I 
believe that this is because he focusses attention to a somewhat greater 
extent than previously on the uses or purposes of descriptive or factual 
language, on the one hand, and evaluative language on the other. In the 
earlier arguments, to recall Braithwaite's point, Hare had tended to 
consider sentences in isolation from their contexts in use. His argu- 
ment in this chapter, at least in intention, is reminiscent of Steven - 
son's, that is to say, words used primarily for evaluative purposes have 
a 'function' which is different from words used primarily for descriptive 
purposes. It is necessary to state this in this way since, as I have 
mentioned, Hare has said that "almost every word in our language is 
capable of being used as a value - word." In Hare's case, the "special 
function" of value words is that of "commending ", and such words, he 
asserts, "plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which do not 
1 
LM, p. 151. 
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perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a means 
of performing this function. "1 While the question of the 'function' as 
'commending' may be debatable, when the point is expressed in this chal- 
lenging way it is difficult to consider that a 'naturalist -as- descriptive' 
theory could stand up to the challenge. But Hare endeavours to make his 
case by means of his practical syllogism, and this procedure is more 
questionable than the simple challenge. With his fondness for parallels, 
he returns to his argument against 'naturalism' later, and since he will 
then be concerned with "good" in a specifically moral context, I shall 
discuss it then. 
There are, however, two aspects of his theory in this chapter which 
must be noted since they have a bearing on his subsequent arguments. The 
first one is that he makes explicit what had tended to be implicit in 
earlier non -cognitivist theories, and that is that his analysis of value 
words is a general analysis of values. 
"...the peculiarities 
to do with morals as 
to explain them have 
like 'good man', but 
of these words," he writes, "have nothing 
such, and...therefore theories which purport 
to be applicable, not only to expressions 
also to expressions like 'good chronometer'.... "2 
As we may expect, his point will be seen to be that they all have the 
common purpose of 'commending'. 
The second point is in his attempt to be more explicit about the 
difference in 'function' between descriptive and evaluative language. 
"One of the most characteristic features of value words," he writes, 
"...is a feature sometimes described by saying that 'good' and other 
such words are the names of 'supervenient' or 'consequential' properties. "3 
In terminology at least this looks suspiciously like a new type of either 
metaphysical objectivism (for example, the 'right - making' characteristics 
1LM, p. 91. 2IM, p. 80. 3LM, p. 80. 
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of Ross and other intuitionists), or naturalism; but since Hare's general 
approach would rule out the former, the latter is suspect. He is aware 
of this possible charge, however, and later (in Part III)1 he refers to 
this doctrine as one which may lead to the allegation that his theory is 
committed to naturalism. In his introduction of the doctrine his inten- 
tion is unfortunately obscure, except to suggest that the thing evaluated 
must have "some one characteristic or group of characteristics...on which 
the characteristic 'good' is logically dependent "; but this is not help- 
ful, especially since in the opening paragraph of the next chapter he 
says that the relation between the terms "good- making" characteristics 
and "good" is "not one of entailment ". Since he refers to the 'super- 
venient' or 'consequential' characteristics in several later passages, 
however, and since it is not clear what his intention is until close to 
the end of Part II,2 I shall simply note its introduction at this point 
and leave the problem in abeyance. 
In his chapter "Meaning and Criteria ", his purpose is to examine 
comparisons which have been made between the word "good" and "typical 
simple property -words like 'red'." His argument, he suggests, will also 
"tell against the theory that 'good' is the name of a complex property.... "3 
Unfortunately, as I shall indicate, his main argument, that is the argu- 
ment against the 'good as instrumental' theory, is question -begging. In 
undertaking this comparison he follows a suggestion from Wittgenstein 
"that the logical character of words can be investigated by asking how 
we would explain their meaning.... "4 In explaining the meaning of "red ", 
Hare suggests, we could use an ostensive approach, pointing to objects 





3L p. 94. 4IM, P. 95. 
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"That is red ". To reinforce the lesson we might then compare objects that 
are not red, but green, saying each time, "That is red; that is not red, 
but green ". He does not suggest that the meanings of all non -value words 
might be conveyed either directly or indirectly in this way (he suggests, 
for example, the word "this ", and words used as proper names). His con- 
cern, however, is not with these exceptions but with the suggestion that 
the word "good" is analogous in its logical behaviour to simple or complex 
property- words. 
But the words "good" and "red" can be "applied to any number of 
different classes of objects ", thus he allows that it seems natural to 
suppose that "good" refers to a "common property ", just as "red" does. But 
such a supposition, he says, is doomed to failure. His argument rests on a 
theory first clearly expressed by Urmson in his paper "On Grading" (first 
published in 1950, in Mind.)1 The word "good ", according to Urmson, is a 
general "grading" word or "grading label ", which may apply to a variety 
of types of things to be 'graded'. Whereas the use (or meaning) of the 
word may be the same in all contexts, the criteria for its use are differ- 
ent in different contexts. In using this distinction Hare of course says 
that the general use of "good" is for 'commending' rather than 'grading'. 
In the use of the word "red," he says, the 'meaning' of the word is not 
independent of the 'criteria' for its use, whereas in the use of "good ", 
the 'meaning' of the word is independent of its 'criteria'. That is to 
say, the common and primary 'function' of "good" is to 'commend' on all 
genuinely evaluative occasions of its use, even though there is nothing in 
common about the types of situations which we term "good ", as there is in 
our use of "red ". In learning how to use the word "good" we do not 
have to learn how to commend for each new class of objects, although 
1Op.cit., reprinted in Logic and Language (2nd. series), ed. Flew, 
pp. 159 -186. 
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"learning the criteria for goodness in a new class of objects may be a 
new lesson each time."1 
With this distinction, and its assumption that "goods' has a primary 
use which is different from words used primarily for descriptive or fac- 
tual purposes, Hare directs his attention to theories which assert that 
the 'common property' referred to when we use the word "good" is the 
'property' of being 'instrumental' or 'conducive to an end'. (Although 
he mentions the theory of 'intrinsic good' he does not intend to consider 
it until later). The most convincing of the 'good as instrumental' 
theories, he grants, would be one which assumes that "good" means "effi- 
cient ", that is to say, "conducive to the end that it is used for. "2 
Now while his argument in this context might tell against any crude 
'property' theory which suggests that the relation of the alleged 'value 
property' to the thing judged is analogous to the relation of the property 
of 'redness' to a thing which is said to be red, I believe that his argu- 
ment will not hold against an ' instrumental' theory which would rest its 
case on the claim that "good" means "efficient ". This is not to say that 
there is nothing wrong with a theory which would so delimit the use of 
the word "good ", but rather that Hare's argument against such theories 
may be turned back against him; and possibly this is indicative of a 
weakness in his own theory. 
His argument against such a theory is not fair since he implicitly 
denies to the 'instrumental theory' the right of adopting the same dis- 
tinction between 'meaning' and 'criteria' which he assumes in dismissing 
that 'instrumental' view. This becomes apparent when one considers the 
same kind of situation as illustrated by Hare for his purposes, while 
1 




presupposing the 'good as instrumental' point of view (rather than as he 
presupposes, the 'good as commending' thesis). This consideration is not 
difficult since --and this may be the source of the problem --all of his 
examples in this context are objects which are used instrumentally, such 
as fire -extinguishers, chronometers, cricket -bats, and augers. If we 
were to teach his hypothetical 'foreigner' the use of the word "good" in 
the instrumental sense we could use Hare's approach, with the same instru- 
ments. Now his main objection to the 'good as instrumental' theory is 
that in each new type of situation we would have to teach the 'foreigner' 
something about the 'end' to be achieved if we wished to teach him to 
use the word to mean "efficient" or "conducive to an end ". 
"For unless we can teach him, in the case of any new class of 
objects, to recognize without assistance for what end they are 
being used, we shall still have to go on giving him a new lesson 
each time, though it will not be about the word 'good' but about 
the word 'end'.i1 
In Hare's theory, on the other hand, he suggests, once we learn that "good" 
is used primarily for commending, we do not have to learn its 'meaning' 
in each new type of situation --- although we do have to learn new criteria. 
An advocate for the 'good as instrumental' theory, however, might well 
query the suggestion that the 'foreigner' could not just as readily 
grasp the meaning of "instrumental good" or "good as efficient" in one 
lesson (this being Hare's test in support of his own 'good as commending' 
theory). Adopting an Aristotelian approach, as Hare does for an opposed 
purpose, I might, for example, try to teach not only the word "good" 
but all of its range of comparatives, from the ultimate "best" to the 
negative "worst ", by having a series of knives with varying degrees of 
sharpness. By using the appropriate words when I try to carve a piece 
1LM, P. 99. 
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of wood, I could teach the use of these words, as Hare must allow. With 
that one lesson the 'foreigner' could learn how to use the words and 
would be able to use them appropriately in other types of situations in 
which 'instrumental' objects are being used. Whether or not he had to be 
taught the 'ends' of other types of activities is not a relevant considera- 
tion, for, adopting the distinction between 'meaning' and 'criteria', the 
'ends' may be considered as 'criteria'. The central problem now is 
whether the 'foreigner' would take from his lesson either the experience 
which may be expressed as, "I understand; I am to use the word 'good' to 
refer to activities and things which are effective in fulfilling the pur- 
pose for which they are used "; or, Hare's view, "I understand; the word 
'good' is to be used to commend ". How is one to resolve this difference? 
At this point an advocate for the 'intrinsic good' theory (among 
others ready to join the issue) might suggest a plague on both houses. 
There is no way to resolve this conflict, he might suggest, so long as 
both Hare and the 'instrumental' theorist choose examples like chrono- 
meters, augers, and Urmson's apples , which may be regarded primarily in 
terms of specific purposes for which they are used. Consider, however, 
other examples of our use of "good ", such as when speaking of St. Fran- 
1 
s, when our concern is not with him as an 'instrument' but simply as 
a good man --a man of the past at that- -whom we find praiseworthy. The 
'intrinsic good' theorist might even go further, to suggest that Hare's 
fundamental mistake is in assuming that there is no difference in 'logical 
behaviour' between "good" in moral uses and in non -moral uses. Hare is 
of course aware of this possible charge and later considers it in more 
detail; thus we must suspend judgment until then. It may be said, never- 
1Cf., LM, PP. 1142-5. 
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theless, that his specific argument against the 'good as instrumental' 
theory is in itself inadequate. 
There is in this chapter another aspect of his theory which should 
be noted since it indicates a further difference between his view and 
Stevenson's. After saying that the word "good" has "a constant meaning" 
in that it is always used for commending, he then says that it is possible 
to know the meaning of "a good shmakum"1 without knowing any of the criteria 
for the goodness of shmakums. This is succinctly summarized in the next 
chapter when he says that "we can know the meaning of 'good strawberry' 
without knowing any" of "the characteristics that make a strawberry a 
good one, or what is the standard of goodness in strawberries. "2 Now 
while Stevenson would allow that the word "good" has a primary use (an 
'emotive' or 'dynamic' use) he would say that when it is used to refer 
to specific objects and people its 'emotive meaning', although relatively 
stable, does not remain constant. In the sense that the word is always 
used 'emotively' or 'dynamically', Stevenson might well say that the word 
itself has a constant meaning; but it would be trivial to suggest that 
one could know the meaning of "good strawberry" independently of one's 
past experience in relation to strawberries. When Hare says that we know 
the 'meaning' of, say, "good shmakum", what he is saying is "a good 
shmakum is a shmakum we would commend ", which is a tautology. It says 
nothing as such about 'shmakums', but it does tell us how Hare would use 
the word "good ". This appears to be a further illustration of Braithwaite's 
suggestion that Hare tends to consider language as isolated from its con- 
text in use. 
In the first two paragraphs of his chapter "Description and alu- 
1LNi, p. 104. 2LM, p. 111. 
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ation" Hare establishes another link between Part II and Part I, in this 
instance specifically with his chapter on "Inference ". Assuming that we 
may distinguish between descriptive and evaluative sentences, he suggests, 
as Stevenson had suggested, that descriptive statements "are often given 
as a reason" for making value judgments. Hare goes on, however, to say 
that a descriptive sentence "does not by itself entail" an evaluative 
sentence. Stevenson, following Hume, would say that a descriptive 
sentence does not logically entail an evaluative sentence at all. Hare's 
qualifying phrase, "by itself ", is suspicious; and the suspicion is 
borne out when he writes, "Yet there seems to be some close logical con- 
nexion between them ", and then poses for himself the problem, "What is 
this connexion ?" 
"The problem," he writes, "may also be put in this way: if we 
knew all the descriptive properties which a particular straw- 
berry had (knew, of every descriptive sentence relating to the 
strawberry, whether it was true or false), and if we knew also 
the meaning of the word 'good', then what else would we require 
to know, in order to be able to tell whether a strawberry was a 
good one ? "1 
To an advocate for Stevenson, Hare's posing the question in this way would 
seem nonsensical, since, he would argue, the knowledge of all of the 
'descriptive properties' of the strawberry would be sufficient to stimulate 
a response based on dispositional 'attitudes' one has acquired in past 
experience. The manner of posing the problem also, of course, presupposes 
the troublesome thesis that there is either an implicit or explicit deduc- 
tive inference in the making of value judgments. He briefly reveals that 
thesis in what he goes on to say. Considering the 'descriptive properties' 
as the minor premiss of his practical syllogism, and the conclusion that 
the strawberry is either a good or bad one, the something more we should 
1 
LM, p. 111. 
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require to know, he says, "are the criteria in virtue of which a straw- 
berry is to be called a good one....We should require to be given the 
major premiss." 
Having briefly introduced this link between Parts I and II, Hare 
uses it to examine more closely the minor and major premisses of his 
practical syllogism, in other words, 'description' and 'evaluation'. In 
the remainder of this chapter his exposition of 'descriptive' and 'evalu- 
ative' uses of words is, with one exception, not essentially different 
from Stevenson's; and much of what he says is dependent on the later - 
Wittgenstein doctrine that a word may have a variety of uses at one and 
the same time. Like Stevenson, he asserts that the descriptive meaning 
of "good" is secondary to its evaluative meaning, and, also, he expresses 
a view which he acknowledges to be similar to Stevenson's theory of 
'persuasive definitions'.1 
Stevenson would probably object, however, to the suggestion that 
the 'function' of the descriptive meaning of "good" could be "performed 
equally well if 'good' had no commendatory function at all. "2 To 
illustrate this point Hare suggests that we might coin a new word, "doog ", 
which could be used to refer to the descriptive criteria which we have 
formerly employed as criteria for our use of "good ". In saying this, 
however, he appears to assume that "criteria" for goodness may be accepted 
or rejected 'at will', so to speak. An advocate for Stevenson, however, 
would likely suggest that 'descriptive criteria' being what they are, 
and we being what we are, we would shortly be using the word "doog" with 
all of the evaluative meaning which had been associated with "good ". In 
this passage, as in so many others, Hare seems to presuppose his non- 
1LM, p. 119. 2LM, p. 116. 
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deterministic or non -causal theory of decision. The passage may also be 
taken as a further illustration of Braithwaite's point that Hare tends 
to consider language in isolation from its context in use. 
He does extend the analysis of descriptive language somewhat 
further than Stevenson, and, in what would be a minor expression of dis- 
agreement, he points out that descriptive words as well as value words 
(considered only in terms of their descriptive meaning) can vary con- 
siderably in vagueness. Stevenson had suggested that although words used 
for descriptive purposes may be vague, words used for evaluative purposes 
are more vague.1 In expressing this Hare reveals his humanistic beliefs 
about the basis of morality. 
"Words in both classes may be descriptively loose or exact," 
he says, "according to how rigidly the criteria have been 
laid down by custom or convention. "2 
And on the preceding page he had said that "the standard of goodness, 
like the meaning of 'red', is normally something which is public and 
commonly accepted." 
The guiding theme for the chapter "Commending and Choosing" is 
"to inquire into the reasons for the logical features of 'good'...and 
to ask why it is that it has this peculiar combination of evaluative and 
descriptive meaning." The answer to this question, Hare suggests, "will 
be found in the purposes for which it, like other value -words, is used in 
our discourse. "3 Now Hare does not question his hypothesis that the 
primary function of the word "good" is to commend; and, as I have men- 
tioned earlier, and must discuss later, some critics see this as a limita- 
tion of his theory. Explicitly accepting 'commending' as the unquestioned 
primary function he goes on to the next question, "to inquire what 
1EL, p. 35. 2LM, p. 115. 3DI, p. 126. 
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commending is." His reply is direct. "When we commend or condemn any- 
thing," he writes, "it is always in order, at least indirectly, to guide 
choices, our own or other people's, now or in the future." In other 
contexts throughout his book he uses as synonyms for "commending" or 
"prescribing ", the following terms: "guiding actions ", "regulating our 
conduct", "giving advice or instruction ", and "the teaching of standards ". 
The point of his argument in relating commending to choosing is that 
"critical value judgments...would not be made if they were not so related...." 
Many traditional moral philosophers have maintained that there is no pur- 
pose in making moral judgments if we are not free to choose, and this of 
course supposes that the people we judge are or were free to choose when 
they acted. Hare takes this point further: there is no point in making 
value judgments unless our purpose in making them is to guide choices. 
Hare's thesis immediately suggests queries which could be more easily 
handled by the traditional approach. The traditionalist might ask, 
"What about the praising of good men, now or in the past ? ". Since the 
guiding of choices must refer to the future, what is the point in judging 
choices which have already been made? Hare answers that "we should not 
speak of good men unless we had the choice, what sort of men to try to 
become." Although this might seem to serve about judgments in the past 
in general, Hare has more to say. 
"...even judgments about past choices do not refer merely to 
the past. As we shall see, all value -judgments are covertly 
universal in character, which is the same as to say that they 
refer to, and express acceptance of, a standard which has an 
application to other similar instances.nl 
Here we see his introduction in the language of values to the analogue 
he had introduced in his discussion of 'universal imperative principles' 
1a, p. 129. 
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in his chapter "Decisions of Principle ". As I have mentioned earlier, 
he has said that the earlier chapter could have been couched in terms 
of value judgments; and that statement comes at the end of the chapter 
we are now considering. The two chapters are related more directly by 
the following passage: 
"To commend...is to guide choices. Now for guiding a particular 
choice we have a linguistic instrument which is not that of 
commendation, namely the singular imperative.r1 
In an earlier chapter, however, (as I have argued)2 he dismissed in per- 
emptory manner the possibility of an analysis of singular imperatives 
(which might have been analogous to Stevenson's theory), and his purpose 
now becomes clearer. A value judgment, he says, is not in its logical 
behaviour like a singular imperative, such as "Take that one ", spoken 
of a car, with no thought of its kind or condition. If I say of a 
particular car "That is a good one" I am saying something more. "I am 
implying that if any motor -car were just like that one ", he writes "it 
would be a good one too...." Hare extends the "implication" even further. 
"...the implication of the judgment 'That is a good motor -car' 
does not extend merely to motor -cars exactly like that one. 
If this were so, the implication would be for practical pur- 
poses useless; for nothing is exactly like anything else. 
It extends to every motor -car that is like that one in the 
relevant particulars; and the relevant particulars are its 
virtues -- -those of its characteristics for which I was commend- 
ing it, or which I was calling good about it. "3 
These "relevant particulars" or "virtues" are related to the "supervenient 
or consequential characteristics" which he had introduced earlier. They 
are, he suggests, the descriptive features which we select or choose to 
which we attach the "'supervenient' or 'consequential' epithet...'good'." 
There are three main problems which come to a head in this chapter, 
but since two of them are better left until later I shall simply state 
11,M, p, 129. 2Cf. above, p.200 ff. 3LM, p. 130. 
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them and discuss only the third. First, there is the assumption I have 
mentioned earlier that value -judgments, if they are action -guiding, must 
be held to entail "imperatives ". Secondly, related to the second question 
but distinguishable from it is the consideration of the thesis that the 
primary 'function' of value judgments is to commend. Thirdly, remembering 
Hare's peremptory dismissal of 'singular imperatives' as analogues to 
possible ethical theories, as well as my criticism of his chapter "De- 
cisions of Principle ", is it not possible to say, as intuitionists and 
emotivists do, that particular value judgments may be made without logi- 
cally implying anything about another thing or person beyond the particular 
one judged? 
It is unnecessary to treat this third question in more than summary 
fashion, since two of the arguments I have used in assessing the chapter 
"Decisions of Principle" hold also for his discussion of value judgments. 
(Other aspects of my earlier criticism are more appropriately held until 
later.) The points I had made which are now of relevance are as follows. 
First, it is not clear what he meant by "decision", 
1 
and the same criti- 
cism holds for "choosing ". His use of the word presupposes the argument 
to distinguish between 'telling' and 'persuading', and that argument was 
unconvincing. His argument appears to presuppose the 'freewill versus 
determinism' controversy in assuming that 'decisions' and 'causes' are 
free from causes, but as Stevenson had argued, such a presupposition 
would invite more trouble than it would avoid. There is no apparent 
merit, then, in his intended use of the word (whatever that intention may 
be) over Stevenson's 'dispositional' use of "choice ". Secondly, in employ- 
ing an argumentum ad hominem against his thesis, I had asked how general 
lAbove, p. 248. 
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or 'universal' his principle of conduct could be ?1 This question may now 
be asked, with his blessing,2 of his "principles for choosing motor -cars ". 
My conclusion was, and is now, that there are no logical grounds for saying 
that the maxim or principle of my particular action or choice may imply 
a principle as a major premiss which is more general than that maxim. 
Thus any major premiss must be trivial: to say otherwise leads to an 
infinite regress of practical syllogisms for the purpose of choosing 
principles. 
In the last chapter of Part II, "'Good' in Moral Contexts ", Hare 
considers the inevitable objections to a theory which postulates that the 
logical behaviour of "good" is the same in non-moral as in moral contexts. 
His main argument to support his view is to displace both the 'good as 
instrumental' and 'good as intrinsic' theories. We have already seen 
that his earlier argument against those who would assert a 'good as instru- 
mental' theory is inadequate. We must now consider whether he has more to 
say that would now convincingly displace both theories. A supporter of 
the 'intrinsic' theory, he suggests, would define this theory as follows: 
"...because there are some objects which are commended for their 
own sakes, and do not have an obvious function beyond their own 
existence, to commend such an object is to do something quite 
different from commending an object which does have a function. "3 
His method "to avoid" either of these views, he says, is to avail himself 
"of the general notions of 'virtue' and 'standard'" which he has been 
using. By "virtues ", as we have seen, Hare means "the relevant particu- 
lars" among descriptive characteristics for which we commend something. 
The word "standard" is used to refer to a "list of virtues ". When we 
keep this distinction in mind, he suggests, we will be aware that there 
is no difference in the 'logical behaviour' of , "a list of virtues" 
1Above, p. 257. 2LM, p. 134. 3LM, p. 137. 
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referring to an object which we coirntend for its instrumental performance 
of a function, and the "list of virtues" for an object which we commend, 
as it were, for its own sake. If the "list of virtues" in one case does 
not 'differ logically' from the other, then, he concludes, there is no 
essential difference in our acts of commending each type of 'object'. 
It is not my present purpose to argue that he is wrong in assuming 
that the word "good" has the same logical behaviour in both contexts; 
but, it must be said, his argument in support of his view is inadequate. 
He says nothing in this later context which would undo my earlier criti- 
cism of his argument against the 'good as instrumental' theory; thus 
one may yet wonder if his supposition that "good" is used for commending 
does justice to the suggestion that it may also be used for 'grading' the 
efficiency of something considered in an instrumental capacity. Now, in 
the later context, in his argument to suggest that there is no essential 
difference between the 'instrumental' and the 'intrinsic' views, he is 
less than fair to the 'intrinsic' view. The argument is less than fair 
for two reasons: first, that the example (referring to the 'intrinsic 
goodness', as well as the 'instrumental goodness', of a bath) is not a 
specifically moral example - --by choosing a non -moral example he might 
well be 'loading' the argument against the 'intrinsic' theory; and, 
secondly, it is an example which is more appropriate for illustrating the 
'good as instrumental' view. That is to say, despite his suggestion, it 
cannot convincingly be considered as more than an example of 'instrumental 
goodness'. This becomes apparent by a closer consideration of his example. 
"A good bath is good both instrumentally (in that it is conducive 
to cleanliness) and intrinsically (for we should not have nearly 
so many baths if our only purpose in having them were to become 
clean ).1 
1 
LNI, p. 138. 
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He then goes on to provide "a standard or list of virtues " for an intrin- 
sically good bath, such as that it "must be within a certain range of 
temperature, which must be maintained throughout the duration; the ves- 
sel must be above a certain minimum size, which varies with that of the 
bather;" and so on. All of this argument, however, depends for its force 
on his assumption (which is explicitly stated in the preceding quotation) 
that the only purpose of having a bath is to become clean. That is to 
say, he assumes that on any occasion when one has a bath not for the 
purpose of becoming clean, then the bath is not to be considered as 'in- 
strumental'. The popularity of spas suggests that there are other defi- 
nite and publicly accepted purposes. Speaking introspectively, as Hare 
does in his example, I often bath for the purpose of relaxing, sometimes 
for the purpose of 'waking myself up', and sometimes during hot summer 
days for the purpose of 'cooling myself off'. And these purposes are as 
recognizable as the occasions when I bath to become clean. The most vague 
purpose for which I may take a bath, I suppose, is when I say, simply, 
"I'd like to have a bath ", and this is possibly what Hare has in mind 
when he speaks of the 'intrinsic goodness' of a bath. But if I were asked 
'why ?' on such occasions, I believe I could state a purpose for which the 
bath would be 'instrumental' -- -even if it is expressed in such phrases as 
"Simply because I would like a bath ", or "Because I would enjoy it", and 
so on. This could only be denied if one could maintain that anything 
that satisfied a 'want' may not be considered as 'instrumental' in satis- 
fying that want. This is not necessarily to presuppose an introspective 
view of 'wants', although, as Stevenson had suggested, it is possible 
that one must also consider introspection in the analyses of ethical 
terms -- -even though he tended to adopt the behaviouristic approach which 
could also provide an analysis for the word "want' among other such 
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After his argument to 'avoid' the 'intrinsic' and the 'instrumental' 
theories, Hare considers three reasons "that have led people to hold that 
the use of the word 'good' in moral contexts is totally different from 
its use in non -moral ones. "2 The first one he mentions, however, is the 
suggestion we have just considered, that a distinction may be made between 
the 'intrinsic' and the 'instrumental' theories, and, as he says in dis- 
missing this reason, "we have already dealt with it ". In view of the 
inadequacy of his argument, however, the possibility remains that the 
'good as intrinsic' theorist would wish to insist (just as would the 
'good as instrumental' theorist) that there may be a use of the word 
"good" which is not adequately considered in Hare's manner of expressing 
his 'good as commending' theory. 
The second reason he considers is that "the properties which make 
a man morally good are obviously different from those which make a chrono- 
meter good." In this instance his argument rests on his thesis that while 
the word "good" as applied to man and chronometer will differ, the evalu- 
ative meaning is the same - - - "in both cases we are commending ". If it 
could be argued, however, that there are other purposes served by our 
use of "good " --that is to say that there is more than one evaluative 
meaning of the word --then it is possible that some philosophers might 
have more grounds than Hare supposes for distinguishing between the logi- 
cal behaviour of "good" in moral and non -moral contexts. This question 
must be left in abeyance until we consider other possible analyses of 
"good". 
The third reason he considers is that it is felt somehow 'moral 
1Cf., Stevenson, EL, p. 3. 2ZY, p. 140. 
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goodness' is more august, more important, and therefore deserves to have 
a logic all its own." Stated in this way, with the value terms "august ", 
"important" and "deserves" plain for all to see, it would be difficult 
not to agree with him. He does not dismiss this view without considera- 
tion, however, for he grants that the fact that our moral judgments may 
"deeply affect the lives of our neighbours...is enough to explain the 
peculiar place that we assign to them." 
"If we add to this the logical point..." he continues, "that 
moral judgments always have a possible bearing on our own 
conduct, in that we cannot in the fullest sense accept them 
without conforming to them...then no further explanation is 
needed of the special status of morals. "1 
In a parenthetical note he says that he will be discussing this view in 
more detail in Part III. In the meantime he simply asserts that "this 
special status does not require a special logic to back it up ", and he 
reasserts his hypothesis that in all of our uses of "good ", whether in 
referring to our own actions or those of others, our use for it is to 
'commend'. 
In this argument Hare once more expresses disagreement with an 
' emotivist' analysis of evaluative language. 
"We may add," he writes, "that the 'emotivity' of much moral 
utterance, which some have thought to be of the essence of 
evaluative language, is only a symptom- -and a most unreliable 
one --of an evaluative use of words. Moral language is fre- 
quently emotive, simply because the situations in which it 
is typically used are situations about which we feel deeply. 
One of the chief uses of the comparison which I have been 
drawing between moral and non -moral language is to make it 
clear that the essential logical feature of value -words can 
be present where the emotions are not markedly involved. "2 
The fact that Stevenson could quite well agree that "the essential logical 
features of value -words can be present where the emotions are not markedly 
involved" is indicative of the fact that Hare, in this instance, has 
1LM, p. 143; Cf., also p.162. 2LMs p 144. 
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cited a primitive version of the 'emotivist' theory. 
Finally, to reinforce his claim that there is no difference in the 
logical behaviour of "good" in moral and non -moral contexts, he considers 
an example, not of baths and chronometers, but of a "good man ". In doing 
so he makes a distinction which might seem at first sight to meet the 
objections I have expressed for the 'good as intrinsic' theorist. We 
must remember, Hare says, that "clearly 'man' in 'good man' is not 
normally a functional word, and never so when moral commendation is 
being given. "1 We may recall, however, that he has said that our purpose 
in making value judgments about a man, even a man of the past, is to guide 
actions and choices in the present and future. This, as I have suggested, 
is a limited view and I hope to make this clear after discussing his 
analysis of "ought" in Part III. 
A question which obviously disturbs Hare concerns the possibility 
that his theory might be said to be committed to naturalism. The possi- 
bility was first suggested when he introduced the notion of 'supervenient' 
or 'consequential' characteristics.2 On that occasion he had been con- 
cerned with "good" in a non -moral context. Now, in a moral context, he 
asks if the 'logical behaviour' remains the same as he had earlier sug- 
gested. He begins his 'parallel' by introducing a conclusion ( "St. 
Francis was a good man ") from his presupposed practical syllogism. Then, 
with reference to the minor premiss of the syllogism he writes the 
following: 
"...it is logically impossible to say this (i.e. "St. Francis 
was a good man") and to maintain at the same time that there 
might have been another man placed in precisely the same 
circumstances as St. Francis, and who behaved in exactly 
the same way, but who differed from St. Francis in this 
respect only, that he was not a good man. "3 
1 
LM, p. 145. 2Above, p. 266. 3124, p. 145. 
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1ihy, he asks, would this be a logical impossibility? This could be ex- 
plained if the word "good" were precisely defined in 'naturalistic' or 
'descriptive' terms. But such a procedure, he suggests, would not retain 
the moral 'function' of the word "good". 
"...it is not the case," he continues, "that there is any 
conjunction C of descriptive characteristics such that to 
say that a man has C entails that he is morally good. For, 
if this were the case, we should be unable to commend any 
man for having those characteristics, we should only be able 
to say that he had them." 
Hare's point might have been more clearly expressed, since the naturalist 
would probably insist (that is if he, for the sake of argument, adopted 
Hare's syllogistic procedure) that one could draw a conclusion that man 
is 'morally good'. Hare's point, however, is that while I may draw a 
conclusion in which the word "good" appears, I would be using the word 
only in a descriptive sense: it would be devoid of its evaluative meaning. 
"Nevertheless," he continues, "the judgment that a man is 
morally good is not logically independent of the judgment 
that he has certain other characteristics which we may call 
virtues or good - making characteristics; there is a relation 
between them, although it is not one of entailment or of 
identity of meaning." 
The missing factor, as we might expect, is the major premiss of the prac- 
tical syllogism. Hare expresses the relation between the moral judgment 
and the factual judgment as follows: 
"It is that a statement of the characteristics of the man 
(the minor or factual premiss) together with a specification 
of a standard for judging men morally (the major premiss) 
entails a moral judgment upon him. "1 
He intends, then, that the "specification of a standard ", the acceptance 
or choice, that is, of a list of descriptive characteristics,to which we 
apply the supervenient epithet "good ", thus to dub them "virtues ", adds, 
as it were, the necessary 'neustic' element or evaluative meaning to the 
145-6. 
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syllogism. Thus, he suggests, we are warranted in concluding that the 
man is morally good. With this conclusion, we do not simply describe a 
man, we commend him; and our act of commending him is the primary purpose 
served by our value judgment. - --But this argument depends on one's 
accepting his central thesis that all genuinely evaluative reasoning is 
either explicitly or implicitly syllogistic in form. Without his use of 
the practical syllogism, as I have suggested earlier, there would seem 
to be no problem in displacing any 'naturalistic' theory which defined 
"good" in descriptive terms. Like Stevenson he might simply have dis- 
placed naturalism by indicating that the word "good" serves a purpose 
beyond that of describing. With the practical syllogism, however, at 
least as he uses it, he unnecessarily complicates the problem. 
Section 6 
In turning to Part III of the book I shall consider two main 
problems which yet remain: first, there is the "assumption, hitherto 
not fully defended, that value -judgments, if they are action -guiding, 
must be held to entail imperatives ";1 and, secondly, the related pro- 
blem, is it an adequate generalization to say that the primary 'function' 
of value judgments is to 'commend' or 'prescribe' or 'to guide choices 
and actions'? 
In the first chapter of Part III (the chapter entitled "'Ought' 
and 'Right' "), he distinguishes between the word "good ", on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the moral words such as "right ", "ought ", and "duty ". 
His analysis to indicate that there is a distinction is simply an extension 
of Stevenson's and we need not consider it further. After making the 
distinction, however, he again relies on a 'parallel' form of argument 
1LM, p 163. 
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to suggest (as Stevenson had done) that the 'logical behaviour' of these 
words as value words is similar. Thus the arguments which I have used to 
indicate inadequacies in his analysis of "good" (such arguments as those 
concerning 'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' values, and the 'supervenient' 
characteristics of value words) may be carried over into his analysis of 
"ought" and "right ". Now in my arguments I have cast doubt on his appli- 
cation of the practical syllogism in moral reasoning. I have indicated 
in particular that there must be doubt about the major premiss, and thus 
indeed about the entire syllogism as he uses it. I had argued that in 
one way of considering it we would be led into an infinite regress in 
choices of principles for deciding principles, and, in the other way, 
its use could be no more than trivial. It may be asked, nevertheless, 
if value judgments, "if they are action -guiding, must be held to entail 
imperatives ?" 
Within the assumption as Hare states it there is of course the 
controversial hypothetical clause "if they are action -guiding ", and, as 
I shall indicate later, this is a limited use of value judgments. If we 
accept, however, that possibly one of the 'functions' of value judgments 
is, in some sense, to guide actions, then we may isolate Hare's claim 
that, therefore, they "must be held to entail imperatives." 
There is, unfortunately, a circularity in Hare's argument. The 
argument rests, in part, on his establishing that not all sentences 
containing the terms "good ", "ought ", and so on, entail imperatives. 
"It is possible," he suggests, "for people who have acquired very stable 
standards of values to come to treat value- judgments more and more as 
purely descriptive, and to let their evaluative force get weaker." It 
would be difficult to quarrel with this,; he goes on, however, to suggest 
that it is possible to use value terms as if they had no evaluative 
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meaning whatever. The value judgment, he says, "gets into inverted 
commas ". Now this is debatable since it could hardly be made by inspection 
or introspection. The circularity begins at this point, since it is appar- 
ent that in making this distinction he presupposes a criterion or defini- 
tion for distinguishing value judgments. He allows, in any event, that 
when value judgments are used in 'inverted commas' it is possible to 
make such a statement as, "You ought to go and call on the So- and -so's, 
but don't." Such a sentence, he says, does not entail an imperative 
since the 'value' term in it is not being used evaluatively. 
"It will subsequently become apparent," he continues, "that I 
am making this true by definition, for I should not say that 
an 'ought'- sentence was being used evaluatively unless impera- 
tives were held to follow from it.i1 
Presupposing the definition, Hare thus provides a naturalistic analysis 
of two classes of sentences which use "ought" in either a 'consciously 
or unconsciously inverted commas' sense. That first sense, as we have 
just seen, involves a recognition of "accepted standards ", and a sentence 
using "ought" in this sense is, according to Hare, a "statement of so- 
ciological fact ". A naturalistic analysis of "I ought to do X ", in 
this sense, becomes his Type (1) sentence, "X is required in order to 
conform to the standard which people generally accept. "2 
The second 'inverted commas' sense has to do with "feelings of 
obligation ". Hare accepted it as a "psychological fact" that we do have 
such feelings, and that these are based (largely, I assume he would have 
to say, although I am not sure what he thinks) on our upbringing and 
environment. Such feelings are aroused in two ways: "If we fail to 
obey it (a principle), we suffer remorse, when we do obey it, we feel 
at ease with ourselves. "3 Now it is possible, he suggests, that we could 
11E 
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make a statement based entirely on these feelings, and he gives as an 
example, the (Type 2) sentence, "I have a feeling that I ought to do X ". 
Such a statement, he says, would be completely descriptive, and if we use 
"ought" in this way it does not entail imperatives. Thus if I happen to 
say, "I felt that I ought not to have done it, but I did it just the 
same ", Hare would not accept this as an objection to his thesis, for in 
this use "ought" is not used evaluatively. Like his analysis of the 
Type (1) sense, however, his analysis suggesting a clear distinction 
between sentences based on feelings of obligation and those based on an 
alleged obligation itself, is impossible to maintain unless he has pre- 
supposed a criterion or definition. 
By means, then, of his presupposed definition he has provided an 
analysis of three types of sentences which use the word "ought ". Types 
(1) and (2), being descriptive or naturalistic sentences, do not entail 
imperatives; whereas Type (3), "I ought to do X ", does entail imperatives 
since it is used in a legitimate evaluative sense. 
The paradoxical nature of this theory should not go unnoticed. In 
other words, if I act simply in accordance with the "accepted standards" 
or in terms of my "feelings of obligation" I have made no genuine value 
judgment. Extrapolating from what he has said elsewhere I assume that 
his objection to alleged decisions from these bases would be said to be 
'caused' whereas the 'decisions of principle' must be in some sense 
uncaused. The crucial case to decide whether a statement such as "I 
ought to do X" is a legitimate value judgment, Hare says, "comes when 
we are wondering whether to make a value- decision which is in disagree- 
ment with the accepted standards or with our own moral feelings.... "1 
1 
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In this passage the argument is again reminiscent of Kant's attempt to 
distinguish between actions done from duty and those done from inclina- 
tion. 
1 
Hare, like Kant, thus must acknowledge that most of our actions 
which are generally acknowledged to be morally good cannot legitimately 
be so labelled, however beneficial to humanity they may seem to be. Now 
this is paradoxical not only for what it explicitly says, but also for 
what it implies. Possibly in his concern for moral goodness and rightness 
Hare, like Kant, has neglected moral badness and wrongness. Part of the 
paradox, that is, is that most of the people and actions which we normally 
judge to be evil and wrong cannot be said to be legitimately evil and 
wrong. Hitler's acts of genocide may be thus as morally neutral as the 
acts of St. Francis. 
The question inevitably emerges, how do I know when I am making a 
legitimate value judgment? How is it possible to maintain that the word 
"ought" in my sentence "I have left undone those things which I ought to 
have done, and I have done those things which I ought not to have done" 
is not a legitimate value word? Hare's answer, as might be expected from 
the manner in which the distinctions were made, is that "cases which are 
alleged to be value -judgments not entailing imperatives will always on 
examination be found to be cases" of the use of "ought" in the naturalistic 
'inverted commas' sense. He then goes on candidly to acknowledge that 
"this contention is, of course, impossible to prove or even to render 
plausible, unless we know when we are to count a judgment as of type (3)." 
Thus he introduces the definition which he has presupposed in making the 
distinctions in the first place. 
"...I propose to get over this difficulty," he writes, "in the 
only possible way, by making it a matter of definition. I 
1 
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propose to say that the test, whether someone is using the 
judgment 'I ought to do X' as a value judgment or not is, 
'Does he or does he not recognize that if he assents to the 
judgment, he must also assent to the command 'Let me do X'?" 
Then he adds the following disclaimer. 
"Thus I am not here claiming to prove anything substantial about 
the way in which we use language; I am merely suggesting a 
terminology which, if applied to the study of moral language, 
will, I am satisfied, prove illuminating." 
The challenge, then, is either to offer a better definition, or to indi- 
cate that this definition is not satisfactory. 
I have already indicated that there is a circularity involved in 
his making the distinctions between the three types of statements in the 
first place. Possibly this would not be a vicious circularity, however, 
if the definition could be re- applied and could be proven satisfactory. 
Unfortunately as M.C. McGuire has cohvincingly argued in his article 
"Where has Hare gone wrong ? ",2 Hare complicates the problem further in 
his efforts to support his definition. Hare seeks, that is, "to show 
that but, for the existence" of the evaluative sense of "ought ", "none 
of the familiar troubles generated by the word would arise. "3 ;That, then, 
are the familiar troubles? His argument is in two main parts. First, he 
analyses the two types of naturalistic sentences which contain the word 
"ought" in an 'inverted commas' sense. These are statements of fact, he 
says, since if they are analytically expanded the word "ought" in them 
"always occurs in inverted commas or inside a subordinate clause beginning 
with 'that'." Thus, he argues, if the Type (1) sentence were further 
paraphrased it might be: "There is a principle of conduct which people 
generally accept, which says 'One ought to do X in circumstances of a 
certain kind'; and I an now in circumstances of that kind." The same 
1ti, p. 168; Cf. also p. 20. 
3Lr1 
p. 170. 
2Mind, LXX, 1961, pp. 400-404. 
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may be said to apply to Type (2) sentences. The crux of his argument is 
now seen in the following passage: 
"Now the fact, that when (1) and (2) are expanded the original 
judgment which they paraphrase occurs within them inside in- 
verted commas, shows that there must be some sense of that 
original judgment which is not exhausted by (1) and (2); for 
if there were not, the sentence in the inverted commas would 
have in its turn to be paraphrased by (1) and (2), and we 
should be involved in an infinite regress. "1 
As McGuire suggests, however, this part of the argument presupposes that 
there is an evaluative sense of "ought ". When Hare places 'ought" in 
'inverted commas', that is, he does so because he assumes that it is 
not a completely descriptive word; and, for him, this lingering evalu- 
ative sense becomes apparent when he provides his expanded paraphrases. 
In his expanded paraphrase for the Type (1) sentences, for example, he 
offers the sentence, "There is a principle of conduct which people 
generally accept, which says 'One 'ought to do X in circumstances of a 
certain kind'; and I am now in circumstances of that kind." Now there 
is no necessity for the naturalist to accept this form of an expanded 
paraphrase. Hare thus begs the question for his own point of view by 
re- introducing the word "ought " - -- although, in arguing to make his dis- 
tinctions between types of sentences in the first place he had removed 
the "ought" from his Type (1) analysis. The naturalist might well follow 
Hare's earlier lead, by replacing the word "ought" with his own natural- 
istic definition of the word, and offering a different form of expanded 
paraphrase. For the sake of argument, he might take the definition from 
Hare's Type (1) analysis; and thus, as his expanded paraphrase, offer 
the naturalistic statement, "There is a principle of conduct which 
people generally accept which says that conformity to the accepted 
1 
LM, p. 170. 
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standard requires that I do X ". There is no need, even, for the use of 
inverted commas. Now Hare, ironically, cannot quarrel with this sugges- 
tion, for, as we shall see, when he offers the second part of his argu- 
ment he grants this possibility. One might argue, then, as McGuire 
maintains, that the first part of Hare's argument in support of his 
claim that there is a genuinely evaluative sense of "ought ", rests on 
the presupposition that there is a genuinely evaluative sense of "ought ". 
Hare's own presuppositions, the naturalist might add, are responsible 
for the 'familiar troubles'. 
What, then, might be said for the second part of his argument when 
he considers Type (3) sentences, in which "ought" is used in a legitimately 
evaluative sense - --the sense, that is, which is alleged to entail impera- 
tives. He supposes, for the sake of argument, that Type (3) sentences 
can be analysed naturalistically. Thus he grants the case I have just 
stated for the naturalist's point of view. Now if Type (3) can be ana- 
lysed naturalistically, he allows, "then these puzzles would not arise 
in the cases of (1) or (2)...it would be possible to affect a completely 
naturalistic analysis of all uses of 'ought' and thus of 'good'." Why, 
then, is this not possible? Hare replies as follows: 
"The fact that this is not possible is entirely due to the 
intractably evaluative character of (3). It is due ultimately 
to the impossibility, mentioned earlier, of deriving impera- 
tives from indicatives; for (3), by definition, entails at 
least one imperative; but if (3) were analysable naturalis- 
tically, this would mean that it was equivalent to a series of 
indicative sentences; and this would constitute a breach of 
the principle established.i1 
The phrase "mentioned earlier" refers back to the passage in Part I in 
which he had introduced his special rule for imperatives ( "No imperative 
conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not 
11E, p. 171. 
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contain at least one imperative "). But this rule is of no use at present 
unless it can be said that the value judgment, Type (3), is or entails an 
imperative, and our only support for that is Hare's stipulated definition 
that a judgment is not evaluative unless it entails an imperative. McGuire 
succinctly brings together the two parts of Hare's argument in the follow- 
ing summary: 
"If it is a fact that in some of its uses, 'I ought' entails an 
imperative, then it is these uses which account for the impossi- 
bility of a naturalistic analysis. The argument however does 
not establish it as a fact that any such uses exist. From the 
premises that (1) if 'I ought' entailed at least one imperative 
we could not analyse 'I ought' naturalistically, and (2) we can 
not analyse 'I ought' naturalistically, - --it does not follow 
that 'I ought' entails at least one imperative. The inference 
'if p then q, and q, therefore p', is not valid. Hare's argu- 
ment, therefore, in no way supports the proposition that if a 
man sincerely assents to 'I ought to do X' he logically must 
assent to 'Let me do X' and a fortiori can not support the 
proposition that if a man sincerely assents to 'I ought'... 
he logically must do it. "1 
Even though Hare's argument has been shown to be circular and 
invalid, the argument against him may be said to be ad hominem and does 
not necessarily destroy the thesis that assenting to a value judgment 
entails assenting to an imperative sentence derivable from it. Can any- 
thing be made, then, if the suggestion that assenting, for example, to 
the judgment "I ought to do X" entails assent to an imperative "Let me 
do X ".2 Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the word "assent" 
is being used, as Hare intends, in precisely the same way when referring 
to the moral judgment as it does when referring to the imperative (al- 
though this is a debatable point).3 To assent is to make a 'decision 
of principle' and thus it is a legitimate procedure to ask for 'reasons' 
or 'criteria' for assenting in each case. Idow since we are speaking of 
2McGuire, op.cit., p. 401. 
Cf. LM, p. 187, where Hare recognizes the oddness of a first 
person singular imperative. 
3McGuire, op.cit., p. 402. 
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entailing, the man who assents to the imperative must recognize the same 
criteria or reasons which he recognizes and accepts when he assents to 
the value judgment. This is to say, then, that the same inferential pro- 
cedure, with the same premisses, is being employed when arriving at the 
conclusions both to assent to the value judgment and to assent to the 
imperative. To suggest that the criteria for a man's assenting to the 
value judgment and assenting to the imperative may be different would 
introduce factors into the premisses of the inferential procedure which 
could lead only to indecision. The only point of difference is, then, 
in some way associated with the two sentences "I ought to do X" and "I 
shall do X ". Now if all other factors in the inferential procedures 
(in Hare's case the practical syllogism) leading to both acts of assent 
(or is it one act ?) are precisely the same, how are we to distinguish 
between the two sentences? This is not, then, to suggest that "I ought 
to do X" is an analytic statement which entails "I shall do X "; it is 
to say that they must be equivalent in meaning. Hare protests against 
the suggestion that according to his "treatment of moral judgments certain 
sentences would become analytic which in ordinary usage are not analytic, "1 
but this is not quite the way to put the problem. The problem is that "I 
ought to do X" means, both in its evaluative and descriptive senses, "Let 
me do X ". It would not be accurate, then, to say, "Thus to say that moral 
judgments guide actions and to say that they entail imperatives, comes to 
much the same thing." It would be more accurate to say that moral judg- 
ments are imperatives; despite Hare's suggestions that it is not his 
intention to 'reduce' value judgments to imperatives.2 
In my assessment of Hare's arguments in earlier parts of the book 
1LM, p. 173. 2LM, pp. 2, 175-9, & 1$0. 
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one of my main conclusions was that his manner of trying to distinguish 
between 'statements' and 'commands' was inadequate.1 If this is so, in 
view of the alleged similarity of the logical behaviour of 'commands' 
and value judgments, it may be said that any of his attempts to distinguish 
between 'statements' and value judgments will also be inadequate. Now, 
in the consideration of his analysis of value judgments I have had to 
conclude that his assumption of the similarity of the'logical behaviour' 
of value judgments and 'commands' has similarly run into difficulties. 
But the sum of these distinctions, as Braithwaite has suggested, amount 
to the "principal thesis" of Hare's argument. Although this suggests, 
then, that a different analysis is required of value judgments, commands, 
and statements (such as Braithwaite has given), I shall consider only 
the question of value judgments. Is it adequate to say, that is, that 
the primary 'function' of value judgments is to 'commend', in the sense 
in which this means to guide choices? This is the remaining major ques- 
tion of the three questions I had mentioned as emerging from the consider- 
ation of his theory. 
One of the main problems with the thesis becomes apparent when one 
considers the making of a value judgment about people or actions of the 
past. It seems odd to suggest that the main 'function' of an ethical 
judgment 'commending' St. Francis is "to guide choices, our own or other 
people's, now or in the future." Hare is of course aware of the possi- 
bility of such a charge, for it is the kind of criticism that bss bean 
persistently made of non -objectivist theories. In Hare's case, however, 
the problem is even more acute than in some other non- cognitinist th ri s, 
in view of his claims that the logical behaviour of 'commands' and value. 
1Cf., above, pp. 210, 216 -7, 220. 
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judgments is the same. There are two difficulties with such a thesis; 
and Hare recognizes them in the final chapter, "An Analytical Model ". 
The first problem is that the imperative mood is confined "only to the 
future tense, whereas a proper universal sentence ", which he presumes a 
value judgment to be, "has to apply to all times, past, present, and 
future."1 The second problem is that "the imperative mood occurs pre- 
dominantly in the second person...." Thus Hare tries to construct "a 
new artificial terminology ", the main purpose of which is "to enrich the 
imperative mood" to cope with these problems. We need not consider this 
attempt further. It is a dubious procedure, and the "artificial termin- 
ology" does not eliminate the oddness that led to its being invented. 
Is there another possible analysis, we might ask, that does not 
require the invention of an artificial model? Braithwaite's review 
suggests that there is. "Supporters of an 'ethics without propositions'," 
he writes, "only weaken their case by attempting to construe moral maxims 
as concealed imperatives. "2 As compared with Hare's classification of 
all prescriptive language (that is imperatives as well as value judgments) 
into the single 'pattern of analysis' indicated by his 'phrastic- neustic' 
analysis, Braithwaite distinguishes between the two categories of "pre- 
scriptions" and "moral maxims ", and in each of these categories he lists 
three types of sentences (as I have mentioned earlier, he distinguishes 
three types of "statements" as well). For him, "the philosophically 
fundamental use of moral maxims (is) that of moral subscription", which 
is exemplified by such a sentence as "I will play my part in seeing that 
no lies are ever told" or "I will ensure, so far as it rests with me, 
that no lies are ever told." In making this analysis Braithwaite of 
1 LM 20p.cit,, p. 260. , p, 187. 
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course emphasizes the need for attending to the "contexts" in which sen- 
tences are used. This, we recall, was a central criticism in his review. 
Among the "less fundamental uses of moral maxims" he includes the two 
types, "moral injunctions" and "requests for moral co- operation ", and 
these, he suggests, are analogous to imperatives. I need not consider 
Braithwaite's proposals further, for, in the next chapter there will be 
ample opportunity to consider alternatives to Hare's thesis. Considering 
what Nowell -Smith will have to say, it may be said, I believe, that while 
Hare has accepted in large part the Wittgensteinian doctrine that an 
individual word may have a variety of uses, he has not applied this dis- 
tinction with sufficient thoroughness to his key words "good ", "ought", 
and "right ". It may indeed be further suggested that he has not suffic- 
iently considered value words beyond these three, even though he has 
recognized that almost any word in our language may be used as a value 
word. He might well have considered, for example, the key aesthetic ad- 
jective "beautiful" in a variety of contexts in which it may be used. 
Even without providing a context it seems highly dubious to say that my 
purpose is to guide either my own choices or those of anyone else when I 
say that Greta Garbo is a beautiful woman. Other possibilities are sug- 
gested by the more complex analysis prescribed by Nowell- Smith. 
What are the general conclusions to the three main questions I 
have mentioned earlier? Considering them in their order of treatment, 
I first questioned the logic of Hare's concern to 'universalize' general 
principles, and I argued that any major premiss of his practical syllogism 
must be trivial.1 Secondly, on the question of whether value judgments 
may be held to entail imperatives,2 we have seen that his argument is 
lAbove, p. 279. 2Above, p. 287. 
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is circular and question -begging, and ultimately committed to saying that 
value judgments and imperatives are identical. Finally, as we have just 
seen, we may query the basic assumption that the primary function of 
value judgments is to guide choices or actions. 
What may be said in general of Hare's place in the tradition of 
moral philosophy we have been considering? In view of the nature of my 
criticism it will be necessary to assess him as much in terms of inten- 
tions as of deeds. To begin with, he is a non- cognitivist, and while 
this negative term is inadequate to characterize his type of non- cogniti- 
vism it may serve to set him apart, with the others in this study, from 
a host of traditional moral philosophers. Next, he distinguishes between 
'descriptive' and 'evaluative' uses of language, and this is a distinction 
which stems from Hume. Then, in a manner related to the first two dis- 
tinctions, he is a non -naturalist in the non - metaphysical manner of Ayer 
and, especially, Stevenson. There is of course a new, twentieth century 
influence which has seemed compatible to most non -cognitivists. The 
contemporary history of this tradition (if not that of many other tradi- 
tions as well) has been obviously affected more by Wittgenstein than by 
any other modern philosophers. The title of the book we have been con- 
sidering is perhaps the best single example of that influence on Hare. 
There are significant differences, however, at least in intention, 
between Hare and the emotivists. In any generalization of the influences 
leading to these differences the names of Kant and Aristotle would be 
predominant. It seems ironic, however, that most of the major diffi- 
culties in Hare's thesis have arisen through the combination of his 
efforts to dissociate himself from emotivism and to associate himself 
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with some aspects of the theories of Kant and Aristotle. In place of 
emotivism he proffered a form of 'conativism' modified by his non - 
cognitivism; although, regrettably, this aspect of his theory is ex- 
pressed largely by implication. A further influence of Kant is apparent 
in the concern to 'universalize' general principles, to get as close as 
his non -cognitivism would permit to the categorical imperative. 
His use of the Aristotelian practical syllogism as the implicit 
or explicit form of all genuine moral reasoning is the most unfortunate 
single aspect of his argument. The underlying problem which he undertook 
to resolve is a form of the problem initially posed by Hume when he re- 
jected all 'is' to 'ought' arguments; and in its contemporary form the 
problem is usually stated as concerning the relationship between 'reasons' 
or 'supporting reasons' and value judgments. The alternatives which Hare 
considered were either to follow Hume (as Ayer, and as Stevenson with 
qualifications, had done), and to say that the fundamental relation is 
not logical, or to try to establish some kind of logical relation. (As 
we shall see in the next chapter, Nowell -Smith considers another alter- 
native). Hare tried desperately to avoid the emotivists, and his use 
of the practical syllogism was his principal means. Whatever may have 
been his motives, he has not offered a convincing solution to the problem 
posed by Hume. 
CHAPTER V 
P. H. IUOWELL-WITH 
Section 1 
In 1955, in a review of Nowell- Smith's Ethics (which had been 
published in the previous year), C.L. Stevenson had this to say: 
"...it is an excellent book. I cannot easily say whether it 
is more or less important than the recent works of ethics by 
Toulmin and Hare; but it unquestionably competes with them, 
and in my opinion quite strongly, for being rated the best 
contribution to ethics that has appeared since the war. "1 
It would perhaps have been difficult for Stevenson to have said that it 
is the best even if he had thought so, since Nowell -Smith, as we shall 
see, is closer to him than are the other two. Later in his review 
Stevenson possibly overstates the similarities. In a context in which 
he refers to doctrines expressed in earlier writings (of Hobbes, Dewey, 
Ogden and Richards, Braithwaite, and his own Ethics and Language) he 
wrote the following passage: 
"But I must not neglect to point out -- though less to qualify my 
praise than to insure that it is properly directed --that the 
general principles of analysis embodied in the book, as well 
as the general ways of applying them to ethics, are all of 
them familiar. Nowell -Smith is original only with respect to 
a certain fresh emphasis that he gives to this or that special 
point. i2 
It is debatable whether there is nothing original within the analysis, 
but Stevenson at least makes it apparent that he would include Nowell - 
Smith as a brother - member in the same philosophic 'family'. The rela- 
tionship is of course established even more clearly in the "Editorial 
mind, 1955, P. 405. 
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Foreword" by A.J. Ayer which I quoted in the introductory chapter.1 
As Ayer's statement indicates, Ethics is a comprehensive book, and 
thus, for this thesis, it will be necessary to be selective. My main 
concern will be of course with Nowell -Smith's 'theory of values'; to 
assess, that is, what his alternative may be to the views we have already 
seen. In considering his theory, however, I shall assume as an under- 
lying question the problem posed by Hume when he said that there is no 
logical relation between 'is -type' and 'ought -type' propositions. Ayer 
and Stevenson, in their respective ways, had accepted Hume's conclusion 
that there is, ultimately, an unbridgable logical gap between sentences 
used primarily for 'factual' purposes and those used primarily for 'evalu- 
ative' purposes; and thus they held that any relation between what have 
come to be called "reasons" for value judgments and the value judgments 
themselves must be a 'psychological' relationship. They might have sim- 
ply called it a 'non- logical' relationship, but it does not beg any 
serious questions to treat the relationship as a mystery that is perhaps 
most easily handled in terms of the behaviouristic language of stimulus 
and response. Hare of course wished to dissociate himself from this view 
and tried to 'bridge the gap' by means of his practical syllogism; but, 
as we have seen, this attempt was unsuccessful and we had to return to 
Hume as represented by Stevenson. Nowell- Smith, like Hare, is unhappy 
about the 'gap', and, as I shall indicate, his central thesis is con- 
cerned with trying to resolve the problem by showing that the 'gap' is 
not really there at all. My main question is, then, 'Does Nowell -Smith 
convincingly resolve the problem posed by Hume ?'. 
In presenting their respective theories, the earlier philosophers 
lAbove, p. 6. 
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we have considered have devoted some attention to negating possible 
alternatives to their views, and Nowell-Smith is no exception. I shall, 
then, in this first section, briefly consider his rejection of the two 
main opponents of non -cognitivism, that is, the 'theoretical' or 'cog - 
nitivist' theories of 'naturalism' and 'intuitionism'. Section 2 will 
be a summary of his examination of basic assumptions of traditional 
theories. His criticism of these assumptions leads into the introduction 
to his new 'logical apparatus', which I shall consider in Section 3. It 
is within this part of his argument that he postulates what may be taken 
as his central thesis ---his attempt, that is, to eliminate "Hume's gap "1 
by means of his theories of "logical oddness" and "contextual implication ". 
In Sectïon 4 I shall consider his analysis of the purposes of 'practical 
discourse'. Sections will be concerned with his discussion of the logic 
of Gerundive -words; and within this section I shall consider his attempt 
to dissociate himself from what he terms the "Persuasive Theory ". Section 
6 will be a brief consideration of his treatment of the logic of the 
words "good ", "ought ", and "right ", 
He sets the theme for his book in the very first sentence: "A 
broad distinction may be drawn between theoretical and practical sciences." 
In establishing this theme he adopts the approach which now seems so 
obvious among those who have been influenced by Wittgenstein. He estab- 
lishes the distinction, that is, in terms of purposes. This method is 
not of course the prerogative of Wittgensteinians for it dates back at 
least to Aristotle, and any teleologist is liable to use it. But not 
only may the method be Aristotelian, the distinction itself, as Nowell- 
Smith later points out, owes much to Aristotle. "The impossibility of a 
1Cf., Ethics, p. 40. 
NOTÑELI SMITH 304 
'scientific morality' and the reasons why it is impossible," he writes, 
"were more clearly understood by Aristotle than by any other philosopher. "1 
In the first two paragraphs of the book Nowell-Smith proceeds to give his 
preliminary distinctions between the theoretical and the practical sci- 
ences. 
"The purpose of the former," he writes, "is to enable us to under- 
stand the nature of things, whether the things be stars, chemical 
substances, earthquakes, revolutions, or human behaviour." 
He then suggests that the motives for the development of this type of sci- 
ence may be found in the questions we ask. 
"These (theoretical) sciences consist in answers to such questions 
as 'What is an acid ?', 'What are the laws of planetary motion ?', 
'How do bees find their way about ?', 'Why does wood float and 
iron sink ?', 'What are the marriage laws of the Arapesh ?'. The 
answers take the form of statements, descriptions, generaliza- 
tions, explanations, and laws. I shall call such discourse 
'theoretical', 'fact -stating' or 'descriptive' discourse...." 
Aware of the kind of objection that has been made against the use of the 
word "descriptive" to refer to the language of the theoretical sciences,2 
he quickly goes on to say that "it must not be supposed that every sen- 
tence in such discourse is a theory or states a fact or describes some- 
thing. Newton's laws belong to descriptive discourse, but they do not 
describe anything." 
"Practical discourse, on the other hand ", he continues, "con- 
sists of answers to practical questions, of which the most 
important are 'What shall I do ?' and 'What ought I to do ?'. 
If I put these questions to myself the answers are decisions, 
resolutions, expressions of intention, or moral principles. 
If I put them to someone else his answers will be an order, 
injunction, or piece of advice, a sentence in the form °Do 
such and such'. The central activities for which moral 
language is used are choosing and advising others to choose." 
There are immediately apparent several interesting similarities 
and dissimilarities between Nowell -Smith's statement about the purpose 
Ethics, p. 19. 
Cf., e.g., Mary Warnock, op.cit., p. 139. 
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of practical discourse and the view of the earlier philosophers in this 
study. To begin with, it is apparent that, like the earlier philosophers, 
he distinguishes between what have been referred to as evaluative and 
descriptive uses of language. In citing the question "Ahat shall I do?" 
he is of course using the same question as Hare, but in also mentioning 
"What ought I to do ?" he immediately extends the range of possible answers. 
It is apparent, that is, that an 'imperative' or 'command' is not the 
primary answer or conclusion to 'practical' argument, as Hare considered 
it to be. 
While his manner of distinguishing between theoretical and practical 
discourse is reminiscent of Stevenson's manner of distinguishing between 
beliefs and attitudes,1 there is a difference of emphasis which could be 
the source of the main criticism made by Stevenson in his review- article.2 
Nowell -Smith's emphasis, that is, is on personal rather than inter- 
personal problems, and this emphasis would appear to be set by the posing 
of the two 'practical' questions as "the most important ". The emphasis 
is increased later, as we shall see, when he asserts that "What shall I 
do ?" is "the fundamental question of ethics .3 With this emphasis, as I 
shall argue in agreement with Stevenson, Howell -Smith tends to ignore 
crucial problems of 'practical disagreement', except when he uses the 
fact of 'disagreement in obligations' to reject intuitionism. It is 
difficult to deny that value judgments are sometimes made not in reply 
to 'practical' questions which either I have asked or have been asked by 
another person, but rather for the purpose of expressing one's disagree- 
ment with another person's value judgment. Sometimes they are made 
simply to express agreement. It may then be philosophically misleading 
1Stevenson, EL, pp. 2-3. 
3Ethics, pp. 100, 267. 
201-,. cizt. , p. 405. 
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for Nowell- Smith to say that "practical discourse...consists of answers 
to practical questions...." This is not to say that there are not occa- 
sions when value judgments are made in response to questions, and possibly 
Stevenson's emphasis was equally faulty in stressing disagreement (and 
agreement, by implication) to the neglect of those problems which, as he 
allowed, do not involve agreement or disagreement, but "simply uncertainty 
and growing conviction."1 In either case the same problems may arise 
concerning 'reasons' or 'justifications' for value judgments; but the 
difference in emphasis could well lead to a difference in emphasis in 
the answers a philosopher gives to the questions he poses to himself. 
On the one hand, a theory like Stevenson's which emphasizes ethical dis- 
agreement might appear to understress the importance of 'decisions', 
'resolutions', 'expressions of intention', and 'moral principles', all 
of which Nowell -Smith stresses in terms of answers posed to oneself. Such 
a theory might also appear to over -stress 'persuasion', even though Steven- 
son was clearly aware of this "possible misconception "2 of his theory. 
On the other hand, a theory which says that "practical discourse con- 
sists of answers to practical questions" might well neglect inter -personal 
disagreement, when one is neither concerned to provide answers, nor to 
help another person, nor to welcome value judgments conflicting with 
one's own. It is possible that both types of approach are partly right 
and partly wrong in their emphases, and this is a question which may be 
kept in mind for later consideration. 
In addition to clearly distinguishing between theoretical and 
practical discourse in his first chapter, Nowell -Smith cites another 
distinction which is fundamental to his book. He does this in a passage 
1Cf., above, Ch. III, p. 121. 2EL, p. 83. 
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in which he differentiates between his approach and the approach of most 
traditional philosophers who had studied such concepts as 'responsibility', 
° choosing as related to wanting', 'duty', and other such problems, with- 
out attending to the 'logic' underlying the questions. 
" :..the more obviously logical questions about words and sentences " 
he writes, "were, until very recently, largely neglected. This 
was because it was implicitly held that the logic of every type 
of discourse must be identical. Grammarians might be interested 
in verbal forms, statements, questions, commands, wishes and so 
on. But the province of philosophy was Truth and the sole ve- 
hicle of Truth was thought to be the 'proposition', expressed 
in an indicative sentence which ascribes a 'quality' to an 
'object'. Other moods and sentence -forms and other uses to 
which sentences might be put, however important they might be 
in other ways, were irrelevant to the quest for Truth. "1 
It is of interest that in the consideration of the non -cognitivist philo- 
sophers in this thesis it has been increasingly apparent that the signi- 
ficant modifications to what I have termed the Humean tradition have been 
made primarily as the result of the employment of several fundamental 
distinctions usually attributed to Wittgenstein. Although I have not 
seen 'Wittgenstein's name in Nowell -Smith's book, neither in the Index 
nor elsewhere, it may be said, nevertheless, that the book is in keeping 
with the Philosophical Investigations. There will be more evidence of 
this as we proceed. In any event, it is Nowell -Smith's intention, while 
employing these distinctions, to show that the adherence to the "logical 
dogma" (that the logic of every type of discourse must be identical with 
the logic of subject -predicate sentences which ascribe 'qualities' to 
'objects') "has prejudiced and distorted the accounts which moral philo- 
sophers have given of what it is to make a moral decision or judgment. "2 
Like earlier non- cognitivists Nowell -Smith is concerned to reject 
intuitionism, and naturalism. It is unnecessary to consider his arguments 
_Ethics, pp. 21-2. 2Ibid., p. 22. 
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in detail since they are not essentially different from some of the 
arguments of the earlier non -cognitivists. Whereas Stevenson, for ex- 
ample, had indicated that these theories had emphasized 'beliefs' to 
the neglect of ' attitudes', Nowell -Smith maintains that they emphasize 
theoretical knowledge to the neglect of practical knowledge. An interest- 
ing innovation in Nowell -Smith's treatment, however, at least in the man- 
ner of expressing the argument, is that he does not treat intuitionists 
and naturalists separately. Summarizing, in effect, the history of the 
controversy, he first permits the intuitionist to reject naturalism or 
any other theory which would reduce ethical terms to non -ethical terms 
(thus to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy'); then he, Nowell- Smith, re- 
jects intuitionism by indicating that it erroneously enphasizes theoreti- 
cal knowledge. 
"The strength of intuitionism," he says, "lies in its uncom- 
promising insistence on the autonomy of morals. To put the 
point briefly and in my own way, practical discourse, of which 
moral discourse is a part, cannot be identified with or reduced 
to any other kind of discourse. Ethical sentences are not, as 
Moore so clearly shows, psychological or metaphysical or theolo- 
gical sentences. Almost all earlier theories had tended to reduce 
ethical concepts and sentences to those of some other subject, 
usually psychology; they tend to define words such as 'good' 
and 'ought' in terms, for example, of the satisfaction of desire 
or of pleasure and pain. Against all such attempts the intui- 
tionists produce a crushing argument which is derived (sur- 
prisingly) from Hume. "1 
Nowell -Smith then quotes Hume's familiar passage in which he challenges 
arguments which proceed from 'is' or 'is not' propositions to 'ought' 
or 'ought not' propositions. Nowell -Smith is not concerned to try to 
apply this argument to all earlier traditional theories, since he has 
suggested that the greatest of the earlier philosophers (such as Plato, 
Aristotle, Epicurus, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Butler)2 did not make the 
'Ethics, p. 36. 2lbid., p. 13. 
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mistake of assuming that ethical problems were anything other than a 
matter of 'practical knowledge'. It might be argued, he suggests, that 
"Aristotle and certain Christian philosophers did not make the mistake, 
since their premises were really disguised value judgments or 'ought' - 
judgments from the start." While it may be said that a philosopher-cum - 
moralist could not be said to have committed the 'naturalistic fallacy', 
it is debatable whether he would evade Stevenson's charge of 'persuasive 
definition'. But, as Nowell -Smith says, "some philosophers, notably the 
hedonists, certainly did make this mistake, and of them Hume's criticism 
is an unanswerable refutation. "1 
After the intuitionists have been allowed to rout the naturalists, 
Nowell -Smith asks if they have any more satisfactory proposal to "bridge 
the gap" between the factual data upon which a judgment is made, and the 
judgment itself. Intuitionists would insist, however, that "obligations 
are immediately and underivately known and require no deduction." Nowell - 
Smith therefore must argue that the intuitionist's "way of representing 
moral knowledge as theoretical knowledge leaves him with a gap to be 
bridged. "2 In the next chapter he will show that "the intuitionist can- 
not both maintain the immediate and underivative character of moral know- 
ledge and also the analogy with empirical discourse which justified his 
use of such terms as 'see', 'recognize', 'true', 'mistaken', 'know', 
'feel', and 'objective'." 
His argument to indicate that there is a gap to be bridged by the 
intuitionist between 'is' and 'ought' is much the same as Ayer had used 
in his paper, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgements ".3 Nowell-Smith, 
like Ayer, points out that the intuitionist, in effect, treats moral 
31bid., p. 37. 
Op.cit., pp. 239-242. 
2Ethics, p. 38. 
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judgments "as descriptions of features of the universe ", even though he 
obscures this by alleging that the features are "non- natural ". Like 
Ayer, Nowell -Smith suggests that, for the sake of argument, we may grant 
that the intuitionist has the experience of 'intuiting' the 'right - 
making characteristics' and the 'rightness' of a proposed action, and 
that he may also 'feel the emotion of obligation'. 
"Does it follow," Nowell -Smith asks, "that I ought to do the 
action towards which I feel the emotion? If Hume's argument 
is valid at all, is it not equally valid against this deduc- 
tion? It cannot be evaded by merely calling the character- 
istic and the emotion 'non -natural'; copious use of this 
epithet serves only to disguise Hume's gap, not to bridge 
it. "1 
The point of the argument, as Ayer had so clearly expressed it, was that, 
for the intuitionist, as well as for the moral sense theorist, the value 
term he uses "simply comes to be descriptive of experiences" which he 
alleges to have. "In neither case," Ayer continues, "does anything what- 
soever follow as regards conduct. "2 Descriptive statements simply do 
not serve the purpose demanded of evaluative or prescriptive statements. 
The second of Nowell -Smith's arguments against intuitionism is an 
extension of an argument which had been used by Ayer in Language, Truth, 
and Logic.3 Nowell -Smith indicates the problem under the section -heading, 
"The Reconciliation of Conflicts ". An interesting feature of the argu- 
ment is that he contrasts the views of the intuitionist or objectivist 
with those of the subjectivist, both in terms of their theories about 
the nature of moral judgments as they are in fact used, as well as in 
terms of the possible consequences of such theories if they were adopted 
in practice. His justification for considering possible consequences 
of such theories is that objectivists have been prone to criticize sub- 
3Ethics, p. 40. 2lbid., p. 240. 
Op.cit., p. 106; cf., above, Ch. II, p. 76. 
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jectivist analyses, as Stevenson had expressed it, for erecting theories 
on shifting sands. Such a theory, the objectivist often suggests, would 
lead to consequences which, as one objectivist, A. Castell, has expressed 
it, "are too high a price to pay for the theory in question ". This 
writer, speaking of Ayer's theory in particular, went on to say that "if 
the theory is true, then no act can ever be criticized or justified in 
moral terms. "1 In the context of this argument, it should be noted, 
Nowell -Smith describes 'subjectivists' in a manner that could be roughly 
applied to most non- cognitivists. (Nowell -Smith appears to wish to remain 
somewhat aloof from 'subjectivism' in this sense, but, as I shall argue, 
it is very much doubtful that he can.) This is the sense in which Braith- 
waite identified himself with Hare's 'subjectivism',2 and is akin to what 
Ayer had referred to as his 'radical subjectivism'. According to Nowell - 
Smith the subjectivist would describe a moral conflict in one of two 
possible ways; and what he says in this passage appears to be a summary 
of Ayer's statement in Language, Truth , and Logic. First, "I might try 
to convince you that you were mistaken about some non -moral fact ", 
assuming that you would agree with my moral judgment when we had agreed 
upon the facts; or, secondly, "I might try to convince you that my moral 
judgment follows from or is a special case of some more general moral 
judgment which I know that you accept." Now both of these forms of 
argument, he says, "presuppose that there is some common moral ground 
between us, if only we can find it." But the subjectivist will allow, 
nevertheless, that "a point may be reached when there is no disagreement 
of a factual or logical kind; and yet a moral disagreement remains." 
At this point, as is said, the moral argument 'breaks down', and, as 
1A. Castell, An Elementary Ethics, p. 142. 
2Braithwaite, op.cit., p. 250. 
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Nowell -Smith says, we "either agree to differ" or resort to "non -rational 
methods of persuasion. "1 Now such a theory, he emphasizes, is "about 
the nature of moral judgments ", and "it does not imply the theory that 
most men approve of trampling on their neighbours." 
Does the 'objectivist' theory, he asks, offer any more satisfactory 
explanation of moral conflicts? 
"Theoretically the objectivist theory cannot help us to reconcile 
conflicts," he answers, "since it conceals a difficulty endemic 
in all theories involving 'intuition'. Intuitions of objective 
properties are either infallible or they are not. If they are 
fallible, then the mere existence of an objective property or 
value is no guarantee that anyone has apprehended it properly. 
However convinced you may be that you are right, it is still 
open to me to deny the genuineness of your intuition. If, on 
the other hand, intuitions are infallible, then disputes cannot 
be genuine. If I disagree with you, you must charge me either 
with insincerity or with moral blindness. And that this account 
of the matter is false is shown by the fact that we do often 
allow others to be sincere when their moral views differ from 
our own. i2 
He then proceeds to turn the tables on those objectivists who would argue 
that, in practice, their theory is superior to the 'shifting sands' 
theory of subjectivists. 
"And in practice," he writes, "the objectivist is, as we should expect, 
in a far worse position for solving moral conflicts. He neces- 
sarily attributes his opponents denial of the truth to wilful 
perversity; and, holding as he does that in spite of his denials 
his opponent must really see the truth all the time, he realizes 
that what his opponent needs is not argument but castigation. 
For arguments cannot convince a man who already sees the light. "3 
He carries this approach even further when he indulges in an historical 
generalization. 
"The objective theory, so far from minimizing the use of force 
to settle moral conflicts, can be, and constantly has been 
used to justify it. It is no accident that religious perse- 
1Ethics, pp. 44 -5; cf., Language, Truth, and Logic, pp. 110 -112, 
and Intro. to 2nd. Edition, pp. 21 -2. Note: See Ethics, p, 156, where 
Nowell -Smith uses these arguments, plus a third, for 'redirecting atti- 
tudes'. I shall discuss this later. 
2Ethics, p. 46. 31bid., p. 47. 
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cutions are the monopoly of objective theorists." 
The intuitionist or objectivist, according to Nowell -Smith and 
other non -cognitivists, assumes that moral judgments are analogous to 
theoretical or descriptive statements, the main qualification being that 
the qualities or properties 'intuited' are 'non -natural'. With this 
assumption, as Nowell - Smith has already indicated, the intuitionist can- 
not explain "the problem of reconciling moral conflicts ", and if his 
theory is considered in terms of consequences it may lead to grave moral 
problems. Nowell -Smith now undertakes to examine the assumption itself, 
and his intention is to show that the analogy between moral discourse 
and empirical discourse "is mistaken in principle ".1 I shall outline 
only his main argument. This argument is of interest since it develops 
in more detail a conclusion which Ayer had expressed in his paper, when 
he said that the 'subjective- objective antithesis' is "out of place in 
moral philosophy. "2 It should be noted that Nowell -Smith does not intend 
to maintain that there is no analogy whatsoever. Since we do use "ob- 
jective terminology in moral matters" ( "we say 'this is good' rather than 
'I approve of this' (and)...we call moral judgments true or false ") it 
is apparent that the analogy may be of some use. His point is rather 
that "the analogy breaks down at a crucial point." Although the analogy 
will break down, he is concerned also that he should not be interpreted 
as expressing the kind of view held by earlier emotivists that moral 
judgments "are mere matters of taste or of what I happen to like." 
"We find that moral judgments are in some ways like empirical 
statements," he writes, "and in other, ways like expressions 
of taste; but it is not incumbent on us to say that moral 
judgments must be the one or the other. In fact they are 
obviously neither." 
3 thics, p. 49. Ethics, P. 49. 
2 
Ayer, op.cit., p. 242. 
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What he intends by this statement will become clearer as we proceed. 
His main argument to show that the analogy between moral discourse 
and empirical discourse breaks down, rests on what he refers to as the 
"objective-subjective contrast" which exists in our empirical discourse, 
but which cannot exist in moral discourse as the objectivist interprets 
it. This becomes obvious, he suggests, in cases of 'conflicting obli- 
gations'---a problem which objectivists tend not to consider with suf- 
ficient thoroughness. While relying on observation in 'empirical' 
situations, "we also know that our senses sometimes deceive us; "1 and 
since we have standards which are generally agreed upon for testing em- 
pirical statements, "we make use of a double language in which 'is', is 
contrasted with 'looks' and 'feels'." 
"Now it is an essential feature of the double language of 'looks' 
or 'feels' and 'really is'," he writes, "that, while the observer 
himself is allowed to be the last judge of how a thing looks or 
feels to him, he is not allowed to be the best judge of what it 
really is. "2 
I may still insist, for example, that one of two objects 'felt' heavier 
than the other, even though the scales on which I weigh them indicate 
that they both 'really' weigh the same. Nowell -Smith is careful not to 
claim too much with this argument. He is not suggesting that "general 
agreement" is "a test of truth ", but simply that "it is a necessary 
condition of the use of objective language" in empirical discourse. Un- 
less we use this objective -subjective contrast, he suggests, we would not 
be able to say, as we do, that a person's statement may be either 'correct' 
or 'mistaken' - --and, as he will argue, the same thing must be said by 
the objectivist to apply to moral discourse as it does to empirical dis- 
course. In applying the distinction to a situation in which there is 
'Ibid., p. 52. 2lbid., p. 53. 
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moral disagreement, Nowell -Smith first mentions the subjectivist's cri- 
ticism that if objectivism were a true account there could be no moral 
disagreement. He cites some of the objectivist's replies to this criti- 
cism, such as that "people often disagree where objective, empirical 
properties are concerned ", and that 'moral intuition might be a very 
imperfectly developed faculty and better developed in some men than in 
others." But this reply, he says, "misses the point of the objection." 
The point is that if there is what appears to be irreconcilable moral 
disagreement the objectivist cannot point to any agreed upon standard or 
method of testing conflicting judgments -- -which he should be able to do 
if moral discourse is analogous to empirical discourse. The intuitionist 
even allows, as Nowell -Smith mentions in his next argument, that "equally 
good men" may form conflicting judgments. Without such a test, however, 
the objectivist cannot say, as he wishes to do, that another person's 
statement is either 'correct' or 'mistaken'. If there is an analogy, 
the objectivist should be able to use the 'double language' of the 'ob- 
jective- subjective contrast' in morals as he can in empirical matters, 
and he must be able to show "that there is a contrast...between 'is 
right' and 'seems right', which corresponds to the contrast between... 
'is heavier' and 'feels heavier'." 
"But this is exactly what the intuitionist cannot do; for in 
making direct awareness the test of real ethical properties he 
eliminates the whole point of the objective -subjective contrast. 
It is not that ethical properties are subjective or even that 
the objective -subjective contrast is wholly misplaced in ethics, 
but that the use of this contrast is quite incompatible with 
intuitionism.) 
Ayer, as I have mentioned, had arrived at the view that "the familiar 
subjective- objective antithesis is out of place in moral philosophy;" 
lEthics, p. 56. 
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and he had done so from the same basic approach taken by Nowell- Smith ---- 
that is, that both the subjectivist who said that there are no ethical 
properties and the objectivist who said that there are, are both using 
descriptive language. Nowell -Smith does not reject the antithesis 
entirely, however, as will be apparent when we consider his analysis of 
A -words and G- words. 
Section 2 
Having indicated the failure of both the naturalist and the intui- 
tionist theories, he sums up the problem with which he confronts his 
reader. 
"The study of ethics seems to end in a blind alley. The older 
philosophers set out confidently to 'erect schemes of virtue 
and of happiness', to discover that the Good Life is or what 
our duties are; but we end with an argument the burden of 
which is to show that all their efforts rested on a mistake. 
In place of the old, often laborious and sometimes exciting 
road we are offered the short cut of immediate insight. But 
our new guides not only fail to lead us where we want to go, 
they do not seem to understand where this is. We ask for help 
in the solution of practical problems and they offer us a des- 
cription of a non -natural world. It is not surprising that this 
has led to a radical scepticism in the writings of otherwise very 
different philosophers. Both logical Positivists and 1'cisten- 
tialists tend to deny the possibility of knowledge or rational 
opinion in ethics and to doubt whether we can ever give good 
reasons for doing this rather than that."" 
This problem, as is apparent, was at its most pressing probably in the 
late 'thirties, following the publication, that is, of Language, Truth, 
and Logic; and Stevenson's Ethics and Language, in 1945, was the first 
major attempt to suggest a way out of the problem. What, asks Nowell- 
Smith, has been the cause of the failure in ethics? In reply, he repeats 
the suggestion we have seen earlier, that philosophers had ignored the 
'logic' underlying their philosophic activities. To reinforce his point 
Ethics, p. 61; for a similar statement see Toulmin, op.cit., 
p. 61ff. 
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he now undertakes to "try to show how the nature and purpose of practical 
discourse has been made unintelligible by the attempt to elucidate it by 
means of a logical apparatus unsuited to the purpose...." Then he will 
try "to substitute a new logical apparatus that may be more successful." 
W'e must now, then, undertake to outline and assess the 'positive' aspect 
of his thesis. 
He proposes, first, to study "the logic of single words, especially 
adjectives ", and then to go on to consider "the use of sentences and argu- 
ments in practical discourse." The 'new logical apparatus' he uses in 
undertaking this study will be seen to be an application of the doctrines 
usually associated with the later Wittgenstein. 
In his consideration of the logic of single words, he isolates two 
assumptions which have been made by most traditional philosophers. 
"(a) The first assumption is that adjectives are the names of 
properties (or qualities or characteristics), that their 
logical role is that of denoting, referring to or standing 
for something. It is a corollary of this that questions 
about the meaning of a word are to be answered by inspecting 
the idea, concept, or object which it denotes and comparing 
this with the objects denoted by other words.... 
(b) A second assumption, intimately connected with the first, is 
that we can ask what a certain word means instead of asking 
'What does So- and -so mean by it ?'"1 
As Nowell- Smith points out, there may be nothing wrong with a philosopher's 
using these assumptions to study the subjects the analysis of which had 
led to propounding them; but "it is by no means obvious that the tech- 
nical apparatus he uses will help to elucidate a realm of discourse quite 
different from that from which he chose his examples. "2 He has no diffi- 
culty in showing that the assumptions are indeed misleading if held to 
refer beyond either mathematics or the natural sciences, or beyond 
lEthics, pp. 61-62. 2lbld., p. 63. 
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'references' to "common objects ". Moore, who had done so much to indicate 
that there is a difference between the uses of words such as "good" and 
"yellow ", nevertheless, as I have suggested earlier,' had used misleading 
terminology. As Nowell -Smith expresses this, Moore's "proof that 'good' 
denoted something simple rests on the assumption that, if 'good' has any 
meaning at all, it must denote something. "2 This leads one to question 
the assumption that "all meaningful words and symbols denote ". To hold 
this assumption would be to hold the theory of meaning which I have re- 
ferred to in earlier chapters as 'meaning in terms only of referent'. As 
we have seen, Ayer was too closely bound to it, and was thus led into 
saying that ethical language was meaningless. Stevenson and Hare, however, 
had clearly seen that such a theory of meaning was limited in its applica- 
tion and could not apply to evaluative language. Nowell -Smith's point is 
not essentially different. A new theory of meaning is necessary for the 
proper understanding of practical discourse, he suggests, and the proposed 
theory is the Wittgensteinian doctrine that 'the meaning of a word is in 
its use'. Now to understand the use of a word one must study it in its 
context. As we have seen, this was the main basis of Braithwaite's criti- 
cism of Hare's thesis. In fairness to John Dewey, lest Wittgenstein be 
given too much credit, it should perhaps be noted that as early as 1920, 
he had advanced a view stressing the importance of considering "the logic 
of individualized situations ",3 and he had said that "we advance to a 
belief in a plurality of changing, moving, individualized goods and ends, 
and to a belief that principles, criteria, laws are intellectual instru- 
ments for analysing individual or unique situations. "4 I would not wish 
1Cf., above, Ch. II, p. 77ff. 
2 
Ethics, p. 65. 
3John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 137. 
41bid., p. 132. 
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to make too much of this similarity, but it certainly may be construed 
as challenging the traditional assumption that "good" must always mean 
the same thing in all contexts. The relevance of mentioning Dewey is 
of course that his influence on the non -cognitivist tradition is directly 
felt at least through Stevenson. Dewey would certainly have agreed with 
Nowell -Smith's assertion that it is not safe to abstract a word from its 
context unless it is a technical word, or unless it refers to common ob- 
jects. The reason for this is that "the same word can be used on different 
occasions, not merely as the name of slightly different objects, but to 
do different jobs, some of which are not naming jobs at all." "With which 
of these jobs," he asks, "are we to identify the meaning ? "1 The old 'lo- 
gical apparatus' thus leads to the view that "practical discourse is 
either meaningless or descriptive of a special non -natural world...." 
Summing up the first part of his analysis of single words, especially 
adjectives, he prescribes the new method of approach: 
"For the question 'What does the word...mean ?' I shall therefore 
substitute the two questions 'For what job is the word...used ?' 
and 'Under what conditions is it proper to use this word for 
that job ?' The importance of separating these questions will 
emerge later; for the present I shall simply abandon the familiar 
model of words as labels attached to things and treat them as 
tools with which we do things. Talking is not always naming 
or reporting; it is sometimes doing. "2 
Using the new theory of meaning, Nowell - Smith now conducts an introductory 
examination of adjectives we use in our ordinary discourse. "The classi- 
fication of adjectives ", he says, "is necessarily a tentative and inexact 
business "; but, "for a start ", he distinguishes between three main types. 
Before introducing his three -fold classification, however, he mentions, 
in order to reject, the intuitionist view that "goodness is a 'conse- 
2Ethics, p. 69. 
Ibid.; cf., Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part I, 
Sections 11, 23, 43, 116, 117, etc. 
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quential Property', by which is meant that it is a property that something 
can have only if it has certain properties. As he had argued in reject- 
ing intuitionism, "the link between goodness and the good - making proper- 
ties is not a logical one ", and "a special act of awareness is needed to 
apprehend it ", although such an act cannot be as the intuitionist had 
interpreted it. Hare, we recall, had similarly argued that there was 
no relationship of entailment between the 'relevant descriptive character- 
istics' (of the minor premiss) to which we attach the 'supervenient' or 
'consequential' term "good ", and the particular value judgment (or con- 
clusion). He wished to assert, nevertheless, that there was a kind of 
dual logical relationship by which the 'phrastic' and the 'neustic' of 
the conclusion could be logically drawn from his implicit or explicit 
practical syllogism. That is to say, the ' phrastic' of the conclusion 
could be drawn in a straightforward deductive manner through the 'phras- 
tics' of the major and minor premisses, while the 'neustic' of the con- 
clusion was in some way to be drawn from the 'neustic' of the major premiss 
(the 'list of virtues' or 'standard') in conjunction with the recognition 
that the minor premiss contained the 'relevant' descriptive characteris- 
tics, that is 'supervenient' or 'consequential' characteristics. As I 
have argued, Hare's use of this practical syllogism is at least a dubious 
procedure. Nowell -Smith, as we shall see later, does not make any such 
rigid formalistic attempt to analyse moral reasoning. Whether he avoids 
difficulties with his use of the new 'logical apparatus', however, remains 
to be seen. 
Although he will not of course take the intuitionist approach, he 
nevertheless suggests that the relationship between an adjective such as 
"sublime ", and "those features of a landscape in virtue of which we call 
it sublime" is "of the same type" as "the special act of awareness" by 
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which we "apprehend " the "goodness" of something. To illustrate this 
point he gives an example of a conversation in which a person describes 
a sightseeing experience, whereupon the second person says "What a sublime 
sight that must have been ". The word "sublime ", Nowell -Smith adds, could 
be replaced by such words as "magnificent ", "stirring ", "awe- inspiring ", 
"wonderful ", and so on, 
"The connexion between their remarks," he says, "is obviously not 
logical entailment; yet we feel that B's comment was the natural 
and appropriate one to make. And this is because he is evincing 
the natural, appropriate motion. "1 
This example illustrates one of the three kinds of ways in which we use 
adjectives. 
"...I shall refer to words of the same family as 'sublime' as 
Aptness -words (A words), because they are words that indicate 
that an object has certain properties which are apt to arouse 
a certain emotion or range of emotions." 
He goes on to say that he is using the word "indicate" with "deliberate 
vagueness ". He does not wish to be interpreted, however, as saying either 
that the word "terrifying ", for example, could "be defined in terms of 
'causing fear'", or that A -words "just express the emotion of the speaker ". 
"A- words ", he continues, "have a logic of their own which is different 
both from that of Descriptive words (D- words) and from that of exclama- 
tions or reports of one's feelings. "2 In addition to A -words and D- words, 
there is a third, broad group of adjectives. Such words are "roughly 
analogous" to words like "praise- worthy ", "note- worthy ", "laudable ", 
"damnable ", and so on. As a tool for classifying these words he uses the 
expression "Gerundive -word "3 or "G- word ". Among examples offered by Nowell- 
Smith to indicate the use in single sentences of these three types of words 
(that is, D-, A -, and G-, respectively) are the following: "A dress may 
lEthics, p. 71 2lbid., p. 72. 
3Toulmin, op.cit., pp. 70-74. 
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be red, comfortable, and indecent. A ball may be a leg- break, tempting, 
and over -pitched. A man may be blue -eyed, amusing, and admirable ". 
There is of course an obvious similarity between these words and words 
which Stevenson would have (roughly) classified as 'descriptive', 'second - 
pattern', and 'first- pattern' words respectively. That is to say, Nowell - 
Smith's A -words are obviously what Stevenson would have termed "descrip- 
tively rich" as compared with the "descriptively vague" G- words; and 
while G -words would have been analysed primarily by Stevenson's first - 
pattern of analysis, the descriptively richer A -words would more appro- 
priately be analysed by the second -pattern. Since Nowell-Smith postpones 
his main discussion of G -words until he considers language used for 'ad- 
vice' rather than 'choosing', I shall not now attempt to assess this com- 
parison. A further point remains, however, for, as is apparent from 
Nowell- Smith's examples, the distinction between A- and G -words appears 
to be no more clear -cut than the distinction between words which Stevenson 
would have assigned for either second -pattern or first -pattern analysis-- - 
and this is a fact which Nowell -Smith later admits.1 But whereas Steven- 
son would say that it is logically impossible to make such a distinction, 
Nowell -Smith would disagree; and he would maintain that the 'Gerundive - 
force' of some of our uses of words is logically distinguishable from the 
'Aptness -force'. Whether he can maintain this distinction, however, is 
questionable, as I shall indicate later. 
Following his introductory analysis of the logic of single words, 
Nowell -Smith turns to the logic of sentences and arguments. Just as 
there have been two misleading assumptions underlying the traditional 
logic of single words, there have also been two misleading assumptions, 
lEthics, pp. $5, 151. 
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he suggests, concerned with the traditional logic of sentences and argu- 
ments. This second pair of assumptions, he says, is intimately connected 
with the first. In the same manner in which the first pair of assumptions 
has led to the neglect of considering words in their uses, so the second 
pair of assumptions similarly leads to considering sentences as abstracted 
from their contexts. For the sake of convenience, he indicates, he has 
spoken of A-words and U-words, but this could be misleading since "it 
would be nearer the truth to speak ofA- and G-uses of words or to say 
that a word can be used with an A,-force or a G- force." When one makes 
the following assumptions, he suggests, "this point is ignored ": 
"(a) that it is always possible to draw a sharp distinction 
between questions about what a word means (or the property 
it denotes) and questions about the things to which the 
word applies (or the things that have that property); and 
(b) that statements can be sharply divided into analytic and 
synthetic. "l 
It would be possible to make these assumptions without questioning 
them, so long as one assumed the traditional logic which had developed 
from the analysis of 'theoretical' discourse; but as soon as one recog- 
nizes that words may be used for 'practical' as well as 'theoretical' 
purposes, and that a single word may serve a variety of both 'practical' 
as well as 'descriptive' purposes, the assumptions are seen to be ques- 
tionable. As an example of the use of these assumptions, Nowell -Smith 
cites Moore's attack on the 'naturalistic fallacy'. If the naturalist 
insists on expressing his definition of "good" in an analytic statement, 
such as "'good' means'pleasant ", then the non -naturalist points to an 
exception in our use of the word "good "; and if he defines "good" in a 
synthetic statement, such as "only things which are pleasant are good ", 
lEthics, p. 75. 
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then the non -naturalist points out that it makes sense to ask of a man 
who has called something pleasant, "but is it good ? ". Moore concludes 
that there is, so to speak, always something left over in attempts to 
define "good ", and thus he says that "propositions about the good are 
all of them synthetic and never analytic. "1 Since our moral judgments 
cannot all be said to be trivial the non - naturalist who dismisses natural- 
ism seeks to explain what a moral judgment is, but he does so in terms 
analogous to the 'property' language of the 'naturalistic' or 'scientific' 
theory he rejects. His answer, as Nowell -Smith indicates, is "that we 
must have a special faculty of insight into necessary, synthetic connex- 
ions".2 The non -naturalist or intuitionist is thus inevitably led into 
the Kantian concern for the possibility of 'synthetic a priori proposi- 
tions'. Now the contemporary non -cognitivist may make two points which 
would lead to setting this whole controversy to one side. First of all, 
both the naturalist and the non -naturalist had assumed, in their differ- 
ent ways, that "good" always meant the same thing. Once it is granted, 
however, that a word may be used in a variety of ways in a variety of 
contexts, then, as Nowell-Smith expresses it, while the non -naturalist 
attack may be valid "in refuting any simple, one -track theory of what 
'good' means, it is powerless to refute any theory which allows that 
'good' may mean different things on different occasions. "3 In recognizing 
this, however, the non -naturalist must also recognize the weakness of his 
own assumption that "good" always has the same 'objective' meaning. Se- 
condly, both the naturalist and the non - naturalist have made the same 
assumptions about the purpose served by the use of moral judgments; and 
once it is granted that moral words are not used in the same way as 
1Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 70 
3 
Ethics, p. 77. Ibid., p. 79. 
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'theoretical' or 'scientific' words, and that they may be used for 
'practical' purposes, then the whole controversy over the 'naturalistic 
fallacy', as non -naturalists had interpreted it, is no longer seen to be 
relevant. 
The suggestion that the 'analytic -synthetic' dichotomy breaks down 
is an extension, in considerably more detail, of a distinction which 
Stevenson had made in the brief section in which he considers Moore's 
treatment of 'naturalism'.1 The questioning of the dichotomy empha- 
sizes a significant difference between Nowell -Smith's (and Stevenson's) 
type of theory, on the one hand, and cognitivist theories, on the other; 
but it also emphasizes a difference between the later and earlier non - 
cognitivist theories, since to challenge the dichotomy is to challenge 
the use of the 'verification principle' as being appropriate as a test 
for moral judgments. As Stevenson had pointed out,2 even theories which 
have "given attitudes a pre -eminent place" have often emphasized 'beliefs' 
to the neglect of 'attitudes', or, as Nowell -Smith would say, have em- 
phasized 'theoretical discourse' to the neglect of 'practical discourse'. 
Hume had clearly expressed his adherence to the dichotomy as a test for 
'rational' knowledge in his celebrated "commit it then to the flames" 
passage ;3 and Ayer, as we have seen, had said of this passage, "what is 
this but a rhetorical version of our own thesis that a sentence which 
does not express either a formally true proposition or an empirical hy- 
pothesis is devoid of literal significance ? "4 Now I would not wish to 
overstress this comparison between the two, for a case may be made for 
saying that Hume, unlike some of his contemporaries, had recognized that 
moral language served a practical purpose and was to be treated differently 
3EL, p. 273. 
Above, Ch. I, p. 26. 
2Above, Ch. III, p. 140. 
4 
Above, Ch. II, p. 66. 
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from the language of science. As we have seen Kemp Smith has convincingly 
argued that Hume had undertaken the writing of the Treatise with the pre- 
supposition that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions "; 
and it is possibly significant that in the "commit it then to the flames 
passage ", the volumes suggested as examples are those of "divinity, or 
school metaphysics ". While it must be said that, for Hume, moral language 
was non -rational, possibly the most that can be made of this is that he 
did not presume that it should be 'rational'. His tests for meaningful- 
ness might then be said to apply to any theories claiming to be based on 
'reason', including cognitivist theories of morals. Ayer's approach, on 
the other hand, is not similarly debatable. There can be no question 
about the fact that he had approached his analysis of morals from his 
epistemology. Moral language, like metaphysical and religious language, 
had to be reckoned with before his theory could be said to be complete. 
Presupposing that the main purpose for language must be a 'cognitive' or 
'theoretical' one, and assuming the 'analytic -synthetic' dichotomy within 
his verification principle, he was logically compelled to say that moral 
judgments are literally meaningless, or not genuine propositions. Now, 
despite the possible differences in their approach to the language of 
morals, it may be said that their arguments against 'cognitivist' theories 
were not without point. That is to say, the theories they challenged 
similarly presupposed the 'analytic -synthetic' dichotomy. Once it is 
clearly seen, however, that the main purposes served by moral judgments 
are not of a 'theoretical' or 'scientific' nature, that words may serve 
a variety of purposes, and that their 'meanings' or 'purposes' are not 
to be determined if they are taken out of contexts, then it becomes 
apparent that tests which may very well serve in theoretical discourse 
are no longer appropriate for other types of discourse. Thus it is, as 
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Stevenson and Nowell -Smith have indicated, that the 'analytic- synthetic' 
dichotomy, and the verification principle which is intimately related to 
that dichotomy, must be said to be inappropriate in the consideration of 
practical discourse. 
While his rejection of the traditional assumptions might seem to 
lead to the suggestion that no treasons' might be given in support of 
'doing things', Nowell -Smith, like Stevenson and Hare, would not agree. 
"...it is certainly true that we do give good reasons for doing 
things, if only because the phrase 'giving good reasons' is 
the phrase used in English for something that we all know we 
do; and if any argument tends to show that this is impossible 
there must be something wrong with the argument.i1 
It is necessary for the moment to differentiate between 'reasons' for 
'doing things' and 'reasons' for value judgments, since, in considering 
A- words, Nowell -Smith is not considering value judgments. We must later 
relate the two questions; but the question before us now is "What are 
good reasons for doing things ?" 
Section 3 
Before Nowell -Smith deals directly with this question, however, he 
must say something further about 'the logic of sentences and arguments', 
as well as about 'the purposes of practical discourse'. It is at this 
point that we are introduced to the central thesis of the book. In con- 
sidering the 'logic of sentences and arguments' he again emphasizes that 
a major "logical mistake" of the earlier theories was that they supposed 
"that the meaning of 'good' can be examined in isolation from its con- 
text"; thus he introduces his doctrine of "contextual implication ".2 
And when he later examines the phrase "good reasons" he will say that the 
test of a 'good reason' is that "it would be logically odd either to ask 
lEthics, p. 78. 2lbid., p. 79. 
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for further reasons for doing something or for a further explanation of 
why someone did it ".1 The key phrase is of course "logically odd ", and 
since he makes considerable use of it, as well as of the phrase "con- 
textual implication ", I shall try to summarize and assess the sections 
in which he stipulates the 'rules' for their use and illustrates the 
application of the rules. As I shall argue, most of the major difficul- 
ties with Nowell -;pith's thesis have to do with his use of the concept 
of "logical oddness ". 
He introduces the first of these sections2 with the following 
example of a conversation: 
"A. What are you doing? 
B. I am having a nice smoke. 
C. Are you enjoying it ? ". 
Commenting on the example he says that "the last question is puzzling. 
Once B has said that he is having a nice smoke there seems to be no further 
room for the question 'Are you enjoying it ?'." He does not suggest that 
there may not be occasions when the question has a purpose. He says, for 
example, that A might have "some embarrassing communication to make to 
B and he simply wants to keep the conversation going...." But, as Nowell - 
Smith continues, "in the absence of such special reasons, the question 
seems ot4se because, in this context, 'nice' expresses the enjoyment 
of the speaker and he has already said that it is nice. "3 This is not 
to say that "nice" always expresses the enjoyment of the speaker, for, 
as he suggests, there are occasions when we may use the word to predict 
that the questioner or hearer may enjoy something (for example, as in the 
statement "Strawberries are nice ".) One cannot use "nice" in the same 
predictive way, he suggests, about oysters, even though the speaker may 
1lbid., p. 105. 2Ibid., p. 79 -84. 
3Ethics, p. $0. (My underlining. I shall later refer to his use 
of this word. 
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use the word to express his own enjoyment. He intends to defend the pre- 
dictive use of A- sentences in more detail later. "For the moment ", he 
writes, "I wish only to make the point that 'they are nice' has different 
implications in different contexts." 
Now there is a shift in Nowell -Smith's use of the highly ambiguous 
word "implications" between this sentence and the sentences immediately 
following. This is important to notice, since if he were held to his 
original manner of using the word it is doubtful if he could have attached 
so much importance to his use of the terms "logical oddness" and "con- 
textual implications ". In the context of the preceding passage he has 
been speaking of various uses of the word "nice ", and I would suggest that 
instead of his saying that he wishes "only to make the point that 'they 
are nice' has different implications in different contexts ", he should be 
held simply to saying that he wishes "only to make the point that 'they 
are nice' serves different purposes in different contexts." By his use 
of the word "implications ", however, he paves the way for using it not 
to suggest 'meanings' in the sense of 'purposes' or 'uses', but rather to 
suggest 'logical implications'. The reader is now prepared to consider 
the phrase "they are nice" in terms of what it 'logically implies' or 
'what follows analytically' from it. The shift begins in the very next 
passage: 
"In the first context 'nice' was used to express the enjoyment 
of the speaker; in the second to predict the enjoyment of the 
hearer. This point is obscured if we suppose that 'nice' must 
mean the same thing in all contexts and that what follows ana- 
lytically from the statement 'It is nice' is the same in all 
contexts. "1 
But he will go on to allow that we cannot use the rules of logical implica- 
tion (as Hare thought we could) for practical discourse. Nevertheless, 
Ethics, p. 80 (my underlining). 
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by using the word "implications" as he has done, he has now led us to 
thinking in terms of "what follows analytically" from a value judgment. 
If we were to adhere, however, to the use of either the word "purpose" 
or the word "meaning ", the last sentence of the preceding quotation would 
then read: 
"This point is obscured if we suppose that 'nice' is used for the 
same purpose in all contexts and that the statement 'It is nice' 
serves the same purpose, or has the same meaning in all contexts." 
The statement would of course be trivial; but to suggest anything more 
at this point would appear to be begging the question for a kind of 
logical implication. This, in fact, becomes apparent when Nowell -Smith 
proceeds to write the next passage: 
"For the concept of logical implication or analytic connexion 
between statements I propose to substitute the concept of 
'contextual implication', and for the concept of self - 
contradiction that of 'logical oddness'...." 
Now even though he will proceed to say that 'contextual implication' and 
'logical oddness' are not to be construed in any rigidly formalistic way, 
nevertheless, because of his different uses of the word "implications" 
in the same context, it would appear that he has been led into pre- 
supposing that there is a rough analogy between formal logic and his 
'practical logic'. This, however, is to beg a very large question. It 
would have been less question -begging if he had adhered to the approach 
he had prescribed earlier. That is to say, instead of considering the 
statement "it is nice" in terms analogous to the phrase "what follows 
analytically from it ", he might simply have considered it in terms of 
his two questions, "For what job is the word 'nice' used ? ", and "Under 
what conditions is it proper to use the word for that job ?" (although 
the word "proper" would have to be watched carefully in any reply to the 
second question). It is possible that the answers to these questions 
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might be obscured by asking what is the "contextual implication" of the 
word as if it were not also a legitimate question to ask "For what job 
is the word 'nice' probably being used ? ". This question may be kept in 
mind throughout the remainder of my summary of his argument in which he 
stipulates how he intends to use these key phrases. 
He illustrates his use of the phrase "contextual implication" in 
the following passage: 
"I shall say that a statement p contextually implies a statement 
q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language 
would be entitled to infer q from p in the context in which 
they occur. Logical implications are a sub -class of contextual 
implications, since if p logically implies q, we are entitled 
to infer q from p in any context whatever. Contextual implica- 
tion can be most easily illustrated in a case where there is 
clearly no logical implication. 
If Jones says 'It is raining', Smith is entitled to infer that 
Jones believes that it is raining, although 'Jones believes that 
it is raining' clearly does not follow logically from 'It is 
raining'. Conversely there is clearly no contradiction between 
'It is raining' and 'Jones believes that it isn't raining'; yet 
it would be logically odd for Jones to say 'It is raining, but 
I don't believe it is'. "1 
In this passage, as in others, Nowell -Smith liberally uses the phrase 
"entitled to infer ", and on each occasion of its use we are entitled to 
ask "By what right are we entitled to infer ?" He now proceeds to stipu- 
late three rules for 'contextual implication'. These rules are of course 
philosopher's rules, derived, in this instance, from the analysis of our 
linguistic behaviour - --as the first sentence in the preceding quotation 
indicates. While they are designated as rules of 'contextual implication', 
and while the emphasis is often on what the speaker implies, it is appar- 
ent from the argument that we may also use them from the hearer's point 
of view as rules of 'contextual inference'. This point is worth mention- 
ing, I believe, since if we are to consider the use of words in their 
lEthics, pp. SO-l. 
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contexts it is worth remembering that the speaker on most occasions will 
probably have a clearer understanding of his purpose than will the hearer. 
And if it is the intention of the speaker actually to 'contextually imply' 
something known to him but not to the hearer, then what the hearer 'con- 
textually infers' will only be (from his point of view) more or less 
probable (this is all of course on the supposition that there is such a 
relationship as 'contextual implication', and that such 'implication' is 
not as formally rigid as logical implication). Now he prefaces his intro- 
duction of the rules with the candid admission that they are not "rigid ". 
"Unlike the rules of logical implication they can all be broken without 
the speaker being involved in self- contradiction. "1 If this is the case, 
however, why carry on with the suggestion that 'contextual implication' 
is analogous, even if only roughly so, to 'logical implication'? Either 
we have logical implication (including 'material implication') or we have 
something distinctly different; and if an analogy is to be found for a 
kind of 'implication', or 'inference' which is not formally rigid, it 
would appear to be at hand in empirical procedures. If all of the rules 
of 'contextual implication' are lax, why say that we are "entitled to 
infer" as if, on the occasions when we felt so entitled, our 'inference' 
were based on the new rules? Do we not need other rules, that is, to 
help us to detect when a person is breaking or keeping the new rules? 
And if so, would not the other rules be more fundamental? I will suggest 
that when the question is a matter primarily of a 'descriptive' or 'fac- 
tual' nature, Nowell- Smith, in order to apply the distinction of 'logical 
oddness', would have to rely implicitly not so much on more fundamental 
rules, but rather on more fundamental procedures -- -that is, the empirical 
'Ethics, p. gl. 
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procedures we learn to use in our normal experience. If canons or rules 
of induction were felt to be necessary then these canons or rules would 
be more basic than Nowell -Smith's rules. In any event, if we are to make 
sense of the application of the phrase "logically odd" to any particular 
'explanation' or 'reason' appropriate to a factual or descriptive question, 
we must rely on empirical procedures. This being so, I would suggest 
that in such questions the introduction of the notion of 'logical oddness' 
is otiose. Is there any need, we might ask, to analyse the preceding 
example about Jones and Smith as if Smith's inference about what Jones 
believes is based on any rules beyond the common -sense empirical pro- 
cedures we learn in our normal experience? It is not, in any event, a 
consideration of the single context of the use of the statement by Jones 
that 'entitles' Smith to make an inference about what Jones believes. It 
is rather the past experience of a sufficient number of 'contexts' of 
knowing Jones and people like Jones that would allow Smith to say, in 
effect, "On this occasion of Jone6's saying 'It is raining', in all pro- 
bability Jones believes that it is raining." In this argument, I would 
emphasize, I have stressed that to make sense of Nowell- Smith's distinc- 
tion of "logical oddness" in what might be termed 'factual' or 'descrip- 
tive' questions (such as Smith's trying to 'infer' if Jones believes what 
he says) we must rely on empirical procedures which go beyond the context 
of the sentence as used. This is not to say, that is, that one must rely 
on empirical procedures on every occasion of trying to make sense of the 
distinction, for, as I shall argue, in questions of values the only way 
we could use Nowell -Smith's distinction of "logical oddness" would be to 
make a value judgment in using it. 
Let us now consider the three rules of 'contextual implication': 
"Rule I. When a speaker uses a sentence to make a statement, it 
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is contextually implied that he believes it to be true. And, 
similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs 
for which sentences are used, it is contextually implied that 
he is using it for one of the jobs that it normally does." 
This rule is often broken, he says, in "lying, play -acting, story- telling, 
and irony...." "But these are secondary uses," he continues, "that is 
to say uses to which an expression could not (logically) be put unless 
it had some primary use." Bearing in mind my criticism of the notion of 
'contextual implication' we may replace this rule to read: 
"When a speaker uses a sentence to make a statement, a con- 
sideration of the context of the sentence, as well as of the 
broader context of our past experience with speakers of this 
type in this type of situation, entitles us to make the infer- 
ence that probably he believes his statement to be true... ", 
and so on. 
The same kind of rephrasing is possible for the remaining rules. 
"Rule 2. A speaker contextually implies that he has what he 
believes to be good reasons for his statement." 
This rule, also, may be broken, he says, "and we have special devices for 
indicating when we are breaking it...such as (the phrases) 'speaking off- 
hand...', 'I don't really know but...', and 'I should be inclined to say 
that...'." 
"But unless one of these guardian phrases is used," he continues, 
"we are entitled to believe that the speaker believes himself 
to have good reasons for his statement and we soon learn to 
mistrust people who habitually infringe this rule." 
Consideration of this passage helps to reinforce my point that the context 
of any particular statement in itself does not guide us in judging whether 
a person believes he has good reasons. It is our experience of knowing 
"people who habitually infringe this rule" or mode of behaviour - --our 
experience, that is, of many 'contexts', not simply one. 
"Rule 3. What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to 
the interests of the audience." 
This rule, he adds, "is the most important of the three rules ", but, 
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"unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more 
common than liars or careless talkers." The reason for his saying that 
this is the most important rule becomes apparent when he says that "it is 
particularly obvious in the case of answers to questions, since it is 
assumed that an answer is an answer." In the first two paragraphs of 
the book, we recall, he had said that theoretical sciences "consist in 
answers" to 'theoretical' or 'descriptive' type questions, while practi- 
cal discourse "consists of answers to practical questions" such as "What 
shall I do ?" and "What ought I to do ?" He now grants that "not all state- 
ments are answers to questions; information may be volunteered ", but 
even "the publication of a text -book on trigonometry implies that the 
author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigon- 
ometry, and to give advice implies that the advice is relevant to the 
hearer's problem." The 'rule' turns out, I suggest, not to be a rule so 
much as it is a statement about all 'purposeful' discourse. In other 
words, any statement which is intended, for example, either as advice or 
as a reason to support the advice, is thus primarily a practical and not 
a theoretical statement. Nowell -Smith in effect grants this point in 
the following crucial passage: 
"This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For the 
major problem of theoretical ethics was that of bridging the 
gap between decisions, ought- sentences, injunctions, and 
sentences used to give advice on the one hand, and statements 
of fact that constitute the reasons for these on the other. 
It was in order to bridge these gaps that insight into necessary 
synthetic connexions had to be invoked. The third rule of con- 
textual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to 
be bridged because the reason -giving sentence must turn out 
to be practical from the start and not a statement of fact 
from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. "1 
The rule is indeed of "the greatest importance for ethics ", for, 
Ethics, pp. 82 -g2. 
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if it can be supported, Nowell -Smith would have eliminated the problem 
posed by Hume which has exercised so many philosophers from Kant to the 
present. More must be involved, however, than simply the recognition 
that any sentence which is used to 'support' a value judgment is thereby 
'practical' and thus of the same 'logical type' as the value judgment. 
It is conceivable, for example, that Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson, in their 
respective ways, could have allowed that 'factual' statements which are 
used to 'lead to' value judgments may be termed 'practical', but they 
would have insisted nevertheless that there is no relationship of logical 
implication between them. And more must be involved than simply recog- 
nizing that a particular 'factual' statement expresses an instance of 
the kind of thing of which a person normally expresses approval or dis- 
approval, since this kind of argument has been allowed by emotivists 
among others. As we have already seen,. Nowell -Smith cannot allow that 
the relation between a 'descriptive' sentence and a 'practical' judgment 
or decision is one of strict logical entailment, and later, as we shall 
see, he rejects the kind of deductive procedure proposed by Hare.1 He 
also rejects 'synthetic' relations between 'reason' and judgment, as is 
indicated by the preceding quotation as well as by statements elsewhere 
in the book. He has of course rejected the 'analytic -synthetic' dicho- 
tomy as being applicable to ethics, but the force of this is rather to 
reject those theories which have been based on the error of supposing 
that value judgments were analogous, in their 'logical behaviour', to 
'theoretical' or 'descriptive' sentences. But while the rejection of 
the dichotomy offers no obstacle to philosophers who consider that there 
is no logical relation between 'reason' and 'value judgment' (in fact it 
lEthics, p. 88. 
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would serve to deepen the mystery which they recognize) it does present 
an obstacle to a philosopher who would wish to establish a logical rela- 
tion. Nowell -Smith must, then, (like Hare) present a 'logical apparatus' 
which would allow him to argue 'logically' from a sentence which is both 
'descriptive' and 'practical' to another sentence which is both 'practical' 
and 'descriptive'. That 'apparatus', as we have seen, is the 'apparatus' 
of "logical oddness" and "contextual implication ". But as I have al- 
ready suggested, the °apparatus' is by no means free from trouble, and, 
in what follows, I shall argue that it serves no practical purpose, and, 
indeed, leads to serious paradoxes. I shall thus contend that the pro- 
blem initially posed by Hume yet remains. 
In concluding his remarks about Rule 3, Nowell -Smith makes a 
curious, but I think revealing observation. 
"This rule is, therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or 
rather it shows how, in matters of ordinary language, rules of 
good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we assume that 
it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between 
decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in 
support of them." 
This remark is of interest for three reasons. First, all of the rules are 
at least rules of good manners; but, in the way in which they are ex- 
pressed, it is doubtful if they are anything more. If I doubt, for ex- 
ample, that a man believes what he says or has reasons for what he says, 
or if I doubt that his remarks are truly relevant to my purposes, I 
would not use Nowell- Smith's rules to test my doubts - -- although to act 
in terms of his rules, while testing my doubts, would be to display good 
manners. Rule 3 would be more than a rule of good manners, however, if 
it is differently expressed. As I have suggested, it turns out not to 
be a rule so much as it is a statement of fact that much of our language 
is practical, even the 'scientific' language of text -books. The 'good 
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manners' remark is of interest, as I have said, for two other reasons. 
Nowell -Smith says that "unless we assume that it (Rule 3) is being ob- 
served we cannot understand the connexion between decisions, advice, and 
appraisals and the reasons given in support of them." I have suggested 
that it is one thing to recognize that 'reasons' may be classified as 
'practical' along with decisions, advice, and appraisals, but it is another 
thing to say that there is some kind of logical relation between them. 
This, then, is an assumption which remains unsupported. The third point, 
by way of comparison, is that Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson would readily 
allow that "we cannot understand the connexions between decisions, advice, 
and so on, and the reasons given in support of them." To generalize their 
point of view, they would accept this as simply another of the mysteries 
with which we have to live. 
Following his stipulation of the rules for 'contextual implication' 
Nowell -Smith proceeds to indicate how he intends to use the phrase "logi- 
cal oddness ", and then to prescribe the task of the moral philosopher: 
"I shall say that a question is 'logically odd' if there appears 
to be no further room for it in its context because it has 
already been answered. This is not to say that the question 
is necessarily senseless, but that we should be puzzled to know 
what it meant and should have to give it some unusual interpreta- 
tion. In the example of the man having a nice smoke it was 
logically odd to ask if he was enjoying it, because in that 
particular context his previous remark implied that he was. 
The task of the moral philosopher is to map the mutual 
relationships of moral words, sentences, and arguments; and 
this is a task, not of showing how one statement entails or 
contradicts another, but of showing that in a certain context 
it would be logically odd to assert one thing and deny another 
or to ask a particular question. "1 
To illustrate further what he means by "logically odd" questions, he cites 
three examples of conversations. In these examples the 'good reasons' are, 
respectively, in terms of A- sentences, D-sentences, and G-sentences. The 
lEthics, p. 83. 
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G- sentence example is as follows: 
"A. I'll pay the butcher. 
B. Why? 
A. Because I owe him money. 
B. Why? (Meaning, not 'How did the debt arise ?1, but 'Why is 
the existence of a debt a reason for paying them ?')." 
The second "why ? ", Nowell -Smith says, is "logically odd ". In view of what 
I have said, however, about his shift in the use of the ambiguous word 
"implications ", from its first use as roughly synonymous with "meanings" 
in the sense of 'uses' or 'purposes', to its use as suggestive of 'logi- 
cal implications',) I believe that the use of the phrase "logically odd" 
is logically misleading. A less misleading, indeed appropriate word for 
such questions would be the word which Nowell -Smith used when introducing 
the distinction -- -that is, the word "otiose ", in the sense in which this 
means "not required, serving no practical purposes, and functionless ". 
Even in this weaker sense, however, as I shall indicate shortly, it is 
debatable whether or not the second 'why ?' is otiose. 
Nowell -Smith's concept of "logical oddness ", as I have indicated, 
turns out to be in some manner the criterion for determining whether a 
'reason' is a 'good reason'. In the three types of examples, including 
the preceding G- sentence example, he allows that A's reply to the first 
question in no way entails "the decision to do what he decides to do." 
"Nevertheless ", he continues, "in each case B's second question is 
logically odd. What can he be after? What better reason or 
further reason could he expect to be given after the one that 
has already been given ?i2 
Now it should not go unnoticed that this is expressed in the form of a 
challenge, which, in the case of the example I have quoted, challenges 
one either to agree or disagree with the value judgment that one ought 
to pay his debts. It is not inconceivable, however, as Stevenson would 
lAbove, p. 329. 2Ethics, p. $4. 
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readily allow, that B's second "why ?" is indicative of a genuine evalu- 
ative disagreement (or 'disagreement in attitude'). If we agree that 
the second "why ?" is otiose it is only because we agree with Nowell -Smith's 
value judgment that 'one ought to pay his debts'. Would it be so easy to 
accept Nowell- Smith's distinctions about 'logical oddness' and 'contextual 
implications', however, if we were to choose an example, which is not at 
all difficult to do, in which there is often widespread disagreement with- 
in a community? Examples might be readily drawn from apparent disagree- 
ments over preferences for political parties, capital punishment, national 
health service, and many others. Consider, for example, the following 
conversation: 
"A. I'm going to join the Aldermaston march. 
B. Why? 
A. Because I disapprove of 'the bomb'. 
B. Why? (Meaning 'why is disapproval of the bomb a good reason for 
going to Aldermaston ?'). 
In justice to Nowell -Smith we should of course carry this conversation on 
much farther; but it is logically possible that there would be a point 
at which a final "why ?" would be asked which neither could be answered 
nor which could be said to be logically odd (coming, as it does, from a 
person who believes bombs ought not to be banned). At this point we would 
have the kind of problem which concerned Stevenson; and it is a moral 
problem. Nowell -Smith, it would appear, at least in this important part 
of his book in which he is introducing his main distinctions, has too 
readily closed off the possibility of such a problem. The main force of 
this objection is of course that if he were to recognize Stevenson's 
problem he would have to consider the possibility that his distinctions 
of "logical oddness" is, in questions of value as in questions of 'fact', 
otiose or 'logically odd'. Consideration of the case of genuine dis- 
agreement in attitude would compel him to provide further distinctions 
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or criteria for determining when a question is 'logically odd'; and this 
is the kind of question which he can hardly leave to individual value 
judgments. 
1 
To this point, however, he has not provided any such criteria, 
either for the consideration of questions which are primarily 'descrip- 
tive' or for questions which are primarily 'practical'. As I have argued 
earlier, it would be necessary to rely on empirical procedures beyond 
Nowell -Smith's special rules in order to make sense of the use of "logi- 
cally odd" in questions of 'fact'. I will now suggest that the use of 
the phrase "logically odd" in questions of value is possible only if we 
make a value judgment in applying the phrase. To say that in my example 
of the Aldermaston marcher the second 'why ?' is 'logically odd' is simply 
to make a value judgment disagreeing with B about the merits of banning 
the bomb; and it seems otiose or 'logically odd' to refer to an opposing 
value judgment as 'logically odd'. It would appear that, to this point, 
Stevenson has good grounds for criticizing Nowell -Smith for not being 
sufficiently concerned with inter- personal problems. This problem will 
emerge again later, and, as I shall argue, the use of the concept of 
"logical oddness" leads to further difficulties. 
Nowell -Smith now proceeds to point out that in the three sets of 
examples, the 'reason', in each case, is "a different sort of reason and 
we shall see that it is tied to the decision in a different way. The 
answers, we recall, were samples of A -, D-, and G- sentences. He now 
explains that the remainder of the book "will be largely devoted to a 
discussion of the ways in which these different sorts of reasons fit into 
each other." By way of illustrating the application of his rules he 
begins by providing an analysis of "the role of A- sentences." (Although 
1Cf., Ethics, p. 105, concerning the distinction between "morally 
good reason" and "logically good reason ". 
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I shall use his language in summarizing the section I shall assume that 
on each occasion of his use of the phrase "logically odd ", the word 
"otiose" is more appropriate). 
In choosing A- sentences to illustrate his rules he says that his 
intention is to "keep away from specifically moral uses of words." He 
intends to indicate later that this digression is "not so irrelevant as 
it may seem" since the "operation of 'good', 'right', 'ought', and G- 
words is in many respects similar to that of A- words." Each A -word, he 
says (such as "terrifying, hair -raising, disappointing, disgusting, bene- 
ficial, ridiculous," and so on) "is connected with a specific human 
'reaction'." He grants that "there may be a gerundive element in the 
use of many of these words, especially if they are prefixed by 'truly' 
or 'really';" but for the moment he is concerned with them as 'reaction' 
words. The word "reaction ", he stipulates, 'must be widely construed ", 
and it must be considered to include "attitudes that people might take 
up, emotions they might feel, things that happen to them and things that 
they do." 
"I shall call the reaction 'appropriate' ", he writes, "if it is 
the reaction that is logically tied to the A -word in question, 
for example, 'being frightened' to 'terrifying', without any 
suggestion that the reaction ought to be exhibited in a par- 
ticular case. 
To understand the logic of an A- sentence we must ask, not 
'What does it (always) mean?', but 'What does its use in this 
instance contextually imply ?', 'What would it be logically odd 
to question ?'.111 
When he speaks, in the preceding passage, of a reaction's being 
"logically tied to the A- word ", it is apparent that he uses the word 
"logically" in the same sense as he uses it in the phrase "logically odd ". 
There is of course nothing logically contradictory, in the strict sense 
Ethics, p. 85. 
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of logical implication, as Nowell -Smith allows, for me to be frightened 
and yet to say "my experience is not terrifying." But as he uses the 
word here, it is suggested that it would be "logically odd" for me, if 
I am frightened, to say "my experience is not terrifying." Thus to say 
that a 'reaction' is 'appropriate' is to say, at least, that it is not 
'logically odd'. It is not clear whether we judge that a reaction is 
'appropriate' after we have assessed that further questions would be 
'logically odds, or whether 'logical oddness' is in some sense determined 
because of our judgment that a 'reaction' has been 'appropriate'. But 
this problem is of lesser significance than others we shall face so I 
shall not pursue it. 
He now suggests that there are four main 'elements' which "seem 
to be contextually implied in typical uses." Since they are "contextually 
implied ", and may thus be assessed by the criterion of 'logical oddity', 
we may assume that each of these 'elements' may be considered as a 'rea- 
son' for uttering an A- sentence. He does not say that all of them are 
present on all occasions, nor are they to be considered as equally pro- 
minent. He says that "the relative prominence of the different elements 
will be different on different occasions." These elements are as follows: 
"(a) The subjective element. In default of other evidence the 
use of an A- sentence usually implies that the speaker has 
the appropriate reaction. i1 
Unless the speaker qualified his statement (to say, for example, "It was 
a terrifying ordeal, but I wasn't frightened. ") Nowell -Smith says that 
"we should always be entitled to infer that the speaker has the appro- 
priate reaction." The reaction would be 'appropriate', that is, in the 
sense that it would be 'logically odd' or otiose to ask, 'You say it was 
1For this and remaining 'elements', see Ethics, pp. 85 -87. 
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a terrifying ordeal; but were you frightened ?' 
"(b) The predictive elanent. An A- sentence is sometimes used to 
imply that someone would have the appropriate reaction to 
something if suitable circumstances arose. 
(c) The generalizing element. Sensible people do not make pre- 
dictions (or retrodictions) except on the basis of evidence, 
so that a man who uses an A- sentence to make a prediction 
contextually implies (by Rule 2) that he has what he believes 
to be good reasons for making the predictions. 
(d) The causal element. Things are not just terrifying or amusing 
or comfortable; animals are terrifying if they are strong, 
fierce, and malevolent; plays amusing if they contain a 
high proportion of remarks and situations of a certain sort.... 
To be told that something has an A- characteristic is not to 
be told just what causal properties it has that give it that 
characteristic; but it is contextually implied that it has 
such properties. And if the A -word is sufficiently narrow 
in scope we can often infer what properties it has although 
the speaker does not mention them." 
In considering in what way the 'elements' may be said to be "present 
in" the use of an A- sentence, Nowell -Smith offers an argument which may be 
used against Hare's use of the concept of 'supervenient' or 'consequen- 
tial' characteristics, especially within the 'practical syllogism'. None 
of the 'elements', Nowell -Smith writes, may be said to exhaust "the mean- 
ing of an A- sentence "; nor do they "logically imply" each other (in the 
strict sense of the word "logically "). Thus, he suggests, "we are tempted 
to say that A -words denote special causal properties of bulls, jokes, 
mountains, cars, and so on in virtue of which they cause people to have 
the appropriate reaction." Now while it is not easy to determine what 
exactly Hare considered to be the relationship between his 'consequential' 
characteristics and the things he judged, his theory is close in form at 
least to what Nowell -Smith is here describing as "special causal proper- 
ties". Whether the relationship considered by Hare was causal or not, 
Nowell -Smith generalizes his argument in a way that would encompass 
Hare's theory; and later in the same argument he specifically says that 
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the explanation in terms of "consequential properties "1 is not helpful. 
The logic of the use of A- sentences, he says, "requires no special pro- 
perties which they denote; indeed such properties only make their use 
unintelligible. "2 To support this point he now considers the relation- 
ship between the 'generalizing element' and the 'predictive element' of 
an A- sentence, and the analytic sentences may be seen to be analogous, 
respectively, to the major premiss and the conclusion of Hare's syllo- 
gism. Indeed Nowell- Smith's statement of the major premiss comes close 
to stating one of the two main 'criteria for assent to a general principle' 
postulated by Hare. Hare had said, that is, that the principle should be 
"well- established (i.e. that everyone would agree with it) "; and, in 
fact, he speaks of this as one of the two "elements" in a judgment, the 
other element resembling the "subjective" element in Nowell -Smith's 
analysis.3 Nowell -Smith's example is as follows: 
"(1) Most people of type X, have been frightened by Y's. 
(3) You, being of type X, will be frightened by Y's." 
The relation between these 'elements', he argues, "is clearly inductive ", 
and "subject to those doubts (real or imaginary) which infect all in- 
ductive arguments." Although he says that it is not his purpose to 
"discuss the logical gap, if any, between the premiss and the conclusion,," 
he wishes only "to show that it cannot be bridged by the introduction of 
an A- sentence ". He uses the following A- sentence: 
"(2) Y's are terrifying to people of type X." 
Now this minor premiss, presupposing in this instance either causal or 
consequential characteristics, is analogous to Hare's minor premiss. By 
promoting some of the 'descriptive characteristics' to 'consequential', 
Hare had hoped that the conclusion might in some way be validly drawn. 
!Ethics, p. 90. 
3Hare, LM, p. 196. 
2Ethics, p. 87. 
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Nowell -Smith argues, however, that the minor premiss "either does too 
much or too little." 
"(a) If it is held to be both a logical consequence of (1) and 
to be a logical implicant of (3) it converts the inductive 
argument into a deductive one. But clearly your being 
frightened does not follow logically from the fact of others 
having been frightened in the past." 
Nor, as I had argued, does a particular value judgment follow from a gen- 
eral one by means of Hare's practical syllogism. Nowell -Smith continues. 
"(b) If both the steps from (1) to (2) and from (2) to (3) are 
held to be inductive, we are worse off than we were before. 
Not only have we now two inductive leaps to make; one of 
them is such that we could never have any reason for making 
it. There are no tests for Y's being terrifying other than 
the fact that people have been terrified by them.... 
(c) It might be said that the step from (1) to (2) is quasi - 
analytic, as it surely is. But we are still no better off 
than before. For, on this interpretation, our evidence 
for the belief that Y's are terrifying is identical with 
our evidence for the belief that people have been frightened 
by them. And if we are allowed to pass from (2) to (3) we 
must also be allowed to pass direct from (1) to (3); so 
that the introduction of (2) is otiose. "1 
Whatever precisely Hare had intended by his theory of 'consequential 
characteristics °, either of the arguments, (a) or (c), would be sufficient 
to raise serious doubts about it. 
Although Nowell - Smith argues against the thesis that an A -word, 
such as "terrifying ", 4oes not denotes either causal or consequential 
properties, nevertheless (as is apparent from his recognizing that there 
is a "causal element" in A- sentences) he does not dismiss the notion 
that a 'reaction' has been caused. And since A -words are 'logically 
tied'to 'reactions' ( "logically" here is in the sense of "logically odd "), 
the link between 'causes' and A -words is very close. A words, he goes on 
to say, "imply the presence of causal properties without saying what these 
1This and preceding quotations, Ethics, p. 88. 
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properties are." This 'implication', in fact, is one of the main purposes 
of A- sentences. A- sentences, he suggests, provide "explanations ", if 
"only at a very lowly level ". The explanations, as the analysis of the 
'elements' indicates, are of a 'predictive' and a 'generalizing' nature 
in that they may 'imply' that "most people would have been terrified "; 
and, secondly, as I have just mentioned, that they "imply the presence 
of unspecified causal properties because of which a thing causes the 
'reaction' that it does; but they do not name such properties." He now 
points out why he had distinguished between the two questions, "For what 
job is the word...used ?" and "Under what conditions is it proper to use 
the word...for that job ?" In reply to the first question he says "A- 
words are used to give explanations and to make predictions "; and, in 
reply to the second, he adds "But their use for these purposes is only 
proper if the speaker has reasons of a certain sort which are not stated 
but contextually implied." Almost in the nature of an after -thought, 
important though it may be, he writes, "They are also used to express 
reactions; and it is this fact that tempts us to equate 'X's are nice' 
with 'I like X's1. 11 1 To equate "X's are nice" with the naturalistic 
formula "I like X's" would be wrong, he suggests, for two reasons. First, 
the sentence "X's are nice" serves other purposes (the 'predictive' and 
'generalizing' purposes, that is); and, secondly, it would be "misleading, 
and therefore improper, if the speaker knew that his taste was peculiar 
and that this fact was important." While the speaker may be expressing 
the same 'reaction' with the sentence "X's are nice" as he does with "I 
like X's ", it would be 'logically odd' for him to equate the expressions 
in view of the different purposes they serve. 
lEthics, p. 90. 
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It may be seen from this summary of his analysis of A -words and 
sentences that, by comparison with the emotivists, Nowell -Smith has shifted 
the emphasis of 'non -cognitivism' considerably towards the 'descriptive' 
or 'cognitive' or 'naturalistic' elements of practical words. Whereas 
Stevenson would have said that the primary purpose of 'emotive' words 
(whether related to first or second -order dispositions, or whether simple 
expressions of emotion or moral value judgments) is to express and evoke 
or alter or reinforce attitudes, Nowell -Smith now suggests that the pri- 
mary purpose of A- words, or rather words used with A- force, is "to give 
explanations and to make predictions." The 'subjective element' of A 
words, recognized by the statement "they are also used to express re- 
actions", is secondary, and is seen primarily as a logical obstacle to 
the expression of a naturalistic theory. While Stevenson had allowed 
that many of our 'emotive' words are rich in their descriptive meaning, 
and of course his second -pattern of analysis was designed to bring out 
such richness, he held to the view that the primary purpose of all such 
words is in some sense emotive or dynamic. 
Section 4 
In undertaking an assessment of the purposes for which practical 
discourse is used, Nowell -Smith again emphasizes the Wittgensteinian 
distinction that words are tools, rather than labels, and that, like 
tools, they may be used for different purposes. Even more important, he 
says, is that they "can be used to do more than one job on any given 
occasion." This is of such importance, he believes, that he introduces 
what he terms the "Janus- principle ": "the principle that a given word 
can not only do two or more jobs at once but also is often, in the 
absence of counter- evidence or express withdrawal, presumed to be doing 
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two or more jobs at once. "1 The 'old model' of language which considers 
words as labels is, he asserts, "not just misleading; it is wholly 
wrong." Using the 'old model', moral philosophers had assumed that the 
value word "good ", for example, had the same 'meaning' in all contexts; 
but with the 'new model' we may appreciate that "the words with which 
moral philosophers have especially to do, which are usually called 'value 
words', play many different parts." Nowell-Smith now makes a statement 
which clearly goes beyond anything that had been said by his predecessors. 
"They ('value- words') are used to express tastes and preferences, 
to express decisions and choices, to criticize, grade, and 
evaluate, to advise, admonish, warn, persuade and dissuade, 
to praise, to encourage and reprove, to promulgate and draw2 
attention to rules; and doubtless for other purposes also. " 
While recognizing the many purposes for which value -words are used, 
he chooses to begin his analysis with "choosing, deciding, and preferring ". 
He grants that the giving of 'pride of place' to any one 'purpose' is 
"to some extent...as in an axiomatic system, a matter of choice." But 
he considers his choice "convenient" since he had begun his study "by 
posing the fundamental question as 'What shall I do ?'." This statement, 
it should be noted, is not the same as his initial statement in the 
second paragraph of the book. There he had said that "the most important" 
of "practical questions" are "'What shall I do ?' and 'What ought I to 
do?'". Later, as I have already indicated, he will argue that "What 
shall I do ?" is 'logically' more fundamental than "What ought I to do ? "; 
thus his decision now to emphasize "What shall I do ?" is by no means 
trivial. 
His first task is to stipulate how he intends to use the words 
"choosing ", "deciding ", and "preferring ". "Choosing ", as he will use 
Ethics, p. 100. 2lbid. , p. 98. 
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the word, means "something that we do ". He grants that it is possible 
to "choose without doing anything ", such as in a man's choosing a place 
for his holiday next year. "In his case," Nowell -Smith says, "we may 
equally say that he had decided or made up his mind where to go. The 
decision is, as it were, put into cold storage to be taken out and acted 
on when the appropriate time comes." Although we may use the word "choose" 
as we would use "decision ", Nowell -Smith intends to limit his use to "cases 
where choosing involves doing something at the time." One may make a 
decision, then, and not yet choose to do it; thus, he says, "a decision 
does not therefore entail a choice." 
"But the relation between the two is, nevertheless, not a con- 
tingent one," he continues. "The fact that people choose to 
do what they have decided to do is not something that we dis- 
cover by observation of human behaviour. The relation is one 
of quasi -implication. A man may decide, for example, to vote 
for Jones and be prevented from doing so by sickness or the 
cancellation of election. But, in default, of such explanation, 
there is no logical gap between deciding and doing. "1 
Now although this is obviously an important stage in the development of 
his theory, it is, I believe, a questionable argument, and this may be 
seen by considering it from two approaches. First, it would appear that 
Nowell -Smith has again been misled by the analogy which he has seen between 
'logical implication' and 'contextual implication'. In this passage, 
especially in view of the use of the term "quasi-implication", it is 
apparent that the word "logical" is used in the sense in which it is used 
in "logically odd ". It would be 'logically odd', that is, to make a 
decision and not choose to do it. But since we are not dealing with 
strict logical implication, and since Nowell -Smith wishes to make a clear 
distinction between his uses of the words "decision" and "choosing ", it 
is not logically contradictory for me to say, for example, "I decided to 
lEthics, p. 101. 
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shoot the Prime Minister, but I am not choosing to do so ". Nowell -Smith 
would of course grant this. As I have argued earlier, however, we cannot 
assess the question of 'logical oddness' simply from the context in which 
the statement is made, and we must involve ourselves in empirical pro- 
cedures and value judgments in deciding whether 'reasons' for our 'de- 
cisions' as well as 'choices' are 'appropriate' - -- despite Nowell-Smith's 
denial in this and other instances. His procedure to overcome this 
objection, however, is to smuggle the 'reasons' into the context as if 
they were necessarily a part of all contexts. In this instance, he goes 
on to say that there are two, and only two, reasons for not choosing to 
do what I had decided to do; and he wishes to make the relation between 
deciding and choosing not simply a 'quasi- analytic' relationship but, as 
he says, an "analytic" relationship. 
"...'choosing' and 'deciding' are used in such a way that it is 
analytic to say that if a man has decided to do something and 
does not do it then either he was prevented or he changed his 
mind. n1 
Thus, by definition, he would establish a logical link between 'choosing' 
and 'deciding'. This does not alter the fact, however, that in order to 
assess whether or not a person's particular choice or action is 'logi- 
cally at odds' with his decision, we must assess 'by observation of his 
behaviour' whether he has been prevented or has changed his mind. We 
cannot simply say, in abstraction or isolation from a context, that people 
will choose to do what they have decided to do, and that there is no 
'logical' gap between deciding and doing. In order to argue that there 
is no logical gap, and that the relation is 'analytic', Nowell -Smith 
would have to indulge in precisely the kind of traditional philosophy 
which his new logic, with its emphasis on 'contextual implications' was 
1Ethics, p. 102 (my underlining). 
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designed to supersede. 
As I have mentioned, there are two ways of indicating that Nowell - 
Smith's argument is inadequate. The second way is to use an argumentum 
ad hominem in terms of the argument itself, and to indicate that a con- 
sequence of the argument is to make the concept of 'logically odd' otiose, 
at least in this context. An important part of his attempt to make the 
relation between 'deciding' and 'choosing' analytic was to introduce as 
one of the key 'reasons' the possibility that the speaker may have changed 
his mind. How, then, does Nowell-Smith use the phrase "he changed his 
mind "? When speaking about the man who has 'decided' where to go on his 
holiday, Nowell -Smith used the phrase "he made up his mind" as synonymous 
with "decided "; and in the context of the argument, since it could not 
be said to mean "chose ", the act of 'changing one's mind' must be con- 
sidered as a 'counter -decision' to the original decision -- -that is, a 
new decision. Thus a reconstruction of the preceding quotation in which 
Nowell -Smith seeks to establish a logical link between 'choosing' and 
'deciding' would now be as follows: 
"...'choosing' and 'deciding' are used in such a way that it is 
analytic to say that if a man has decided to do something and 
does not do it then either he was prevented or he decided not 
to do it." 
But if he had decided not to do it, then his choosing not to do it is 
not logically odd. Indeed, now to choose to 'follow' the initial decision 
would be 'logically odd'. If this is the case (and considering that we 
would excuse a person who had been prevented from doing something) one 
can never say that a particular choice is 'logically odd', even if it 
appears 'at odds' with a previous 'decision- stating' sentence. Nowell- 
Smith must allow, then, that anything I choose to do is not 'logically 
odd'; and since, as I have argued, the use of the tool 'logical oddness' 
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in assessing reasons for choices is itself based on a value judgment, 
the theory is thus committed to a form of the Socratic paradox -- -that I 
always choose to do what I morally approve of doing. It seems reasonable 
to conclude, then, that so long as Nowell -Smith wishes to distinguish 
between the uses of the words "decision" and "choosing" as he does (and 
I am not questioning this distinction), he cannot maintain that there is 
either an analytic or a quasi -analytic link between them. 
The distinction he would make between the uses of "choosing" and 
"preferring" is of special interest since in analysing these words Nowell - 
Smith introduces the word "good" for the first time as an object of analy- 
sis. This argument is of importance to him later, since by assuming it, 
as I shall indicate later, he is able to suggest that the fundamental use 
of value words is in choosing and advising rather than in value judgments 
which 'appraise' or give 'verdicts'.1 "The word 'good'," he says, "can 
be used to express a preference and when so used is always a concealed 
comparative." If a speaker's statement of preference (in other words a 
value judgment) is challenged, "he must be prepared" to make a comparison 
between the thing he terms "good" and other things not so good. Sentences 
which express 'preferences' are, then, value sentences used to assert or 
imply that something is better than another. But Nowell- Smith distinguishes 
between sentences expressing 'preferences' and those expressing 'deci- 
sions'. 
"Preference begins," he continues, "with thinking this course 
better than that and ends with deciding that it is the best, 
and the sentences that we use to express preferences are tied 
to those used for expressing decisions in the same quasi - 
analytic way that the latter are tied to doing. There is no 
need therefore to try to bridge the gap between 'this is the 
best thing for me to do' and 'I shall do this'. In deciding 
that something is the best thing for him to do a man has already 
decided to do it," 
1See Ethics, D. 170. 
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There is, then, he suggests,a quasi -analytic link between a sentence ex- 
pressing a 'preference' and a sentence expressing a 'decision'; and the 
same kind of quasi -analytic link between the sentence expressing a 'de- 
cision' and a sentence expressing the act of 'choosing to do it'. If 
the quasi -analytic link is the same kind, then my arguments against his 
distinction between "decision" and "choosing ", may apply equally against 
his distinction between "preference" and "decision ". This is to suggest, 
then, that there is a 'gap' between 'preferences', on the one hand, and 
'decisions' and 'choices' on the other. 
Nowell -Smith is obviously concerned with the type of objection 
which I have offered, for he goes on to say that "choice would be an 
unfathomable mystery" if a sentence expressing a 'preference' and the 
sentence expressing the 'decision' to take it "were interpreted as being 
only 'synthetically' connected with each other." "A mysterious gap would 
always emerge," he continues, "for it would make sense to say; 'I prefer 
this course to any other (or this is the best course for me), but shall 
I do it ?'." This, however, is a 'loaded' way of stating the alternative. 
It is not even a convincing persuasive argument for a philosopher to say 
"The relation is either quasi -analytic or else it is an unfathomable 
mystery." As I have suggested earlier, Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson would 
not have been swayed by such an argument. Possibly the relation between 
a sentence stating a preference and a sentence expressing the decision 
to take it is ultimately, like so many problems facing us, an unfathomable 
mystery. 
Perhaps the most paradoxical consequence of Nowell -Smith's theory 
is one that emerges most clearly in his important chapter "Reasons for 
Choosing ". In that chapter he directly considers the question of "giving 
reasons for our decision ", and he begins by pointing out that the phrase 
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"good reason" is ambiguous. 
"It may mean 'morally good reason', that is to say a reason which 
justifies an action and exempts the agent from censure; or it 
may mean 'logically good reason', that is to say, a reason which 
leaves no further reason for the question 'What shall I do ?' or 
for the question 'Why did you (he) do that ?'." 
355 
As we may expect, Nowell -Smith will use "good reason" in the latter sense; 
and he later emphasizes that "by a 'logically good reason'" he does "not 
mean a morally good reason. "1 In the earlier context he explains his 
intention. 
"In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding 
chapter, our task is not to discover propositions that entail 
a decision to act but propositions which are such that, once 
they are granted, it would be logically odd either to ask for 
further reasons for doing something or for a further explana- 
tion of why someone did it. "2 
He indicates, further, that "precisely the same vocabulary is used both 
in deliberating ante rem and in explaining post rem why someone did what 
he did." Now the main point of contention in the preceding quotation is 
the phrase "once they are granted ". In a case of a question concerning 
a 'practical' problem, as I have argued, if I agree (or we may now use 
the word "grant ") that a person's 'reason' or 'explanation' for a deci- 
sion, or a choice, is 'appropriate' or 'not logically odd', I do so only 
because I have made a value judgment agreeing with his. Conversely, if 
I think that a person's question or reason is 'logically odd', I do so 
by making a value judgment which disagrees with the value judgment ex- 
pressed in the sentence or sentences giving his 'reasons'. Thus the 
phrase "once they are granted" is all -important and cannot be by- passed 
without serious consideration. It is indeed fundamental to the whole 
question of 'logical oddity' in the preceding attempt to distinguish 
between a 'morally good reason' and a 'logically good reason'. But in 
lEthics, p. 114. 2Ethics, p. 105 (my underlining). 
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'granting' the 'appropriateness' of a 'reason', I must say, in effect, I 
have a 'pro -attitude' for your 'reason'. It would appear that in order 
to apply the phrase "logically odd" to 'reasons' for decisions and choices 
we must conclude, despite Nowell -Smith's wishes to the contrary, that the 
phrases "logically good reason" (in his special sense of "logically ") and 
"morally good reason" are indistinguishable. 
Nowell -Smith next considers the question "Are all the reasons that 
can be given of the same logical type ?" And he answers, in effect, "in 
one sense, no ", and "in another sense, yes". The answer is 'no' to the 
type of theory as postulated by Hobbes, "according to whom all action is 
caused by desire or aversion ",1 if "desire" and "aversion" are considered 
as what we have termed "occurrence" words. Hobbes' mistake, according to 
Nowell -Smith, is in believing that "motive- explanations all conform to 
one pattern and specifically to the itch -scratch pattern.... "2 This is 
not to suggest that an explanation in terms of the 'itch -scratch pattern' 
is never appropriate; but that to use the word "desire" as if it always 
had reference to feelings, and not also to what we have termed "disposi- 
tions", would be logically misleading. As I have suggested earlier,3 a 
major difficulty with Ayer's first version of the emotive theory of values 
was that he tended to assume what Nowell -Smith has now termed the "itch - 
scratch" analysis of "feelings ". While Nowell -Smith would, then, reject 
this kind of 'single -pattern' analysis, he does not, however, completely 
reject Hobbes' theory. Hobbes had suggested a general distinction, that 
is, between "endeavour toward" and "endeavour fromward" which could have 
a wider reference than "desire" and "aversion" in the 'occurrence' sense. 
Nowell -Smith believes that there is good reason for this kind of general 
lEthics, p. 106. 2Ibid., p. 111. 3Above, Ch. II, p. 96. 
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distinction, but, in order to avoid the possibility that his theory might 
be misunderstood if he uses a word like "desire ", he adopts the course of 
inventing "a new generic word ". Like Stevenson, he chooses the word 
"attitude "; but instead of Stevenson's "approval" and "disapproval ", or 
Hobbes' "endeavour toward" and "endeavour fromward ", Nowell - Smith uses 
the terms "pro- attitude" and "con- attitude ". As we shall see, he would 
use this distinction in a different way from Stevenson's use of "approval" 
and "disapproval ". To illustrate 'pro -' and 'con -attitude' words he 
offers the following lists: 
List A List B 
like Hate 
Approve of Dislike 








Interested in Try to avoid 
Fond of Try to prevent 
Try to achieve Try to get rid of 
Try to acquire Try to stop 
Try to obtain Try to avert 
Try to prolong 
He goes on to say that he has "deliberately included in these lists con- 
cepts of different logical types in order to make clear that the use of 
'having a pro- attitude towards' should not be restricted to any one 
pattern ". Whether he is suggesting it or not, the fact that he has 
included Stevenson's "approve of" and "disapprove of" in these lists 
would not warrant any suggestion that Stevenson had used these words in 
any 'single- pattern' sense. Stevenson had not analysed the word "atti- 
tude" in any detail, and, like Nowell -Smith, he recognized that it was 
a vague term. He had said, however, that within his class of 'attitudes' 
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were "purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences, desires, and so on, "1 
and his use of the terms "approval" and "disapproval" was intended to 
express much the same 'pro' and 'con' distinction among these attitudes 
as Nowell -Smith's use of "pro- attitudes" and "con- attitudes ". It is of 
interest that Stevenson says in a footnote that his use of the word 
"attitude" is "in much the same broad sense that R.B. Perry gives to 
'interest'." Now in his Realms of Value (a later book than the one men- 
tioned by Stevenson) Perry uses the word "interest" in a manner verbally 
similar to Nowell -Smith's use of "attitude ". Perry writes that "the word 
n 
'interest' points to attitudes of for and against..., and the word "is 
to be taken as a class name for such names as 'liking'- 'disliking', 
'loving'- 'hating', 'hoping' -'fearing', 'desiring' -'avoiding', and countless 
other kindred names. "2 If there is a difference between Nowell- Smith's 
lists of 'pro'- and 'con- attitudes' and those suggested by the others, 
it would be in that he has included what might be called 'doing - words', 
such as "try to achieve" and "try to prolong ". He is aware of, and un- 
moved by the possible criticism "that many of the items on the list would 
not normally be said to have anything to do with 'attitudes' at all. The 
word 'attitude' has been selected," he adds, "just because it is vague. 
The important point that I wish to bring out lies in the words 'Pro' and 
'Con'. "3 Since language used to express efforts to 'achieve', 'acquire', 
'obtain', and 'prolong' might well be considered, however, within Steven - 
son's list of 'purposes', 'aspirations', 'wants', 'preferences', 'desires', 
and so on, it is a debatable point whether there is any significant dif- 
ference in intention between the two in their proposed analyses of 
'attitude -expressing' language. One difference, in fact, is that Nowell- 
1Stevenson, EL, p. 3. 
3Ethics, p. 112. 
2Perry, Realms of Value, pp. 6 -7. 
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Smith tends to blur the distinction between A -words and fl- words, and he 
thus comes closer to 'naturalism' than Stevenson would condone. This 
will become apparent in my subsequent argument. 
One of the two major problems for moral philosophy for Stevenson, 
we recall, was the problem of proving and supporting ethical judgments. 
The practical (we might say 'moralistic') motivation for Stevenson was, 
as we have seen, the settling of ethical disagreements. To do this he 
was prepared to go so far as to make an assumption which "one may even 
cling to...in desperation, as the only hope of settling issues that may 
otherwise lead to serious discord. "1 That assumption was that "all 
disagreement in attitude is rooted in disagreement in belief." Thus he 
argued that "lu statement about matter of fact which speaker 
considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or 
against an ethical judgment. "2 A 'good' reason, we may assume, would be 
a 'reason' which led to the resolution of a disagreement in attitudes of 
two or more people, or the resolution of a conflict of attitudes in an 
individual; and the relation between that 'reason' and a value judgment, 
as we have seen, is fundamentally psychological rather than logical. He 
allowed of course that a disagreement in attitudes could also be resolved 
by non -rational means, such as when a person tries to alter another per- 
son's attitudes by means of value judgments and other 'persuasive instru- 
ments' rather than by rational argument concerning 'beliefs'. Such non - 
rational procedures would not be termed "reasons ", however, for , as he 
had said, "if any ethical dispute is not rooted in disagreement in belief, 
then no reasoned solution of any sort is possible. "3 How, then, does 
lAbove, Ch. III, p. 170. 
2Stevenson, EL, p. 171+. .
EL, p. 13$. 
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Nowell- Smith's use of the distinction between 'pro -' and 'con -attitudes' 
compare with Stevenson's approach? 
The most obvious difference is of coarse that Nowell -Smith wishes 
to maintain that there is a quasi -logical relationship between 'reasons', 
or 'explanations', and 'choices', or 'decisions'. Now instead of con- 
sidering the expression of, say, a 'con- attitude' word as being indica- 
tive either of a person's disagreement in attitude with another person, 
or of a conflict of attitudes in an individual, Nowell -Smith contends 
that the use of such a word may be considered as a reason, or an explana- 
tion for a decision, or a choice. 
"Sentences containing pro - and con -words," he says, "provide 
good --that is to say, logically complete -- explanations of 
choice. If you ask a man why he is gardening or why he is 
going to turn on the wireless and he says that he enjoys 
gardening or wants to hear some music, he has given a reply 
that makes a repetition of the question logically odd. "1 
He tends to pay more attention to 'pro- words' than to 'con- words', but he 
regards their 'logical behaviour' as being the same, as may be seen from 
the preceding quotation. Speaking of 'pro- words' only, however, he pro- 
ceeds to write the following passage: 
"Pro -words differ from each other in many ways, but they all have 
this in common that they provide logically impeccable explana- 
tions of why someone chose to do something. They also provide 
logically impeccable reasons for deciding to do or not to do 
something. The 'reason for doing' which is expressed by such 
a phrase as 'because I want...' or 'because I enjoy...' may be 
counteracted by other and more weighty reasons for making the 
opposite choice; but each pro -sentence refers to a reason and, 
in the absence of counter- reasons, it would be logically odd not 
to choose.s2 
It is regrettable that he does not more thoroughly analyse what could be 
meant by saying that a reason "may be counteracted by other and more 
weighty reasons." What is meant by the phrase "more weighty "? How do 
hthics, D. 113. 2Ethics, p. 114. 
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we make such a judgment? Unless we are given a satisfactory answer to 
these questions the theory may be said to lead to difficulties. If I 
say, for example, that I did something "because I enjoyed doing its', and 
if it is allowed that any such reason "may be counteracted by a more 
weighty reason ", then, in any particular context, how can it be definitely 
said that the initial reason I gave is "logically impeccable "? Would 
there not always be some uncertainty ? -- -There is a further and more 
serious difficulty as we shall see shortly. 
Nowell- ±lii.th emphasizes the point we have seen earlier that by a 
'logically good reason' he does not mean a 'morally good reason'. This, 
as I have argued is a debatable distinction within his theory. 
"By a 'logically good reason'," he writes, "I do not mean a 
morally good reason; I mean anything which, when offered as 
an explanation of why someone chose to act as he did, has the 
force of making further questioning logically odd.il 
The test -case for such a view would obviously be the giving of reasons 
for a morally reprehensible action; and Nowell - Smith considers this possi- 
bility. If we ask a man who is torturing a cat why he is doing it, and 
if he replies "because I enjoy it ", then, according to Nowell -Smith, "the 
reply does not give a morally good reason; but logically it is impeccable." 
Thus, by definition, Nowell -Smith seals off any further questioning of a 
'reason' (despite the fact, as we have just seen, that it is possible 
that there are 'more weighty reasons'). The effect of this is to say 
that "logically good reason" is equivalent in its use to the word "motive "; 
and if a person can cite his 'motive' for acting as he did, he has thereby 
provided a 'logically good reason'. And since Nowell -Smith appears to 
use the word "motive" in the same way as he uses "pro -" and "con- attitude ", 
he thus says that "anything which could be offered as a logically good 
Ethics, p. 114. 
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reason for or against doing anything must be included in the lists" of 
'pro -' and 'con- attitude' words. 
"The proposition that any statement which gives a logically 
complete reason for choice must include a reference to a pro - 
or a con -attitude is thus a frank tautology. "1 
If, then, it is 'appropriate' to continue to ask "why ?" of a person's 
reason or explanation, this is indicative of the fact that the alleged 
reason or explanation is not a good reason or explanation, and makes no 
reference to either a pro- or con -attitude. It is his intention to indi- 
cate later, he says, that "deontological words (right, obligation, duty, 
and their cognates) never give logically complete reasons for choice." 
"To put the point in a paradox which I shall defend later," he 
writes, "'believing that something is the right thing to do' 
and 'believing that something is my duty' are never good reasons 
for doing it and such beliefs never explain why people do what 
they do.r2 
We must wait, then, for an explanation of this point - -- although, in view 
of my criticism of his use of the concept of 'logical oddness' it would 
appear that the paradox is only mildly startling by comparison with 
other paradoxes to which the theory leads. It may be wondered, that is, 
if, on the basis of his distinctions, any reasons he could offer may be 
said to be good reasons. This possibility may be supported by further 
consideration of his theory of 'pro -' and 'con -attitudes' as he has intro- 
duced it. 
As Stevenson has said in his review- article, Nowell -Smith tends to 
emphasize 'personal' rather than 'inter- personal' problems; and his manner 
of using the distinction of 'pro -' and 'con- attitudes' is another example 
of Stevenson's point. Nowell -Smith's emphasis, that is, does not suggest 
any concern to resolve the 'disagreement in attitudes' that would be 
llbid. 2lbid., p. 115. 
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indicated if two people who were judging a person or object, or who were 
trying to decide a course of action, expressed conflicting statements. 
His emphasis, despite the possibility of such a 'conflict' or despite 
problems faced by an individual when considering alternative decisions or 
choices, is rather on whether an individual could provide a good reason 
for a particular decision, or choice. If in making his distinction he 
can say "I like" or "I dislike ", "I approve of" or "I disapprove of ", 
"I love" or "I detest" (and so on throughout the lists of pro - and con - 
words), then he has provided a "logically impeccable'reason" for his 
decision, or choice. Such a view, however, may be seen to lead, again, 
to a serious paradox if we consider a case of inter- personal disagreement. 
We may again consider the example of the Aldermaston marcher' (in which 
I had deliberately used one of the con -attitude phrases from Nowell -Smith's 
list, that is "disapprove of "). Now it is reasonable to suppose that in 
any such argument B would, at some point, say or clearly indicate that 
the 'reason' for his persistent questioning is that he "approves of" the 
policy of having 'the bomb'. Thus we would have a situation where the 
conflicting sentences "I approve of 'the bomb'" and "I disapprove of 
'the bomb'" are each said to be "logically impeccable reasons" for the 
conflicting attitudes. Later in the book Nowell- canith warns against 
speaking of "conflicting moral attitudes as 'contradictory', "2 since this 
might run the risk of supposing that moral discourse is analogous to 
empirical discourse. For the sake of argument I shall abide by his wish 
and instead of saying that the sentences "I approve of 'the bomb," and 
"I disapprove of 'the bomb l" are 'logically contradictory', I shall use 
"logically" in much the same sense as he uses it in "logical oddness" 
'Above, p. 340. 2Ethics, p. 195, also p. 268. 
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and I shall say simply that the conflicting sentences are 'logically at 
odds' with each other. (This, I believe, is to understate my case). His 
theory is thus committed to allowing that there may be situations in which 
two people provide 'logically impeccable reasons' for statements which are 
'logically at odds' with each other. What purpose could be served in such 
instances by referring to the 'logically at odds' reasons as each being 
'logically impeccable'? The word "reason" is used in a trivial sense if 
its only purpose is to indicate, in effect, that a person understands 
his motives or knows what he is doing. 
This completes my summary and assessment of Nowell -Smith's exposi- 
tion of the basic distinctions for the use of his new 'logical apparatus'. 
If my criticism has been sound, it is apparent that, like Hare's argument, 
Nowell -Smith's has a serious weakness, and that this weakness is in his 
central thesis. That thesis, as I have indicated at the beginning of the 
chapter, was designed primarily to indicate that no 'logical gap' exists 
between 'reasons' and value judgments, and decisions, and choices. This 
is essentially the same problem which had been posed by Hume. While Ayer 
and Stevenson had followed Hume in accepting that there is a gap and that 
it is logically unbridgeable, Hare had tried to bridge it and had failed. 
Nowell -Smith, with the same motive as Hare, has rested his case on his 
use of the concepts of "logical oddness" and "contextual implications". 
While there is undoubtedly much of value in his analysis of language, his 
central thesis, like Hare's is unconvincing and to this point Hume's 
problem remains unresolved. The weakness of Nowell- Smith's basic thesis 
affects later arguments. Since the book is of such a comprehensive 
nature, I shall be considerably more selective in my choice of remaining 
arguments. It will of course be necessary to consider his analysis of 
G- words, and of the words "good ", "right ", and "ought ". I shall also 
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consider his arguments against the 'Persuasive Theory' which he, like 
Hare, would wish to reject. 
Section 5 
Nowell -Smith presents his main discussion of G -words in his chapter 
"Advice and Exhortation "; and it is in this chapter that he also makes 
his major attempt to dissociate himself from what he has termed the 
"Persuasive Theory ". He does not mention the name of any of the philo- 
sophers who have said, in their various ways, that moral judgments are 
'persuasive', but since Stevenson would appear to be the most formidable 
opponent I shall consider his theory as the representative of such theories. 
The attempt to reject the 'Persuasive Theory' comes at the end of the 
chapter, but the argument presupposes distinctions made earlier in the 
chapter which should be considered, in addition of course to his analysis 
of G-words. I would not wish to suggest, in any event, that the 'rejec- 
tion' of the 'persuasive' theory is the only matter of importance in the 
chapter, since what he has to say earlier is of interest as a contribution 
to the tradition of the analysis of 'practical language'. 
He begins the chapter with the following statement: 
"Practical language is not only used for making up our own minds 
what to do; it is also used for telling others what to do, and 
there are four main types of situation in which we do this." 
As we have already seen, Nowell -Smith offers a more detailed list of 
purposes of 'practical language' than have the earlier philosophers we 
have considered.' Nevertheless, with his emphasis on the question "What 
shall I do ?" as the fundamental 'practical' question, he has not as yet 
clearly indicated a 'purpose' or 'function' of practical language which 
could not be considered as a 'species' of the general purpose expressed 
'Above, p. 349. 
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by the word "choosing ". He implicitly grants this in the preceding quo- 
tation when he makes the general statement that "practical language is 
not only used for making up our own minds...." A difficulty apparently 
resulting from this emphasis has been, as I have indicated, that it tends 
to pass over the problem emphasized by Stevenson when he says that there 
may be a basic and apparently irreconcilable disagreement in attitudes. 
Nowell-Smith, as I have pointed out, stresses such a disagreement in 
rejecting 'objectivist' theories, but in other crucial contexts in which 
he has been postulating his own special theory he has ignored it. We 
must consider, then, whether Stevenson's criticism is overcome by Nowell- 
Smith's classification of the "four main types of situation" in which we 
use practical language "for telling others what to do ". Although in the 
chapter we are discussing he intends only to treat what he terms "Advice" 
and "Exhortation ", we may nevertheless consider the classification separ- 
ately before considering the two specific types. If a situation indica- 
tive of 'practical disagreement' is to be presented one would assume that 
it would be among the four types. These are as follows: 
"(a) Cases of giving instructions about the best, simplest, most 
convenient, etc., way of doing what the recipient of the 
instructions has already decided to do or of achieving an 
end that he has already decided to aim at. These cases do 
not seem to give rise to any philosophical difficulties 
since, although such instructions cannot be identified with 
hypothetical statements in the form 'You will only succeed 
if you do...', their value as instructions depends mainly 
in the truth of the hypotheticals with which they are in- 
timately connected; and this is an empirical matter. 
(b) Cases in which Jones tries to help Smith to solve a problem 
of choice, which is not just a problem about means or methods. 
I shall call these cases of Advice. 
(c) Cases in which Jones tries to persuade Smith to do something 
by using the language of advice without the proper contextual 
implications. I shall call these cases of Exhortation. The 
choice of the words 'advice' and 'exhortation' to distinguish 
the two types of case is somewhat arbitrary; but the distinc- 
tion between the cases is real and important. 
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(d) Cases in which Jones commands or orders Smith to do some- 
thing. "1 
In view of Stevenson's criticism I believe it may be said that 
there is a prima facie case for saying that there are at least two further 
types which are ignored by this classification - --at least it may be said 
that Nowell -Smith's manner of expressing the four types does not do justice 
to two other possible types. In expressing Types (b) and (c), Nowell - 
Smith appears to assume that Type (6) is typical of cases in which language 
is used to tell other people what to do while using "the proper contextual 
implications." As he has expressed it, however, he presents Jones as 
trying to help Smith to solve Smith's problem of choice; and it is assumed 
that Smith welcomes such assistance. This emphasis could be misleading 
and, supposing that Nowell- Smith's "proper contextual implications" could 
be used, a case may be made for recognizing another type which could be 
expressed as follows: 
(e) Cases in which Jones and Smith have been in disagreement 
about what to do, and in which each of them is trying to 
support his own arguments by means of "the proper con- 
textual implications ". Such cases may be termed Practical 
Disagreement. 
Now in such cases, as we have already seen, the terminology of "contextual 
implications" and "logical oddness" would serve no practical purpose if 
both Jones and Smith provide 'reasons' for their choices. Furthermore, 
as we have also seen, the terminology would lead to the paradox that 
'logically at odds' statements may each be said to be 'logically impec- 
cable'. While this is a disagreeable conclusion it is one that Nowell- 
Smith should not have ignored. 
The second possibility overlooked by the four -fold classification 
is the following: 
lEthics, p. 745. 
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(f) Cases in which Jones and Smith have been in disagreement 
about what to do, and in which each of them is trying to 
support his arguments by 'rational' discussion of the 
'facts' of the situation. 
This type of course begs the question for the kind of view proposed by 
Hume, Ayer, and Stevenson. The presupposition is that in at least some 
cases 'practical disagreements' may in some way be resolved by discussion 
of 'beliefs' or 'facts' without using Nowell- Smith's tools of "contextual 
implication ". In a persuasive defence of this question -begging, however, 
I would point out that Nowell- Smith's classification begs the question 
for his own thesis; and if he uses his classification in order to reject 
what he terms the "Persuasive Theory" then his procedure is questionable. 
The strongest persuasive argument for recognizing my Type (f), however, 
is offered by Nowell -Smith himself when, later in the chapter, he postu- 
lates three methods of argument for 'redirecting attitudes'; and the first 
two are the types of 'rational' argument over 'beliefs' or 'facts' which 
both Ayer and Stevenson would allow as the basic methods of argument in 
a situation in which there is a disagreement in attitudes. The two types 
of argument are those in which, first, a person "may point out certain 
probable consequences" of his proposed action, and, secondly, that another 
person's "pro- attitude is a special case of something towards which (he)... 
has a general con -attitude. "1 It should be noted of course that Nowell- 
Smith does not use the tool of 'logical oddness' to 'redirect attitudes'. 
It is apparent, in any event, that my Type (f) case would have to be 
included in his Type (c),2 and that he would probably want to say that 
in my example Jones is "using the language of advice without the proper 
contextual implications " - -- although it is now dubious that he could say 
this, unless he were willing to allow that the arguments for 'redirecting 
lEthics, p. 156. 21bid., p. 155. 
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attitudes' were non -rational, or possibly even 'persuasive', and he could 
hardly do that. By this time, in any case, I believe that I have cast 
sufficient doubt on the tools of 'logical oddness' and 'contextual impli- 
cation' to warrant questioning any classification which presupposes it. 
In further support of Stevenson, one may assert as a challenge the ques- 
tion I have begged. It is difficult to deny, that is, that at least some 
'practical disagreements' are resolved after discussion of 'beliefs' or 
'facts'; and if we are to recognize types of situations in which we use 
language to try to get people to do something we want them to do, and 
they do not want to do it, then this Type (f) classification of the use 
of language cannot be ignored. 
It is in his analysis of "Advice" that, as I have mentioned, Nowell - 
Smith presents his main treatment of G- sentences. 
"G- words," he writes, "are those that imply not merely that the 
relevant person is likely to have a certain reaction, but that 
they ought to have it. "1 
As I have remarked earlier,2 G- and A -words are not easily able to be 
distinguished, and Nowell -Smith now emphasizes this point. 
wVie have already seen that they (G- words) cannot be sharply 
distinguished from A- words, partly because the sane word 
(e.g. 'eligible') can have an A -force in some contexts and 
a G -force in others, and partly because there are some reac- 
tions that are so universally encouraged and others that are 
so universally condemned that it is impossible to use the A- 
word concerned without being taken to encourage or condemn the 
reaction. In default of an express withdrawal of the G- force, 
the A -word always carries it." 
There is a similarity, as I have suggested, between Nowell- Smith's G- and 
A- words, and Stevenson's words for his first- and second -patterns of 
analysis, although Stevenson would not have suggested that there is any 
logical distinction possible between the two extremes. This poses a 
l.Ethics, p. 151 2Above, p. 322. 3Ethics, p. 151. 
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question which we may now consider. 
As we would expect, Nowell -Smith seeks to avoid any suggestion 
that he is presenting an 'objectivist' analysis of G- words. "Just as 
it is useless to represent A -words as standing for objective properties," 
he says, "so it is equally useless to treat G -words in the same way." 
But what purpose is recognized, we must ask, in saying that G -words are 
different from A- words? Referring to an example of Jones's advising 
Smith to see a film, Nowell -Smith writes that "Jones might have said, not 
that it is entertaining, but that it is worth seeing." 
"The difference lies in the fact that, while the A -word is more 
specific --(it is the fact that Smith will be entertained that 
gives the remark its point as advice)- -the G-word is less specific 
but indicates more clearly that it is advice which is being given. 
'Worth seeing' bears on its face a hortatory, commending force 
that 'entertaining' does not. The film may be worth seeing 
either because it is entertaining or because it is instructive; 
and each of these implies that it has certain causal properties. 
But the gerundive phrase neither states what these properties 
are nor indicates whether they are such as to entertain or to 
instruct. Yet even so it is not a mere prediction; its use 
contextually implies (under Rule 2) that Jones believes it to 
have some of the properties and (under Rule 3) that he believes 
the properties to be relevant to Smith's problem of choice. "1 
The use of the phrases "more specific ", "less specific ", and '; +ore clearly ", 
in the first sentence would seem to indicate, however, that there is not 
a clear distinction between A- and G- words; and since Sowell- ,With dis- 
qualifies himself from making any genuine classifications of words in 
isolation from their contexts, it would appear that the distinction 
cannot be clearly made at all. He admits this, in part, in the following 
passage: 
"It would appear, then, that there is little to distingaish a 
G-word from an A -word, and, in the contexts of choosing and 
advising, this is so; for, in these contexts, A-words are 
being used as G -words and differ from them in being for the 
lEthics, p. 152. 
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most part more explicit as to the causal properties con- 
textually implied." 
Nevertheless he wishes to insist on a kind of logical distinction, and, 
he suggests, one distinction is that "while A -words are often used in 
non -practical contexts, G -words are only used in practical contexts. "1 
(This is an important statement to which I shall again refer). 
"There is nothing odd," he writes, "about discussing the climb - 
ability of a mountain even when no one concerned is thinking 
about climbing and a man who says that it is climbable is not 
yet urging anyone to climb it. On the other hand the prime 
role of G-sentences is to urge, exhort, command, and advise 
and, while there is nothing odd about 'It's climbable, but I 
don't advise you to climb it' (1), there is something odd 
about 'It's worth climbing, but I don't advise you to climb 
it' (2), or 'You ought to climb it, but I don't advise you 
to' (3)."2 
He goes on to say that the "one general difference between A- and G- 
sentences" is that G-sentences 'must have a pro- or a con -force ", that 
they "are always explicitly for or against something." "A- sentences, on 
the other hand," he continues, "are neutral unless the context shows which 
force they have. "3 
This is a questionable argument, however, and is dependent primarily 
on what might be called the 'contextual ambiguity' of the word "climbable ". 
I shall argue that in the manner in which Nowell -Smith presents his argu- 
ment, the word "climbable" cannot be considered as an A -word in the 
sentence "It's climbable, but I don't advise you to climb it "; that is, 
it must be considered as a D- word, or rather a word used with D- force. 
He has said, we recall, that "among the typical A -words are: Terrifying, 
hair -raising, disappointing, disgusting, beneficial, ridiculous, funny, 
amusing, sublime. "4 Their common distinguishing feature was that "each 
of them is connected with a specific human 'reaction'," with the word 
llbid., p. 154 (my underlining). 
3 
1bid. , p. 155. 
2lbid., p. 154. ,I
p. 84. 
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"reaction" widely construed to include "attitudes that people might take 
up, emotions they might feel, things that happen to them and things that 
they do." With such a wide interpretation almost any 'doing' word could 
be made to fit the definition, along with 'emotive' words at the other 
extreme, such as "Hurrah" and "Alas ". If we are to maintain a distinction 
between Descriptive -words and Aptness- words, however, there will be border- 
line cases, such as, for example, when Sir Edmund Hillary appraises a 
mountain and says "It's climbable" (meaning "In all probability I shall 
be able to climb it "), and when he says Is climbable:" (in the 're- 
action' or 'Aptness' sense which he might have used when he stood with 
Tensing on the peak of Everest). If it is suggested that "It's climbable" 
in the first of Sir Edmund's uses is a 'reaction', then of course this 
would completely blur the distinction which Nowell -Smith had made at the 
outset of the book when he distinguished between 'theoretical' and 'prac- 
tical' discourse. Now although he could hardly allow this interpretation, 
this is what he has done when he rests his argument on the premiss I have 
previously quoted, that is: "while A -words are often used in non -practical 
contexts, G -words are only used in practical contexts." If in the sen- 
tence "It's climbable" (or any other indicative mood sentence in which an 
A -word is said to be used), the word "climbable" is said to be in a "non - 
practical context ", then it must be said to be in a "theoretical context ". 
Since it is the key word of the sentence it must be a 'theoretical' and 
not a 'practical' word. No other explanation is feasible within Nowell - 
Smith's argument. In such a context, however, the word is no longer 
appropriately termed an A -word, but must be said to be a D -word. Such 
a word, if normally considered as an A -word, would then, in its 'theore- 
tical' context, be an A,-word in an "inverted commas" sense (to borrow 
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Hare's distinction).1 It would not be used, that is, with an A- force. 
If Nowell -Smith maintains that in his example it is a genuine A -word, or 
is used with an A- force, then it must be said to be used in a 'practical' 
and not a 'theoretical' context; and in a 'practical' context, as he has 
allowed, "there is little to distinguish a G -word from an i word...." 
I would thus conclude that Nowell -Smith cannot support the distinction 
he would wish to maintain between A- and G -words (and, indeed, in some 
instances, between A- and D- words). It would appear, then, that the 
utility of the attempted distinction is that it, like Stevenson's first - 
and second -patterns of analysis, may serve for the purpose of analysing 
'practical' words ranging from 'descriptively vague' practical words to 
'descriptively rich' practical words. 
We may now proceed to the section entitled "The redirection of 
attitudes "tin which Nowell - Smith considers the "Persuasive Theory". In 
discussing this section we must recall that he has been concerned so far 
with the 'context of advice', and the paradigm for 'cases of Advice' was 
his Type (b) situation ( "Cases in which Jones tries to help Smith solve 
a problem of choice, which is not just a problem about means and methods. ") 
The presupposition is that Jones and Smith will be concerned with the 
giving and receiving of advice within "the proper contextual implica- 
tions". Now I have suggested that this paradigm may be misleading if it 
neglects what I have termed 'practical disagreement'. At first sight, 
however, this would appear to be the type of situation which would emerge 
from Nowell -Smith's hypothetical case. 
"An important factor emerges in the context of advice," he writes, 
"that cannot be present in the context of choice. If Smith asks 
Jones what is the best thing for him to do the terms of the 
'Hare, LM, p. 124. ""Ethics, p. 155 ff. 
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problem are set for him (Smith) by his actual pro - and con - 
attitudes towards the different situation that different choices 
would bring about. But the terms of the problem are not so set 
for Jones, since Jones may disapprove of Smith's pro - and con - 
attitudes in a way that Smith himself cannot, just because they 
are his attitudes. Jones's task, qua adviser, is to solve Smith's 
problem of choice, to which Smith's attitudes are alone relevant. 
The fact that Jones approves or disapproves is not, by itself, 
a good reason for Smith's doing anything any more than 'because 
he is blind' is." 
It should be noted, in passing, that the final statement in this quotation 
would readily be allowed by Stevenson since, for him, what constituted a 
'reason' was not the approval or disapproval expressed by a value judg- 
ment, but a 'belief' which led to the altering or reinforcing of attitudes 
expressed in the value judgments. Stevenson's main problem has not yet 
emerged, however, for in the preceding quotation, despite Jones's dis- 
approval of Smith's attitudes, Smith is yet in the position of seeking 
and wanting advice, and Jones is yet in the role of adviser. Nowell - Smith 
would appear to be about to alter that situation, however, with the follow- 
ing passage: 
"But the terms of the problem are not set for Jones, since Jones 
has his own problem of whether to accept the role of adviser or 
not. If he disapproves of Smith's attitudes he may prefer not 
to solve Smith's problem but to alter it. Thus if Smith asks 
if the film at the Super is a good one in a context where it is 
clear that his problem is 'Shall I go to it this evening ?', 
Jones may reply 'You oughtn't to go to the cinema at all; you've 
got some work to do'. "1 
He then cites several more examples in which Jones is trying to redirect 
Smith's attitudes. Quite rightly, however , he concludes that the apparent 
disapproval "makes little difference to the logic of advice." The respec- 
tive roles of Jones and Smith have not changed, although "the discussion 
has shifted onto different ground." Nowell -Smith now goes on to indi- 
cate that there are three methods of argument in which Jones might re- 
lEthics, pp. 155-6. 
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direct Smith's attitudes, and these ways, as I have said,1 closely re- 
semble the general methods of moral argument proposed by Ayer and Steven- 
son. Since I have outlined the first two (my purpose being to indicate 
that Nowell - Smith must recognize a type of case which is not included in 
the four paradigms he has provided),2 I shall now summarize only the 
third. In this situation Jones "may exhibit his own con -attitude... 
without giving any reason ". Nowell -Smith grants that the third way "does 
not by itself constitute any reason ", but "the very fact that Smith asks 
Jones (and not someone else) for advice shows that he has a general pro- 
attitude towards doing whatever Jones suggests, simply because Jones 
suggests it. "3 
At this point, to quote Stevenson, "where Nowell -Smith seems about 
to discuss inter- personal problems, he veers off into criticisms of what 
he calls the 'Persuasive Theory' of ethics, claiming that it makes far 
too much of persuasion. "4 Stevenson's point is well made; and before 
discussing what Nowell -Smith says about the 'Persuasive Theory', it is 
worth emphasizing that point. As Stevenson says of Nowell -Smith's ex- 
amples, we have not been presented with a situation in which both Smith 
and Jones are involved in a genuine 'disagreement in attitude'. Even in 
the example of the third type of argument for redirecting attitudes, the 
man seeking advice has "a general pro -attitude" towards doing whatever 
the adviser suggests. Stevenson proposes an example of the same type as 
my earlier example of the disagreement over 'banning the bomb'. In 
Stevenson's example two statesmen are "trying to decide whether or not 
they ought to involve their country in a war." 
1 
,Above, p. 368. 2See my type (f) case, p. 368. 
'Ethics, pp. 156 -7. 
4Op.cit., Mind, p. 408. 
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"The problem is now inter -personal;" writes Stevenson, "nor can 
it properly be described as two concurrent personal problems 
in which each man alternates between the role of advised and 
adviser. For if it should happen, as they discuss the matter, 
that A comes to decide on war and B comes to decide on peace, 
we shall have a situation in which each is free from his per- 
sonal indecision or conflict; but we shall also have a situ- 
ation in which effective decision of each man is blocked by 
that of the other. i1 
Stevenson goes on to make the point that Nowell -Smith has thus ignored 
the type of situation in which an "interpersonal issue could not be 
settled by the use of reasons." This type of situation, it should be 
noted, is not treated later in the book and the criticism by Stevenson 
may be generalized. 
"So however much Nowell -Smith's emphasis on contextual implica- 
tions is calculated to establish friendly relations with 
naturalists, he doesn't give the naturalists what they most 
want - -- something that will be sufficient to establish inter- 
personal agreement in ethics (for the seemingly gerundive, 
as well as the other uses of the terms) by use of the methods 
of science. I think he should be more explicit in acknow- 
ledging this." 
In view of my earlier arguments I must agree. This is of course no small 
matter, for it would completely undermine his use of the 'new logical 
apparatus' in which his special tools of 'logical oddness' and 'contextual 
implications' have been so prominent. This is not to say that there is 
nothing of value in his analysis for obviously the emphasis on 'contexts' 
demanded by the doctrine that 'the meaning of a word is in its use' is of 
considerable importance --- although this doctrine may be employed without 
Nowell -Smith's special 'apparatus', as other philosophical analysts have 
so clearly demonstrated. If one grants for a moment, however, that there 
may be 'practical disagreement' --and how can this be denied ? --then the 
tools of 'logical oddness' and 'contextual implications' are not only 
seen to be otiose (one has to appeal beyond them to make them work ), but 
10p.cit., Mind, p. 408, 
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they lead to conclusions sufficiently paradoxical to warrant asking if 
the tools are worth using at all.1 - -- Although Nowell -Smith offers no 
arguments in the remainder of the book to warrant any qualification of 
my conclusion I shall briefly consider what he has to say about the 'Per- 
suasive Theory', and about the general value words "good ", "right ", and 
"ought ". While this plan, I regret, must pass over other interesting 
topics in this comprehensive book, it does not ignore any problem that 
could surmount the difficulties we have seen in Nowell- Smith's central 
thesis. 
His account of the 'Persuasive Theory' certainly cannot be said 
to be a generalization that could appropriately apply to the theory 
postulated by Stevenson -- -even though Stevenson makes much of the word 
"persuasion" and says that any ethical judgment, is itself a persuasive 
instrument. "2 Nowell -Smith introduces his interpretation of the theory 
in the following passage: 
"It is sometimes said that the role of moral sentences is'per- 
suasive', that they are used to arouse emotions or attitudes 
or to get people to do things. But although, as we shall see, 
moral language can be used in this way, the theory confuses 
the job that moral sentences are used for with the ulterior 
purposes that we may have in using them. Influencing and 
persuading are things that we can do with or without words, 
and their importance for the logic of moral language has been 
seriously overestimated. A man may use advice, as he may use 
bribery, cajolery, or the thumb -screw to persuade someone to 
do something; but what he actually does with this bit of moral 
language is to advise, not to persuade; just as he may use a 
hammer for making boxes, but what he actually does with the 
hammer is not to make a box but to drive in nails. "3 
The main point of difference between Stevenson and Nowell -Smith is that 
Stevenson uses the word "persuasive" in a sense almost as broad as must 
be the stimuli for Nowell -Smith's 'reactions'. But the theory Nowell - 
Smith is attacking suggests a use of the word "persuasive" at least as 
1See above, pp. 357 & 362-3. 
3Ethics, p. 157. 
2Stevenson, EL, pp. 139-140. 
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limited as what appears to be the conventional use of the word - -- although 
his supposition that 'persuasion' must always be selfish suggests that 
he is using the word in a sense even more limited than it may be conven- 
tionally used. Socrates and Jesus, for example, were not above using 
'persuasion'. While it is perhaps unfortunate that Stevenson adopted 
the word for the purpose for which he intended, he nevertheless gives 
ample grounds for interpreting his use in a broad sense. In what is 
possibly the main passage in which he stipulated in a general way how he 
intended to use the word he had said that "a method is persuasive to the 
extent that it supports a judgment by means that go beyond the mediation 
of articulate beliefs. "1 Thus Nowell -Smith's third method for redirecting 
attitudes (that is, the exhibiting of a con -attitude without giving any 
reason) would be termed by Stevenson a 'persuasive' argument. To under- 
stand the broad sense in which Stevenson used the word it would be necessary 
to recall what he considered to be the purposes served by the use of 'emo- 
tive' language. Although it is perhaps usual to generalize Stevenson's 
theory to say that moral language is used, as he had said in one context, 
"to evoke or directly express attitudes ", if we recall the broad purposes 
served by his use of the word "attitudes" we may begin to understand what 
he had intended when he said that a moral judgment may be regarded as a 
"persuasive instrument ". He had said, among other things, that "moral 
judgments are concerned with recommending something for approval or dis- 
approval ";2 and the words "approval" and "disapproval" may be interpreted, 
as we have seen, in much the same sense as Nowell -Smith's use of "pro -" 
and "con- attitudes ". Then, speaking of the two types of 'emotive' 
language, Stevenson had said that "both imperative and ethical sentences 
1Stevenson, EL, p. 144. 
2EL, p. 13; see also pp. 21, 22, 27, 33, 3$. 
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are used more for encouraging, altering, or redirecting people's aims 
and conduct than for simply describing them." It is difficult to think 
of a word which would not, out of context, misleadingly serve to indicate 
the way in which Stevenson regarded the relation between one value judg- 
ment and the consequent value judgment or decision or action which may 
have followed. "Persuasive" is obviously misleading when taken out of 
context as Nowell -Smith has done; but so, too, are the words "stimulus ", 
"motive" and "cause ", all of which roughly indicate the purpose for which 
Stevenson used the word "persuasive ". In this broad sense, it should be 
noted, Nowell -Smith's word "advice" could also be said to be 'persuasive', 
just as could Hare's word "telling ".l 
Nowell -Smith grants that what he terms the 'Persuasive Theory' 
"enshrines an important truth ". That truth, he suggests, is that there 
must be a 'reason' or 'motive' for doing things, and this applies to 
'advising' as well as to any other activity. Sometimes, he suggests, the 
'reason' for advising "may be a desire to persuade someone to do some- 
thing"; but, he continues, "this does not mean, however, that advice can 
never be disinterested." And in this context Nowell -Smith considers 
"disinterested" as meaning "unselfish ". 
"A man who advises another on the choice of a career may be con- 
cerned solely for the welfare of the recipient of his advice, 
and the father who gives death -bed advice to his son can hardly 
hope to gain by it. The Persuasive `theory, by implying that a 
man who gives advice must have an ulterior motive, makes an 
unfortunate and unnecessary concession to the doctrine that all 
human action is necessarily selfish. "2 
Stevenson quite rightly protests. "But just who," he asks, 1'has implied 
that the motive is 'ulterior' ?" It would indeed seem that Nowell - Smith 
is here tilting with his own strawmen. Certainly the 'stimulus' in a 
lAbove, Ch. IV, p. 208. 
2Ethics, pp. 157-8. 
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'persuasive' argument is in some sense 'ulterior', just as are the moun- 
tains and films which 'cause' people to have 'reactions' in Nowell -Smith's 
examples. But in Stevenson's theory, just as in Nowell- Smith's, an 
'attitude of approval' (or a 'pro -attitude') must be 'evoked' before a 
'choice' is made, and that attitude is solely the agent's. Stevenson 
clearly indicated that the 'attitudes' of the 'persuader' just as the 
'attitudes' of the person persuaded may range from the extremes of 'sel- 
fish' to 'altruistic', and, stepping out of his analytic role on several 
occasions, as I have mentioned, he used strongly persuasive arguments in 
support of altruism. We may again consider a quotation which makes this 
point: 
"Persuasion is unquestionably a tool of the 'propagandist' and 
soap -box orator; but it is also the tool of every altruistic 
reformer that the world has ever known. We must not banish all 
doctors to rid the world of quacks. "1 
In his brief section on "Exhortation" Nowell -Smith possibly comes 
closest to the problem of 'disagreement in attitude'.2 "Exhortation is 
the use of advising language ", he says, "without the contextual implica- 
tion that the recipient has some pro -attitude towards adopting the sugges- 
ted course." In such instances, he says, the method of argument might be 
called "rhetoric ", "propaganda ", or "suggestion ". Once more, however, as 
Stevenson says, he veers away from the problem. He does not consider the 
possibility that, if his logical apparatus is sound, disputants in a case 
of disagreement in attitude might each have their own "logically impecca- 
ble reasons" for their conflicting attitudes. He chooses, instead, to 
attempt another blow at the 'Persuasive Theory'; but this blow is puzzling. 
"It is important to notice", he says, "that this (the language 
of Exhortation) is a secondary use of language, parasitic on 
1Stevenson, EL, p. 164. 2See also, Ethics, p. 194. 
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on genuine advice; and this fact is fatal to the 'Persuasive' 
theory of moral language. A man can only learn to accept, and 
reject advice if, in the majority of cases, accepting the 
advice does in fact lead to the result he himself desires.... 
Unless moral words had first been used in a way which connects 
them with our own interests -- whether these be selfish or un- 
selfish--we could never have come to be persuaded or dissuaded 
by their use and they could not act, as they sometimes do, as 
levers with which to manipulate the conduct of others.rl 
He is certainly not tilting at Hume, Ayer, and especially, Stevenson in 
this passage. Apart from questioning the phrase "parasitic on genuine 
advice ", Stevenson could quite readily agree with the main 'arguments' 
in this section - --In this passage, incidentally, Nowell -Smith clearly 
reveals his credentials for membership in the family of contemporary 
non -cognitivists who would be classified by text -book writers as 'subject- 
ivist' or perhaps 'radical subjectivists'.3 
Section 6 
In his treatment of the general value words "good ", "right ", and 
"ought ", Nowell -Smith relies considerably on his doctrine of 'logical 
oddness' and 'contextual implications'. Consequently, one of his basic 
assumptions in his treatment of these words is that there is no logical 
gap between a D- sentence 'reason' and a 'choice', since they are both 
'practical' in such a context. A second basic assumption is that there 
is a relation of quasi -implication between a D- sentence reason (along 
with other types of sentences used as 'reasons') and a value- choice. 
Since I have questioned both assumptions it would be possible to spend 
considerable time simply applying my earlier criticisms to his analyses 
of these value words. This now seems a profitless exercise, however, so 
I shall undertake for the most part simply to summarize the purposes 
Ethics, p. 158. 
Cf., e.g. EL, pp. 27 -8. Also, Ch. IV above, p. 203. 
3Cf., above, p. 311. 
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which he considers are served by the uses of these words. It is here, I 
believe, that Nowell -Smith makes his most valuable contribution to the 
analyses of the language of values -- -even though this is a secondary 
consideration as compared with the attempt to resolve the problem of the 
Humean gap. Because of his assumptions, the problem of the Humean gap 
again emerges in his analysis of these words, as I shall indicate on the 
occasions when I deviate from my general plan to summarize his analysis. 
In the first section of the chapter entitled "Good" he considers 
the word in what he assumes are its fundamental uses, that is in the con- 
texts of 'choice' and of 'advice'. The 'logical behaviour' of the words, 
he asserts, is the same in both contexts, thus I shall consider only the 
context of 'choice'. He assumes of course that the question "What shall 
I do" is the fundamental practical question, and that the answer is a 
sentence expressing a 'preference'. (Nowell- Shii.th here appears to rely 
on the quasi -logical link which he assumes between 'preferences', 'de- 
cisions', and 'choice' -- -but this, as I have argued, is a questionable 
assumption).1 In this section he takes as his task the analysis of such 
expressions as "Because it is a good one" and "Because it is the best" 
when they are offered as explanations or reasons for choosing and advising. 
The peculiarities of the 'logical behaviour' of "good" and "best ", he 
contends, have to do with the fact that they are among the most general 
and most flexible of 'practical' words. When we consider his classifi- 
cation of sentences that may be used as 'explanations' or 'reasons' for 
choosing and advising, we see the following categories: (1) D-- sentences 
(such as "Because it has more leg -room ", when said of a choice of a car) 
which are explicit about the empirical properties of the thing chosen, 
lAbove, pp. 353. 
NO WELD-SMITH 383 
and which 'contextually imply' an A- property "without specifying that it 
is "; (2) A- sentences (such as "Because it is more comfortable ") which are 
not as descriptively specific as D- sentences. The A7-word "comfortable" 
is expressed as a 'reaction' to A- properties, but these properties are not 
named, but merely 'contextually implied'. Both D- and A- sentences when 
offered as explanations for choosing and advising are said to 'contex- 
tually imply' a pro- attitude towards the relevant A- property; (3) G- 
sentences, which would indicate that the car 'ought' to be chosen, are 
even less specific about the 'reasons'. (As I have argued earlier, 
however, it is impossible to differentiate between A- and G-words either 
in logic or practice, and this is again seen in the first section on 
"good ". He has given as an example of an 117-word the statement "Because 
it is more comfortable "; but the word "comfort" is included in his list 
of pro- attitude words, and thus one would suppose that the statement 
"Because it is more comfortable" would, like a G- sentence, 'express' a 
pro -attitude just as much as it would 'contextually imply' it). As 
Stevenson would say, such words as Nowell - Smith would include among his 
G -words are 'descriptively poor'. But a G-sentence, according to Nowell - 
Smith, would show "more plainly than an A- sentence that advice was being 
given." (4) Finally, we have the category of the most general of practi- 
cal words, "good ", "best ", "right ", an d "ought ". As compared with a less 
general G- sentence, he says, the expression "Because it is the best" 
shows "more plainly that I was choosing but says even less about the 
reasons. In fact it says nothing about them at all; it only implies that 
I have reasons. "1 There is a similarity between what Nowell -Smith says 
about these words and what Stevenson says about 'first- pattern' words. 
/Ethics, p. 167. 
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Both philosophers are in agreement that the words, when considered out 
of contexts, are descriptively vague or unspecific, but that they express 
the attitudes of the speaker. (It is to be wondered, by the way, if 
Nowell -Smith, with his emphasis on contexts, is justified in saying that 
the word "best" says nothing about the reasons for its use, for, as he 
allows, it is "the Janus -word par excellence ", and one would assume that 
in some contexts its 'descriptive meaning' is not only implied but is 
obvious. Stevenson had also said, as we have seen , that the word "good" 
is extremely "flexible ", but far from suggesting that it always is des- 
criptively vague, he had said that "it may be used to mean such qualities 
as reliable, charitable, honest, and so on, and may even have a specific 
reference as that to going faithfully to church on Sundays ".)1 While 
there are similarities in their analyses of "good" there is of course a 
significant difference, for Stevenson would say that the statement "Be- 
cause it is the best" could never be a 'reason' as such, since it is not 
a 'belief' -statement. It would have to be considered among 'non -rational' 
methods for reinforcing, or altering, or opposing attitudes. Nowell - 
Smith, on the other hand, allows that it is a 'reason', although not the 
best of 'reasons'. "The trouble ", he says, "is that the reason is too 
good." By that he means, in part, that the expression does not 'say 
anything' about the reasons for its use. That is to say, it is descrip- 
tively unspecific. Its value, he suggests, is that it "shows that my 
choice was no passing whim, that it was considered more or less carefully, 
that the object had certain unspecified 'good -making' properties, and 
that my choice was not a peculiar one. "2 Thus he says that on hearing 
the reason "Because it is the best" the response "I know you thought it 
2Ethics, p. 161. 1Stevenson, EL, p. 35. 
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the best car; but why did you choose it ?" is 'logically odd'. Now as we 
have seen, he assumes that the question "What shall I do ?" is the funda- 
mental practical question; and, as I have suggested, his assumption that 
"practical discourse...consists in answers to practical questions" appears 
to have led to his neglect of 'practical disagreement'. This is again 
apparent in his analysis of "good" in the contexts of choice and advice. 
If we were to accept his use of the tools of 'logical oddness' and 'con- 
textual implications', we might well allow that it is 'logically odd' to 
say "I know you thought it the best car; but why did you choose it " ?; but 
there would appear to be nothing 'logically odd', however, about question- 
ing the 'reason' itself, rather than the choice that followed from the 
'reason'. In other words, one might say "I know you thought it the best 
car, but I disagree with you." Since it is possible that in such cases 
of disagreement, as Stevenson maintains, 
1 
one person could block another 
person's "effective decision" (or choice), the disputants would be left, 
as it were, with two conflicting value judgments -- -and these value judg- 
ments are judgments gua appraisals or verdicts, and not gua decisions and 
choices. I shall return to this point shortly, but in the meantime I 
would point out that when such a disagreement occurs the practical question 
facing the disputants is not "How do I explain or give reasons for my 
choice ? ", since the 'choice', in the sense of doing something, has not 
been accomplished. The question is rather "How do I support my appraisal 
or verdict or value judgment of the situation ?" The problem of resolving 
evaluative disagreement expressed in terms of conflicting value appraisals 
or judgments appears to be no less fundamental than the problem of an- 
swering the question "What shall I do ? ". 
1Stevenson, op.cit., Mind, p. 108. 
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More faithful than most contemporary moral 'philosophers to the 
doctrine that a word may have a variety of uses, Nowell -Smith now con- 
siders other uses of the word "good ". He discusses these uses, he says, 
"in the order in which they seem to diverge more and more from the funda- 
mental use, which is to express or explain a preference. "1 (When he uses 
the word "preference ", we recall, he intends that it be considered in the 
sense in which it means "thinking that a course of action is better than 
another ", and, further, that there is a quasi -analytic relation between 
'preference' and 'decision', and between 'decision' and 'choice'. As I 
have argued, however,2 he does not convincingly establish that quasi- 
analytic relation, and there is thus a logical gap between a 'preference', 
which is expressed by means of a value sentence, and a decision, which 
may be expressed by means of the sentence "I shall do this "). Now in 
saying that there are other uses of the word "good ", he does not say that 
the uses are independent of a 'preference', since at the end of the chapter 
he writes the following sentence: 
"The various ways in which 'good' is used are unintelligible 
unless they are directly or indirectly connected with choice; 
and I shall try to show later that the same applies to 'ought'. "3 
His analysis of the various uses of "good" thus has a dual purpose: first, 
to indicate that there are other uses which are logically distinguishable 
from its use in sentences expressing 'preferences °, and thus 'choices'; 
and secondly, to argue for his thesis that the use of "good" in sentences 
expressing 'preferences' and 'choices' is 'the fundamental use'. 
The three other main 'practical' categories of usage of "good" 
are, (a) "Praising and Applauding ", (b) "Commending", in the sense 
in 
which it means to advise a person to choose the thing commended, and 
1Ethics, p. 163. 
3Ethics, p. 182. 
2Above, p. 353-4. 
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(c) "Verdicts and Appraisals ". While he says that the (a) and (b) cate- 
gories are closer to 'choosing' in that they are performances, the (c) 
category of "Verdicts and Appraisals" comprises sentences which cannot be 
termed performances or decisions to do something, but are rather "judg- 
ments". It is in this category that he places moral judgments (I shall 
return to this shortly). He then proceeds to give two "special cases of 
the appraising use." First, there is (d) "Efficiency ". 
"When 'good' is predicated of any object (Natural or artificial, 
animate or inanimate) that is used for a purpose, it implies 
the presence in a relatively high degree of those properties 
that the object must have to do its job." 
The second special case of the 'appraising' use is in the cases of (e) 
"Skill ". 
"When we call a man a good lawyer, scholar, cricketer, or liar, 
the use is similar to the 'efficiency' use except for the 
fact that, since these are men, the purpose concerned is their 
purpose, not the purpose they are used for." 
In all of these practical uses, he says, there is more than simply an 
empirical recognition that something measures up to criteria or conforms 
to certain standards, for, also, a pro -attitude is 'implied'. Finally 
there is (f) "the descriptive use ", in which a man who uses the word 
"good" may not be "choosing, advising, defending a choice or piece of 
advice, or appraising, but referring to an object which he or others 
would call good if they were doing one of these. "1 
This classification of other uses of the word "good" is of interest 
for several reasons when it is compared with the views expressed in earlier 
writings in moral philosophy. It implies, for example, the rejection of 
any 'one -track' analysis such as Hare's which asserts that the primary 
and only 'function' of value judgments is that of 'commending' or guiding 
Ethics, p. 166. 
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choices, although it recognizes Hare's thesis as part of a broader thesis. 
Similarly, it recognizes that Urmson's views on 'grading' are simply part 
of a broader thesis. Nor would Nowell -Smith reject the ' "good" as in- 
strumental' theory (as Hare does) but would incorporate that 'one -track' 
theory, along with Hare's, Urmson's, and others, in his more general 
thesis. But even more important than these comparisons, and more con- 
troversial, is that Nowell -Smith asserts in effect that the concern of 
most modern philosophers for moral judgments .T1_4_ appraisals or verdicts 
has been a limited concern. The use of "good" in moral judgments gut, 
appraisals, that is, is simply one of a variety of uses, and is not even 
the most fundamental. Nowell -Smith grants that his view is not easily 
established when, in the section "Preference and Appraisal ", he writes 
the following passage: 
"But it is the connexions between the performatory uses and 
the verdict -giving, judging, or appraising use when the 
qualities on which the verdict is based are thought to be 
'admirable in themselves' that are the most important and 
the most difficult ".1 
In his argument he substitutes the word "preferable" for "admirable ", 
"since admiration is itself a performance akin to praising and 'admirable' 
is therefore too narrow in scope to cover all appraisals other than those 
of efficiency and skill." His argument rests on the view that although 
the "performatory uses" of the word "good" (that is, in choosing, ad- 
vising, praising and applauding, and commending) 'contextually imply' 
appraisal, "it is not so clear that the converse is true." What this 
amounts to saying is that whereas an act of 'preference' is involved in 
all of the performatory uses, and in such acts a pro -attitude is implied 
and expressed, in some cases of appraising, however, (such as in the 
lEthics, p. 170. 
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'grading' of candidates, or wine) it is possible that the 'appraiser' is 
simply grading in an empirical way by reference to established criteria. 
No 'preference' and thus no pro- attitude is implied, he suggests, in such 
non -practical cases of appraising. 
This argument and other arguments in the chapter would establish 
Nowell -Smith's thesis that the use of "good" in moral judgments ugua 
appraisals is logically less fundamental than its use in sentences ex- 
pressing choices and decisions, only if we grant several assumptions 
which I am not prepared to grant. The most important of these for the 
present argument is his supposition that the act of preference is linked 
in a quasi -analytic way to decision and thus to choice, and therefore may 
be said to be a 'performance' in the same sense as they are said to be 
performances. As I have argued, however,1 he does not convincingly 
establish that quasi -analytic relationship, and so long as he is prepared 
to say that a 'preference' is logically distinguishable from a 'decision', 
then we must assume that there is a 'gap' between them. And since sen- 
tences expressing preferences are those which assert that one course of 
action is better than another, they would appear to be indistinguishable 
from sentences which are normally said to be value judgments gua apprai- 
sals (such as, "I consider that to be a better car "). A second assump- 
tion is that it is possible to employ the tool of 'logical oddness' in 
assessing whether a preference, or a decision, or a choice, is 'appro- 
priate' without making a value judgment (or value- appraisal). But, as 
I have indicated, the tool cannot be used in practical situations without 
implicitly or explicitly making a value judgment2 -- -and even then it leads 
to serious paradoxes. A third reason for questioning the view that 
1Above, pp. 351 ff. 2Above, pp. 355-6. 
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sentences expressing decisions and choices qua performances are logically 
more fundamental than value judgments is related to his neglect of dis- 
agreement in attitudes. As Stevenson has said, Nowell -Smith's examples 
"give the impression that evaluative problems are readily brought to a 
reasoned solution. "1 Stevenson also mentioned, as we have seen, that it 
is possible to consider examples in which one person could block another 
person's "effective decision" or choice, and this is tantamount to saying 
that one person could, by means of a value judgment, block another per- 
son's 'performance'. Thus, as I have suggested,2 a question which appears 
to be no less fundamental than Nowell- Smith's question "What shall I do? 
is the question "How do I support my appraisal or verdict or value judg- 
ment of the situation ?" I would now add, "How do I support my preference 
for something ?" This is of course another way of expressing one of the 
guiding questions in Stevenson's book. 
Towards the end of the chapter Nowell -Smith argues that the 
"practical uses" of the word "good" are "logically prior to the apprais- 
ing use ",3 but "appraising" in this context could apply only to his non - 
practical appraisals ",4 in which a person "may be simply applying the 
criteria that he and others customarily use for these purposes. "5 This 
argument does not then support the view that the use of the word "good" 
in contexts of 'choice' and 'advice' is always more fundamental than its 
use in situations of 'practical appraisal', since, as I have shown, 
'practical appraisal' is necessarily involved in the 'preference' which 
precedes, and is not logically related to, 'decisions' and 'choices' and 
'pieces of advice'. His argument shows only that it has been possible, 
1Stevenson, Mind, p. 40S. 2Above, p. 385. 
Ethics, p. 1$0. Ibid., p. 176. 
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in some manner, to establish criteria which, may be used empirically, and 
that it is thus possible to use words like "fair ", "good ", "better ", and 
"best" in what Hare has termed 'an inverted commas sense'. Thus, in view 
of the preceding arguments, and especially in view of my argument that 
'preferences' cannot be said to be related in any logical way to 'deci- 
sions', nor 'decisions' to 'choices', I cannot accept Nowell -Smith's view 
that moral judgments are logically less fundamental than statements ex- 
pressing decisions and choices (expressed in the form "I shall do this "). 
I would say, on the contrary, that if we use his new 'logical apparatus' 
we would be committed to the view that value -appraisals or value judg- 
ments are in fact logically prior to decisions and choices. I cannot 
insist on this conclusion, however, since I cannot accept his 'logical 
apparatus' and I can see no logical relation whatever between value judg- 
ments and statements of the form "I shall do this ". Given the choice in 
this context of either the new 'logical apparatus' to remove the problem 
of 'Hume's gap', or the acknowledgment of the gap and, according to 
Nowell -Smith, "unfathomable mystery ", I must then choose the latter. 
The difficulties which have emerged in this brief consideration of 
"good" cannot be resolved by anything that Nowell -anith says in his analy- 
sis of "right" and "ought ". The reason for saying this is simply that he 
considers that "good" is logically more fundamental than "right" and 
"ought "; and any weakness in the analysis of "good" will remain as an 
underlying weakness in the analysis of "right" and "ought ". Whereas 
Stevenson had said in effect that the 'logical behaviour' of "right" and 
"ought" is the same as that of "good "1 (the only difference being that 
we conventionally use "right" and "ought" to refer to "actions, while we 
1Stevenson, EL, pp. 97-102. 
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tend to use "good" to refer to "persons or things "), Nowell - Smith main- 
tains that there is an important difference between them. The main differ- 
ence, he contends, is that "right" and "ought" are, as it were, one step 
removed from 'pro-attitudes'. While "good" and "best" not only 'con- 
textually imply' but also 'overtly express' pro -attitudes, "right" and 
"ought" only 'contextually imply' such attitudes. The main reason for 
making this distinction (if I understand his point correctly) is that we 
cannot judge an action without considering "the purpose of the person 
concerned ", and a purpose is understood in terms of a 'decision' or a 
'choice'. To reinforce his point that "good" is more closely linked 
with 'pro- attitudes' than are "ought" and "right ", he writes (in a later 
chapter) the following passage: 
"We could imagine a world in which people used such words as 
good, desire, aim, purpose, choose, happiness, and enjoy, but 
in which they had no conception whatever of duty, obligation, 
right, and ought.... 
We could also imagine a world in which people used pro -words 
and also used the words 'right' and 'ought' in a purely 
hypothetical way; for they might discover that they could 
only achieve their ends by adopting certain courses which 
they would call 'the right course' or 'the course we ought 
to adopt'. But is is impossible to imagine a world in which 
people used the words obligation, duty, right, and ought but 
did not use any pro -words at all. "1 
Thus, to generalize his analysis perhaps too extremely, from a considera- 
tion of the question "What ought I to do ?" we are taken back to the 
question "What shall I do ?" as "the fundamental question in ethics. "2 
While I shall not quarrel with his postulation of a "modified teleo- 
logical" theory, I shall of course quarrel with his basic question - --at 
least in the form in which he has asked it, and as if, in answering it, 
the conclusion "I shall do this" is linked in a quasi -analytic way to 
lEthics, p. 224. 2Ethics, pp. 267-$. 
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the question. As I have indicated, a question which may be said to be 
at least as fundamental is the question "How do I support my appraisal 
or verdict or value judgment ?" But even to recognize this question is 
to maintain that Nowell -Smith's 'logical apparatus' will not necessarily 
provide an answer to the question "What shall I do ? ", however 'logically 
impeccable' (in Nowell -Smith's terms) my own 'preference' may seem to bee 
I must still face the possibility of a further demand for 'reasons' for 
my 'preference' or 'value judgment'; and at this point we may again ask 
Stevenson's fundamental theme -setting question, "What is the nature of 
ethical agreement and disagreement ? "1 
Nowell- Smith's principal aim, we recall, was to argue that the 
problem posed by Hume's challenge against arguments from 'is' to 'ought' 
is, in effect, a pseudo -problem when considered in terms of providing 
reasons for value judgments. Thus I had taken as my main question for 
the assessment of his theory the question "Does Nowell -Smith convincingly 
resolve the problem posed by Hume ?" To accomplish his aim he had to 
eliminate not simply one 'gap', but two; that is, he had to show, first, 
that factual or D- sentences when used as 'reasons' could be said to be 
'practical' in the same sense as were sentences expressing preferences, 
decisions, choices, and value judgments. This does not eliminate the 
more important gap, however, between 'reasons' and preferences, decisions, 
choices, and value judgments. Hume might at this point challenge an 
argument from a D- sentence to, for example, a G-conclusion. In his 
attempt to eliminate this gap, Nowell -Smith offered his new 'logical 
apparatus' with its special tools, 'logical oddness' and 'contextual 
1Stevenson, EL, p. 2. 
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implications', But the neglect of disagreement in attitude allowed him 
to overlook the shortcomings of the 'apparatus' and the paradoxes to 
which its use would lead. My conclusion must be that he, like Hare, has 
not resolved Hume's problem. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Introduction I have indicated that throughout ray examin- 
ation of the works of the five philosophers there would be two underly- 
ing themes. The more fundamental of the two is the challenge posed by 
Hume when he maintained that there is no logical relationship between 
'is' -type and Bought' -type propositions. Following Nowell-Smith I have 
referred to this as the problem of 'Hume's gap'. The secondary theme is 
concerned with qualifications and modifications to the Humean brand of 
non- cognitivism resulting from the theories of 'meaning' held by each of 
the four contemporary philosophers. These two themes are intimately 
related, since either the acceptance of ' Hume's gap', or any attempt 
either to bridge it or to eliminate it altogether is dependent to a con- 
siderable extent on the theory of tmeaningt one holds or presupposes. 
The problem posed by Hume would have been resolved, for example, if Kant, 
aroused from his 'dogmatic slumbers' by this very problem, had been 
successful in arguing for the possibility of 'synthetic a priori proposi- 
tions'. That is to say, Kant had hoped in effect to postulate a theory 
of meaning which would encompass not only analytic and empirical proposi- 
tions but also a kind of proposition which would permit us to say that 
value judgments are similarly 'cognitive'. Kant's argument did not con- 
clusively resolve the problem, however, neither to his own complete satis- 
faction,1 nor to the satisfaction of most modern philosophers. Nor had 
1Kant, Groundwork, tr. Paton, p. 129. 
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any other modern philosopher resolved Hume's problem to the satisfaction 
of most others; and the problem had remained to confront contemporary 
moral philosophers. Considering these two themes I shall now summarize 
what I have had to say about each of our four contemporaries. In this 
summary I shall not consider the anti- cognitivist arguments we have re- 
viewed. I accept that in these arguments our non- cognitivists have estab- 
lished a convincingly 'persuasive' case against traditional cognitivist 
theories of moral philosophy, in particular the theories of 'naturalists' 
and 'intuitionists'. 
Both in the early and later expressions of his emotivist theory 
Ayer accepts 'Hume's gap'. There can be no logical bridge, he maintains, 
between 'factual' statements and value judgments. Either in the making 
of a value judgment based upon a consideration of 'facts' or in the 
attempt to 'support' a value judgment by appealing to 'facts', the re- 
lationship between the different types of statements is psychological and 
not logical. The 'autonomy of morals' is strictly maintained (too strict- 
ly in fact). In both versions of his theory his views about the nature 
of value judgments and of factual statements are obviously influenced by 
two epistemological assumptions' which are similar to those held by Hume. 
These assumptions are, first, that some form of the 'verificationiat' 
theory is the one -and -only theory of 'meaning', and, secondly, the related 
assumption that the theory of 'meaning' is a unum nomen unum nominatum 
theory. Ayer appears to be unwilling to accept doctrines ususiiy 
associated with the later Wittgenstein that 'the meaning of a word is in 
its use' and that a single word may have more than one meaning at one and 
lAbove, Ch. II, p. 94. 
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the same time. Thus the relevant value -word in a value judgment cannot 
be said to have any 'descriptive meaning'; and, secondly, since value 
judgments cannot pass any 'verification' test they must be regarded, so 
to speak, as second -class citizens of language. When Hume reversed the 
roles of 'reason' and the 'passions', however, it seems clear that he by 
no means under- valued the 'passions' (or under- valued values). If Kemp 
Smith's thesis is sound Hume had in fact approached his epistemology 
from the prior assumption of the predominance of 'values'. Ayer, on the 
other hand, gives much greater emphasis to 'reason', and his approach is 
definitely from the assumption of the predominance of 'cognitive' state- 
ments. Thus he has difficulty in finding a place for value judgments in 
his general philosophical theory. In the early version of his theory 
they are regarded as "mere pseudo -concepts" or as having "no factual mean- 
ing", and although he later modifies his manner of expressing his theory 
to allow that value judgments may be said to have 'meaning', this allow- 
ance is rather a bow to conventions of language than a significant 
modification of his theory. The main modification of his theory is in 
his contention that value judgments express and evoke 'attitudes', with 
the word "attitudes" used in a dispositional sense; whereas in his early 
theory, in saying that value judgments express and evoke 'feelings', he 
tended to use "feelings" in the 'occurrence' or 'itches and aches' sense. 
Thus his later version avoids the difficulty apparent in the objection 
that he could not adequately account for the fact that we may judge that 
the action of Brutus was morally wrong even though we may have no 'feel- 
ings' about his action. But this modification does not essentially 
alter his emotivist analysis of ethical judgments. For Ayer there is no 
question of either bridging (by logic) or eliminating 'Hume's gap'® 
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For Stevenson, the 'sides' of 'Hume's gap', so to speak, are not 
so completely separable as Ayer has made them out to be. Indeed the anal- 
ogy of the 'gap' becomes more difficult to apply. Although in insisting 
on the distinction between 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' he is insisting on 
the 'autonomy of morals', he nevertheless does not maintain (as Ayer does) 
that a statement used to express a value judgment is simply evaluative. 
Nor does he maintain that a statement used to express a 'belief' must be 
simply 'descriptive'. That is to say, a statement may have both 'emotive 
meaning' and 'descriptive meaning'; and in saying this he is not using 
the word "meaning" in a different generic sense in each case. It is 
rather that each type of 'meaning' is a co- ordinate species. With Steven- 
son, unlike Ayer, sentences used for expressing value judgments have as 
much right to be termed "meaningful" as do sentences expressing 'beliefs'. 
He is able to say this since he believes that the verification principle, 
as useful as it is for some purposes, is not appropriate for testing value 
judgments. To assume that it is appropriate would be to make the mistake 
of emphasizing 'beliefs' to the neglect of 'attitudes', and thus to hold 
'cognitivist' assumptions. To maintain that value -sentences may be 
'meaningfully' on a par with sentences expressing 'beliefs' Stevenson 
postulates his 'psychological or pragmatic theory of meaning'; and this 
theory is a general theory, within which 'emotive meaning' and 'descript- 
ive meaning' are co- ordinate species. 
He differs from Ayer in another significant respect, however, for 
he asserts that it is possible to say of a statement, as of an individual 
word within it, that it has both 'descriptive' and 'emotive' meaning. 
He employs, that is, the doctrines that a word may have a variety of uses, 
and that it may serve more than one purpose at one and the same time. Now 
if a sentence used for the purpose of expressing a value judgment may be 
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said to have 'descriptive" meaning, as well as 'emotive' meaning, then 
it has something in common with a sentence used primarily to express a 
'belief'. Thus it is possible to establish a partial logical link be- 
tween 'descriptive' or 'factual' statements and value judgments. A 
'descriptive' statement may be used, for example, to point up a formal 
inconsistency between the 'descriptive' meanings of two value judgments 
made by the same person. "In general," he writes, "ethical statements, 
like all others that have at least some descriptive meaning, are amenable 
to the usual applications of formal logic. "1 'Hume's gap', if considered 
only in terms of the sentences which express 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' 
(rather than in terms of the 'beliefs' and 'attitudes' themselves) is 
thus seen to be able to be partially bridged; but, it is to be emphasized, 
this 'bridge' is only between the 'descriptive' element of the factual 
statement and the 'descriptive' element of the value statement. There 
is no such logical 'bridge' between any 'element' of the factual state- 
ment and the 'evaluative' or 'emotive' element of the value statement. 
Thus any 'factual' statement used to point up the formal inconsistencies 
of either two or more value statements, or a value statement and a factual 
statement made by any person, will not logically entail that the person 
who makes the statements must make them consistent. Similarly, any 
'factual' statement used as a 'supporting reason' for a value statement 
will not necessarily lead another person to agree with that value state- 
ment. Thus, despite his establishing a partial link between descriptive 
statements and value statements, Stevenson would insist that there is a 
fundamental gap between them which cannot be bridged by logic. 
Among other ways in which Stevenson follows Hume, possibly the 
IEL, p. 116; cf., above, Ch. III, p. 163. 
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most significant is that not only does he insist upon the 'autonomy of 
morals', but he emphasizes the 'emotive' or 'dynamic' use of value judg- 
ments as being the primary use. He is an 'emotivist', and among contemp- 
orary emotivists he appears to be the most thorough and the most cautious. 
When we use value judgments, he insists, our primary purpose is, in an 
extremely broad sense, 'emotive'. This word, with its association with 
'feelings' and 'passions' in the 'occurrence' sense, is perhaps unfortun- 
ate, and critics of 'emotivism' tend to think of the word in the narrow 
sense. In Stevenson's use, however, it could be said to encompass all 
of the range of purposes between expressing and evoking 'feelings' to 
expressing and evoking 'attitudes'. Now Stevenson obviously emphasizes 
'attitudes' in his analysis of ethical disagreement (and agreement), and 
in this sense he refers to the expressing of 'attitudes' in a manner that 
could easily be said to include commanding, commending, prescribing, 
grading, praising, guiding conduct and choices, advising, and other such 
uses stressed by other contemporaries as being the primary uses of value 
judgments. It is not enough, then, for a philosopher to dissociate him- 
self from 'emotivism' by attacking the most primitive expression of it. 
To avoid Stevenson's theory it would be necessary to indicate that his 
analysis inadequately 'characterizes' the relationship between 'factual' 
statements and value judgments, for it is in his analysis of that relation- 
ship that he reveals what is distinctive about his brand of emotivism. 
And for a non- cognitivist to indicate that Stevenson's analysis is uncon- 
vincing it would be necessary not only to show in what way that analysis 
is inadequate but also to postulate a theory which in some way offers a 
more convincing treatment of 'Hume's gap'. 
Hare reacts against the 'emotivist' views that the fundamental 
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relation between a factual statement and a value judgment, and the funda- 
mental relation between a value judgment and a decision to do something, 
is 'causal'. All genuinely evaluative moral reasoning, he contends, is 
either explicitly or implicitly syllogistic in form; and moral judgments, 
like factual statements, are governed by logical rules. By means of his 
analysis he claims to have revealed a practical syllogism which we use 
or assume in our moral reasoning; and in his treatment of this syllogism 
he makes use of Wittgenstein's doctrine that words and statements may 
have more than one use (or 'meaning') at one and the same time. Treating 
the 'descriptive' and 'evaluative' elements of premisses and conclusions 
separately (using traditional rules of inference for the 'descriptive' 
or 'phrastic' elements, and stipulating a new logical rule for the quasi - 
imperative or 'neustic' elements) he purports to show how a genuine 
'piece' of moral reasoning can proceed from 'factual' premisses to an 
evaluative conclusion. But his argument fails. It fails first in its 
negative anti- emotivist phase in which he seeks to distinguish between 
'telling' and 'persuading'. Moral judgments and imperatives are, in one 
sense, like 'statements', he asserts, and in that sense they 'tell' a 
person something without 'influencing' him. The strength of his argument 
rests on 'persuasive' illustrations, however, for he uses the word 
"persuasion" in a manner in which we often use the word "propaganda ", 
rather than in the broad 'causal' sense in which Stevenson uses the word. 
In that broad sense of "persuasion ", what Hare refers to as a "statement" 
may often be said to be "persuasive ". It is not difficult to think of 
'statements' (or 'descriptive indicatives', as I have termed them) which 
appear to 'stimulate' or 'motivate' actions. His argument also fails in 
the positive phase, in which he presents his principal thesis that all 
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genuinely evaluative moral reasoning is either explicitly or implicitly 
syllogistic in form. By means of his practical syllogism he would bridge 
'Hume's gap', and in place of a type of 'emotivism' he would postulate a 
type of non - causal 'conativism'. But his argument would lead to the con- 
sequence of reducing value judgments to imperatives, a consequence which 
not only contradicts his intention, but also re- introduces into the 
tradition of non- cognitivism the problem of explaining moral judgments 
about men and actions of the past. Are we not doing something other than 
issuing an °imperative' when we praise Socrates? Of even greater signifi- 
cance is that if the practical syllogism is truly fundamental to our 
moral reasoning, then the most that can be said for it is that it is 
trivial, with its major premiss no more general than the 'maxim' of the 
particular action or judgment which is said to be its 'conclusion'. 
There is nothing in Hare's argument, I suggest, that would warrant our 
concluding either that he has convincingly dissociated himself from 
'emotivism' or that his treatment of ' Hume's gap' is to be preferred over 
Stevenson's analysis. 
Nowell -Smith does not seek to bride ' Hume's gape; he seeks rather 
to eliminate it. In trying to support his thesis he makes considerable 
use of the doctrines of meaning of the later - Wittgenstein: that words, 
like tools, may have a variety of uses, and, more importantly, that un- 
less we are otherwise cautioned we may assume the 'Janus- principle' that 
any word has more than one use at any one time. Thus we need not assume 
that any list-type statement which is used in moral reasoning is simply 
'descriptive'. If such a statement is used either as a basis upon which 
we make a value judgment, or as a 'reason' for a value judgment we have 
made, then that statement is appropriately termed 'practical'. It is 
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thus of the same general logical type as the value judgment itself; and 
to say this, he suggests, is to eliminate ' Hume's gap'. As I have argued, 
however, there is a more fundamental gap implicit in Hume's challenge. 
There is a gap, that is, between sentences with 'descriptive -force' and 
sentences with 'gerundive -' or 'evaluative- force'. Like Hare, Nowell - 
Smith is unwilling to accept the 'emotivist' solution that the basic 
relation between such sentences is in some sense 'causal' or 'psycho- 
logical', although (unlike Hare) he allows that there are 'causal' 
relations between 'stimuli' (such as seeing mountains and cars) and 're- 
actions' to such 'stimuli'. He wishes to maintain, nevertheless, that 
the relation between statements used with 'descriptive -force' and those 
with 'gerundive -force' is quasi- logical and not causal. Thus he presents 
his 'new logical apparatus' in which the tools of 'logical oddness' and 
'contextual implication' are most important. As I have argued, however, 
these tools cannot be used in moral argument unless one makes prior moral 
judgments in using them. The tools serve no purpose therefore that could 
not be served simply by the value judgments used in their employment. 
The tools are, so to speak, post hoc to the judgments used in applying 
them. Furthermore, by his neglect of ethical disagreement Nowell -Smith 
fails to see the paradox that, with his 'logical apparatus', two people 
could each have 'logically impeccable' reasons for expressing 'logically 
at odds' value judgments. His analysis does not then provide a satis- 
factory method for the bridging of the more fundamental gap implicit in 
Hume's challenge. Neither in the use of his 'new logical apparatus', nor 
in his oblique and unconvincing arguments against a 'Persuasive Theory' 
(not Stevenson's) does Nowell -Smith offer a solution to Hume's challenge 
which is to be preferred over Stevenson's 'emotivist' and Humean answer. 
'Hume's gap' remains to be bridged by logic. 
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